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ABSTRACT 
Australian Prime Ministers in the 1970s and early 1980s did not incorporate Anzac into their 
discourse of national identity.  However, since 1990 Australian Prime Ministers and their 
governments have increasingly engaged with Anzac in a manner that has supplanted the traditional 
role of the Returned and Services League as custodians and drivers of Anzac.   This has involved 
them consistently giving Anzac Day addresses during the last twenty-five years, both at home and at 
significant sites of Australian war remembrance overseas.  But this has not always been the case.  
Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac in the past was primarily as a participant, not as a 
custodian, and was more sporadic, more suburban, and less spectacular. 
 
The thesis explains this shift by tracing the increasing use of Anzac discourse by Australian Prime 
Ministers from 1972-2007.  It will be argued that these Australian Prime Ministers have increasingly 
shown ‘Anzac entrepreneurship’ – successfully identifying the public’s desire to engage with Anzac 
and facilitating Anzac’s resurgence by employing the power resources of the state in order to 
amplify Anzac.  Critical discourse analysis is adopted to analyse the integration of Anzac discourse 
into Prime Ministerial language.  Such an approach points to the socially embedded nature of 
language, whilst simultaneously analysing the linguistic construction of this language. 
  
The thesis identifies that Prime Ministers have engaged with Anzac in order to both consti tutive ly 
renovate Anzac as a central Australian identity and for instrumental policy ends.  These twin 
developments have pertained especially to the processes of domestic economic reform in a 
globalising world and the deployment of Australian troops during the War on Terror.   Such a study is 
important, as recent scholarly interest in Australian politicians’ role in the resurgence of Anzac from 
political scientists and historians has not seen systematic investigation of Prime Ministerial Anzac 
Day addresses that analyses the evolution of these addresses over time or closely examines their 
language on a sustained basis.   
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction: Anzac’s Entrepreneurs 
 
The Sydney suburb of Liverpool is located in the city’s south-west, about 30 kilometres from the 
central business district (CBD).  Liverpool was once an agricultural satellite of Sydney, replete with 
market gardens that supplied the city and its surrounds.  During the middle of the 20th century, 
urban sprawl had begun to engulf the area, and vast state-funded Housing Commission estates were 
built in the areas nearby to house inner-city slum dwellers who had been shifted west after slum 
clearances.  The area had, and continues to have, a strong working-class and immigrant presence.  In 
the centre of Liverpool is the Edmondson VC Memorial Club, and a few blocks away from there is 
Bigge Park, where the modest mid-century brick and concrete Liverpool District War Memorial is 
located.  Nearby is a cairn of large bush rocks, topped with a small white cross, evoking the imagery 
of a battle site grave.  A 2009 refurbishment of the site added two low walls, engraved with Lest We 
Forget, which back onto the local tennis courts (warmemorialsregister.nsw.gov.au).   
 
Such a humble location seems an unlikely site for Prime Ministerial commemoration of Anzac Day .1  
We have become accustomed over the last quarter century to the spectacular ceremony associated 
with the commemoration of the 25 April 1915 landings of the Australian and New Zealand Army 
Corps, along with the forces of the Allied Powers, at the Gallipoli Peninsula in modern day Turkey.  
This commemoration has been located at the sites of battle and remembrance in Australia and 
overseas that act as markers of Australia’s war history.  Above all, we have become accustomed to 
the image of the Australian Prime Minister at Gallipoli, standing in the gloom of the dawn with the 
inky vastness of the Aegean Sea to one side, and the cliffs of the peninsula rising sharply up into the 
sky on the other.  Here they deliver missives, laden with the weight of the collective memory of  the 
nation, on the importance of Anzac for the present generation, all beamed live to an audience back 
home.  A dawn service ceremony in Liverpool seems unlikely to compare to the spectacular and 
evocative dawn service at Gallipoli, and even more unlikely to draw Prime Ministerial attention.   
 
Nonetheless, this location in south-west Sydney was where Prime Minister Gough Whitlam marked 
the dawn service on Anzac Day 1974 (Whitlam 1974a).  Although this section of Liverpool now sits in 
the neighbouring seat of Hughes, Liverpool was firmly in Whitlam’s seat of Werriwa in the 1970s.  
                                                                 
1 Following convention, Anzac has been used in the thes is, rather than the capitalised acronym of Aus tralian a nd 
New Zealand Army Corps (ANZAC).  See Lake and Reynolds (2010, viii).   
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Scant details of the service exist, save for a handwritten note on the commitment in the Prime 
Ministerial Daily Program for 25 April 1974, located in the Whitlam Institute’s digital collection  
(Whitlam 1974a).  The newspaper reports of the day did not report on it, instead noting Whitlam’s 
attendance at the Sydney Cenotaph later that morning where he wore his World War II  medals for 
service, laid a wreath before the march, and chatted with the participants (Cunningham 1974, 2; 9) .   
No speech was given by Whitlam, and he mixed freely with the crowd, part of the milieu of the day, 
not its focus.  The Daily Program notes that Whitlam later that day attended the Anzac service at the 
Masonic Club in Parramatta in Sydney’s west, again, far from the CBD and its customary sites of 
Sydney war remembrance at the Martin Place Cenotaph or nearby at the NSW ANZAC War Memorial 
in Hyde Park.   
 
Contrast the relaxed and suburban commemoration of Anzac Day 1974 with Anzac Day 2007.  On 
this occasion, Prime Minister John Howard too saw it fit to attend the dawn service in a suburban 
electorate far from the usual significant battle and remembrance sites, like Gallipoli or the Australian 
War Memorial (AWM) that he usually preferred.  But this was not in his own seat of Bennelong in 
Sydney’s north.  Instead, he appeared at a dawn service at Greenslopes Repatriation Hospital, 
Brisbane - in the inner southern Brisbane electorate of Griffith, held by the increasingly popular 
opposition leader Kevin Rudd.  Rudd, having made plans to attend the dawn service at the AWM in 
Canberra, sent his daughter Jessica to stand in for him at Greenslopes (Karvelas, Parnel l,  and Dodd 
2007).  Later that day, Howard returned to Canberra to attend the parade, which was also attended 
by Rudd.  An anonymous Coalition source was said to have remarked ‘I don't know whether the PM 
was trying to play with Rudd's mind.  But it worked anyway’ (Karvelas, Parnell, and Dodd 2007).  
Anzac here was a forum for partisan electoral competition, which the media enthusiastically 
reported upon.   
 
Unlike Whitlam in 1974, Howard made a speech during his attendance at the Greenslopes dawn 
service.  It was something that he had done often as Prime Minister on Anzac Day.  In this speech he 
marvelled: 
It has undoubtedly been one of the most warming experiences of the Australian nation, 
particularly of those generations who fought in the wars in which this country has been 
involved to see over the last 10 or 20 years a resurgence of affection for and observance of 
ANZAC Day. The extraordinary scenes of thousands of young Australians going to Gallipoli 
Peninsula on ANZAC Day, the growing numbers of young people attending ANZAC Day services 
sends a very powerful message of reassurance to all generations of Australians that this most 
special of all Australian days will always be at the centre of our national life (Howard 2007).  
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Howard’s admiration of the resurgence of Anzac tacitly acknowledged that this had not always been 
the case.  During the intervening period between Whitlam’s dawn service in Liverpool and Howard’s 
dawn service in Greenslopes, Anzac had changed.  Anzac had evolved from being worryingly in 
decline and contested, to a resurgent and increasingly essential, incontestable, and unpolitical, 
discourse of Australian national identity.  Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac had changed 
too, beyond the differences elicited by the occupation of the office of Prime Minister by di f ferent 
personalities operating in different temporal circumstances.  Where Prime Ministers had once been 
participants in Anzac’s commemoration, taking part at the leisure of the Returned and Services 
League (RSL) who governed Anzac Day, they were now drivers (Holbrook 2014, 6).  Prime Ministers 
took centre stage on Anzac Day with speeches of national significance, where once they had not.  
Their government’s now used the resources of the state to fund war commemoration, where once 
they had not.  And the media focused their attention on the actions of Prime Ministers on Anzac 
Day, where once they had not.  The institution of Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac had 
been seemingly irrevocably altered.  The question then becomes how much of this change in Anzac, 
and change in Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac, can be attributed to Australian Prime 
Ministers?  And how and why has that change occurred?   
 
Prime Ministers as Anzac Entrepreneurs 
The answers to these questions can be explained within the framework of nationalism  
entrepreneurship.  Astute actors working within the context of nationalism have the potential to 
create new ‘markets’ for nationalist feeling by identifying the desire for national ist sentiment and 
fulfilling that desire.  Not every nationalist will be an entrepreneur – nationalism entrepreneurs can 
be distinguished by their ability to seize the opportunity to promote their new form of  national ism 
when older forms of nationalist practice become unstable  and unsustainable.2  In doing so, 
nationalism entrepreneurs disrupt, alter, and even destroy, old patterns of nationalist practice.  As 
such, this process of contestation makes nationalism entrepreneurship an inherently political 
process, even though nationalism’s tendency to present itself as essential and perennial may 
obscure this fact.  The degree to which such an actor will be successful in the endeavour of 
nationalism entrepreneurship will depend on them fulfilling certain criteria, which will be of varying 
importance in differing circumstances:  
1. Nationalism entrepreneurs need to be sensitive to the socio-political context that they are  
working within and respond to the local and particular nationalist symbols, traditions , and 
                                                                 
2 See Kingdon (1995, 165-195) and Mintrom and Norman (2009, 650), who both apply the idea  of entrepreneurs 
seizing the opportunity to promote new policy avenues in the context of public policy.   
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beliefs of this context (see Smith 2001, 57-61).  Further, they must be wary of resistance to 
their version of nationalism that may arise from this socio-political context.   
2. Leading on from this, nationalism entrepreneurs are more likely to be successful if they are  
perceived as nationalists themselves.  If a nationalism entrepreneur can demonstrate  their 
commitment to a genuinely felt nationalist end, they will be seen to be signalling their 
authenticity with their sympathetic, altruistic, or ideational, commitment to the good of  the 
broader nation.  If nationalism entrepreneurs fail to do this, they may open themselves to 
accusations of employing nationalism as a strategy for personal gain, and be met with 
suspicion or rejection.   
3. Nationalism entrepreneurs can potentially come from any sphere of society, but their 
degree of success will depend on their ability to mobilise power resources.  Nationalism 
entrepreneurs can draw upon individual power resources (e.g. wealth, prestige, personal 
acumen and popularity) or collective power resources (e.g. group or ethnic identification, 
solidarity-based organisation, pooling of power resources)3 to create and spread the 
internalisation of new forms of nationalist sentiment.  Political and cultural elites are  actors 
who frequently possess these power resources.  On balance then, elite possession of  these 
resources will make them more likely candidates for nationalism entrepreneurship than the 
average individual who cannot mobilise these resources.   
Nationalism entrepreneurship is a useful approach to the study of actors working within the context 
of nationalism because it accounts for the role of both structure and agency in the reproduction of  
nationalism.  Nationalists are neither wholly determined by the socio-cultural context that they f ind 
themselves in, and nor are they able to wholly define this socio-cultural context and manipulate the 
populace for instrumental ends.  An account of actors working within a nationalist context needs to 
take account of both of these elements of structure and agency, and take account of how each 
element of power may be more or less important in varying circumstances.   
 
As such, nationalists are profoundly influenced by their context, so much so that national identity 
becomes internalised.  But they also retain the ability to influence and shape that context, to def ine 
it in their own nationalist terms if they can acquire the consent of their fellow nationalists by 
working within the elastic boundaries of national identity.  The goal for nationalism entrepreneurs, 
therefore, is not an instrumental political end divorced from nationalism (Brubaker 1998, 292) .  For 
                                                                 
3 See Wrong (1979, 124-145) regarding individual and collective power resources.   
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nationalism entrepreneurs, the nationalist goal is the end in of itself.  Instrumental political or pol icy 
ends may be bound up in this nationalist end, but they are not exogenous to that nationalist end.   
 
This thesis argues that Australian Prime Ministers Hawke, Keating, and Howard, were nationalism 
entrepreneurs.  All were proud Australian nationalists, and all had an affinity for Australia’s war 
history.  All worked within the changing times – a globalising world had led all three of these men to 
conclude that Australia needed to respond with neoliberal economic reform (or economic 
rationalism, in the local parlance).  Changing political and cultural demographics and attitudes 
amongst the Australian population had meant that old forms of Australian national identity based 
upon British race patriotism had become unstable (Curran 2006; Curran and Ward 2010), with Anzac 
itself especially suffering from its association with these forms of Australian identity.  Responding to 
these twin developments, Hawke, Keating, and Howard, turned to Australia’s war history and 
redefined Anzac.   
 
Anzac was an ideograph – a nebulous and elastic rhetorical signifier with a loose, but recognisable, 
meaning that allowed a degree of transformation (McGee 1980).   Anzac’s entrepreneurs used the 
ideographic nature of Anzac to incorporate contemporary neoliberal values, and later, martial 
meaning centred on the War on Terror and contemporary Australian Defence Force (ADF) 
deployments.  They were able to promote their versions of Anzac successfully by using the power 
resources of the institution of the Prime Minister and the state, replacing the role of the RSL in 
Anzac’s commemoration.  And the Australian public responded enthusiastically to Prime Ministerial 
promotion of Anzac, as Prime Ministers successfully delivered a form of nationalism that aligned 
with the public’s own sense of national identity.   
 
The Unpolitics of Anzac 
Prime Ministers Hawke, Keating, and Howard were successful Anzac entrepreneurs because they 
succeeded, to varying degrees, in creating an unpolitical form of Anzac.  In order to define what the 
thesis means by unpolitics, we must first wade into the difficult terrain of how we may def ine ‘the 
political’.  Following Hay (2007, 62-64), the political may be narrowly or broadly defined along axes 
of political conduct and spheres of political context.   Armed with this insight into the voluminous 
definitions of the political, the thesis thus rejects classifications of the political that are restricted to 
the formal institutional sphere of government, or that only narrowly countenance certain forms of  
conduct as political, such as self-interest or ensuring good governance.  Instead, politics can be 
defined expansively and is encompassed by certain features, rather than solely spheres or conducts: 
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politics as choice – where politics can only occur when there are choices to be made; politics as the 
capacity for agency – where the choices made have the potential ability to make a difference and 
are not simply subject to fate; politics as deliberation – where the choices of politics and the 
potential for agency is interrogated and contested; and politics as social interaction – as politics is 
relational, in the sense that it affects others, even if decisions are made alone (Hay 2007, 65-70).  
Realms that are not subject to these conditions, where human agency is null, and choices and 
deliberation are impossible, are thus ‘non-political’ (Hay 2007, 79).   
 
The choice to use the term unpolitical thus seeks to convey the way that these features of politics 
can be discursively organised out of relations and instead be presented as incontestable, essential,  
and outside or ‘above’ politics (see Schaap 2005, 18-21).  It does not imply that there is an actual 
absence of politics or apathy towards politics.  Crucially, decisions that affect others are  sti l l  made, 
even if the agency and deliberation of politics remains latent (see Lukes 2005, 29).  It is a purported 
state of being in which certain modes of political conduct are deemed inappropriate and spheres for 
the political are demarcated.  Relatedly, the unpolitical may be the result of established practice or it 
may be an active process.  The process of depoliticisation is evident when the unpolitical is 
instigated by the active exercise of agency (Hay 2007, 78-87; Flinders 2008); when unpolitics is the 
result of established practice and tradition it is commonsensical, essential and taboo, and politics 
remains latent.   
 
Thus, whilst depoliticisation may describe the active process of unpolitics, it does not ful ly capture 
the meaning behind the unpolitical.  When social relations are established as commonsense and 
essential, it does not make sense to describe the state of being as a verb (despoliticisation).  Nor i s 
the past participle (depoliticised) appropriate if the unpolitical state of being has not been 
acknowledged as political in the past, and thus gone through the process of depoliticisation.  Other 
related synonyms, such as anti-politics and post-politics, are also inappropriate.  Anti -poli tics,  that 
being when ‘…“politics” as a means of conducting public affairs is condemned and some alternative 
ways of conducting those affairs is proposed in its place’ (Hindess 1997, 21) again captures the active 
process when it describes the rejection of politics, but fails to directly account for the purported 
essential state of being of the unpolitical.  Post-politics also only refers to the process, rather than to 
an essential state of being, with its emphasis upon managerial and technocratic forms of 
governance:  
Post-politics refers to a politics in which ideological or dissensual contestation and struggles 
are replaced by techno-managerial planning, expert management and administration… ‘Doing 
politics’ is reduced to a form of institutionalized social management and to the mobilization of 
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governmental technologies, where difficulties and problems are dealt with by administrative 
and techno-organizational means (Swyngedouw 2010, 225).   
Post-politics’ emphasis upon technocracy and managerialism also employs a language about late 
capitalism that fails to appropriately capture the primordial essentialism of nationalism and Anzac.   
 
To sum up, the unpolitical has been employed in the thesis in order to capture the discursive  realm 
that is professed to be outside or above politics.  It is a purported state of being that may be 
signalled by an active process of depoliticisation or it may be an essential form of established 
practice that has not yet been politicised.  Importantly, it does not claim that there is an actual 
absence of politics, but instead seeks to convey the manner in which politics is denied.  Whilst other 
forms of demarcating the political and unpolitical are established in the literature, they do not ful ly 
capture the meaning of the unpolitical that the thesis seeks to convey.  To reiterate, Australian 
Prime Ministers have encouraged, sanctioned and helped establish an unpolitical version of  Anzac.  
This was undertaken by Hawke, Keating and Howard with varying degrees of commitment, active 
participation and success.  However, as will be shown, all of these Prime Ministers have made some 
attempt to respect and encourage the unpolitics of Anzac.   
 
The Scope of the Thesis 
Having set out the general argument and scope of the thesis, it is important to note what the thesis 
will not do.  Whilst the thesis provides an analysis of Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac, and 
their role in Anzac’s resurgence, it does not propose to provide a holistic account of that resurgence.  
Accounts of the Gallipoli campaign that began on 25 April 1915 have been manifold - beginning with 
C.E.W. Bean’s official history of the Australian Imperial Force during World War One, the work of 
historians like Bill Gammage, and a plethora of contemporary popular histories.  Historians l ike K.S 
Inglis and Carolyn Holbrook have also examined the evolution of Anzac in Australia’s national life 
over time.  Whilst the theory of nationalism entrepreneurship is sensitive to the context that 
entrepreneurs find themselves in, and the thesis pays considerable attention to that context, the 
thesis does not propose to examine the breadth of that socio-cultural context like Inglis (2008)  does 
with his history of the war memorial, or Holbrook (2014) does with her history of Anzac 
remembrance.  Nor does it make a comparative study with other countries and their remembrance 
of war.  Especially relevant here is New Zealand – whilst this may seem like an oversight, given 
Australia’s and New Zealand’s shared war history, Anzac in Australia has been defined by Prime 
Ministers in exclusive Australian terms, and Australia’s relationship with New Zealand has been 
neglected by Australia’s Anzac entrepreneurs.   
9 
 
 
Instead, the thesis focuses on the language of Prime Ministers themselves.  In doing so, the thesis 
has taken a particular approach to Prime Ministerial language.  Firstly, it assumes that Prime 
Ministers ultimately animate their speeches and are solely responsible and accountable for the 
words they are speaking, despite the issue of authorship in an age of speechwriters and media 
officers (Wodak et al 2009, 71).  Secondly, the thesis has deliberately chosen to analyse the archival  
evidence of Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac during their time in office, rather than to 
conduct post-term interviews.  Such an approach trades off the potential insight interviews may 
offer in favour of avoiding issues that may arise from Prime Ministers projecting their bias or seeking 
to protect their legacy.   
 
The thesis will progress as follows.  Chapter 2 reviews the relevant literature and explains the 
methodological approach of the thesis.  In it I survey the literature on Prime Ministerial engagement 
with Anzac from political scientists, historians, and sociologists.  I find that whilst considerable 
attention has been paid to the topic of Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac, it lacks systematic 
and sustained analysis.  The chapter further conducts a critical survey of the nationalism l i terature 
and proposes that the entrepreneurship literature offers greater theoretical insight into the 
operation of actors working within the context of nationalism than has been offered by this current 
literature.  Finally, the chapter provides an overview of the methodology employed in the thesis -  
critical discourse analysis (CDA).  Here the thesis argues that CDA offers both a qualitative and 
quantitative approach to the study of discourse that demands both a focus on the textual 
production of language and the social and political context that produces these discourses, a 
method that has not yet been applied to the study of Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac.  
 
Chapter 3 provides an overview of the period under examination by conducting two tasks.  Firstly, i t 
employs process tracing to sketch the causal reasons for the adoption of Anzac by Australian Prime 
Ministers.  Whilst several explanations for this shift exist in the literature, I propose that no one 
account wholly explains what is happening by itself.  Instead, the cumulative effects of the distance 
in time from the original Anzacs, the reconciliation of Vietnam veterans with Australian body po litic,  
the tradition of Anzac in Australian cultural life, and Prime Ministers’ nationalism entrepreneurship , 
provide necessary, but by themselves insufficient, causal reasons for the Prime Ministerial adoption 
of Anzac.  The second section of Chapter 3 establishes the genre of Prime Ministerial Anzac Day 
addresses.  It does this by applying corpus assisted discourse analysis, a quantitative approach to 
CDA, to explore the frequency and distribution of the genre’s features.  As such, it identifies the 
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various thematic and characteristic features of these addresses, including where and when the 
addresses have been delivered, and for what purpose; representations of Anzac; the themes 
invoked; where Anzac is located by the speeches and which battles it is associated with; and who 
Anzac’s agents are.  The chapter concludes that Anzac has increasingly become ‘rhetorically path 
dependent’ (Grube 2014) over the period under examination.   
 
Chapter 4 begins the finer grained analysis of the individual Prime Ministers and their engagement 
with Anzac by looking at the period from 1972-1987.  Anzac was contested by social movement 
activists and demonstrably in decline during the terms of Whitlam and Fraser, though its importance 
in national life was never extinguished as counter-narratives of resistance, renovation, and 
recognition, played out.  The chapter notes that whilst Whitlam and Fraser never stopped engaging 
with Anzac during their terms in office, they were primarily participants in that process , and that 
their participation was less spectacular and more local  than what we have become accustomed to in 
more recent years.  Things began to change with Hawke, however, who demonstrated some of  the 
above tendencies, but also initialised greater engagement with Anzac in the lead up to the 
reconciliatory welcome home parade for Vietnam veterans in 1987.  The chapter further argues that 
the reconciliation of Vietnam veterans with the wider Australian body politic was a crucial tipping 
point in the engagement of Prime Ministers with Anzac, as it instituted an unpolitical form of  Anzac  
that was essential and taboo to contest, and was as such suitable for Prime Ministerial engagement 
and instrumental use.   
 
Chapter 5 examines the remainder of Hawke’s time in office from 1988-1991.  Here I argue that 
Hawke demonstrated the potential of Anzac entrepreneurship, correctly identifying the public’s 
desire for Anzac and responding to it, especially with the unprecedented state involvement in the 
70th anniversary of the Gallipoli landings and Hawke’s trip there for April 25 1990.  Anzac offered an 
unpolitical platform from which Hawke espoused his message of consensus, and his government’s 
commitment, and by extension the people’s commitment, to the project of neoliberal economic 
reform.  This lesson had been taught from experience, as the contested nature of the Bicentenary in 
1988 had made the delivery of this message less successful than it had been on Anzac Day 1990.  
More prosaically, Hawke also used Anzac Day to deliver speeches that closely resembled familiar 
partisan policy addresses, demonstrating that the sacredness of Anzac had not yet fully coalesced 
around Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac.   
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Chapter 6 analyses Keating’s engagement with Anzac Day.  Where Hawke been cautious with Anzac 
by honouring its traditional tenets centred on the Gallipoli campaign of World War I, Keating 
attempted to relocate Australia’s understanding of its war history, and its conseque nt meaning, to 
World War II and the War in the Pacific.  This was part of his wider political project that attempted to 
reorganise Australian political and cultural life around neoliberal principles of economic reform in 
response to globalisation, and engagement with Asia in order to succeed in this endeavour.  
Underpinning this policy direction was Keating’s belief that Australia’s historical ties with Great 
Britain and Empire were damaging its future prosperity, and the consequent need for Australia to 
abandon such connections by becoming a republic, and embracing an Asian future.  Keating 
reflected these tendencies in his engagement with Anzac, visiting Papua New Guinea (PNG) and the 
Kokoda Track, sites of significance during the War in the Pacific and for the defence of Australia, for 
his first Anzac Day.  Keating argued that it was here that the true significance of Australia’s war 
history lay.  The combination of Keating’s politics, and his attempt to relocate Anzac, caused 
considerable controversy and was opposed conservative critics.  Whilst the contestation that his 
version of Anzac attracted meant that he less successful in keeping his version of Anzac unpolitical,  it 
was an ambitious and precedential engagement with Anzac that demonstrated both the possibilities 
and limits of such engagement.   
 
Chapter 7 explores the increase in memorialisation that surrounded Keating’s term in office that 
occurred outside of Anzac Day, part of the international ‘memory boom’ of the late 20th century 
(Winter 2006).  The chapter analyses the opening of the Australian Vietnam Forces National 
Memorial, the interring of the Unknown Soldier, the 50th anniversary of the D-Day landings, and the 
Australia Remembers program of events that commemorated the end of WWII.  I argue that Keating 
had both success and failure in this arena of memorialisation – success because these forms of 
memorialisation centred on his preferred version of Australia’s war history that emphasised WWII 
and played down the significance of Gallipoli; and failure because he largely refrained from 
referencing his political style and honoured the strictures of the Anzac tradition in order to be 
unpolitical, and in particular, failed to dislodge the place of Gallipoli in the national  psyche .  It also 
makes the point that state involvement in memorialisation was increasing, with the Australia 
Remembers program particularly employing the funding and policy resources of the state.   
 
Chapter 8 explores the first years of Howard’s term as Prime Minister, from 1996-2001.  In this 
chapter I argue that Howard‘s version of Anzac repudiated Keating’s attempted reimagination of 
Anzac’s location and meaning, and attempted to reinstate an unpolitical, conservative , and 
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traditional, reading of Anzac.  This repudiation emphasised a ‘mainstream’ reading of Anzac that 
stressed the Anglo-Celtic heritage of Anzac, the centrality of Gallipoli, and tended to emphasise unity 
over reference to the diversity of Australian society.  Howard also actively policed this version of 
Anzac, and refused to countenance critiques of his vision.  Finally, Howard filled Anzac with new 
neoliberal values that referenced the individualism of his government’s policy agenda ,  despite the 
collectivist tendencies of Anzac’s traditions.   
 
Chapter 9 analyses Howard’s latter years in office, from 2002-2007.  In particular, it examines the 
way Howard aligned Anzac with his government’s increasing tendency towards intervention, and 
participation in the international War on Terror.  I argue that it was during this period that Howard 
established himself as Anzac’s most successful entrepreneur.  Whilst Howard’s engagement was just 
as politically motivated as Keating’s, his strict adherence to a conventional and conservative reading 
of the Anzac tradition helped to successfully keep his version of Anzac unpolitical.  It further 
instituted a ‘hyper-Anzac’ – a turbo-charged version of Anzac that was more spectacular, more state-
orientated, more chauvinist in its patriotism, more rapturously received, and therefore harder to 
contest, than Howard’s predecessors managed to achieve.  I finally argue that Howard’s version of  
hyper-Anzac has made it difficult to reimagine Anzac in politically progressive terms.   
 
I conclude by surmising the argument presented above and proposing some avenues for further 
investigation.  If, as I propose, Anzac has been reimagined in an unpolitical manner that has been 
most successfully realised in conservative and neoliberal terms, how does this compare to the e l i te  
realisation of other days of Australian national significance, such as Australia Day?  Can national ism 
entrepreneurship be fruitfully realised as a generalisable, mid-level theory of nationalism?  And how 
might the trend towards Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac fit within the changing 
institutional context that Prime Minsters find themselves within, and their seemingly growing 
power?  I believe that this thesis will offer some fruitful avenues for investigation regarding these 
questions, in addition to providing an original and illuminating insight into Prime Ministerial 
engagement with Anzac.   
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CHAPTER 2 
Literature Review and Methodology: A Survey of Prime Ministers, 
Nationalism, and Critical Discourse Analysis 
 
Introduction 
This chapter surveys the breadth of academic inquiry into Prime Ministerial Anzac Day addresses and 
engagement, nationalism, and entrepreneurship, before making an argument as to why critical 
discourse analysis has been adopted as the methodological approach to the research question.  As 
will be shown, Prime Ministerial Anzac Day rhetoric has not seen detailed examination by scholars.  
This seems somewhat surprising given the amount of attention Anzac has received from researchers 
working in political science, history, sociology and cultural studies.  This gap in the literature 
warrants scholarly attention in order both to shed light on the shift in Prime Ministerial narratives of  
national identity and to provide a more comprehensive and systematic analysis than has been 
attempted before.  The chapter will further demonstrate that whilst the theoretical literature on 
nationalism literature is vast, it does not adequately capture the operation of structure and agency 
in the Prime Ministerial turn to Anzac, and that the entrepreneurship literature offers a fruitful 
avenue of theoretical insight.  Finally, the chapter demonstrates why CDA is an appropriate method 
to effect this analysis.  CDA points to the socially embedded nature of language, whilst 
simultaneously analysing its linguistic construction.  CDA therefore looks at the poli tical  and social  
forces that produce discourses of national identity, whilst also pointing to the ways that these 
discourses simultaneously produce and reinforce these forces.  This dual approach to the study of 
Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac has not been attempted previously, and its adoption in 
this thesis offers a fuller view of the process.   
 
Prime Ministers and Anzac in Political Science 
The study of Prime Ministers in political science is a broad field, which Strangio, t’ Hart and Walter 
(2013) have admirably surveyed.  Following their assessment of the literature, studies of the 
institution of the Westminster Prime Minister have centred on historical approaches; area and 
comparative studies (usually institutional in approach, and somewhat lacking in behavioural 
analysis); biography and autobiography (of sometimes questionable quality); and rhetorical and 
communicative analyses (Strangio, t’ Hart and Walter 2013, 3-6).  Strangio, t’ Hart and Walter (2013, 
4) criticise the value of political biography, asserting that it often ‘…does little to compare and 
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contrast its subject and the circumstances in which that prime minister governed with other holders 
of the office and their contexts.’  Biography and memoirs do, however, provide rich and valuable 
insight into the workings of particular Prime Ministers, and, on occasion, brief contextualisation of  
their engagement with Anzac (see, for instance, Watson 2011; Howard 2010).  Historical, area and 
comparative studies have tended to focus on the trend towards greater power centralising with and 
around the institution of the Prime Minister.  Such a shift has from some quarters been termed 
presidentialisation, the ‘development of (a) increasing leadership power resour ces and autonomy 
within the party and the political executive respectively, and (b) increasingly leadership ‐centred 
electoral processes’ (Poguntke and Webb 2005, 5).  Such an approach has been contested, 
principally regarding the institutional basis for the claim that the centralisation of power in the 
institution of the Prime Minister is mimicking the powers of presidents, especially US presidents 
(Dowding 2013a; also see Kefford 2013a; Kefford 2013b; and Dowding 2013b for this debate in an 
Australian context).  Such a debate can be transcended, Strangio, t’ Hart and Walter (2013, 5) claim, 
by adopting the ‘core executive’ approach to the power of the Prime Minister, where Prime 
Ministers are enmeshed in relationships with other political actors, and cannot therefore ‘…simply 
be assumed to have a determining influence for each issue that crosses their table.’  The core 
executive method informs their approach to the study of Prime Ministers, which examines the 
interplay between social and political context and relations, political institutions, and Prime 
Minister’s personal characteristics (Strangio, t’ Hart and Walter 2013, 6).   
 
Most relevant for this thesis is the last category of Prime Ministerial studies that Strangio, t’ Hart and 
Walter (2013) identify – studies of Prime Ministerial rhetoric and communicative strategies.  In 
political science, recent generalist works on Australian political rhetoric have examined topics such 
as the development of political rhetoric over time, current trends in political speech, and have 
theorised the institution of Prime Ministerial language.  Importantly for this study, these works have 
paid little or no attention to Prime Ministerial Anzac Day addresses, despite its prominence as a 
feature of Australian political rhetoric.  Grube’s recent publications on Australian pol itical  rhetoric 
have focused upon the broad institution of the ‘rhetorical prime minister’ (Grube 2013) and its 
rhetorical ‘path dependency’, where Prime Ministers ‘… are caught between the desire to utilise 
fresh and engaging rhetoric in order to better explain a new policy direction and the reality that they 
can’t be seen to be contradicting themselves’ (Grube 2014, 99).  Uhr and Walter’s (2014) edited 
collection collates papers on a range of topics in Australia political language, focusing broadly upon 
language and political behaviour, the standards of rhetoric, and also upon the content of Austral ian 
political rhetoric, but it does not address Anzac.  Dyrenfurth (2010, 41) has noted that the study of 
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political language in Australia has been understudied, and has touched upon the role of Anzac in the 
language of Prime Minister John Howard (Dyrenfurth 2007).  Kane and Patapan (2010, 386) examine 
the ‘artless art’ of political rhetoric, arguing that democratic systems of government ‘…impose a 
difficult burden on their leaders, expecting them to have special abilities to lead even while 
demanding they cloak those abilities in an aura of ordinariness’, which leads to plain, informa l,  and 
calculated political rhetoric.  Finally, McCabe (2013) surveys the development of Australian pol itical  
speech from the beginnings of the 20th century to the present, noting the role of technological and 
cultural change in bringing about transformations in political language.   
 
The study of the political language of individual Prime Ministers in isolation and comparison has also 
been undertaken.  Brett (2003, 196; 204; Brett 2005) examines the role of Anzac in Howard’s 
language as she explores the political traditions of the Liberal Party of Australia (LPA), but l ike  the 
other authors mentioned above, does not make this the focus of her analysis.  Her earl ier work on 
the language of Robert Menzies similarly does not examine Anzac (Brett 2007).  Johnso n has 
conducted extensive work in the field of Prime Ministerial language and discourse.  The Labor Legacy 
(Johnson 1989) studied the rhetoric and ideology of Labor governments and Governing Change: 
Keating to Howard (Johnson 2000) adopted an approach strongly influenced by discourse theory to 
compare the Australian identity narratives of Keating and Howard in the context of economic 
reform, globalisation, and neoliberalism.  Later work by Johnson (2007) focused upon the interplay 
between Howard’s political  language, identity politics, and public policy.  None of this work by 
Johnson touches upon the role of Anzac in Prime Ministerial language or discourses of identity.  
Finally, Greenfield and Williams (2003, 291-292) briefly address the role of Anzac in what they term 
Howard’s ‘authoritarian populism’, but do not situate their study in the broader context of Prime 
Ministerial discourses of Anzac.   
 
In addition, there is a small literature that can be located within political science and international 
relations that addresses politicians’ engagement with Anzac.  In this mould, the edited collection of  
Sumartojo and Wellings (2014) contains studies into memorial diplomacy, that being, the political 
interaction of national leaders surrounding major war anniversaries and sites (Graves 2014).  In the 
same collection, Wellings (2014) argues that resurgent Anzac nationalism is a product of 
globalisation, and contends that the national identity narratives of Australian politicians of  the last 
thirty years have been a reaction to these globalising forces.  Whilst outside the time period of  this 
thesis, Beaumont (2015a; 2015b) has analysed the role of memory in the reproduction of Anzac 
during the centenary of the Gallipoli landings, pointing to the enormous financial backing by the 
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state, but also contending that it is ‘…no longer adequate to argue that the memory of war is entirely 
shaped by the state, which imposes a Gramscian-style hegemonic ideology “from above” on a 
population that accepts this as natural and beyond critique’ (Beaumont 2015a, 531).  However, such 
studies have been relatively rare in political science, and they do not directly addresses Prime 
Ministerial language in a sustained and systematic manner.  As such, I contend that a substantial gap 
exists in the field of Australian political science regarding the study of Australian Prime Ministerial 
narratives of, and engagement with, Anzac.   
 
Prime Ministers and Anzac in History 
Moving beyond political science reveals that historians have naturally shown considerable interest in 
Anzac, and also in politicians’ engagement with Anzac during the time period under examination.  
Historian Ken Inglis’ work has had considerable impact in this regard, beginning with his seminal 
investigation into the work of C.E.W. Bean, the official historian of Australia’s World War One 
commitment, and his role in the conceptualisation of Anzac in Australian society (Inglis 1965).  
Further work by Inglis on Anzac was published in his impressively conceived and detailed history of  
Australian war memorials, first published in 1998, and with a significant update in 2008 to include 
further reflection on the continuing memorialisation of Anzac after 2000 (Inglis 2008).  Woven into 
this history is the role of Prime Ministers and the state in the process of memorialisation in Australia, 
especially in the updated epilogue of the 2008 edition.  Similar themes are examined by Inglis (1999)  
in his examination of the interring of the Unknown Soldier and the role of Prime Minister Paul 
Keating.  Inglis’ research agenda does not, however, include detailed examination of Prime 
Ministerial language, or seek to explain how and why Prime Ministers have engaged with Anzac.   
 
Holbrook (2014, 166-206) also devotes considerable space to Prime Ministerial engagement with 
Anzac in her history of Anzac remembrance, interviewing former Prime Ministers Fraser, Hawke, 
Keating and Howard for her study, and providing valuable insight into their post-career assessments 
of their engagement and contribution to Anzac.  Holbrook’s approach does tend to therefore focus 
upon the Prime Minister’s own assessments of their engagement, as opposed to examination of 
what they did, or more significantly for this study, exactly what they said and how.  In Curran’s 
(2006) study of Australian Prime Ministers and Australian nationalism, Prime Ministers’ engagement 
with Anzac is put it in the context of their wider rhetoric on national identity.  Unlike Holbrook, 
Curran tends to focus on the biography of Prime Ministers to explain their views on national identity 
during their terms in government, as well as upon what they said.  Curran’s work does not, however, 
attempt a systematic examination of all speeches, and nor does it attempt linguistic analysis of  the 
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addresses.  From a more critical perspective, Lake and McKenna have both pointed to the role of 
politicians and governments in supplanting the Returned and Services League as custodians of Anzac 
and their role as the celebratory ‘new promoters of Anzac’ (Lake 2010; McKenna 2010).   
Examination of particular Prime Ministers’ engagement with Anzac, and some analysis of their 
language, can be found in Nelson’s (1997) examination of Keating at Kokoda, and McKenna’s critical  
work on Howard (2007).  But like other studies, these works do not offer detailed examination of the 
linguistic construction of language, or systematic analysis of the development of Prime Ministerial 
engagement with Anzac.  McKenna (2010) does offer an insight into the role of politicians in his 
more general examination of Anzac’s resurgence, but again, does not conduct a systematic or 
linguistic analysis.   
 
Academic historians have also engaged with Anzac and Australia’s war history more generally, often 
taking a broadly social history approach.  Russel Ward’s The Australian Legend (1993) epitomised the 
radical nationalist tradition of interpretation of Australian identity, and argued that the figure of  the 
larrikin digger was a continuation of Australia’s bush mythology.  Seal (2004) found similar themes to 
be persuasive when he examined the folk traditions of the Australian Imperial Force (AIF),  but also 
pointed to the institutionalisation of a more official and statist tradition of Anzac too.  Gammage’s 
(1974) work, The Broken Years, presents a history of the AIF by examining the letters and diaries of  
1000 soldiers, and Thomson (2013) presents an oral history of Anzac and its evolution by 
interviewing these soldiers in the twilight of their lives.  More critical historians, such as Lake (1992)  
and Bongiorno (2014) have pointed to the ways that Anzac reproduces dominant forms of masculine 
and Anglo-Celtic identities respectively.  Conservative historians publishing in Quadrant have 
challenged what they see as the anti-Imperial and ‘nihilist’ view of Australia’s war history that argues 
that Australia’s participation in WWI was a violent waste of life of little strategic importance to 
Australia (Bendle 2014; Moses, Santamaria and Hirst 1992).  Recent edited collections have also 
analysed the history of the effects of war upon returned soldiers (Crotty and Larsson 2010) and have 
challenged the mythologising and inaccurate historical assumptions that arise in interpretations of  
Australia’s war history (Stockings 2010).  Despite not addressing the research question und er 
examination in this thesis as such, such works provide valuable insight into the origins and 
reproduction of Anzac in Australian history and society.   
 
Prime Ministers and Anzac in Sociology, Anthropology and Cultural Studies 
Scholars working broadly within sociological, anthropological, and cultural studies frameworks have 
also engaged in analyses of Anzac, though their disciplinary focus tends to lead them to investigation 
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of the broad societal level processes that produce Anzac, rather than to examination of the actor 
centred production of Anzac via Prime Ministers.  Donoghue and Tranter (2013, 5-6) present data 
from the Australian Survey of Social Attitudes, and find that 90% of Australians regard Anzac as 
being associated with Australianness to some extent, and that Anzac is more important for older, 
‘boomer’ aged citizens.  They regard the resurgence of Anzac as being attributable to positive media 
coverage, the promotion of Anzac by political leaders, and the symbolic representation and cul tural  
performance of Anzac in Australian life (Donoghue and Tranter 2013, 9-10).  Kapferer’s ethnographic 
work compares Australian and Sri Lankan nationalism, and contains significant analysis of Anzac.  He 
argues that the egalitarian ethos of Australian nationalism is reproduced within the commemoration 
of Anzac, in tension with the state (Kapferer 1988).  Elder’s work on Australian identity (Elder 2007, 
246-252) contains analysis of the dominant forms of Anzac’s representation, and contrasts this with 
hypothetical approaches to Anzac that account for Australian war history’s many ambiguities 
regarding the mental health of returned service personnel, the wars of settlement against 
indigenous peoples, and violence perpetuated against women during war and by veterans when 
they returned home.  She also has provided an important account of the Women Against Rape 
(WAR) activists who contested Anzac during the 1980s (Elder 2005).  Finally, Nicoll (2001) takes a 
cultural studies approach to the history of Australian national identity, also analysing the ambiguities 
of the violence of Australia’s war history in sites like the Australian War Memorial, and mediums like  
visual art.  As noted though, these approaches do not examine the Prime Ministerial reproduction of  
Anzac.   
 
As has been demonstrated, while much research has been conducted on Anzac, a substantial gap 
exists in the study of Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac.  As of the present moment, no 
author has attempted to systematically address Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac over time, 
whilst also paying attention to Prime Ministers’ linguistic construction  of Anzac, and placing that 
within the political and social context of their times in office.  I contend that addressing this gap in 
the literature is an important endeavour, as it contributes to the understanding of the institution of  
Prime Ministerial language, in addition to a deeper understanding of Prime Ministerial narratives of  
national identity.   
 
Nationalism and Entrepreneurship 
As was introduced in the first chapter, the thesis proposes that Prime Minsters Hawke, Keating and 
Howard were nationalism entrepreneurs.  To employ the market metaphor, these Prime Ministers 
were significant and powerful actors who correctly identified the public sentiment for Anzac, met 
19 
 
that need, and in the process helped to create a new market for Anzac that replaced the old forms 
that had dominated Anzac’s commemoration.  This next section reviews the nationalism l i terature 
and demonstrates that existing explanations of actors operating in the context of national ism have 
been under-theorised.  Further, it demonstrates why the entrepreneurship literature can help to 
explain the Prime Ministerial adoption of Anzac.   
 
A Survey of Some of the Dominant Approaches to Nationalism 
The nationalism literature can be divided into four rough categories, entailing different ontologi es 
on the emergence and reproduction of nationalism – the primordial, modernist, ethno-symbolic, and 
discursive approaches.  The primordial school sees nationalism as a product of the ‘natural ’ ,  deep, 
and ancient roots and traditions of the nation (Özkırımlı 2000).   The tendency of primordialists to 
see the nation as a natural product of humanity has been largely discredited as a casual explanation 
for nationalism by scholars working in the other three schools of nationalism theory.  They point to 
the lack of empirical evidence to support these claims (Özkırımlı 2000, 83), and suggest that these 
seemingly natural attachments are indeed construed or constructed.  As will be explored in the 
thesis, there is little in the way of empirical evidence to suggest that Prime Ministerial engagement 
with Anzac has been natural or given, and, as such, primordialism is an inadequate explanation for 
this shift.  A milder form of primordialism is perennialism, which observes the long, pre -modern 
history of nations, back to the Middle Ages, or even antiquity (Smith 2001, 50).  However, such a 
view still shares the ‘giveness’ of nationalism with primordialism, where national identity is 
‘transmitted from one generation to the next with their “essential” characteristics unchan ged’ 
(Özkırımlı 2000, 75), which, like primordialism, cannot be supported by the empirical evidence in the 
observation of Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac.   
 
Modernism, on the other hand, tends to sees nations, and thus nationalism, as ‘products of  
specifically modern processes like capitalism, industrialism, the emergence of the bureaucratic state, 
urbanization, and secularism’ (Özkırımlı 2000, 85).  Gellner (1983, 1), in particular, is an important 
foundational figure in this respect, who defined nationalism as ‘primarily a political principle, which 
holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent.’  Nationalism for Gellner was a 
function of modernism, where a universalising national high culture was imposed upon previously 
multiple local and folk low cultures via schooling and bureaucratic means (Gellner 1983, 57).  This 
was a broadly society level process, a characteristic that also defines Anderson’s (1991) famously 
constructed ‘imagined communities’.  Anderson (1991, 36) attributes changing culture during the 
enlightenment as the casual reason for the shift towards nations – the challenging of sacred 
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languages, like Latin, the decline of the absolute monarch, and the collapse of ‘a conception of 
temporality in which cosmology and history were indistinguishable, the origins of the world and of  
men essentially identical.’  The development of the printing press, in the context of these changes, 
provided a means for the imagination of the national community to replace these cultural  
certainties.  Whilst these two authors certainly do not represent the breadth of scholarship on 
modernist approaches to nationalism, they do point to the primarily top-down and broadly society-
level focus of the school, where nationalism is largely a phenomenon imposed upon a society by 
societal forces outside the control of the vast majority of a nation.   
 
The next school, ethno-symbology, rejects primordialism and attempts to strike a balance between 
the perennialist and modernist position (Smith 2001, 60; Özkırımlı 2000, 168-169).  Smith (2001, 60) 
notes that ‘[n]either perennialism nor modernism sought to enter the world of nationalism…’ and, as 
such, failed to account for the historically contingent (perennialism) and often pre -modern basis of  
ethnic identity, myth, memory and symbol (modernism).  Smith argues that this position is necessary 
because nations are neither wholly continuous nor wholly recent functions of modernity.  Instead, 
the roots of the nation lie in its symbols, a bottom-up society-level process.  Whilst such an approach 
acknowledges the role of elites in the reproduction of nationalism (Smith 2001, 57), its focus on the 
reproduction of the symbols of a nation tends to take the ir reproduction for granted, and fails to 
explain why some symbols are chosen, why others are ignored, and the role and motivations of 
actors who do the reproducing (Calhoun 1997, 49-50).  As such, ethno-symbolism, like modernism, 
makes an important contribution to the understanding of the structural framework that elites like 
Prime Ministers must work within, but it does not explain their role in the reproduction of 
nationalism.  The socio-cultural focus of modernism and ethno-symbolism therefore creates a blind-
spot regarding the agency of particular actors in the reproduction of nationalism.  As such, both 
approaches are inadequate to the analysis of the Prime Ministerial adoption of Anzac, as the 
research question of this thesis is less about the socio-cultural processes that produce national ism, 
but instead how and why actors working within this context choose to engage with nationalism.   
 
The final approach to nationalism is the discursive or postmodernist school, a loose collective of 
approaches characterised by the rejection of what they view as the reducti onist causal explanations 
of nationalism already surveyed here, and a commitment to the study of nationalist discourses.  A 
study of nationalism that entails a discursive approach therefore adopts a theoretical viewpoint that 
contends that no one theory of nationalism can explain all instances of nationalism (Özkır ıml ı 2000, 
226-28; Calhoun 1997, 22).  Further, study of particular nationalisms cannot be reduced to a singular 
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and essentialist understanding of that nation, as many competing and contested vers ions of the 
nation are at play within nation-states (Özkırımlı 2000, 228).  Discursive approaches to nationalism 
argue that what is common to differing forms of nationalism is the discourse of national ism, which 
claims, firstly, the primacy of the nation’s values and interests over any other competing claims of  
interest based upon sub-national identifications such as class, gender or sexuality; secondly, 
discourses of nationalism view the nation as the essential and only source of legitimacy; and final ly,  
nationalist discourses are mobilised with binary distinctions such as ‘us and ‘them’ (Özkırıml ı 2000, 
230).  Added to this is the dialectical relationship between discourse and the social structures, 
practices and institutions that make up the day-to-day of nationalism (De Cillia, Reisigl & Wodak 
1999, 157).  So, whilst at different times the bottom-up cultural explanations of ethno-symbolism or 
the top-down explanations of modernism may offer insight as to the casual factors of a particular 
nationalist discourse, the dialectical relationship insight points to the conclusion that neither 
operates in isolation.  Nationalist social practices are influenced by the situatedness of their cultural  
and political setting, but these nationalist practices in turn influence the cultural and political setting 
in which they are embedded.  Finally, then, the effectiveness of nationalism lies in its routine, 
regular, and every-day reproduction  – its inclusion in school curricular, its visible presence in the 
architecture of the landscape, the national flag and anthem, the observance of national days and 
anniversaries, its reproduction in high and pop culture etc. (see Billig 1995; Özkırımlı 2000, 230-32; 
Calhoun 1997, 50).   
 
Such an approach has had a great influence upon the thesis, and I have adopted its insights into how  
the discursive reproduction of nationalism occurs in its analysis.  However, much like the above 
approaches, it does little to explain why actors adopt nationalism or to provide a theoretical 
framework to analyse and distinguish between the varying degrees of agency and influence of 
particular actors in the reproduction of nationalism.  So whilst the discursive approach to 
nationalism builds upon the previous insights of the other schools and has much to o ffer a 
researcher regarding the reproduction of nationalism, it leaves the role of particular agents of 
nationalism under-theorised.   
 
Not all approaches to nationalism are theoretically insensitive to the role of actors in the 
reproduction of nationalism, with some researchers in the modernist school focusing on the agency 
of elites in the emergence of nationalism, broadly organised into a sub-school known as 
instrumentalism.  Brass (1979, 41) epitomises this view:  
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[Nationalism is] the process by which elites and counter-elites within ethnic groups select 
aspects of the group’s culture, attach new value and meaning to them, and use them as 
symbols to mobilise the group, to defend its interests, and to compete with other groups.  In 
this process, those elites have an advantage whose leaders can operate most skilfully in 
relation both to the deeply-felt primordial attachments of group members and the shifting 
relationships of politics.   
Similar sentiments underpin Hobsbawn’s ‘invented traditions’, where nat ionalism, via emerging 
innovations like primary education, national days and public monuments, became a substi tute  for 
social cohesion, and buttressed the interests of the ruling elite in the context of a threat to those 
interests in emerging mass democracies in Western liberal countries from 1870-1914 (Hobsbawn 
1983, 270-271; 303).  As such, when certain modernists do focus upon political actors in the 
literature, they tend to see the adoption of nationalism by elites as narrowly instrumental.  This 
instrumental focus has been criticised as being overly rationalist (Smith 2001, 56-57; Brubaker 1998, 
291-292).  As Brubaker (1998, 292) identifies:  
Of course 'interests' are central to nationalist politics, as to all politics, indeed to social life 
generally. The elite manipulation view errs not in focusing on interests, but in doing so too 
narrowly, focusing on the calculating pursuit of interests taken as unproblematically 'given' 
(above all politicians' interest in attaining or maintaining power), and ignoring broader 
questions about the constitution of interests, questions concerning the manner in which 
interests - and, more fundamentally, units construed as capable of having interests, such as 
'nations', 'ethnic groups' and 'classes' - are identified and thereby constituted. Elite discourse 
often plays an important role in the constitution of interests, but again this is not something 
political or cultural elites can do at will by deploying a few manipulative tricks. The 
identification and constitution of interests - in national or other terms - is a complex process 
that cannot be reduced to elite manipulation [emphasis in the original].  
And therein lies the problem with the instrumental focus of scholars who analyse the role of elites in 
the production and reproduction of nationalism.  Nationalism is not solely, or even primarily, a 
strategy to pursue particular political ends.  Instead, the interplay of identity and interest means that 
nationalism is the end in of itself.  The realisation and maintenance of a national identity central  to 
one’s own identity is therefore inextricably linked to the pursuance of nationalism by actors.  Finally,  
this nationalist end, and its potential success or failure, is profoundly influenced by the situatedness 
of the actor – they develop these ends within, and for, the context they find themselves in.   
 
As such, the nationalism literature, especially the discursive approach to nationalism, provides 
important theoretical insights into the emergence and reproduction of nationalism.  Relevantly to 
this study, however, the literature is weaker when considering the role of elites in the production 
and reproduction of nationalism, and this has seen this aspect of nationalism left under -theorised.  
The next section suggests that the entrepreneurship literature has much to offer regarding the 
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theorising of the role of elites in the contemporary reproduction of nationalism, and to the Prime 
Ministerial engagement with Anzac, as it accounts for the role of individual actors in the emergence 
of particular norms, and sees their role as being a function of ideational, altruistic, or empathetic 
reasons, instead of narrow instrumentalism.   
 
A Survey of Some of the Dominant Approaches to the Entrepreneurship Literature 
Entrepreneurship, as a concept, developed as a descriptor of behaviour in the market place, and has 
since then been fruitfully applied to multiple political and social contexts.  The following section 
briefly outlines this development, some of the areas that the term has been applied to, and makes 
the case for why entrepreneurship is a useful theoretical framework to describe Prime Ministerial 
engagement with Anzac.  Mintrom (2000, 86) surveys the theorisation of entrepreneurship as a 
market process from the 18th century, and concludes that the figure of the entrepreneur ‘is best 
thought of as a market maker.  The entrepreneur attempts to respond to unmet needs , or to meet 
needs that are currently being met, but to do so in a way that leads to greater satisfaction at the 
same cost, or the same level of satisfaction at lower cost.’  In the process, however, successful 
entrepreneurs change previous patterns of trade, which might attract a counter-response from 
rivals.  Note, however, that due to imperfect knowledge, there is always the possibility of failure.  
The successful entrepreneur must be sensitive to such developments and work with their team and 
network to advance their trade (Mintrom 2000, 111).   
 
This entrepreneurship literature has been employed by political scientists working within the area of  
public policy to explain actions of certain prominent and influential actors in the policy process.  
Kingdon (1995, 179) identifies these actors as policy entrepreneurs, those ‘…willing to invest their 
resources – time, energy, reputation, money – to promote a position in return for anticipated future 
gain in the form of material, purposive, or solidary benefits. ’  Policy entrepreneurs act during ‘pol icy 
windows’ - those moments when the opportunity to address a pet issue or push a pet solution opens 
up (Kingdon 1995, 165-168).  Mintrom and Norman 2009, 650-654) further develop the concept of 
policy entrepreneurship by identifying certain characteristics they must display in order to be 
successful.  Whilst the following may not always be equally important in differing circumstances, 
these attributes include possessing good social acuity by making use of policy netw orks and being 
sensitive towards, and responding to, the motives, beliefs and ideas of those within the policy 
context; effective problem definition to organise in certain perspectives and options, and organise  
out others; the ability to work within teams and employ networks to canvass multiple skill and 
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expertise resources and garner support for proposals; and finally , leadership by example to signal 
their genuine commitment to a proposal (Mintrom and Norman 2009, 652-654).   
 
Entrepreneurship has also been applied by scholars in areas such as the law (Sunstein 1997) and 
international relations (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Young 1991), particularly in regards to the 
emergence of norms.  Norms for Sunstein (1997, 38-39) are systems of approved and prohibited 
behaviour, sustained by social sanction and the law.  Norm entrepreneurs can exploit situations 
where norms become challenged or unviable, and create ‘norm bandwagons’, where people who do 
not believe in a norm, but comply with it due to sanction, support the actions of norm entrepreneurs 
and effect change (Sunstein 1997, 47-48).  Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) apply some of these ideas 
to the realm of international relations, and theorise the life cycle of international norms: norm 
emergence → norm cascade → internalisation of the norm.  Norm entrepreneurs frame issues for 
reasons of empathy, altruism and ideational commitment, and are ‘…critical for norm emergence 
because they call attention to issues or even “create” issues by using language that names, 
interprets, and dramatizes them’ (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 897-898).  Norm entrepreneurs work 
from appropriate and strategic platforms to create a ‘tipping point’ where a critical mass of  nation -
states adopt new norms and become norm leaders, which leads to a norm cascade, where the norm 
is increasingly adopted by the rest of the world, who then become norm followers (Finnemore and 
Sikkink 1998, 899-902).  After this point, international norms may become internalised, and assume 
a ‘taken for granted’ value status (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 904).  As such, norm theory provides 
a finer grained description of the role of entrepreneurs and their role in the adoption of certain 
social and political norms.  Finally, Young (1991) has applied the entrepreneurship literature to the 
study of political leadership in the international sphere, identifying entrepreneurial  leadership as 
part of a schema that also includes structural and intellectual leadership.  Entrepreneurial leaders 
set agendas, popularise ideas, devise innovative solutions to problems, and broker deals (Young 
1991, 294).   
 
The entrepreneurship literature is relevant to the analysis of Prime Ministerial engagement with 
Anzac because it provides a more nuanced perspective on the engagement of elites wi th national ist 
discourses.  Such an observation has been implicitly advanced by Brubaker (1996; 1998), who 
identifies ‘political entrepreneurs’ who have engaged with nationalism in the entrepreneurial sense 
identified above in former-Soviet states.  However, Brubaker does not develop this observation 
further in order to flesh out the theorisation of the role of these actors in the operation of 
nationalism.  I advance that the entrepreneurship literature offers a deeper insight.  It reveals that 
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the actors working towards change (whatever that change may entail) are not simply cynical 
manipulators working towards instrumental ends like power, prestige, or wealth accumulation, that 
are exogenous to their purported cause.  Instead, entrepreneurs display a since re commitment to 
the normative end they are pursuing.  They are astute observers, sensitive to their context and 
willing to work with, and respond to, the desires and beliefs of others.  Finally, entrepreneurs work 
towards the adoption of new ways of doing things, whether that be the creation of new markets, 
policies or norms.  In the process, they alter, or even destroy, old ways of doing things, which may 
create resistance, and may be unsuccessful.  As has already be sketched in the introduction, and wil l  
be demonstrated throughout the thesis, such a perspective is analogous with the Prime Ministerial  
engagement with Anzac, and the role they have played in Anzac’s resurgence.   
 
Methodology: Critical Discourse Analysis 
This chapter now turns to addressing why critical discourse analysis is a fruitful methodological 
approach to the research question.  The following section provides an overview of CDA, and sets out 
why this methodological approach addresses the gap in the literature regarding Prime Ministerial 
engagement with Anzac.  As has been shown, previous studies of Anzac and Prime Ministerial 
language do not simultaneously address the social and political context of Prime Ministerial 
engagement with Anzac and provide systematic linguistic analysis of their language.  Nor do these 
studies apply an analysis over time in order to identify trends and make comparisons between Prime 
Ministers.  CDA researchers, especially those informed by the work of Fairclough (see Fairclough 
1995; Fairclough 2005; and Fairclough, Cortese and Ardizzone 2007), pay close attention to both the 
textual representation of language and discourse and to the social and political context which 
produces those texts.  It is a primarily qualitative approach, but has also been supplemented  with 
quantitative corpus assisted discourse analysis, an approach that adopts some of the quantitative 
methods of corpus linguistics, particularly lexical frequency and distribution, in order to explore a 
corpus and reinforce the validity of findings (Bayley 2007; Duguid 2007).  This epistemological 
approach is informed by an ontology that views language as socially constructed.  As such, CDA 
provides the thesis with a novel and insightful approach to the study of Prime Ministerial 
engagement with Anzac, as it addresses both the linguistic features of their textual representation of 
Anzac and the social and political context that influences this textual representation.   
 
The Variety of Discourse Analysis 
There is a wide variety of approaches to discourse analysis, with CDA being one amongst many.  
Phillips and Hardy (2002) have organised these approaches into four broad categories, organised 
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according to their relative focus on context vs. text and constructivism vs. criticism.  The categories 
are interpretative structuralism, social linguistic analysis, critical linguistic analysis and critical 
discourse analysis.  Very briefly: 
Social linguistic analysis is constructivist and text-based…Interpretative structuralism focuses 
on the analysis of the social context and the discourse that supports it…Critical discourse 
analysis focuses on the role of discursive activity in constituting and sustaining unequal power 
relations…critical linguistic analysis also focuses on individual texts, but with a strong interest 
in the dynamics of power that surround the text… (Phillips and Hardy, 2002, 22-7).   
CDA has been chosen as the approach to this thesis from amongst these options because it 
combines the study of the social and political context and examination of the texts that produce and 
are produced by this context.  As shown earlier in this chapter, there has been a lack of study into 
the textual representation of Anzac and Australian national identity by Australian Prime Min isters,  
with examination of the social and political context dominating.  When textual analysis has been 
conducted in the study of Australian political language, it has tended to focus upon the rhetorical 
patterns and strategies of political actors, to the neglect of the structural patterns that influence 
these patterns.  CDA has been chosen for this thesis because it offers a way to tackle the research 
question that is lacking in the identified literature, leading to a fuller account of Prime Ministerial 
engagement with Anzac.   
 
Defining CDA 
There are a number of forms of CDA.  This variety is hardly surprising considering the discipline’s 
commitment to a diversity of approaches and theoretical perspectives.  In fact, an interdiscipl inary 
and multi-method approach has been championed by many of the major figures within the discipline 
(see Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999; Fairclough, 2005; Van Dijk 2001; Wodak 2001a; Wodak and 
Matouschek 1993).  Wodak argues that the critical commitment of the approach rende rs it 
inherently interdisciplinary: ‘[p]roblems in our societies are too complex to be studied from a single  
perspective’ (Wodak, 2004, 199).  Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999) follow a similar line of  thought 
when they contend that to formalise the approach would impede the ability of CDA to effectively 
analyse a wide variety of changing social practices and their operation.  This commitment to 
diversity and interdisciplinary cooperation involves adapting the approach to the research problem 
and rejecting the compartmentalised nature of disciplines within academia.   
 
An institutionalised or classic definition of CDA is therefore absent from the literature, a result of the  
diversity of influences and methodological approaches, and the stated desire to make  the method 
interdisciplinary.  Despite this, the general aims of CDA are fairly set, with the manner one tackles 
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the research question being more contentious than the actual aspirations of the approach.  CDA 
aims:  
…to systematically explore often opaque relationships of causality and determination between 
(a) discursive practices, events and texts, and (b) wider social and cultural structures, relations 
and processes; to investigate how such practices, events and texts arise out of and are 
ideologically shaped by relations of power and struggles over power; and to explore how the 
opacity of these relationships between discourse and society is itself a factor securing power 
and hegemony (Fairclough, 1995, 3).   
The connection between the first sphere of social practices and the social world, and the second 
sphere of text, and the commitment to the critical investigation of the interaction of these two 
elements when exploring power relationships, helps to explain the nature of CDA.   
 
CDA’s approach to power is sensitive to the interplay between agency and structure.  As Fairclough 
(2005, 8-9) argues, ‘…texts have causal effects upon, and contribute to changes in, people (beliefs,  
attitudes, etc.), actions, social relations, and the material world’.  However, this causal effect is 
contingent – the success of texts in bringing about social change is dependent on any number of 
context specific processes, events, and actors (Fairclough 2007, 10-14).  As such, a reductively 
constructivist view of language that sees texts as constituting politics is rejected by CDA theorists.  
Fairclough (2005, 8-9) contends that we need to distinguish here between construction and 
construal; whilst actors may be able to construe the social world via discourse, they cannot 
automatically construct it.  To construct the social world would not only require control over 
dominant discourses but other factors like people’s acceptance and internalisation of such 
discourses.  Thus, this view rejects simplistic reductivism regarding the structural power of discourse, 
and instead argues that in order to understand the power of language and discourse, a researcher 
must pay attention to the agency of those who attempt to mobilise such discourses.   
 
Such insight is crucial to the study of Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac.  Whilst Prime 
Ministers have enormous agency regarding the construal of discourses surrounding Anzac via their 
access to the power resources of the state, they do not inevitably constitute the social and pol i tical  
world.  Nor can they construe their Anzac discourses as they please – the socio-political situation 
that Prime Ministers find themselves in means they have a limited repertoire of textual and 
discursive tools at their disposal if they are to successfully engage with Anzac and avoid sanction.  
CDA’s ontology and epistemology thus compels the researcher to pay attention to the interplay of  
agency and structure in the relationship between Prime Ministerial Anzac Day texts, discourses, and 
the social and political context that this occurs within.   
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A Methodological Approach to CDA 
As noted, CDA is a heterogeneous method. Wodak et al (2009) identify four broad schools of CDA: 
the Dutch, German, Vienna, and British schools.  The Vienna and British schools are of particular 
relevance to this study.  The Vienna School is centred on the work of Ruth Wodak and has a strong 
basis in sociolinguistics.  It has developed a methodology which they have described as the 
discourse-historical approach (Wodak 2001b).  This approach is quite intensive and seeks to 
incorporate ‘…systematically all available background information in the analysis and interpretation 
of the many layers of a written or spoken text…’ (Fairclough and Wodak 1997, 266).  To this end, a 
system of ‘triangulation’ has been employed by researchers in the field, involving the incorporation 
of ‘…various interdisciplinary, methodological and source -specific approaches to investigate a 
particular discourse phenomenon’ (De Cillia, Reisigl and Wodak 1999, 157).  Although triangulation is 
not a formal model with a consolidated approach, it does suggest that superior findings will be 
obtained if a research question is approached from more than one theoretical or methodological 
angle.  Leading on from this, the discourse-historical approach utilises a four-layered conception of  
‘context’ which takes into account grand theories, middle -level theories, discourse theory and 
linguistic analysis when examining texts (see Wodak 2001b; Wodak 2004).  Its areas of investigation 
have included studies of racism and anti-Semitism, and analyses of national discourses in Austria and 
the European Union (Wodak 2004; Wodak et al 2009).  The discourse-historical approach of the 
Vienna school has been adopted by this thesis, as its emphasis upon the historical root of discourse 
accounts for trends, continuities, changes and comparisons in the study of Prime Ministerial 
engagement with Anzac.  In addition, its call for triangulation has guided the thesis’ adoption of a 
variety of theoretical and methodological approaches to the research question.  
 
The British School of CDA has been enormously influenced by the work of Fairclough.  Areas of 
research for this school have included analysis of the language of ‘New Capitalism’ and in particular,  
the discourse associated with Tony Blair and New Labour (see Fairclough, 2000).  The Briti sh school  
uses a three-dimensional model of CDA based on the following:  
Discourse, and any specific instance of discursive practice, is seen as simultaneously (i) a 
language text, spoken or written, (ii) discourse practice (text production and text 
interpretation), (iii) sociocultural practice.  Furthermore, a piece of discourse is embedded 
within sociocultural practice at a number of levels; in the immediate situation, in the wider 
institution or organization, and at a societal level… The method of discourse analysis includes 
linguistic description of the language text, interpretation of the relationship between 
(productive and interpretative) discursive processes and the social process (Fairclough 1995, 
97). 
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Fairclough has been particularly interested in using CDA to study the discursive nature o f social 
change (see Fairclough 1992; Fairclough, Cortese and Ardizzone 2007), and has argued that many of  
the social changes that have occurred during recent decades, especially those associated with the 
introduction of ‘New Capitalism’, have also involved attempts to re -engineer ‘language practices’ 
(Fairclough 1992, 6).  Further, ‘…it is perhaps one indication of the growing importance of language 
in social and cultural change that attempts to engineer the direction of change increasingly include 
attempts to change language practices’ (Fairclough 1992, 6).  It is therefore important that a 
component of the study of social change should include a focus on discourse and its evolution.   
 
Fairclough has also been particularly interested in developing CDA as social research methodology 
and promoting it as a viable research method for writers outside linguistics (Fairclough 1995; 
Fairclough, 2005).  This has involved a shift away from a Foucauldian tendency to consider the 
content of a discourse without considering its textual basis.  Fairclough contends that: 
[t]he premise of this argument is that the sorts of social and cultural phenomena that such 
analysts are orientated towards are realized in textural properties of texts in ways which make 
them extraordinarily sensitive indicators of sociocultural processes, relations, and change.  
Social and cultural analyses can only be enriched by this textural evidence, which is partly 
linguistic and partly intertextual – partly a matter of how links between one text and other 
texts and text types are inscribed in the surface of the text.  At issue here is the classical 
problem of the relationship between the form and content.  My contention is that no analysis 
of text content and meaning can be satisfactory which fails to attend to what one might call 
the content of texture (or, the content of its form) (Fairclough, 1995, 4-5).   
Fairclough argues that there should be no ‘either/or’ between research which focuses on the textual 
features of a discourse, but is relatively ignorant of social theoretical issues, and a methodology 
which may engage with these issues, but fails to address the linguistic features of a text (Fairclough, 
2005).  This view has had a profound influence upon the thesis, and has informed its concern to 
examine both the textual representation of Prime Ministerial discourses of Anzac, and the pol i tical  
and social forces that have influenced these texts.   
 
This desire to promote CDA as a viable methodology for researchers interested in social theory and 
change has led Fairclough to be one of the few figures in CDA to attempt to enunciate a detailed 
methodology for the lay reader (see Fairclough, 2005).  A summation of the methodological 
considerations a researcher might take into consideration in textual analysis is as follows (Fairclough 
2005, 191-194): 
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Social events 
Social events ‘constitute what is actual’ (Fairclough 2005, 223).   They are influenced by social 
structure, practices and actors.  Texts constitute part of social events, and are influenced and 
mediated by social structure and actors, though not in an automatic manner.   
 
Genre 
The genre of texts is ‘…realized in actional meanings and forms of a text’ and they can vary in terms 
of their institutionalisation and stability (Fairclough 2005, 66-67).  Genres can link together in genre -
chains (the linking together of various genres such as the press release and the interview) and their 
degree of fixity or hybridity with other genres.  
 
Difference 
Fairclough is here interested in how social difference  is textually represented.  Is it open to 
difference; does it emphasise difference and conflict; does it attempt to overcome difference; or 
does it close off or deny/supress difference in favour of a focus on consensus or solidarity 
(Fairclough 2005, 41-42)?  Analysis of difference can shed light on the politics of identity and how 
particular forms of politics claim universality (Fairclough 2005, 40-41).   
 
Intertextuality 
Intertextuality involves having some qualitative awareness of what other texts and voices may be 
relevant to the text under analysis.  Having this awareness allows the researcher to pay attention to 
which texts and voices are included or are excluded and absent in a text (Fairclough 2005, 47).   
 
Assumptions 
Assumptions pervade texts, as meaning is communicated via shared understandings.  Assumptions 
can also be ideological and value-based, and can thus reveal much about the politics being conveyed 
in a text (Fairclough 2005, 55).   
 
Semantic/grammatical relations between sentences and clauses 
In this instance, Fairclough (2005, 87-89) especially notes semantic and grammatical relations that 
re/produce power, legitimation, and equivalence or difference, at the level of sentence and clause .  
Semantic relations between sentence and clause may be causal, conditional, temporal, additi ve, 
elaborative, or contrastive/concessive.  Grammatical relations may be paratactic, hypotactic or 
embedded.   
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Exchanges, speech functions and grammatical mood 
Exchanges refer to the typology of speech interaction between actors; speech functions reveal 
purpose of the speech (such as statements of fact, evaluation, prediction etc.); and a text’s tone 
(declarative, interrogative or imperative) is conveyed by its grammatical mood (Fairclough 2005, 
105-116).   
 
Discourses 
This involves identifying the discourses, and the features of discourses, being drawn upon in texts, in 
particular, identifying the main themes of the discourse, and the perspective (or point of view) of the 
discourse.  This may also involve textual analysis which notes semantic relations, grammatical 
features, metaphors, assumptions etc. (Fairclough 2005, 193).   
 
Representations of social events 
Linked to the analysis of discourse is the examination of how social events are represented.  This 
involves both textual analysis and examination of social events.  It pays attention to what is included 
or excluded regarding the social and political sphere, and how this represented (Fairclough 2005, 
193).   
 
Styles 
Style is ‘…the discoursal aspect of ways of being, identities’ (Fairclough 2005, 159.  They may include 
features such as body language, pronunciation, vocabulary etc.   
 
Modality 
Modality is the examination of what people commit themselves to in their texts, the degree to which 
they commit themselves, and how that is represented textually (Fairclough 2005, 165-171).   
 
Evaluation 
Finally, by evaluation Fairclough (2005, 171) means the values the text producer communicates and 
is committed to.   
 
Not all of these features of the method of CDA will be drawn upon equally in the thesis.  For 
example, the focus of the thesis is upon Prime Ministerial Anzac Day addresses and statements, 
where the speech act is conducted by a single actor to an audience that does not interact with the 
speaker.   Thus, speech exchange analysis is redundant.  But with that exception, these elements al l 
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feature at some point throughout the thesis, though they will receive varying levels of emphasis at i t 
progresses and deals with different social events, actors and practices.   
 
The Corpus and Corpus Assisted Discourse Analysis 
The approach to CDA outlined so far has been qualitative in nature.  In keeping with the stated 
commitment to triangulation, the thesis applies quantitative analysis as well.  This takes the form of  
corpus assisted discourse analysis, an approach to CDA informed by corpus linguistics (Bayley 2007).  
Corpus assisted discourse analysis claims ‘…that a selection of texts can first be studied through 
concordance software which provides information on, for example, lexical frequencies and 
distributions, regularities and irregularities in collocation patterns and thus patterns of meaning’ 
(Bayley 2007, 55).  As such, corpus assisted discourse analysis can be used usefully in conjunction 
with CDA as it offers, firstly, an introductory insight into the corpus before conducting finer grained 
qualitative analysis; and secondly, it serves to offer further empirical verification of qualitative 
analysis.  Corpus assisted discourse analysis has primarily been used in Chapter 3 to introduce the 
genre of Prime Ministerial Anzac Day addresses and statements with frequency and distribution 
analysis, but also features as the Prime Minister’s Anzac address style is introduced.   
 
Regarding the corpus itself, it consists of 23 speeches and 10 media statements or releases, 
conducted by Prime Ministers between 1973 and 2007.  It consists of over 15000 words, which 
makes it a small corpus, but to the best knowledge of the author, it represents ev ery Prime 
Ministerial Anzac Day address and statement given during this period.  Thus, we are deal ing with a 
population and will employ descriptive statistics, as the need for inferential statistics is void.  The 
collation of this corpus is an endeavour that has not been attempted before in the literature, and i t 
contains speeches and addresses that have received little or no attention from scholars.4  Source 
material has been derived from the PM Transcripts Archive hosted by the Department of Prime 
Minister and Cabinet, the Prime Ministerial libraries of Whitlam, Fraser, Hawke and Keating, the 
Prime Minister’s website at pm.gov.au, the PANDORA web archive, the National Archives of 
Australia, material hosted at aph.gov.au, and from collated speech publications (see Appendix).  The 
corpus has been cross-checked with newspaper reports regarding Anzac Day in order to ensure 
comprehensive coverage of these materials.   
 
The selection of sources required a degree of judgement.  The necessity of the selection of most 
sources was clear, as their delivery was on Anzac Day and their subject matter was primarily on 
                                                                 
4 This is primarily associated with the early speeches – Fraser (1979), Hawke (1986a), and Hawke (1989).   
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Anzac and its meaning.  Others were not given on Anzac Day, but directly addressed Anzac themes, 
and their close proximity to the date of 25 April has thus also seen their selection (see Hawke 1989; 
and Keating 1993a).  Speeches and media releases given on Anzac Day, but not directly and 
substantively on Anzac, have been omitted, as have speeches substantively on Australia’s war 
remembrance delivered on dates other than Anzac Day, such as Remembrance Day or anniversaries 
of significant war dates like Victory in the Pacific Day.   
 
Conclusion: CDA and the Study of Prime Ministerial Engagement with Anzac 
This thesis draws upon the methodological approach of CDA, especially that of Fairclough (1995; 
2005), as the basis for the investigation of Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac.  The 
methodological approach has been adopted for ontological and epistemological reasons.  The 
ontological assumption of the thesis, subsequently empirically demonstrated, is that the production 
and reproduction of Prime Ministerial language regarding Anzac has not been a natural ly or 
organically occurring phenomenon.  On the contrary, it has been a political process, whereby Prime 
Ministers have actively construed language for ends aligned with their agendas of government.  But 
this process has not occurred in a vacuum, and simpl istic assumptions regarding the ability of  e l i tes 
to hegemonically impose their views upon the Australian public fail to account for the very real limits 
on such courses of action.  As such, CDA demands an epistemological approach that examines both 
the textual reproduction of Anzac and the social and political context that this production occurs in, 
in order to more fully account for the interplay between agency and structure surrounding Prime 
Ministerial engagement with Anzac.   
 
Further, CDA’s emphasis upon triangulation encourages a variety of theoretical and methodological  
approaches to the study of language. This approach has been adopted in the thesis in order to 
address the research question more systematically than has been attempted by researchers before.  
Regarding methodology then, the thesis augments the method of CDA outlined above by Fairclough 
with the discourse-historical approach to the development of Prime Ministerial engagement with 
Anzac, in order to better account for change over time and differences between Prime Ministers.  It 
has also collated a comprehensive corpus of Prime Ministerial Anzac Day addresses and media 
statements and supplements the primarily qualitative textual analysis method of Fairclough (2005)  
with quantitative corpus assisted discourse analysis, an approach which enhances the validity of 
claims made regarding the evolution of Prime Ministerial narratives of Anzac.  I argue that such an 
approach, given the gap in the literature regarding the study of Prime Ministerial  language 
surrounding Anzac, provides an appropriate method that accounts for the interplay between social  
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and political forces, discourse, and text that make up Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac, and 
provides compelling empirical evidence and data to back the analysis.   
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CHAPTER 3 
The Prime Ministerial Turn to Anzac: Exploring the Shift 
 
This chapter serves as an overview of the thesis by firstly sketching the causality behind the Anzac 
entrepreneurship of Australian Prime Ministers, and secondly, by outlining the broad textual 
characteristics of Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac over the time period of 1973 - 2007.   
This approach is informed by the discourse-historical method outlined in Chapter 2, and seeks to 
incorporate a rich and as inclusive as possible analysis of the relevant background and context to 
Anzac entrepreneurship by Prime Ministers.   
 
In the first section, I examine the broad socio-political context that Prime Ministers engaging with 
Anzac have operated within.  Process tracing (see Bennett 2010; George and Bennett 2005; Roberts 
1996) is employed to examine four potential hypotheses for the Prime Ministerial adoption of Anzac.  
These hypotheses are:  
1. Distance in time: this explanation posits that the increasing distance from the confl icts and 
horrors of the original Anzac Day cleared the air enough for Prime Ministerial adoption of 
Anzac.   
2. Vietnam reconciliation: this hypothesis suggests that the Prime Ministerial turn to Anzac i s a 
consequence of the reconciliation of Vietnam veterans with the Australian community after 
the bitter divisions of the Vietnam War.   
3. Nationalism as tradition: this account of the Prime Ministerial turn to Anzac draws upon 
ethno-symbolism, and explains the turn as a product of Australian national myths, symbols,  
values and memories (Smith 2001, 57).   
4. Nationalism entrepreneurship: this explanation characterises the Prime Ministerial shi ft to 
Anzac as a function of the nationalism of the Prime Ministers and the efficacy of nat ionalism 
as a political strategy.   
Having considered the persuasiveness of these potential accounts, I conclude that none can sole ly 
explain the Prime Ministerial adoption of Anzac.  The explanations are cumulative, meaning that the 
shift towards Anzac can only be explained as the outcome of the aggregation of these factors.    
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The chapter then provides an overview of the Prime Ministerial turn to Anzac, 1973 – 2007.  It does 
so by exploring the changing characteristics of that engagement and providing an assessment of the 
genre of Prime Ministerial Anzac Day addresses.  This section of the chapter employs corpus assisted 
discourse analysis of Prime Ministerial Anzac Day addresses from 1973 (in particular, analysis of 
frequency and distribution) in order to sketch its imprecise, but increasingly institutionalised and 
consistent, genre boundaries.  In doing so, it seeks to identify the situation and themes of these 
addresses and how they have changed over time.  Since 1990, Australian Prime Ministers and the ir 
governments have increasingly engaged with Anzac in a manner that has supplanted the traditional 
role of the RSL as the custodian of Anzac (Lake 2010, 139; Inglis 2008, 554-555).  This has involved 
them consistently giving Anzac Day addresses, both at home and at significant sites of Australian war 
remembrance overseas, in a form that is often characterised by high rhetoric and nationalism.  But, 
as will be shown, this has not always been the case.  Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac in the 
period prior to 1990 was more sporadic, more local, and less spectacular.  Further, Prime Ministerial  
Anzac Day addresses have not always been solely, or even primarily, about the significance of Anzac 
in Australia’s national life, with some more closely resembling a policy speech.  Over time, the 
conventions of these addresses have coagulated, and have begun to demonstrate a significant 
degree of rhetorical path dependency (Grube 2014).   
 
The chapter aims to preface the analysis of the individual Prime Ministers that follows in the 
remainder of the thesis by conducting these two tasks.  Having established the causal reasons 
behind the Prime Ministerial adoption of Anzac, and having sketched the  characteristics of the genre 
of Prime Ministerial Anzac Day addresses, we can more clearly see the operation and evolution of 
both these features.  Such a task is crucial because, as has been identified in Chapter 2, the ex isting 
literature on Anzac has not included systematic qualitative and quantitative analysis of either of 
these elements.   
 
Tracing the Prime Ministerial Adoption of Anzac 
As has been demonstrated in Chapter 2, the casual explanation for the emergence of nationalism is a 
contested field (see Özkırımlı 2000; Dahbour 2009).  The competing explanations for the emergence 
of nationalism as caused by the bottom-up socio-cultural processes of ethno-symbolism, the top 
down functionalism of modernism, or the discursive representation of nation of fer important, but 
incomplete, insights in the case of Prime Ministerial adoption of Anzac.  In this case, national ism is 
operationalised by entrepreneurs – political and cultural elites who are cognisant of the public’s 
desire for unifying symbols of nation and who utilise their access to the power resources their e l ite  
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positions offer to supply and encourage that desire.  Entrepreneurs’ reasons for doing so can be 
characterised as partly motivated by the instrumental possibilities that such an adoption of fers and 
partly due to genuine identification with the form of nationalism they are promoting.  The following 
section will outline competing hypotheses regarding the Prime Ministerial adoption of  Anzac, and 
will demonstrate that whilst a combination of bottom-up and top-down factors were at play, it is the 
combination of these factors in the context of nationalism entrepreneurship that is crucial.   
 
This first section of the chapter argues that certain insufficient, but necessary, causal preconditions 
needed to be met before Anzac became an acceptable political discourse fit for use by Prime 
Ministers.  Roberts’ (1996, 291) concept of cumulative colligation will be employed to explain the 
workings of the multiple hypotheses, that being “[t]racing the [cumulative] steps by which changes 
in the structure of society come about”, where structure is taken to mean repeated social and 
cultural discursive actions.  Mackie’s (1965, 245; emphasis in the original) ‘INUS’ condition, where a 
cause is ‘…an insufficient, but necessary part of a condition which is itself unnecessary but suff icient  
for the result’ will be employed to demonstrate the inadequacies of the explanations in i solation, 
but their explanatory power in conjunction.  Noting that political elites are constrained in their 
ability to mobilise forms of nationalism that fail to gel with the community, this section argues that 
the distance in time, Vietnam reconciliation, and nationalism as tradition explanations, all needed to 
be fulfilled as necessary bottom-up conditions before Prime Ministers could adopt Anzac and 
employ nationalism entrepreneurship after 1990.    
 
Distance in Time 
It has become a common explanation for the more general rise of Anzac to be attributed to the 
increasing temporal distance from the original Anzac Day (see Seal 2004, 4; McKenna 2010, 118; 
Inglis 2008, 413).  Whilst none of these authors deal directly with the question of whether this 
influenced Prime Ministers in their use of Anzac, a plausible summation can be made – the 
increasing distance from the original landings at Gallipoli has tempered the bitter memories 
associated with WWI.  The memory of the 60 000 men killed during the war is lessened as they 
become names on memorials rather than lost loved ones.  The broken diggers who made it home 
have passed on and have taken their painful memories with them, and the bitter partisan divisions 
over the conscription referendums have become historical facts, rather than lived memories.  
Perhaps more importantly, the temporal distance from the tensions and hostility of the Vietnam era 
has similarly lessened the rawness of that conflict as well.  Finally, as the diggers have passed, the 
RSL has lost much of its raison d'être as a lobby group, and much of its power.  This has lessened the 
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impact of their oftentimes conservative lobbying and has attracted less opposition as a 
consequence.  The tempering of these bitter hostilities has left a relatively uncontroversial, even 
sacralised, version of Anzac, uncontentious to those young enough to never to have experienced the 
above, and free for the taking by political elites.   
 
Whilst plausible, the distance in time explanation fails to adequately explain the steps between 
creating a space to reincorporate Anzac and Anzac being hegemonic.  There is nothing inherent 
about the ageing of ex-servicemen and women or the increasing distance from the original Anzac 
Day that suggests that Anzac will increase its hegemonic place in conceptions of Australianness.  It i s 
just as plausible that as diggers faded into history, their central place in nationalist history, off icial 
public life, and thus reproduction in nationalist discourse, would fade as well.  In fact, the possibi li ty 
that Anzac would die out was noted by those who aligned their sense of self with Anzac, and those 
who opposed it, during the 1960s, 1970s and early 1980s (Curran and Ward 2010, 197; Macleod 
2002).  The parades were smaller as diggers aged and passed away, and the crowds watching 
became thinner too.  For example, the Canberra Times reported in 1979 that the small NSW town of  
Gundaroo ‘forgot’ to commemorate Anzac Day, as there was no one left interested in keeping the 
tradition alive (Canberra Times 1979, 1), and The Age noted the thin and quiet crowd of 20000 at the 
1975 Melbourne Anzac Day parade while 77000 watched football (Lewis 1975, 4).  As such, the 
distance in time hypothesis fails to sufficiently explain how the reinscription of the centrality of 
Anzac in the national lexicon occurred and why Prime Ministers subsequently adopted it.   
 
On its own, then, the distance in time explanation remains an insufficient explanation of how the 
reproduction and re-imagination of Anzac evolved from a problematised state during the period 
around and after the Vietnam War, to one of hegemonic and uncritical celebration, suitable for 
engagement by entrepreneurial Prime Ministers.  Having said that, temporal distance remains a 
crucial element in the reinscription of Anzac - distance from the original horrors of WWI and the 
divisiveness of the Vietnam War tempered the pain and acrimony of those conflicts as citi zens who 
never experienced these divisions began to take their place in the public sphere.  This temporal 
distance created the necessary space for reconciliation, healing, and reincorporation of  Anzac into 
Australian nationalist discourse.   
 
Vietnam Reconciliation  
The second plausible and cumulative causal explanation for the increasing engagement with Anzac 
by Australian Prime Ministers rises out of the questions raised above regarding the  problematisation 
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of Anzac during and after the Vietnam War - the Vietnam reconciliation explanation.  It argues that 
the hostility to militarism that was demonstrated in the campaign against the Vietnam War 
continued among the new-left social movements and their sympathisers during the 1970s and 
1980s, and consequently also began to affect Anzac.  Anzac Day attendances were down, the 
imperial link that Anzac represented was being over-taken by the independent and somewhat 
parochial ‘new nationalism’ of the  Whitlam government (Curran and Ward 2010; Alomes 1988), and 
by the early 1980s radical feminists, and sporadically, other movements, were staging protests at 
Anzac Day parades and ceremonies (Twomey 2013).  Anzac fell out of favour with the public, and 
with the government, as the nation’s sense of nationalism evolved.   
 
As a consequence of these changes, Vietnam veterans were largely ignored by both the publ ic and 
by the government, and little was initially done to memorialise their failed war (Inglis 2008, 363).  
Doyle (2002, 78) notes that for the veteran community this was tantamount to betrayal:  
[T]he Australian [Vietnam] veteran’s status as a genuine veteran, an authentic ‘digger’, had 
been made contingent on the way the nation had come to view the ‘history’ of its engagement 
in Vietnam after the fact…this ‘history’ had robbed them of their rightful place as validated 
third-wave Anzacs… 
From the early 1980s onwards, however, veteran anger at this marginalisation led them to pressure 
the government for recognition of their sacrifice and continued suffering.  In response, a welcome 
home parade was staged in 1987 and a national memorial to Vietnam veterans was completed in 
1992.  Whilst these acts represented reconciliation between the veteran community and the wider 
public, this reconciliation was unpolitical (Schaap 2005), as its form of restoring veterans to their 
rightful place in the story of Anzac meant that contestation of Anzac, as had occurred in the 1960s – 
1980s, was no longer acceptable.  To do so would open old wounds and dishonour the sacrifice and 
suffering of the veterans who had served.  As such, Anzac becomes incontestable, sacred , essential 
and unpolitical – ripe for the taking by entrepreneurial Prime Ministers prone to instrumental  uses  
of nationalism, and also applying bottom-up pressure on Prime Ministers from the veteran 
community to include their story into a newly reinstated Anzac nationalist narrative (see Chapter 4, 
and Schaap (2005), for discussion of unpolitical reconciliation).   
 
The Vietnam reconciliation casual explanation is again a necessary element of the Prime Ministerial  
turn to Anzac, but not a sufficient explanation of this shift.  It is necessary as it is the tipping point 
where Anzac shifts from being contested to being unpolitical.  Without the unpolitical reconciliation 
of Vietnam veterans and the body-politic, Anzac would have remained a hotly contested and divisive 
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form of Australian nationalism, unsuitable for the unifying discourse of nationalism that leaders of  
liberal-democratic states find so useful (Norman 2004, 87).  To put it another way, the uni fying and 
cohesive discourse of nationalism provides leaders with a language to mollify the competing 
interests of a pluralistic society and mobilise support for policy action.  Attempts by Prime Ministers 
to use Anzac in this manner have been more or less explicit, and have been more or less 
controversial, but have only become common, since reconciliation with Vietnam veterans.  This 
event therefore represents the moment in time when a new norm regarding an unpolitical Anzac 
emerged and began to become internalised.   
 
However, Vietnam reconciliation is not a sufficient explanation of causality, as the focus of Prime 
Ministerial Anzac Day addresses has remained the Gallipoli campaign.  The Vietnam War, and the 
difficulties Vietnam veterans faced upon their return home from war (Doyle 2002; Ross 2009), 
remained a little mentioned feature of Prime Minister’s Anzac Day addresses, being cited 
infrequently in their speeches.  When Vietnam was mentioned, it appeared primarily in a ‘check-list’  
of Australian war commitments to be honoured, along with WWI, WWII, Korea and contemporary 
deployments.  Thus, the reconciled and unpolitical Anzac ushered in by Vietnam veterans did  not 
accompany a reimagining of Anzac that placed these veterans at its centre.  Liberal-democratic 
leaders’ desire for a unifying discourse of nationalism is instructive here (Norman 2004) – despite 
reconciliation, the divisions of Vietnam still remained fresh in the living and popular memory of  the 
body politic and thus served as a poor tool for cohesion by leaders.   
 
In sum, the Vietnam reconciliation explanation demonstrates how Anzac became unpolitical and 
sacralised, as reconciliation was necessary i f Prime Ministers were to engage with Anzac 
entrepreneurially.  However, it remains an insufficient causal explanation as to why they chose to do 
so – the reconciled Anzac as utilised by Prime Ministers has not seen the honouring of Vietnam 
veterans as a primary or significant element of their engagement with Anzac.  As such, it is one more 
cumulative element in the bottom-up and essential INUS preconditions of why Prime Ministers 
adopted Anzac after 1990.   
 
Nationalism as Tradition 
The third cumulative causal explanation for the increasing use of Anzac by Australian Prime 
Ministers is nationalism as tradition.  This explanation draws heavily on the nationalism l i terature, 
especially ethno-symbolism, and emphasises the cultural role of public myth, memory, values, 
symbols and occasion (Smith 2001, 57-61), in contrast to the modernists’ explanation of nationalism 
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as being a functional or instrumental expression of modernism.  It argues that nationalism is a 
product of the everyday expression and reproduction of the nation in the discourse of the public 
(Billig 1995), and that elites, such as Prime Ministers, are powerfully constrained in their ability to 
mobilise or shape forms of nationalism that sit uncomfortably with popular understandings of 
nation.  In this mould, Kapferer (1988, 121) notes ‘Australia Day is the day of the state, whereas 
Anzac Day is the day of the nation.’  More concretely, the nationalism as tradition explanation points 
to the extraordinary rise of Anzac and its observance amongst the public, and especially young 
Australians, since about 1990 - the increasing attendances on Anzac Day, the backpacking ‘pi lgrims’ 
to Gallipoli, and the explosion of memorial construction after 1990 to an extent unseen since the 
1920s (Inglis 2008, 471).  All these factors point to the rise of Prime Ministerial engagement with 
Anzac as being their response to the cultural pressure to include the story of Anzac in their 
narratives of Australian identity and nationalism.   
 
The nationalism as tradition explanation, like the previous explanations, is a necessary, but not 
sufficient causal reason for the adoption of Anzac from 1990.  It is a necessary explanation of  Prime 
Ministerial adoption of Anzac for the reasons outlined above – if nationalism entrepreneurs want to 
successfully evangelise their version of nationalism, then they are much more likely to succeed if 
they do so in a manner that resonates with the community.  The Bicentenary and the Centenary of  
Federation, where political elites attempted to mobilise the nation around a national  occasion and 
largely failed, provide instructive contrasting cases.  Both these occasions either failed to exci te the 
public’s imagination (in the case of the Centenary of Federation) or failed to provide a uni fying and 
politically neutralised discourse of nation (the Bicentenary) and have thus failed to resonate with the 
same sense of genuineness that Anzac appears to have for those Australians who attend Anzac Day 
parades, pilgrimage to Gallipoli for the dawn service, or play two-up at the local pub on the April 25th  
public holiday.  Kapferer’s observation regarding the official, state -led nature of Australia Day can be 
employed to help explain much of this failure - overtly civic forms of nationalism remain largely 
devoid of meaning for an Australian form of nationalism that emphasises values based upon 
egalitarianism and anti-authoritarianism.  The Bicentenary, as an attempt at state national ism, was 
thus doubly condemned – endorsed, and largely planned, by the state, it failed to resonate with 
those distrustful of nationalism’s state based excesses, and was also challenged and contested by 
Indigenous protesters and their supporters, who rejected a simple, neutral or triumphant expression 
of nationalism with the catch-cry “White Australia has a Black history” (Turner 1994, 87).  Anzac (at 
least since reconciliation with Vietnam veterans) has not suffered from the same problems, al igned 
as it is with Australia’s hegemonic traditions of national selfhood.   
42 
 
 
However, nationalism as tradition remains an insufficient explanation for the Prime Ministerial turn 
to Anzac.  Crucially, the chronology of renewed public engagement with Anzac does not align to the 
nationalism as tradition explanation, as the enormous response by the public to Anzac occurs after 
1990, not before.  Some embryonic public revival of interest in Anzac was being generated in the 
1980s via cultural icons like the film Gallipoli or Bill Gammage’s book The Broken Years, but this 
interest failed to translate into greatly increased crowd attendances to Anzac Day dawn services and 
marches during this period.  The real explosion of interest occurs from 1990 onward after 
reconciliation with Vietnam veterans and, crucially, as the government becomes an entrepreneurial 
actor in the promotion of Anzac, with the precedential Hawke government’s role in the 
memorialisation of the 75th anniversary of the Gallipoli landings in 1990.  This can be seen from the 
following graphs, which show Anzac Day parades and dawn service attendances in Sydney, 
Melbourne and Canberra from 1960.5  The graphs report the percentage of the city’s population that 
has turned out to attend the dawn service or the march.  This method has been chosen as it 
accounts for population change over time, and it therefore more accurately reflects shifts in 
attendance than the raw figures.  World Values Survey data similarly reflects this trend in atti tudes.  
Whilst not a direct measure of the Australian public’s endorsement of Anzac, the measure of the 
Australian public’s confidence in the armed forces serves to reinforce the idea that public had a 
more ambivalent view of the military before 1990, and that this view of the military began to 
improve after this point in time, and was especially ingrained by 2005.   
 
  
                                                                 
5 A few notes regarding the attendance graphs.  Firstly, the attendance figures have come from newspaper reporting 
on Anzac Day.  Importantly, these are estimates of the crowd attendance, and a degree of caution should therefore 
be exercised when interpreting the figures.  Crowd estimates from these sources were reported to have come from 
police estimates, organiser estimates, or reporter estimates .  The figures were taken from The Sydney Morning 
Herald (for Sydney), The Age (for Melbourne), and the Canberra Times (for Canberra) in the first instance.  If fi gures 
were not reported in those sources, then The Australian was consulted.  Again, if figures were not reported i n The 
Australian, then the city’s tabloid newspapers were consulted next.  Sometimes crowd figures have not been 
reported in any of these sources, and gaps are therefore present.  The problem of missing data especially a ppears 
during the years when Anzac was problematised and contested during the 1970s and 1980s, when crowds were not 
newsworthy, or perhaps too embarrassingly small, to report.  The percentage figure has been obtained by di viding 
the reported attendance figure by the Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australian Historical Population Statistics, 2014 
(catalogue number 3105.0.65.001) population figures for the relevant year.   
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Figure 1 – City Attendances at Anzac Day Marches, percentage of city population.   
Anzac Day march attendances dropped from highs in the early 1960s in all 
locations.  Note that Melbourne newspapers stop reporting the march 
attendances after 2000, as the dawn service becomes the preeminent 
Anzac Day event.  Both Sydney and Melbourne show signs of recovery 
especially from the mid-1990s, when considerable government 
investment in the promotion of war remembrance began.  Canberra 
shows flatter attendances from the 1970s, as they decline from highs that 
represented over 20% of the population.  Please note the use of different 
percentage scales in the graphs to more clearly represent the change in 
attendance over time.   
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Figure 2 - City Attendances at Anzac Day Dawn Services, percentage of city population.   
Dawn service attendances demonstrate considerable growth during this 
period, as they have a self-replenishing sources of attendees, unlike  the 
march which depends more significantly on service-people who have 
aged and passed on (Inglis 2008, 550).  This growth once again begins 
during the 1990s, and especially after 2000.  However, in all locations this 
growth does not match the march attendance highs of the 1960s.  Please 
note the use of different percentage scales in the graphs to more clearly 
represent the change in attendance over time.   
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Figure 3 – The Australian Public’s Confidence in the Armed Forces, 1981 - 20126 
Note the increase in confidence in the military over time, and the considerable drop in those reporting a lack of confidence in the military.    
                                                                 
6 This graph has been generated using the World Values Survey Data Analysis Tool (http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSOnline.jsp).   
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The quantitative evidence regarding the improvement in public sentiment towards Anzac suggests 
that 1990 was the point where the new norms surrounding Anzac had started to become 
internalised by the public, and that the public was responding to the promotion of these new norms 
by political and cultural entrepreneurs.  This demonstrates that Prime Ministers were not passive ly 
responding to public pressure, but were instead engendering this response by acting as 
entrepreneurs – recognising a public desire for symbols of nation and fulfilling it to massive success.  
This point can be further demonstrated by the fact that Hawke decided to go on the precedential 
Gallipoli trip in 1990 on the basis of the recommendation of Defence Minister Kim Beazely, who had 
in turn based his suggestion upon a single conversation with a veteran (Holbrook 2014, 173-174).  
This was not a case of the government responding to sustained pressure from the RSL, or the publ ic 
generally.  Thus, the nationalism as tradition hypothesis is the final bottom-up condition necessary 
for the adoption of Anzac by Australian Prime Ministers.  It explains why a genuine feeling of 
nationalism amongst the public is a necessary precondition for leaders who seek to successfully 
employ a nationalist discourse, but it does not sufficiently and fully explain why Prime Ministers 
adopted Anzac.  The answer to why Prime Ministers adopted Anzac is addressed by nationalism 
entrepreneurship.   
 
Nationalism Entrepreneurship 
The final, and necessary, explanation for the increasing engagement with Anzac by Prime Ministers is 
nationalism entrepreneurship.  Critics of Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac, like those 
authors associated with What’s Wrong With Anzac? (2010), point to the role of the state in the 
resurgence of Anzac, and see political agendas behind the form that this state involvement has 
taken.  Such a view is supported by parts of the nationalism literature, like Brass (1979) and 
Hobsbawn (2005), who view nationalism instrumentally, and tend to also see national ism as being 
invented and accepted by a public unproblematically.  However, as the discussion so far has 
demonstrated, Anzac has not developed in isolation from the public and been presented as fait 
accompli by elites.  As Norman (2004, 94) notes, leaders and elites in liberal -democracies draw upon 
nationalist discourses in order to appeal to diverse and plural groups within a nation-state, but they 
cannot do so at will:  
Political leaders in modern democracies obviously do not have the power to shape the national 
identities of citizens at will… They cannot control sources of information; political opponents 
and political commentators may react immediately to explicit signs of their “playing the 
nationalist card”; and there are real limits on the extent to which they can coerce and 
brainwash large portions of the populations… [I]n developed Western democracies today the 
power to influence people’s beliefs and sentiments in any realm…is much more dispersed and 
‘decentralised’.   
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Australian Prime Ministers from Hawke onwards have acted as Anzac entrepreneurs, where 
nationalism has been used instrumentally, but that instrumental motivation has involved more than 
the pursuance of particular policy or power ends.  These instrumental goals have also been bound 
up in the nationalist identities of these Anzac entrepreneurs – they wish to see their particular 
versions of national identity realised via these polices.  This entrepreneurship has been sensi tive to 
the context that it has operated within, and has responded to the desires of the public even as it has 
promoted Anzac.  Prime Ministers have thus personally promoted Anzac at the textual level of 
national identity with their speeches, and enacted government policy to promote Anzac at the 
discursive and social practice level.   
 
The increase in Anzac entrepreneurship at the textual level by Prime Ministers can be measured 
simply by noting the increase in Prime Ministerial Anzac Day addresses after Anzac becomes 
increasingly presented as unpolitical, following the reconciliation and reincorporation of  Vietnam 
veterans (see Chapter 4).  From 1989 - 2007, at least one speech or media statement has been made 
on every Anzac Day.  In contrast, from 1973 – 1988 only two speeches and one media release were 
given by Prime Ministers.  These speeches have provided a unifying discourse of nation, rich in 
meaning for the present, and leading from that, an instrumental discourse for bolstering supp ort for 
policy action.  Anzac is a powerful unifying discourse because of its unpolitical nature after 
reconciliation with Vietnam veterans and because of its strongly felt resonance within the 
community and therefore has been employed effectively to appeal to unity, a sense of purpose, and 
serve as a lesson for the present.   
 
There is much evidence to support the nationalism entrepreneurship explanation in relation to 
government policy that promotes Anzac at the discursive and social practice level.  The first is the 
largess of government funding for memorial construction and the increase in activity which has 
occurred in that regard, beginning in the 1980s (Inglis, 2008, 381-389), and before the public began 
to respond to Anzac en masse (see Chapter 4).  The second is the government’s willingness to 
memorialise significant anniversaries – Hawke’s trip to Gallipoli for the 75th landing anniversary of  
the landings in 1990, the Australia Remembers program of the mid-1990s marking the end of the 
Second World War, and Howard’s visits to Gallipoli for the 85th and 90th anniversaries.  The third is 
the increased funding of those federal agencies and departments that play a key role in 
memorialisation, as seen in Figure 4.   
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Government funding of war remembrance 
$00,0007 
 
1981-828 1984-85 1989-90 1994-95 1999-00 2004-05 
Australian War 
Memorial9 
6,2 15,2 20,5 33,3 106,5 38,8 
Department of 
Veterans Affairs10 
5,4* 6.1* 10,4* 11,5 36,6 31,6 
Figure 4 – Federal Government Funding of War Remembrance, 1981/82 – 2004/05 
As can be seen, government funding of the Australian War Memorial increased significantly over the 
time period, including significant funding for redevelopment.  Government funding of the 
Commemorative Activities budget of the Department of Veterans Affairs (DVA) also saw signi ficant 
increase over time, and an expansion of its commemorative role beyond its original function of 
maintaining Australian war graves.  Finally, there is the education programs for schools that the DVA  
funds, sending educational materials on Anzac and Gallipoli to schools nationwide (Lake, 2010).  Al l  
these factors provide evidence for the extensive government promotion of Anzac, which provided 
the regular and ongoing reproduction of nationalism which i s essential to the maintenance of 
conceptions of nationality.   This promotion by political elites has helped to further internal ise the 
norms of Anzac.   
 
Prime Ministerial discourses of national identity, and their linked policies of Anzac promotion, 
illuminate the final cumulative, and necessary (but not in itself sufficient) causal reason behind the 
Prime Ministerial adoption of Anzac as being a function of their nationalism entrepreneurship.  This,  
combined with the cumulative preconditions of the previous explanations, comprehensively 
demonstrate the causal reasons behind the Prime Ministerial adoption of Anzac as a central 
nationalist discourse post-1990 – the ground had been set by distance in time, Vietnam 
                                                                 
7 Figures have been adjusted for inflation to 2005 terms, using the Reserve Bank of Australian Inflation Ca lculator 
(http://www.rba.gov.au/calculator/).   
8 This start date has been chosen as the Australian War Memorial Act 1980 and the War Graves Act 1980 introduced 
the contemporary governance, reporting, and funding arrangements, for both these institutions.   
9 Figures from the Australian War Memorial Annual Reports.  The spike in funding 1999-00 can in part be expl ained 
by major capital works carried out at the AWM, including the Bradbury Aircraft Hall and the ANZAC Hal l  exhibition 
facility.   
10 Figures from the Department of Veterans Affairs and Repatriation Commission Annual Reports.  Figures marked * 
come from the Office of Australian War Graves Annual Reports, and reporting of commemoration in these 
publications was l imited to the maintenance of Commonwealth war graves.  From 1994-95, commemorative 
activities were added, in addition to the maintenance of war graves, which was part of the Aus tra lia Remembers  
program (see Chapter 7).  The Office of Australian War Graves reporting was rolled into the DVA’s Annua l  Report i n 
1994-95 too.  The commemorative function was kept as a responsibility by the DVA, and is declared in s ubsequent 
reports.   
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reconciliation, and nationalism as tradition.  Nationalism entrepreneurship explains the causal 
reasons why, given these conditions, Prime Ministers turned to Anzac as a central discourse of 
Australian national identity – Anzac was part of their sense of national identity, they promoted that 
sense of national identity, and they consequently aligned their political visions and pol icy agendas 
with that sense of identity.  An overview of how Prime Ministers have engaged with Anzac is 
provided in the next section of the chapter.   
 
An Overview of the Genre of Prime Ministerial Anzac Day Addresses using Corpus Assisted 
Discourse Analysis  
The second section of the chapter provides an overview of the genre of Prime Ministerial Anzac Day 
addresses and media releases from 1973 – 2007.  In doing so, it seeks to follow CDA’s emphasis upon 
paying attention to the socially embedded nature of language production.  It also aims to clarify 
some aspects of the literature on Anzac by employing corpus assisted discourse analysis to provide a 
quantitative assessment of Anzac Day addresses.  As such, it identifies the various thematic and 
characteristic features of these addresses, including where and when the addresses hav e been 
delivered, and for what purpose; followed by Prime Ministerial representations of Anzac, the themes 
invoked, where Anzac is located and which battles it is associated with, and who Anzac’s agents are.  
As will be shown, whilst Australian Prime Ministers may stick closely to the traditions of Anzac with 
their addresses, they subtly renovate understandings of Anzac in alignment with their policy 
agendas.    
 
Anzac Day: The Speech Setting and Frequency 
In his brief parsing of the of the role of Prime Ministerial rhetoric on Anzac Day, Grube (2013, 55) 
asserts: ‘[f]or Australian prime ministers, it has been a consistent duty of the rhetorical prime 
ministership to speak at a dawn service on ANZAC day – to encompass everything that the day 
means for Australia’s history and the development of its national identity.’  Grube is certainly correct 
in his assessment of the content of Prime Ministerial Anzac Day addresses, but how much truth is 
there to both the consistency of their addresses over time, and the frequency of their dawn service  
speeches, as opposed to other Anzac Day ceremonies?   
  
Figure 5 reports the frequency of Prime Ministerial dawn service addresses, Anzac Day addresses 
falling at a time other than the dawn service, non-Anzac Day addresses, and one recorded message 
to the nation.  During the period under examination, dawn service addresses were demonstrably 
outnumbered by other forms of Anzac Day speeches by two to one.  So, whilst dawn service 
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addresses may be prominent in public memory due to their publicity and stirring imagery, they have 
not been the most frequently employed platform for making an address on Anzac Day.   
 
Anzac Day Address Time 
Other Anzac Day Ceremony 12 52% 
Dawn Service Ceremony 7 31% 
Non-Anzac Day Ceremony 3 13% 
Recorded Message 1 4% 
Figure 5 – Prime Ministerial Anzac Day Addresses by Time of Day, 1973 - 2007 
Further, as Figure 6 shows, it is only since 1990 that Prime Ministers have begun to consistently 
address an Anzac Day audience.  This is not to say that Prime Ministers did not engage with Anzac 
prior to 1990, but that engagement was as primarily as a participant, rather than as the focus or the 
driver of the ceremony.  Finally, Prime Minister’s Anzac Day participation was often more local, 
rather than national or international, as Prime Ministers marked Anzac Day in their local electorates, 
state capital cities, or wherever they may have found themselves on Anzac Day as they conducted 
the business of government.   
 
 
Figure 6 – Prime Ministerial Anzac Day Address and Media Statement Frequency, 1973 - 2007 
Over time, Prime Ministers have increasingly moved away from a more localised commemoration of  
Anzac and marked Anzac Day at a significant site of Australian war remembrance.  As demonstrated 
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in Figure 7, Gallipoli became a prominent site, but this only began with Hawke’s trip there in 199011.   
The Australian War Memorial in the nation’s capital Canberra has increasingly replaced the suburban 
setting of Prime Ministerial Anzac Day remembrance too, with the addresses that have been given 
there occurring after 2000.12  Trips to World War Two sites were conducted in the 1990s by Keating 
to Papua New Guinea in 1992 and by Howard to Thailand in 1998, but notably dropped off after 
2000.   
 
 
Figure 7 - Prime Ministerial Anzac Day Address Location by Period, 1973 - 2007 
As can be seen in the trends in the frequency and location of Prime Ministerial Anzac Day addresses, 
Prime Ministers have moved away from the local roots of Anzac as it was memorialised by the RSL in 
the past.  Instead, Anzac Day has been increasingly marked at significant Australian war sites 
overseas, or at the AWM.  Critical discourse analysis’ emphasis on the socially embedded nature of  
discourses compels us to examine these shifts and the way they reveal the increasing 
institutionalisation of Prime Ministerial Anzac entrepreneurship.  The genre of Anzac Day Prime 
Ministerial addresses has a physical setting, and this setting is relevant as it activates a frame that 
distinguishes it from other genres (Frow 2006, 9-10).  The physical setting of a genre is therefore also 
a social event, constituting what is actual about the genre (Fairclough 2005, 223).  Regarding the 
shift from the local to the national or international stage, the audie nce that consumes these 
                                                                 
11 Hawke made the Gallipoli trip in 1990.  Howard followed in 2000, and again in 2005.  Nota bly, Kea ting did not 
make the trip, with his reticence towards its imperial connotations being conspicuous (Holbrook 2014, 179-192).   
12 Prime Ministerial addresses at the AWM have been given in 2001 and 2003.   
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addresses is being called upon to note the evolution of this social event, with the replacement of the 
RSL as Anzac’s custodian, the growing significance of Anzac in Australian national life, and the central 
role of the Prime Minister and the state in its remembrance.  This lesson is reinforced by the 
frequency of Prime Ministerial Anzac Day addresses.   
 
Genre Chains and Hybridisation 
Prime Ministerial Anzac Day addresses have linked in chains with other genre forms.  Prominently, 
this has included the media release and the interview.  This linking may seem innocuous, but the 
regular linking of these forms demonstrates both the concern of Prime Ministers to engage the 
media in reporting their Anzac Day addresses and activities, and their confidence in the media to 
report this news to an audience eager to consume this story.  An example of this was Howard’s trip 
to visit the troops participating in the Iraq War on Anzac Day 2004 when two addresses were made, 
along with two media releases regarding Anzac Day itself, two media releases on the awarding of 
medals for service, and finally, a doorstop interview on 25 April, and an interview with ABC radio’s 
AM Programme on the morning of 26 April (Howard 2004a; 2004b; 2004c; 2004d; 2004e; 2004f; 
2004g; 2004h).  This burst of activity ensured the maximum positive coverage of the trip (Grattan 
2004, 17), and of Howard’s central messages of supporting and thanking the troops for their service  
and reinforcing the necessity and importance of Australia’s Iraq commitment (see Chapter 9) .   The 
linking of these genres provides evidence of how Prime Ministers have actively engendered the 
coverage of their Anzac Day activities and messages.   
 
Prime Minister’s Anzac Day addresses also demonstrate a high degree of hybridisation of various 
categories of their rhetorical responsibilities.  Grube (2013, 43) identifies six rhetorical genre 
categories that Prime Ministers might fulfil - world leader, party leader, local member, policy 
advocate, national representative, and relationship builder.  The role of Prime Minister as national  
representative is most obviously present in their Anzac Day addresses, but to a greater or lesser 
extent, all these genre forms are evident across the breadth of Prime Ministerial Anzac Day 
addresses under examination here, mixing together two or more genre categories in speeches.  
Hawke, in particular, combined categories – mixing policy advocacy, leadership on the world stage, 
and reaching out to groups whose support he relied upon, in combination with speaking on behalf of 
the nation.  So for example, on Anzac Day 1986 Hawke spoke in Athens and recalle d the sacrifice and 
comradeship of Greeks and Australians during World War Two:  
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These shared experiences from the darkest and most bitter days of defeat have, however, left 
lasting benefits.  
 
For the Australians and other allies who fought alongside their Greek comrades it is the 
staunch friendships which were forged then.   
 
These friendships were tested to the utmost limits and have endured.  They endure not only 
among those who fought but have been passed down to the men and women of succeeding 
generations (Hawke 1986a, 2).   
 
Here Hawke takes on the role of national leader, speaking on behalf of the nation and imbuing Anzac 
with meaning for the Australian people – ‘friendship’ between allies.  Simultaneously, though, 
Hawke was inhabiting the role of world leader, representing Australia to the world and building the 
relationship with Greece, with the friendship between the nations ‘enduring’ and being ‘passed 
down’.  Finally, Hawke was alluding to his role as a policy advocate and relationship builder to 
sections of the domestic audience in Australia, as the Greek diaspora in Australia was an important 
constituency for the Australian Labor Party during the 1980s (Jupp 2000).   
 
Such genre hybridity did sometimes attract dissension when the political intruded via policy 
advocacy.  In 1993, for example, Keating attracted controversy when he linked his government’s 
Asian engagement with Australia’s war history by calling the 8th Division held as Prisoners of War 
(POWs) by Japanese forces in World War Two ‘… the first pioneers of Australia in Asia.  The 
frontiersmen’ (Keating 1993a, 2).  The RSL and the Opposition both responded by condemning the 
Prime Minister for introducing a partisan element to Anzac Day (Brough 1993, 1; see also Chapter 6) .   
Howard’s Iraq trip on Anzac Day 2004 also attracted criticism when it became clear that the trip was 
as much about shoring up support for the contested deployment as it was for thanking the troops 
(Grattan 2004, 17).   
 
Over time, instances of genre hybridisation that included overt partisan policy advocacy have 
become less frequent.  Howard in particular took an active role in engendering this norm.  This is 
certainly not uniform across the corpus, but policy advocacy of the type that saw Keating provoke 
controversy in 1993, or Hawke spruik his government’s record on repatriation benefits in 1989 
(Hawke 1989) or the Labor Party’s defence White Paper in 1991 (Hawke 1991) was gradually 
replaced by Howard with speeches that primarily conformed to the genre category of nati onal 
leader, with allusions to world leader if the address was being hosted by a foreign government in an 
overseas location.  This change over time reflects the growing coalescing of the genre boundaries of  
Prime Ministerial Anzac Day addresses, and their increasing conformity to the sombre and 
nationalistic rituals of Anzac.   
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Thematic and Tonal Representations of Anzac 
The next section will examine the tone and themes evident in Prime Ministerial representations of  
Anzac.  Following Seal (2004, 3-6), it will argue that Anzac can be viewed as a spectrum with the 
‘Anzac tradition’ at one end and the ‘digger tradition’ at the other.  Drawing upon the image of 
national identity expressed in the Australian legend (Ward 1993), the digger tradition is 
characterised by the bottom-up values of the soldiers who fought in World War One - mateship, 
anti-authoritarianism, larrikinism, racism, sentimentality, pity and fear (Seal 2004, 2).  The Anzac 
tradition, on the other hand, consists of the top-down values of officialdom and the state, 
emphasising:  
… a set of attitudes and values within which notions of honour, duty, bravery, sacrifice and 
salvation are central, located particularly within a militarist context.  Overarching these are the 
imperatives of commemoration and remembrance linked with an overpowering aura of 
nationalism, emphasising unity, sameness, heritage, patriotism and loyalty (Seal 2004, 4).    
Whilst Prime Ministers have made reference to the digger tradition, especially to mateship, the 
state-centric themes of service and nationalism that characterise the Anzac tradition fit better with 
their project of presenting Anzac as a unifying discourse of nation and thus have dominated their 
representations of Anzac.  This has important consequences for the rhetorical function and tone 
represented in Prime Minister’s Anzac Day addresses.   
 
Figure 8 reports the coded frequencies of key elements of the di gger and Anzac traditions and 
confirms Seal’s characterisation.  Official representations of Anzac by Prime Ministers strongly 
reference the service and sacrifice of servicemen and servicewomen, their bravery, honour and 
heroism, and lessons for the nation state regarding national unity rather than national diversity.  
These lessons are reinforced by frequent calls to remember and by the sacralisation of Anzac by 
reference to its sacredness.  Further, after 1990, the high rhetoric of the Prime Ministerial A nzac Day 
address genre has increased.  The employment of the Anzac tradition has an important rhetorical 
function.  It asks the audience to remember the values of service, sacrifice and unity, and is 
frequently employed in conjunction with lessons for the present.  These lessons for the present 
often include an explicit or implicit policy agenda, such as Hawke’s hybridisation of  Anzac Day and 
policy speeches in service of his government’s policy, agenda, Howard’s alignment of Anzac with 
justifications for the deployment of Australian troops to the invasion of Iraq, and neoliberal ism and 
economic reform, which was mobilised by Hawke, Keating and Howard.   
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Figure 8 - Prime Ministerial Anzac Day Address and Media Statement Rate of Mentions per Speech to Anzac and Digger 
Traditions, 1973 - 200713 
The digger tradition is not completely absent - the two traditions are linked on a spectrum, not 
separate.  However, the two features that dominate representations of the digger tradition in the 
corpus, mateship and generalised Australianness, only weakly represent the Australian legend that 
the digger tradition draws upon in the contemporary context.  Australianness now has a more plural  
and complex meaning, with Pearson and O’Neill (2009), for instance, arguing that representations of  
Australianness on Australia Day present and celebrate this plurality of contested meanings.    
Regarding mateship, both parties have employed this value, despite its traditional association with 
Labor politics, weakening its connection to the Australian legend.  Dyrenfurth (2015, 201) has 
pointed to the ways that Howard’s version of mateship ‘… seemed to decouple its meaning from 
state interventionism in aid of a more egalitarian and equal society’ in favour of a more conservative 
and economically liberal interpretation of its meaning.  Fraser’s (1979, 5) invocation of mateship as 
one of the ‘great qualities’ of Anzac in 1979, however, reveals that conservative engagement with 
mateship also has a longer history.  These facts reinforce the point that the digger tradition is weakly 
represented by Australian Prime Ministers.   
                                                                 
13 Where the Anzac or digger traditions have been identified, this has been coded in the corpus.  This has c rea ted a  
population of coded mentions, with the rate of mentions of these traditions over time, and per speech, being us ed.  
The Anzac tradition themes n=7: remember; s acrifice; bravery/courage/valour; duty/service; honour; unity; 
sacredness/soul .  The digger tradition themes n=7: mateship or mates; generalised Australianness; humour; 
egalitarianism/fair-go; larrikinism; anti-authoritarianism; fear.   
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The tone of Prime Ministerial Anzac Day addresses reinforces the rhetorical function outlined above, 
with the employment of the Anzac tradition again playing a crucial role.  The digger tradition, with its 
informality, laconic humour, and ambivalence towards the heroism of death, all serve as poor 
foundations upon which to construct the necessary sombre and reverent tone that Australian Prime 
Ministers have employed on Anzac Day to augment their themes and policy agendas.  The Anzac 
tradition, on the other hand, is replete with signifiers of appropriate tone – calls to remember duty , 
honour, and sacrifice invites reflection and reverence, not light-heartedness regarding the larrikin 
exploits of diggers or bitter cynicism about the legacies of war.   
 
The reverence invoked by the tone of the Anzac tradition is also helped by frequent reference to the 
sacredness of Anzac by Prime Ministers.  Sacredness, pilgrimage and spirituality are frequently 
employed as themes by Prime Ministers, ensuring the sanctity of the tone of Anzac.  These 
references are primarily secular, though allusions to the Christian faith also appear.  Such references, 
in combination with more secular references to the nation’s soul, pilgrimage to the sacred site of 
Gallipoli, or the spirituality of the day, all echo the reverent and authoritative tone of  the sermon.  
Further, though, the reference to the Christian faith reinforces the Anglo-Celtic hegemony that 
characterises Prime Ministerial Anzac Day speeches.   
 
On rarer occasions, the tone is not reverential, but patriotic and celebratory.  In particular, McKenna 
has noted calls by Howard after 2001 not only to commemorate Anzac, but also to celebrate it 
(McKenna 2010, 126-127).  Such rhetoric invokes nationalist sentiment, calling upon the audience to 
revel in Anzac’s expression of Australianness.  Calls to celebrate Anzac are certainly evident in 
Howard’s language after 2001, with his 2003 address, for instance, arguing that Anzac: ‘… is about 
the celebration of some wonderful values, of courage, of valour, of mateship, of decency, of a 
willingness as a nation to do the right thing, whatever the cost.’ (Howard 2003a).  But calls to 
celebrate Anzac also have a longer history.  It is evident in the language of Hawke (1989, 4) - ‘Next 
year, we will be celebrating the 75th anniversary of [Anzac]’ - and Keating (1993b, 59) - ‘This visit 
today [to Kokoda] is a celebration of our freedom and our friendship [with PNG] … ’  The call to 
celebrate Anzac is thus characteristic not only of Howard’s Anzac Day addresses, but of  the tone of  
Prime Ministerial Anzac Day addresses more generally, as part of the patriotic sentiment which 
Prime Ministers ask audiences to embrace.   
 
The thematic and tonal characteristics of Prime Ministerial Anzac Day addresses serve particular 
purposes.  Over time, the campaigning and politicking purpose of the hybridised national leader and 
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policy advocate Anzac Day address has been replaced by more singularly national leader rhetoric.  As 
they have done so, the speeches have changed, drawing upon the Anzac tradition to structure the 
thematic and tonal representation of Anzac.  But this does not mean that the policy agenda has 
disappeared from Prime Ministers’ addresses.  Though Howard became more understated in his 
presentation of policy than his predecessors, his representation of Anzac often subtly renov ated 
Australian identity in line with his government’s policy priorities.  Such endeavours have been aided 
by the reverential, sanctified, and patriotic themes and tones of the Anzac tradition that make 
challenges to Prime Ministerial representations of Anzac blasphemous.   
 
Locations of Anzac 
The next section examines where Prime Ministers see Anzac being located and their conservative 
interpretation of Australia’s war history.  The focus has been upon the two World Wars and their 
associated battles, and the honouring of the participants in contemporary Australian Defence Force 
deployments.  Of these factors, Gallipoli has dominated Prime Ministerial interpretation of 
Australia’s war history.  Such an interpretation has an important rhetorical function and contributes 
to the success or failure of Prime Ministers’ speeches.  Figure 9 shows the named frequency of  the 
war or conflict Prime Ministers associate with Anzac.   
 
World War One, the war that established contemporary patterns of remembrance, is mentioned as 
frequently as World War Two, although World War Two’s mentions predominate during the 1990s, 
the decade that saw the 50th anniversary of the end of the war, the Australia Remembers program of 
commemoration, and an attempt by Keating to relocate the meaning of Anzac to Kokoda.  
Contemporary troop deployments in the Iraq conflict of 2003-2011, East Timor, Afghanistan, the 
Solomon Islands, and the War on Terror feature prominently in the 2000s, and the Gulf War features 
in the 1990s.  Prime Ministers have honoured the service of the contemporary Australian Defence 
Force in their speeches, have linked them to the Anzacs of the past, and have sought to use Anzac as 
a platform to legitimise Australian participation in contemporary conflicts (McDonald and Merefie ld 
2010, 195-197).  Prime Ministers have not been bold enough to use Anzac Day as a platform to 
acknowledge and commemorate the wars between Indigenous Australians and white settlers that 
established the modern Australian state, reflecting their general reluctance to incorporate 
Indigenous Australians into their interpretation of Anzac (see below). 14   
 
                                                                 
14 See Inglis (2008) 501-504 for an account of this issue vis a vis the AWM and Howard’s rejection of the inclusion of 
this aspect of Australia’s history in the AWM.   
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Figure 9 - Prime Ministerial Anzac Day Address and Media Statement Frequency of Named War, 1973 - 2007 
Figure 10 reports the named frequency of the site of Anzac for sites with three or more mentions.   
Gallipoli clearly dominates where Prime Ministers see Anzac originating from, with more than four 
times the mentions of the nearest ranked sites of France and Kokoda.  The most significant si tes of  
Anzac are also strongly associated with the two World Wars, with the Battle of Kapyong during the 
Korean War and the Battle of Long Tan during the Vietnam War being the only named exceptions.  
Qualitative analysis of the appearance of the mid-century wars of Korea and Vietnam and their 
associated battles of significance in the corpus reveals that they received little attention by Prime 
Ministers, as they mostly feature in a list of wars and battles to be commemorate d, rather than as 
the focus of commemoration.  An exception to this was Hawke (1989) who, soon after the 
reconciliation of Vietnam veterans with the Australian polity, recalled the controversy of  Vietnam 
and Vietnam veterans’ difficulties when they returned from that failed war.   
 
Only one Prime Minister attempted to relocate understandings of Anzac away from Gallipoli.  
Keating attempted to shift Australian’s understanding of their war history from Gallipoli and World 
War One to the Pacific and World War Two (Curran 2006, 294-295; Holbrook 2014, 179-180) and he 
was responsible (though not solely) for many of the mentions of World War Two and its associated 
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battle sites during the 1990s.  This shift was intimately connected to his political project - an 
Australian republic, an outlook to Asia and a rejection of the deferential conservatism that he argued 
characterised the Coalition’s engagement with Empire and remembrance of war.  The partisan 
nature of this shift attracted significant controversy and was contested by conservative opponents 
and the RSL.   
 
 
Figure 10 - Prime Ministerial Anzac Day Address and Media Statement Frequency of Named Site of Anzac, 1973 - 2007 
The location of Anzac is a crucial element in the rhetorical function of Prime Minister’s Anzac Day 
addresses.  If, as this thesis argues, Prime Minister’s speeches on Anzac Day serve a policy function, 
as well as a commemorative one, then the structure of implication of an address becomes crucial  to 
the speech’s rhetorical role.15  In other words, if Prime Ministers wish to employ Anzac for policy 
ends by associating those policy ends with the positively perceived traditions of Anzac, then they 
must focus upon those aspects that invoke positively perceived background knowledge; the ‘good’ 
wars and battles of the World Wars, and especially upon Gallipoli where the nation is seen to have 
                                                                 
15 According to Frow (2006, 9) the structure of implication is the assumed background knowledge that a genre 
expects the audience to understand.   
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been born.  It comes as little surprise that the conflicts where Australia is interpreted by large 
enough numbers to have committed wrongs (the wars of settlement and Vietnam) are ignored or 
marginalised, as their inclusion would hinder the rhetorical function.  The fact that Keating ran into 
such controversy for a relatively conservative reinterpretation of the location of Anzac demonstrates 
just how crucial adherence to the traditions of Anzac are if rhetorical success is to be ensured.   
 
Anzac’s Agents 
Who have been Anzac’s agents in Prime Ministerial Anzac Day addresses?  Such an analysis is linked 
to CDA’s concern to analyse the structural relations that produce discourses and texts, and reinforce 
these structural relations.  A number of factors will be explored here, including the gender of Anzac’s 
agents, instances of named ethnicity, and the general level of incorporation and acknowledgement 
of diversity in the addresses.  It will be shown that despite considerable academic criticism of the 
hegemony of masculine and Anglo-Celtic identities in Anzac, and activism from the community to 
ameliorate these factors by incorporating difference into representations of Anzac (Bennett 2014; 
Bongiorno 2014), Prime Ministers continue to speak of Anzac in terms that reinforce notions of 
national unity and are negligent of difference.   
 
Beginning with gender, Figure 11 shows the frequency of representations of gender per speech and 
media release in Prime Ministers’ Anzac Day addresses.  Strikingly, women are never identified with 
a gendered noun in isolation in Prime Ministerial Anzac Day addresses and media releases.  The 
phrase ‘men and women’ is used frequently, but men are primarily the agents identi fied by Prime 
Ministers.   
 
Rate of Gendered Nouns In Anzac Day Addresses 
Men Men and Women Women 
1.42 1.00 0.00 
Figure 1116 - Prime Ministerial Anzac Day Address and Media Statement Rate of Gendered Nouns Mentions per Speech, 
1973 - 2007 
Service type can also serve as an imperfect proxy for gender, as nursing is historically associated with 
women and frontline engagement in battle with men.  Such gendered roles, and analysis of how this 
                                                                 
16 Where an agent of Anzac has been identified with a gendered noun, this has been coded in the corpus.  Thi s has 
created a population of coded mentions, with the rate of mentions of gendered nouns per speech being us ed.  The 
same process has been applied to service type in Figure 12.   
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privileges masculine identities, have of course evolved over time, and Prime Ministers have generally 
referred to contemporary agents of Anzac with the conjoined gendered nouns of men and women.  
However, given the historical focus of many Prime Ministerial Anzac Day addresses, service type can 
still demonstrate the gendered nature of Prime Ministerial representations of Anzac’s agents.  Thus, 
Figure 12 reports the frequency per speech of coded instances of service type in the corpus.   
 
Rate of Service Type In Anzac Day Addresses 
Infantry 0.42 
Navy 0.21 
Air Force 0.12 
Nurses 0.00 
Figure 12 - Prime Ministerial Anzac Day Address and Media Statement Rate of Service Type Mentions per Speech, 1973 - 
2007 
Like the gendered noun woman, nursing is never mentioned as a service type.  As such, 
representations of the gender of Anzac’s agents in Prime Minister’s Anzac Day addresses have 
changed little since WAR activists and academics (Lake 1992) began to challenge the gendered 
nature of Anzac in the 1980s.  For the Prime Ministers under examination in this thesis, the central  
national identity discourse of Anzac remained masculine.   
 
Indigenous Australians fared little better than women, featuring in one named mention of ethnicity, 
by Hawke (1991).  In 1991, Hawke was paying tribute to a small group on indigenous people who 
had served during WWII, but had not been formally enlisted, and consequently had not received 
payment for their service.  In contrast, Liberal Prime Ministers have not included reference to 
Indigenous Australians in their Anzac Day addresses.  Regarding diversity more generally, Prime 
Ministers have not tended to use Anzac Day to emphasise the diversity of the nation during this 
period.  This stands in contrast to the competing and contested plurality of meanings and identi ties 
celebrated on Australia Day (Pearson and O’Neill 2009).  Howard especially tended to emphasise 
national unity over diversity, repeatedly utilising the refrain that Anzac represented na tional  unity 
and common purpose17.  Other Prime Ministers have been less reticent.  Keating argued that the 
POWs of World War Two ‘…found in all sorts of circumstances that they shared common human 
                                                                 
17 See, for instance, Anzac Day 2002: ‘It [Anzac] has remained relevant not to glorify war or to paint some romantic  
picture of our history but to draw upon a great example of unity and common purpose’ or  Anza c Da y 2000: ‘We 
come to draw upon their stirring example of unity and common purpose’ (Howard 2000a; Howard 2002a).   
62 
 
ground with people they had, for cultural and historical reasons, been inclined to  patronise or 
despise’ and that there was a lesson in that for Australians as they engaged with Asia (Keating 
1993a, 3).   
 
These examples demonstrate how Anzac’s entrepreneurs had a mixed record regarding the 
expansion of the identity boundaries of Anzac.  Whilst Anzac has largely remained a nationalist 
discourse associated with the hegemony of Anglo-Celtic and masculine identities, it did not remain 
exclusively so.  However, the extent to which Prime Ministers present diversity has largely continued 
to be dependent on outsider groups conforming to the hegemonic strictures demanded by Anzac, 
and the attendant compliance with its values of service, sacrifice and duty to the state.   
 
Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter has been to provide an overview to the remainder of the thesis.  
Following the discourse-historical method, it has done so in order to provide as much detailed 
background to the analysis as possible to Prime Ministerial Anzac entrepreneurship.  In the process, 
it has demonstrated the cumulative causality behind the Prime Ministerial turn to Anzac, and set out 
the situation and themes of the genre of Prime Ministerial Anzac Day addresses.  Having done so 
allows us to more clearly observe the operation of causality, and the evolution of the add resses, 
behind Prime Ministerial Anzac entrepreneurship.   
 
In doing so, the chapter has attempted to establish both the causality behind the Prime Ministerial  
turn to Anzac, and the nature of that engagement once the turn had been made, in a more 
systematic manner than has been attempted in the literature before.   It has done so by applying 
both qualitative and quantitative analysis of the available evidence.  Some conclusions can be drawn 
having conducted this analysis:  
1. The causality behind the Prime Ministerial turn to Anzac is multiple and difficult to sort 
through.  Nationalism entrepreneurship captures the multi-causal reasons behind this shi ft 
by taking account of both the social processes and structures that Prime Ministers must 
operate within, and the enormous agency they have as political elites with access to the 
power resources of the state.  In the end, and despite their power, Prime Ministers have 
only been successful (and not always consistently successful) in their Anzac 
entrepreneurship because they have delivered a form of nationalism that the Australian 
people have identified with, and the Australian people have accepted as essential, taken for 
granted, and unpolitical.   
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2. Quantitative analysis of these changes confirms some theoretical assumptions in the 
literature.  Firstly, Seal’s (2004) Anzac/digger tradition has been confirmed in analysis of  the 
corpus, with the state orientated Anzac tradition being strongly evident.  Secondly, critics 
who have pointed to the masculine and Anglo-Celtic hegemony of Anzac also have their 
suspicions confirmed, as analysis of the Anzac’s agents has shown a general lack of diversity.   
3. Quantitative analysis has also shown some deficiencies in the literature.  Firstly, the fact that 
march and dawn service attendances tend to rise after governments begin to promote 
Anzac from 1990 suggests that the public is responding to their nationalism 
entrepreneurship, rather than the other way around.  Also regarding attendances, we should 
exercise caution when it is claimed that ‘record crowds’ have attended Anzac Day, as recent 
dawn service attendances have not matched the early 1960s highs of the marches.  
Secondly, analysis of the corpus reveals that some of the features that Prime Ministerial 
Anzac Day addresses that have been attributed to particular agents (especially Howard), 
such as celebration of Anzac and co-option of  the Australian legend, have longer histories.   
The analysis in this chapter of the causality behind the Prime Ministerial turn to Anzac, and the 
genre of their Anzac Day addresses, provides a base for us to observe in more detail the evolution of  
these factors in the remaining chapters of this thesis.   
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CHAPTER 4 
From Contestation to Reconciliation: Anzac Under Whitlam, Fraser 
and Hawke, 1972-1987 
 
Anzac was in a state of flux from 1972 to 1987.  At the beginning of this period, the divisions of the 
Vietnam War, the election of the reformist Whitlam government, and the move away from Bri ti sh -
based expressions of Australian identity all presented challenges to the public expression of  Anzac.  
As Holbrook (2014, 121) notes:  
By the 1970s, the gulf between the meaning that the old diggers attributed to the Anzac 
legend and that imputed by younger people seemed impossible to bridge.  A martial 
nationalist ideology, anchored in ideas of racial supremacy and Empire, had stoked the Anzac 
legend for half a century.  As the pillars of this ideology were dismantled, so the legend itself 
collapsed.   
This process had begun before the 1970s (see Holbrook 2014, 117-120; Macleod 2002), but by the 
beginning of the decade, an apathetic public was increasingly uninterested in the annual 
commemoration of Anzac.  As shown in Chapter 3, the number of Australians turning out to Anzac 
Day parades and dawn services began to dwindle appreciably by the middle of the decade and this 
trend continued throughout most of the 1980s.  The legacy of the Vietnam War, and then new 
tensions regarding the conduct of the Cold War and nuclear weapons during the 1980s, meant that 
militarism was a hotly contested issue in the public sphere.  The prominence of social movement 
contestation of Australianness and the national interest contributed to a public discourse that was 
antithetical to the values that Anzac had been traditionally associated with – Empire, militarism, 
conservatism, masculinity, violence and whiteness.   These factors contributed to the re luctance of  
political elites to place Anzac at the centre of conceptions of national identity.  But by the late 1980s, 
the reconciliation of Vietnam veterans with the wider Australian body politic saw newly emerging 
norms regarding Anzac’s commemoration that reasserted the centrality of Anzac and sanctioned the 
contestation of Anzac’s conservative meaning.   
 
This chapter seeks to explore this shift in Anzac, and the Prime Ministers’ changing role in 
commemoration, by tracing the thread of Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac through the 
period from 1972 to 1987.  It does so in four parts that examine the social context that was dri ving 
changes to Anzac, Prime Ministers’ engagement with Anzac, and their Anzac Day speeches:  
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1. The first section sets out the nature of Anzac’s decline as a central national narrative from 
the 1960s until the 1980s.  The Vietnam War, changing conceptions of  the Australianness, 
evolving senses of the political influenced by new social movements, and these social 
movements’ direct contestation of Anzac, were all factors that problematised Anzac, and 
contributed to poor Anzac Day attendances and concern about Anzac’s continued relevance.   
2. Here the chapter acknowledges that despite these challenges, Anzac never disappeared, and 
that it was supported by a range of actors.  This section examines the counter-narratives 
that supported Anzac – resistance to challenges to the traditional, conservative, and martial  
version of Anzac that was championed by the RSL; renovation of Anzac by cultural agents, 
such as historians and film makers, who reimagined Anzac with a new assertive 
Australianness that played down Anzac’s traditional British and martial origins, and 
emphasised new nationalism, tragedy and trauma; and recognition, where disowned and 
ignored Vietnam veterans pushed their claim to be included in the story of Anzac, which was 
accommodated with reconciliation.   
3. The chapter then sets out the engagement of Prime Ministers with Anzac’s commemoration, 
and their infrequent speeches.  Reflecting the role of the RSL in Anzac’s commemoration, 
and Anzac’s contested nature, Prime Ministerial participation with Anzac during  this time 
tended to be more sporadic, more local, and less spectacular than it has been in more recent 
times.  Prime Ministers did still participate in Anzac’s remembrance, however, this 
commemoration was primarily as a participant, rather than as an instigator, of the occasion.  
Significantly, whilst Hawke displayed some of these tendencies with his participation at this 
time, he also displayed early signs of Anzac entrepreneurship, especially regarding Vietnam 
veterans and their agitation for recognition.   
4. Finally, the chapter explores the reconciliation of Vietnam veterans with the wider 
Australian body politic, represented by the welcome home parade in October 1987. I  argue 
that the form that this reconciliation took was ‘restorative justice’ (Schaap 2005, 13-15), 
which restored the place of Anzac in Australian cultural and political life, but had the effect 
of limiting contestation of Anzac and the form that it took.  This is the crucial tipping point 
where Anzac becomes unpolitical, as to contest Anzac’s meaning and centrality would be to 
reoffend.  Once reconciled, Anzac increased in prominence as an ideograph: 
An ideograph is an ordinary language term found in political discourse.  It is a high-
order abstraction representing collective commitment to a particular but equivocal 
and ill-defined normative goal.  It warrants the use of power, excuses behaviour 
and belief which might otherwise be perceived as eccentric or antisocial, and 
guides behaviour and belief into channels easily recognized by a community as 
acceptable and laudable… (McGee 1980, 15).   
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The unpolitical reconciliation of Vietnam veterans with the Australian public interacted with Anzac 
to create an unpolitical ideograph that presented Anzac as essential and incontestable.  This 
demarcated Anzac as a sphere where the politics of deliberation and contestation was not to occur.  
Anzac’s status as an ‘unpolitical’ ideograph meant that Prime Ministers could engage with Anzac, i f  
they were skilful enough to do so, in a manner that aligned Anzac with new, contemporary meanings 
that were depoliticised, and difficult and taboo to contest.   
 
Building upon the process tracing of Chapter 3, I argue that the progression of these trends is crucial  
to an understanding of the Prime Ministerial turn to Anzac, and the form of Anzac that Prime 
Ministers engendered after 1990 that will examined in the remaining chapters of the thesis.   
 
Anzac in Decline 
The post-war period had seen the slow decline of Anzac as a central nationalist narrative, with 
publically expressed concerns regarding the proper and continued observance of Anzac Day being 
evident as early as the 1950s (Holbrook 2014, 116-118).  The debut of Alan Seymour’s play The One 
Day of the Year in 1961 caused controversy with its critical treatment of the sentimental and 
unquestioning acceptance of Anzac Day and its drunken commemoration.  By 1965, and the 
beginning of Australia’s involvement in the Vietnam conflict, Macleod (2002, 151) notes a certain 
ambivalence in the media coverage of that year’s Anzac Day and examination of whether the day 
would continue to hold the same significance.   
 
Australia in the 1960s was, however, largely conservative (see Jordens 2009, 75-76; Cochrane 2009, 
165), despite popular memory of the decade as one of radicalism and social change centred on the 
opposition to the Vietnam conflict and the radicalisation of university students.  In particular, 
Jordens (2009) argues that Australia’s youth had a deferential attitude towards authority, ref lected 
in opinion polling on the question of the Vietnam conflict and conscription.  Further, the 
conservative Liberal/Country Coalition won four elections during the decade, in 1961, 1963, 1966 
and 1969.  During this time, Australians were largely happy to allow Anzac Day to be se l f -governed 
by the RSL and watch respectfully (if sometimes uncomfortably) from a distance (Macl eod 2002, 
150).   
 
Opposition to Anzac Day and its memorialisation began to become more entrenched as the war in 
Vietnam continued and hostility towards conscription began to grow.  Inglis (2008, 358-361) notes 
several, largely sporadic, instances of defacement of war memorials during the second hal f  on the 
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1960s, up until the end of Australia’s involvement in Vietnam.  In particular, 1971 saw the bashing of  
the sole guard of Melbourne’s Shrine of Remembrance by unknown assailants before they painted 
‘P.E.A.C.E.!’ on the columns along the front of the Shrine.  Sporadic, small scale protests on Anzac 
Day were also evident (Curran and Ward 2010, 198), though dwarfed in size and significance by the 
larger Moratorium marches.  One protest also occurred during the return of Australian servicemen 
from Vietnam, when a 21 year old Nadine Jensen, doused in red paint, smeared marching soldier’s 
uniforms in 1966 (Curthoys 1994, 129).  Save Our Sons, a women-led movement, staged a silent 
protest on Anzac Day 1966 at the Melbourne Shrine of Remembrance and led other such protests at 
events when conscripts left for Vietnam (Jordens 2009, 79).  More generally, the anti -war movement 
that sprang up surrounding the Vietnam War, the well -attended and publicised Moratorium 
marches, and the increasing pessimism surrounding the conflict after the 1968 Tet Offensive and Mỹ  
Lai Massacre, all helped to problematise Anzac as a central national discourse (Curthoys 2009, 156; 
Curran and Ward 2010, 197-198; Donaldson and Lake 2010, 88-90).   
 
By the time the ALP had been elected to government in 1972, the observance and acceptance of 
Anzac Day as a central national commemorative date had been challenged.   This decline was 
reflected in government policy during the 1970s.  The British race patriotism that had dominated 
Australian political life until this point was being replaced with ‘new nationalism’ (Curran and Ward 
2010) and the beginnings of multiculturalism.  There was little place for Anzac in the multicul tural , 
post-Vietnam nationalism of the Whitlam government, and as symbolic policy changes, such as the 
favouring of an Australian honours system over the traditional imperial honours system, the 
changing of the national anthem, and funding Australian arts and cultural programs, were instituted.  
Further, whilst the dismissal of the Whitlam government in 1975 saw the return of the Coal i tion to 
government, it did not see a corresponding reassertion of older forms of national identity.  Fraser’s 
abandonment of some of the symbols of new nationalism, for example, reverting to the use of  ‘God 
Save the Queen’ as the national anthem and returning to recommending Australians for imperial 
honours, sat alongside the retainment of elements of Whitlam’s reformist government, prominently, 
multiculturalism and its associated identity discourses (Brett 2003, 157-185; Curran 2006, 173-175).  
Fraser, like Whitlam, grappled with the political need to develop a more inclusive and distinctly 
Australian identity, following the post-war influx of immigration and the collapse of British forms of  
identity.  By the time Hawke was elected in 1983, these changes had become entrenched, and a 
return to the British race patriotism that had sustained Anzac up until this period of time seemed 
more unlikely than ever.   
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Attendances at Anzac Day parades declined during this period as Anzac became a neglected, and 
sometimes contested, feature of Australian identity and national discourse.  Dawn service 
attendances also declined during this period, though Canberra’s attendances remained more robust 
than Sydney’s of Melbourne’s (see Chapter 3).  Curran and Ward (2010, 197) note that this period 
saw newspapers reflect upon the decline, with The Australian (1977, 6) musing ‘is it that we are 
remembering an anachronism?’ and the Canberra Times and The Sydney Morning Herald both 
reporting upon the small town of Gundaroo that ‘forgot’ to mark Anzac Day and had left the local 
memorial unattended and choked by weeds (Canberra Times 1979: 1; Ellercamp 1979, 2).   
 
Further challenging Anzac in the 1970s and early 1980s was the evolution of social movements, 
moving beyond the anti-war movement into newly political spheres of social life.  For example, the 
Tasmanian Wilderness Society had campaigned successfully against the damming of the Franklin 
River and had contributed significantly to the placing of environmental issues onto the national 
agenda and to the spread of like-minded groups (Papadakis 1990, 343-4).  The Sydney Gay and 
Lesbian Mardi Gras evolved from a protest in 1978 to a celebratory parade in 1981 and signalled the 
increasing prominence and success of the gay rights movement (Marsh and Galbraith 1995, 301-
306).  Both movements challenged previously held conceptions of Australianness and the 
boundaries of political action.  Further, the period saw continued contestation and questioning of 
militarism, along with increasingly radical and confrontationist opposition from some groups 
regarding these matters.  The early 1980s was a time of heightened Cold War tension, and the 
peace, anti-nuclear and environmental social movements were active in contesting previously 
settled conceptions of the national interest and Australia’s defence posture (Elder 2005, 74).  The 
Palm Sunday anti-nuclear rallies of the early to mid-1980s saw a peak of support in 1985 as 170,000 
marched in support in Sydney (Smith 2001, 43).  Popular culture also supported these movements, 
with bands like Midnight Oil promoting a broadly radical environmental, anti -nuclear, and peace 
message through the 1980s and 1990s, and Red Gum releasing their anti-war ballad to the returned 
Vietnam veteran, ‘I Was Only 19’, in 1983.   
 
In addition to these more generalised social movement activities, Anzac Day saw direct contestation 
and protest action by activists (Twomey 2013, 100-101).  The radical feminist group Women Against 
Rape conducted a number of protests on Anzac Days in the early to mid-1980s at several capital ci ty 
locations around Australia.  Their purpose was to challenge the mythology of Anzac Day by 
emphasising rape in war, militarism, and male violence, as part of a broader radical feminist activist 
agenda to emphasise ‘…the way rape has been used in war and in “peace” to keep women under 
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control’ (Howe 1995, 305).  Howe (1995, 304) argues that WAR activism on Anzac Day was not 
particularly concerned with deconstructing and analysing the peculiarities of the Australian 
experience of wartime and the way the Anzac narrative privileged masculine understandings of 
Australianness, and instead attempted to broaden the meaning of the day to include:  
…the universal experience of women in war.  Instead of focusing on the nationhood 
(manhood) myth enshrined in the Anzac Day tradition, women participating in Anzac Day 
marches have sought to reclaim the day as a day of mourning and, at the same time, to 
broaden the meaning of Anzac Day to include women of all nations who have suffered in 
wartime… 
Feminist protest activity on Anzac Day had origins as early as 1977 (Twomey 2013, 98), and by 1980 
and 1981, WAR activists in Canberra had sought to join the Anzac Day parade, and were blocked by 
police and some were arrested (Elder 2005, 71-72).  The words DEAD MEN DON’T RAPE were 
sprayed onto a wall near the Sydney cenotaph in time for Anzac Day 1983, and 168 WAR activists 
were arrested in Sydney that year after attempting to join the march, in defiance of a court order 
(Odlum 1983, 3).  Marches and vigils were conducted on Anzac Days in other capital cities during this 
period too (Inglis 2008, 440-441).  WAR activity began to decline in the late-1980s as disagreements 
about the effectiveness and appropriateness of these protests drained the impetus to follow 
through with continued action (Inglis 2008, 441-442), due in part to WAR activists falling prey to 
nationalist sympathies when criticising Australian personnel (Elder 2005, 78).   
 
Less prominently, there was also disquiet from gay activists regarding Anzac during this period.  In 
1982, the Gay Ex-Service Persons Association (GESPA) advertised a meet-up on Anzac Day in a 
Melbourne newspaper and asked the Victorian RSL for permission to lay a wreath at the Melbourne 
Shrine of Remembrance, which was ostensibly granted by the president of the Victorian RSL, Bruce 
Ruxton (Hirst 1982, 13).  Nicoll (2001, 192) argues that ‘…along with women and their “hysterical” 
shell-shocked counterparts, homosexual diggers were excluded from the [Australian War] 
Memorial’s celebration of national identity’.  This exclusion was also present in Melbourne in 1982, 
as Ruxton himself prevented GESPA representatives from laying a wreath on Anzac Day.  Citing 
GESPA’s failure to lay their wreath at the allotted time as the reason for their exclusion, Ruxton went 
on to note:  
I don’t mind poofters in the march but they must march with their units.  We didn’t want them 
to lay a wreath because we didn’t want anything to do with them.  We certainly don’t 
recognise them and they are just another start to the denigration of Anzac Day (Ruxton, as 
cited by O’Callaghan 1982, 3).   
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Note the sublimation of difference by Ruxton here – gay ex-service personnel could not be excluded 
from the parade itself due to their war service, but the acceptance of their presence was only 
extended if they remained silent and unrecognisable.  Actions that promoted difference and stepped 
outside the acceptable limits of conduct were actively prohibited by Anzac’s guardian, the RSL.  Elder 
(2005, 73) notes the difficulty of protesting on Anzac Day, as the nationalistic nature of the occasion 
emphasises homogeneity over heterogeneity, and the sacralised composition of Anzac rituals invites 
introspection and silence over contestation and protest.  For their part, GESPA expressed their 
disappointment at being prevented from laying a wreath on this occasion and denounced Rux ton as 
‘a very bigoted man’ (O’Callaghan 1982, 3).  In following years, GESPA representatives were 
reportedly permitted to lay a wreath at the Shrine of Remembrance in 1983, but were again refused 
permission in 1984 (Humphries 1984, 4).   
 
Further protest activity was undertaken by activists when flour was thrown on the prison officers’ 
band that was marching in Sydney on Anzac Day 1984, with a ‘clandestine’ group called the 
Prisoners’ United Militant Activists claiming responsibility.  A spokesperson said: ‘To have ‘screws’ 
marching alongside world war veterans is the ultimate hypocrisy.  The wars were supposed to keep 
us free and yet internal oppression continues and the police and screws are the cause of the greatest 
and most insidious loss of freedom’ (Roberts 1984, 3).  Whilst treated by police as a minor incident, 
the act further demonstrated the breadth of radical activism that was associated with Anzac Day 
during the period.   
 
In sum, the challenge to Anzac during this period was profound, with Anzac being challenged directly 
and indirectly in a radical manner in the public sphere by a range of new social movements and 
activist organisations.  The challenge to Anzac had moved from largely isolated and small scale 
actions, in the 1960s and 1970s, to a more frequent, more collective, and very public, confrontation.  
Not only that, but the public was responding to this new environment by continuing the trend of 
turning out to Anzac Day parades and dawn services in smaller numbers.  Anzac, and its primacy in 
the national narrative, was being contested head on.  A process of politicisation had intruded into 
the previously essential nationalistic sphere of Anzac and introduced politics and contestation.   
 
Holding the Line: Counter-Narratives of Resistance, Renovation and Recognition.   
Despite the challenges that Anzac faced during this period, it did not die out.  Resistance, renovation 
and reconciliation were all themes that sections of Australian culture and politics mobilised in 
support of Anzac.  The RSL resisted change, fulminating against the subversive social movements 
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that sought to challenge the RSL’s previously hegemonic version of national identity.  Culturally, Bi l l 
Gammage’s book The Broken Years and Peter Weir’s film Gallipoli reimagined the British race 
patriotism of the Gallipoli campaign by viewing the operation with a critical eye regarding the 
failures of British command, imbuing Anzac with fresh meaning for Australian new nationalists (Inglis 
2008, 415-417; Holbrook 2014).  Finally, Vietnam veterans who felt aggrieved by their treatment 
after their return from war and from their exclusion from the pantheon of Anzac pressed for 
recognition, which the state and the Australian body politic accommodated with steps towards 
reconciliation.  These changes were occurring in a social context where the trauma of war was 
increasingly recognised medically and discursively in the local and international sphere.  This change 
had the effect of challenging the martial and heroic former basis of Anzac, and assisted the 
reimagination of Anzac (Twomey 2013).   
 
Resistance 
The RSL, as the custodian of Anzac, resisted its decline.  Holbrook (2014, 118) demonstrates that the 
RSL had been warning against what it viewed as complacency regarding Anzac as early as the 1950s, 
as the generation who had fought WWI began to pass away.  By 1965, Macleod (2002, 151-152) 
notes a newspaper interview with the NSW president of the RSL for Anzac Day, and his failure to 
recognise, when prompted, that many people saw Anzac Day as a glorification of war.  When a f lare  
was used to ignite wreaths in an apparent protest at Sydney’s Anzac Day in 1972, the RSL’s NSW 
president Colin J. Hines fulminated ‘It was an insult to the memory of those who paid the supreme 
sacrifice to keep this country free, and to every man, woman and child in Australia’ (The Sydney 
Morning Herald 1972, 2).  The hegemony of Anzac in the RSL’s version of unified and homogenous 
national identity is revealed by Hines’ declarative grammatical mood, with his assertion that ‘every’  
Australian was insulted by these actions, as if contestation of Anzac by any person was unthinkable.  
Such rhetoric also provides evidence for the RSL’s self-perceived role as a defender of conservative 
vision of Australian national identity during this time (Donaldson and Lake 2010, 79-80). 
 
As has already been noted, one of the RSL’s most vehement and conservative defenders of Anzac 
during this period was Victoria’s Bruce Ruxton.  Ruxton often found himself at the centre of an Anzac 
Day controversy during the early 1980s, resisting the social movement activism that Anzac Day was 
attracting.  As a further example, the denigration of Anzac Day was a theme that Ruxton had 
warmed to in an interview with The Australian newspaper published on Anzac Day, 1982, where he 
saw Anzac as being under threat from many of the new social movements noted above:  
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I think it [GESPA] could be a concerted effort by anti-heritage groups to destroy the march… I 
just think there is a fair bit of heritage bashing at the moment.  We had Women Against Rape 
in Canberra last year, there is some trouble in Sydney, there’s gays in Melbourne and now we 
are having trouble with some of the ethnics in Victoria.  I certainly believe there is a deliberate 
campaign by some people in this country to destroy Anzac Day (Ruxton, as cited by Hirst 1982, 
13).   
Ruxton’s claim that there was a ‘concerted effort’ to coordinate a unified campaign against Anzac 
during the early 1980s (as opposed to the actions of individual activist groups seeking to pursue their 
individual goals) seems paranoid, based upon the available evidence.  However, Ruxton’s views 
reflect the RSL’s tendency during this period to be a force for conservative resistance against the 
social and political forces that were challenging Anzac.  Whilst the passage of time has proven that 
the RSL largely failed to defend its conservative view of Anzac and Australian national identity, it 
remained a powerful and prominent voice in Anzac’s defence during this period, actively policing i ts 
boundaries.   
 
Renovation and Re-imagination 
Several scholars have pointed to the cultural reimagining of Anzac that was occurring during the late  
1970s and early 1980s (see Inglis 2008, 415-417; Curran and Ward 2010, 247-248; McKenna 2010, 
116-117; Holbrook 2014, 126-142, Twomey 2013).  Whilst some social movement activists of the 
period rejected Anzac, more sympathetic cultural agents renovated Anzac for a time that could no 
longer countenance ideals of British race patriotism and overt militarism, and instead emphasised a 
more ambivalent, traumatic, and tragic version of Anzac.  Particularly influential agents in this 
process were academic and lay historians, and filmmakers.   
 
Historians played an important role in providing an empirical basis for this renovation of Anzac, with  
academic Bill Gammage being particularly prominent in this process.  His book The Broken Years: 
Australian soldiers in the Great War (1974) was a social history, drawing upon the diaries and letters 
of the soldiers who had fought on the frontline.  Gammage (1974, xiii; emphasis in the original)  was 
at pains to point out that his work was ‘…not a military history of the First AIF.’  Such a distinction 
was important, as Gammage’s project was less about echoing the heroism and martial national ism 
that had characterised C.E.W. Bean’s military history, and that had previously sustained Anzac, and 
instead emphasised tragedy as its theme (Inglis 2008, 416; Holbrook 2014, 133).  Gammage was also 
frank when discussing the AIF’s less heroic deeds and the perceived de ficiencies of the British 
(Holbrook 2014, 133), providing a more ambivalent reading of Anzac.  Also reinforcing this social 
history renovation of Anzac was a small body of lay history, produced by family historians who were 
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keen to explore their family members’ experience of war.  This was a trend that was protean in the 
first half of the 1980s, but exploded especially after 1990 (Holbrook 2014, 145).  These historians 
helped reimagine Anzac, engendering a more personal and tragic empirical basis for Anzac.    
 
This newly renovated basis for Anzac was employed by Peter Weir and David Williamson in the f i lm 
Gallipoli (1981).  Inglis (2008, 416) notes that Gammage’s Broken Years served as an ‘inspiration and 
guide’ for the film, and he worked as a historical consultant during its production.  Weir played with 
the possibilities that Gammage’s work had opened up, and he seized upon the opportunity to 
reimagine Anzac for a contemporary audience (Curran and Ward 2010, 247-248; Holbrook 2014 138-
139).  This involved ‘…distancing the Anzac Corps from its primary function (killing Turks, entirely 
absent from the film), and turning the culture of imperial loyalty on its head so that the British 
emerged as the principle foe’ (Curran and Ward 2010, 247).  In Gallipoli, the AIF is not an Imperial 
force displaying heroic deeds and sacrifice against a racially imagined Turkish enemy.  The Anzacs are 
instead tragic figures, sacrificed by the callous and incompetent British, with the story serving as an 
allegory for an audience enamoured with new nationalism.  Similar anti-British themes were also 
adopted by other films and TV programs of the period that dealt with Australia’s war history (Curran 
and Ward 2010, 248).   
 
In sum, there was a cultural renovation of Anzac during the period, as cultural agents working within 
the context of the decline of British race patriotism and new nationalism reworked Anzac for a 
contemporary audience.  Caution needs to exercised regarding causation here – as has been shown, 
Anzac was still very much a contested national narrative during this period, neglected and 
sometimes rejected.  However, the protean renovation of Anzac during this time helped create a 
basis for a new Anzac, more suitable for the times, and one that has proved to have the potential  to 
resist decline.   
 
Recognition 
By the early 1980s, and in the context of continued narratives of contestation and resistance 
surrounding Anzac, Vietnam veterans began to organise politically, seeking recognition and 
reconciliation.  Some veterans had expressed dissatisfaction with the widespread apathy, 
indifference, and even hostility to their experience demonstrated by successive  governments and 
the wider public after their return from war.  In particular, they emphasised the traumatic 
experience of their participation in war, and their position not as agents of failed Western 
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imperialism in South East Asia, as they had been discursively portrayed by the anti -war movement, 
but as victims of the horrific physical and psychological impact of war.   
 
Vietnam veterans were further unhappy that they had been excluded from the story of Anzac.  As 
Dixon (2010, 127) notes:  
…in many respects, while Vietnam veterans have stood outside the Anzac mythology, and have 
presented their claims in terms of the unique nature of their experiences and (mis)treatment, 
their experiences, their stories, and even their grievances, constitute a quest for incorporation, 
and attempt to contribute to and become part of the Anzac legend.  
This experience was not universal amongst Vietnam veterans.  Some veterans experienced few 
problems upon their return and continued on their lives much as they had before active service, or 
even resented the image of the broken and sick Vietnam veteran (Ross 2009, 197).  Importantly, 
however, the wider discourse has been one where Vietnam veterans had been discursively omitted 
from the story of Anzac during the 1970s and 1980s (Doyle 2002, 78; Dixon 2010, 135).  The public 
and the state had begun to lose interest in Anzac, no memorials were erected in the landscape to 
mark the sacrifice of Vietnam veterans, and the state and the RSL seemingly cared little for veterans’ 
concerns about the ongoing effects of Agent Orange or their damaged mental health.  So, whilst the 
Australian public went about their lives largely ignorant or ambivalent about the experience of 
Vietnam veterans, a significant number of veterans were left feeling betrayed and neglected.  As one 
veteran interviewed in the late 1980s expressed:  
It’s not that I was ashamed I was in Vietnam, but I’d been given the feeling I should be 
ashamed.  I mean it was obvious at that time we were going to lose, so you had no comeback.  
For a man that was a dedicated Australian, and thought I was doing the right thing, it was very 
hurtful…   
We were fighting a war that was not only unpopular, no one had a clue where we were.  Young 
blokes of twenty were dying for their country through no choice of their own, and the people 
didn’t know and couldn’t care less (Brett and Moran 2006, 86).   
The divide between veterans and the wider community was exacerbated by the socio-economic and 
political gap between the two groups who drove conceptions of the Vietnam War.  The mostly 
conservative, rural and lower-middle class and working-class veterans, and the urban, middle-class 
anti-war movement participants did not generally interact or mix socially (Curthoys 1994, 130), so all  
the opposing groups were left with were impressions and stereotypes about the experiences, 
politics and emotions of each other.   
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To respond to the neglect of government, the failure of the RSL to address their agenda, and 
especially to press for an investigation into the effects of exposure to Agent Orange, the Vietnam 
Veterans Association (VVA, and formerly the Vietnam Veterans Action Association) began to 
coalesce as a pressure group in 1979-80 (Ross 2009, 195).  It was successful in presenting itself as the 
voice of veterans, despite differences amongst veterans regarding the need for political 
representation.  The normal avenue for such representation would have normally been the RSL, but 
veterans had fallen out with this avenue of policy access over two main concerns.  Firstly,  V ietnam 
veterans clashed with the RSL over the course of action on Agent Orange and the need for a Royal 
Commission into its effects and, secondly, many veterans felt unwelcome or unwanted in local  RSL 
branches or had openly clashed with RS League and club members over their ostracism (Ross 2009, 
197).   
 
The VVA was an active pressure group, and was successful in lobbying the federal government to 
take action on veteran health problems, including both mental and physical trauma, in pressing for 
studies into veterans’ health complaints and for a Royal Commission into the effects of Agent 
Orange, which the Hawke government instituted.  However, the Royal Commission did not find in 
favour of the VVA’s concerns about the effects of Agent Orange.  In addition, a proposal to continue 
research into veteran mortality, after a pilot study, was declined funding by the federal government 
(Doyle 2002, 84).  So, pressure group activity by the VVA during the first half of the 1980s had seen 
some success, but the full agenda certainly had not been recognised by government.  As Ross (2009, 
198) argues, veterans of the Vietnam War ‘…want recognition, reconciliation; they want the 
community to be grateful to ex-servicemen and respect them for having served in Vietnam.’  The 
VVA’s lobbying actions during the first half of 1980s were the expression of a desire for recognition 
from the government and the public that had ignored their sacrifice and had failed to incorporate 
them into national narratives of Anzac.   
 
Prime Ministerial Engagement with Anzac, 1972 – 1987 
It was in this ambivalent context that Prime Ministers engaged with Anzac during the 1970s and 
early 1980s.  What frequently characterised the nature of their role in the commemoration of 
Australia’s war history during this period was a tendency to be a participant in that commemoration, 
with the focus of the day on the diggers themselves during the dawn service and march.  This stands 
in contrast to later engagement, when the numbers marching declined as the diggers aged and 
passed away, and which tended to see Prime Ministers play a more prominent role as they drove 
and led the commemoration of Anzac Day.  As such, Prime Ministers’ engagement with Anzac used 
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to tend to occur more infrequently, and to take the form of being local, and of being understated 
and less spectacular.  The few speeches that were made by Prime Ministers  reflected these 
tendencies, and Anzac Day was sometimes ignored as the business of government and partisan 
politics continued as per usual.  Whitlam and Fraser both consistently reflected this pattern, though 
Hawke began to demonstrate both these elements, and early signs of Anzac entrepreneurship, with 
his engagement with Anzac during this period.   
 
Prime Ministers as Participants 
Prime Ministers frequently took part in Anzac Day from 1973 to 1987, but this contribution was 
usually as a participant in the proceedings, rather than as a driver or focus of the commemoration.  
As has been noted, the RSL remained the custodian of Anzac during this period, and the organisation 
of the day reflected the RSL’s concern to see that the focus of the day’s commemoration would 
remain upon the ex-service personnel whom the day honoured.  The Prime Ministers’ role, then, 
was frequently to serve as one of the dignitaries of the occasion, lending the endorsement of t he 
state to the proceedings.  For example, Whitlam marked Anzac Day 1973 in London, at the Cenotaph 
at Whitehall and listening to the sermon at Westminster Abbey that referenced Anzac Day, with his 
only two active duties that day being laying a wreath at Whitehall and reading one of two lessons at 
Westminster Abbey (AAP 1973, 9).  Similar patterns are revealed by Whitlam in 1974, when he laid a 
wreath at the Sydney Cenotaph during the march, and then shook hands with members of the 
crowd (Cunningham 1974, 2; 9).   
 
Fraser played a similar role, laying a wreath at the AWM in 1976 (The Australian 1976, 3), 
participating in an April 24 sunset service at the Sydney Cenotaph in 1977 (Canberra Times 1977, 11), 
and participating in the dawn service at the Shrine of  Remembrance in Melbourne in 1980, 1981, 
and 1982, along with marching in the parade in 1981 and 1982 (The Age 1980, 9; Fraser 1981a; 
Murdoch 1982, 3).  Correspondence between the Victorian RSL and Fraser in 1981 reveals that he 
was invited by the RSL to attend Anzac Day that year in Melbourne (Fraser 1981b), rather than to 
give a speech or to be the focus of the commemoration, as has become the norm in more recent 
years.  This exchange demonstrates that, in this instance at least, the RSL was firmly in control of the 
governing of Anzac’s commemoration.    
 
Hawke started to become more actively involved in war commemoration (see below), but he also 
reflected the tendency to be a participant in Anzac Day, laying wreathes in Sydney in 1984 ( The 
Australian 1984, 3) and at the AWM in 1985 (Canberra Times 1985, 1).  The Prime Minister’s minor 
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role in commemoration is also revealed by news coverage of Anzac Day during this period, with their 
attendance frequently being conveyed as secondary to the reporting on the marchers, the RSL, the 
crowd, and other dignitaries in attendance, or as part of this milieu  (see, for instance Cunningham 
1974, 2; The Australian 1976, 3).  As such, it can be seen that the Prime Minister frequently played a 
secondary, participatory, role in Anzac Day during this period.   
 
Local Commemoration 
Another distinguishing feature of Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac during this period was 
its more local and suburban commemoration, far away from sites of Australian war remembrance 
like the AWM or Gallipoli.  The local nature of Anzac’s commemoration was a reflection of the RSL’s 
custodianship of Anzac and their concern to honour the diggers they represented.  This emphasis on 
the ex-service personnel themselves was mobilised via the local RSL branch, and on larger scale , the 
state branches of the RSL in state capital cities (see Inglis 2008).  This tendency was demonstrated by 
Whitlam in 1974, as he marked the day with a dawn service at the Edmondson VC Memorial Club in 
Liverpool in south-west Sydney, before laying a wreath at the Sydney Cenotaph during the march, 
and then attending an afternoon Anzac service at the Masonic Club in Parramatta (Cunningham 
1974, 2; Whitlam 1974a).   
 
Fraser tended to be present at Anzac Day ceremonies around the country, as he both 
commemorated Anzac and simultaneously conducted the business of government.  Fraser appeared 
at the AWM in 1976, Sydney cenotaph in 1977, Alice Springs in 1978, Esperance in 1979, and 
Melbourne in 1980, 1981, and 1982.  In Alice Springs, Fraser attended the local service, then chatted 
with ex-servicemen at the RSL afterwards (The Australian 1978, 3).  Finding himself in Esperance, 
Western Australia in 1979, after having attended the dawn service in Albany, Fraser delivered an 
Anzac Day address that was not reproduced in the east coast newspapers (see The Australian, The 
Sydney Morning Herald, The Age, and the Canberra Times for April 26 1979).  Instead, The Australian 
(1979, 1) decided to report that Fraser was embarrassed to learn that his staff had not organised a 
wreath for him to lay at the Esperance ceremony, and The Sydney Morning Herald (1979, 2) reported 
that ‘The Prime Minister, Mr Fraser, spent $56 on drinks yesterday trying to persuade striking 
goldminers to go back to work. He failed.’  Such reporting illustrates the local nature of Prime 
Ministerial engagement with Anzac, conducted almost as an afterthought to the business of 
government.  It also demonstrates how little focus was placed upon the Prime Minister and his 
actions as they pertained to Anzac Day at this time.  Materials in the Fraser Library Archives also 
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reveal that Fraser frequently liaised with the local RSLs in his electorate and helped to organise guest 
speakers or to have naval vessels visit local ports on Anzac Day (Fraser 1981b).   
 
Whitlam’s Anzac Day in 1974 saw him organise his commitments in a similar manner, with the dawn 
service in Liverpool taking part in his seat of Werriwa.  Ultimately, even Prime Ministers are in office  
at the pleasure of their local constituents, and Anzac Day presented an opportunity to engage with 
them.  Anzac Day for Prime Ministers therefore often drew them back into the local politics of  their 
electorates, in addition to demonstrating the understated and suburban nature of their participation 
during this period.   
 
The Speeches of Whitlam and Fraser 
Despite the fact that Prime Ministers were primarily participants on Anzac Day during this time, they 
did occasionally make Anzac Day addresses.  Regarding frequency, only two speeches were made by 
Prime Ministers regarding Anzac Day between 1972 and 1987, in 1979 and 1986, and one media 
release was distributed, in 1984.  This stands in contrast with Prime Ministerial engagement after 
1990, when a speech or media release has been provided every year without exception.  Often, 
instead of a Prime Ministerial missive being given on the lessons and values of Anzac, the business of 
partisan politics continued as usual, with Prime Ministers making speeches, releasing media 
statements, and conducting interviews regarding policy and politics unrelated to Anzac Day.   
 
Whitlam released a statement on national heritage policy in 1974, and gave a speech and press 
conference in Peru on Anzac Day 1975 (Whitlam 1974b; Whitlam 1975a; Whitlam 1975b).  The 1975 
speech briefly alluded to Anzac Day, with Whitlam (1975a, 1) saying:  
This morning I laid a wreath at your national shrine. Some of you may know that today is also 
the anniversary of a battle with historic, indeed sacred, significance in the minds of the 
Australian people. Of course our military annals have little in common, but I was reminded by 
this concurrence of events of just how closely the histories of our two countries are linked with 
Europe. 
This brief allusion echoed some of the elements of later Prime Ministerial speeches with its 
reference to the sacredness of Anzac.   Having said that, Anzac was not mentioned directly, and the 
date was not employed as an opportunity to discuss the significance of Anzac Day.  Whitlam instead 
used this as a platform to launch into a longer, and somewhat speculative, speech upon the 
historical and cultural links between Australia and Peru.   
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Fraser also practiced everyday politics and policy on Anzac Day, releasing materials for the media on 
Anzac Day in 1976, 1977, 1978 (Fraser 1976; Fraser 1977a; 1977b; Fraser 1978).  1978 was a 
prominent example of the business of government continuing, despite it being Anzac Day, with 
Fraser in Alice Springs primarily to address policy matters regarding indigenous disadvantage.  His 
Anzac Day commitments of attending the local Anzac Day ceremony was part of a busy schedule that 
also included two addresses regarding indigenous policy (Fraser 1978), meeti ng with indigenous 
Land Council representatives and local indigenous people, and later flying to Katherine (O’Neill 1978, 
3).  The reporting on this trip in The Australian also emphasised Fraser’s activities as they pertained 
to indigenous policy (O’Neill 1978, 3).  Clearly, Anzac Day was only a small part of the Prime 
Minister’s schedule in 1978.  This stands in contrast to the schedules that later occupied Prime 
Ministers on Anzac Day, which are full of Anzac Day commitments, especially on a significant 
anniversary date.   
 
Speeches were infrequently made on Anzac Day, with only two being made, in 1979 and 1986.  
Fraser had wondered about the continuing significance of Anzac Day earlier in the decade, in radio 
broadcasts to his electorate of Wannon.  In 1972, he pondered:  
These days, when so many of our traditional values are being called into question, Anzac Day is 
perhaps a suitable time for us to consider whether those values still have application to our 
contemporary society. 
Is patriotism an outdated concept? Or the willingness to fight for freedom for our families, 
ourselves and our fellow men? 
Thousands of Australians have died for those principles and today we remember them.  
I firmly believe those principles are as valid in today's changing world as they ever were, and 
may the memory of those who have fallen constantly remind us of that (Fraser 1972, 3).   
The modality of Fraser’s speech is notable.  Reflecting changing public attitudes towards Anzac and 
the values that underpinned it, Fraser felt compelled to defend Anzac’s martial national ism in the 
face of social change with his high level of commitment – ‘I firmly believe’.  But, such a desire to 
defend Anzac’s traditional conservative meanings was abandoned the following year, when instead 
Fraser reconceptualised Anzac with Liberal Party values for a changed Australia:  
In the old terminology, Australians fought for God, for Queen and for country, but I think if 
these words were analysed, it really means the people fought for the right to choose the kind 
of society in which they wanted to live. People fought for the right to determine their own 
government, for a right of choice.  They fought for their families, for their wives, for their 
children. They fought for a better society (Fraser 1973, 1-2).   
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Here Fraser recognises and grapples with the datedness of Anzac.  To solve this problem, he imbues 
Anzac with what ‘it really means’ – new ideas for changing times.  As such, Fraser falls back upon the 
traditions and philosophy of his party, filling Anzac with meaning regarding the spirit of individualism 
and liberty to replace its problematised traditions of God, Queen and country.   
 
Fraser was not an Anzac entrepreneur.  Instead of embracing Anzac and grasping the opportunity to 
fill it with new meaning for the nation, as his successors did, Fraser was reluctant to deliver Anzac 
Day addresses and envisage Anzac in line with either his policy agenda or a new age.  Such a 
reluctance was unsurprising given the contestation that surrounded Anzac in the af termath of the 
Vietnam War, when Fraser had been both Army and Defence Minister in the Holt and Gorton 
governments.  Only one Anzac Day address was given by Fraser, in 1979, but its location in 
Esperance in Western Australia was far away from the most significant shrines of Anzac on the east 
coast, and it received little attention from the media.  The speech is full of ‘…what were to become 
the stock idioms of Anzac discourse’ (Graves 2014, 181) – Gallipoli, freedom, mateship, courage, 
sacrifice and remembrance - but its impact was minimal.  Regarding policy, Fraser’s speech affirmed 
Australia’s commitment to its allies:  
…this day, above all, is our tribute 
 To those who died 
 Doing a job that had to be done,  
 Doing a job to make our world safe for decent people, 
And letting it be known, by our actions, that Australia stands by its friends and doesn’t back 
down when the going gets tough.   
 In this commemoration we remember, too, 
The allies who fought at Gallipoli, where the Anzac legend was born (Fraser 1979, 2).   
Here Australians are pragmatic stoics, who had fought heroically, and did not back down when the 
going got tough.  The emphasis upon allies was significant given the ANZUS relationship, Fraser’s 
hostility towards the Soviet Union (Curran 2006, 185), and continuing superpower tension during the 
period.  Nonetheless, the single speech given during his term, and the locat ion of the speech far 
away from a significant site of Anzac’s commemoration, illustrates that Fraser hardly placed Anzac at 
the centre of his conception of Australianness, or aligned Australia’s war history with his 
government’s policy agenda in any signif icant manner.   
 
81 
 
Hawke and the Beginnings of Anzac Entrepreneurship 
In contrast to his predecessors, Hawke began to engage with Anzac and Australia’s war history in a 
more substantive manner.  This was fairly protean in nature in the first half of the 1980s, but 
significant steps were taken towards Anzac entrepreneurship.  In particular, this engagement 
occurred within the framework of Hawke’s consensus politics, where Hawke attempted to reconci le 
the competing groups and interests of Australian politics wi th his political style and institutional 
framework, and especially with the Prices and Incomes Accord (see Johnson 1989, 102-108; and 
Jaensch 1989, 161; Moore 2003).  This political style was employed towards the objective of 
neoliberal economic reform, but it was also applied to other spheres of public policy (Economou 
1993), including Vietnam veterans.  Importantly for the VVA, Hawke tended to negotiate directly 
with the heads of interest groups and peak bodies (Moore 2003, 112).   
 
To begin with, Hawke responded to the policy and recognition demands of the VVA via the RSL, 
using their national conferences to address the concerns of Vietnam veterans.  The addresses both 
engaged the veteran community as a perceived important lobbying constituency, personali sed the 
policy process, and helped Hawke set the policy agenda.  Hawke had confronted the demands of the 
Vietnam veteran community soon after the tabling of the findings of the Royal Commission into the 
effects of Agent Orange, telling the RSL’s 1985 national conference:  
The report’s central finding is that the chemical agents, by and large, had no adverse effects on 
Australian personnel.  The government accepts that the case for a link between Agent Orange 
and health problems among Vietnam Veterans has not been established.   
However, both the government and the RSL need to be aware that the physical and 
psychological sufferings of the Vietnam veterans are real enough, whether or not they were 
caused by Agent Orange.  Mr Justice Evatt is clearly stating that the main task, caring for 
Vietnam veterans, is still continuing.   
I can assure all of you here today that we will be looking very carefully at the report’s 
recommendations in the light of this government’s demonstrated commitment to providing 
optimum care for the veterans of all wars (Hawke 1985, 6-7).   
At this point, Hawke was largely reactive to the challenges being posed by the VVA.   Having 
instituted the Royal Commission into the effects of Agent Orange early in his term as Prime Minister, 
there was a need to respond to its findings.  However, there was also the need to manage 
expectations – the Royal Commission’s findings were not what the VVA had wanted, and Hawke was 
addressing criticism of these findings and was urging policy restraint.  By pre senting the 
government’s position to the leading returned serviceperson’s organisation, the RSL, the VVA could 
be kept at arm’s length and the agenda controlled.   Thus we see rather unspecific and non -
committal modality from Hawke – ‘we will be looking very carefully at the report’s 
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recommendations’ - rather than specific policy initiatives that directly addressed the VVA’s concerns 
regarding Agent Orange and its effects.  Hawke presumably chose to present this here, as the RSL 
had opposed the Royal Commission in the first place (Ross 2009, 195-197) and could plausibly be 
considered to be more sympathetic than a hostile VVA audience.  However, there was an economic 
imperative too - Hawke could hardly announce new spending when his government was tightening 
access to veterans’ disability pensions in a climate of economic uncertainty, an issue he addressed 
earlier in this speech (Hawke 1985, 2).   
 
Hawke’s consensus politics was in effect in this instance – Hawke was interacting with a peak 
representative body, with the dissident VVA being marginalised.  It was too dangerous to include the 
VVA when consensus was a stake.  However, it was not all negative for Vietnam veterans in this 
period, as the seeds of recognition and reconciliation were being sown during these early years of  
the Hawke government.  As Hawke acknowledged, veterans’ claims of suffering were ‘real enough’,  
and he cautioned against the RSL or government treating it as anything but.  This emphasised the 
Vietnam veteran’s traumatic experience of war, their position as victim (Twomey 2013), and their 
attendant need for ‘care’.  The change in tone from Fraser’s 1979 speech, where Anzac’s agents had 
fought heroically, is stark.   
 
The state also began to engage with remembrance in a more substantive manner.  Beginning with 
small steps on Anzac Day 1984, the government announced that it would take up the RSL’s 
suggestion that the Australian government petition the Turkish government to rename Ariburnu, the 
section of the Gallipoli peninsula where Australian forces landed in 1915.  The Anglicised Anzac Cove 
was chosen as a replacement, in time for the 70th anniversary of the landings in 1985 (Hawke 1984).  
The government returned the favour by using the name Gallipoli Reach to title part of the shorel ine 
of Lake Burley Griffin at the bottom of Anzac Parade in Canberra, and honoured the role  of  Turkish 
forces led by Kemal Ataturk with the Ataturk Memorial Garden in Canberra in 1985.  New war 
memorials were also announced, constructed and unveiled along Anzac Parade in Canberra during 
this period.  They included the National Memorial to the Royal Navy unveiled in 1986, the Australian 
Hellenic Memorial unveiled in 1988, the National Memorial to the Australian Army unveiled in 1989, 
and the Australian Vietnam Forces National Memorial in 1992.  Hawke himself was the Chairman of  
the Canberra National Memorials Committee during this period, and had a hand in their planning 
(Hawke 1986b).  In 1985, the government helped send a small group of nine surviving Gallipoli  
veterans overseas to Anzac Cove to mark the 70th anniversary of the Gallipoli landings, which was 
also attended by Minister for Veterans Affairs Arthur Gietzelt (Cranston 1985, 15).  In 1987, the 
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Deputy Prime Minister Lionel Bowen also travelled to Gallipoli to mark Anzac Day (Stephens 1987, 
13) and Vietnam veterans were that year ‘welcomed home’ as they led the army in the Sydney Anzac 
Day march, with sustained applause and cheers from the crowd (The Sun-Herald 1987, 5).   
 
Further, Hawke made his first Anzac Day address of his term in Greece in 1986, an early example of  
memorial diplomacy (Graves 2014, 169-170), that being:  
…the instrumentalization of sites of memory, commemorative events and national days as a 
vehicle for international relations.  It might be defined as that dimension of diplomatic practice 
that seeks to materialize and mobilize a shared sense of the past at the intersection of 
collective memory and transnational history.   
Hawke was in Europe at the time pursuing talks regarding Australia’s trade policy, and in particular 
seeking support for reform of the European Economic Community’s subsidisation of agricultural 
products that were damaging the profitability and viability of Australian exports (AAP 1986, 3).  In 
Greece, he had raised this issue in talks with the Greek government, and had sought to reaff i rm the 
links between Australia and Greece.  Inglis (2008, 384) argues that Hawke’s personal interest in 
Greek (and Turkish) wartime honours was at least in part motivated by a ‘…a concern for ethnic 
votes’.  This was reflected in Hawke’s emphasis upon the relationship between Australia and Greece 
in the 1986 Anzac Day address in Athens, where he recalled the sacrifice and comradeship of Greeks 
and Australians during World War Two: 
These shared experiences from the darkest and most bitter days of defeat have, however, left 
lasting benefits.  
For the Australians and other allies who fought alongside their Greek comrades it is the 
staunch friendships which were forged then.   
These friendships were tested to the utmost limits and have endured.  They endure not only 
among those who fought but have been passed down to the men and women of succeeding 
generations (Hawke 1986a, 3).    
Here Hawke takes on the role of national leader, speaking on behalf of the nation and imbuing Anzac 
with meaning for the Australian people – ‘friendship’ between allies.  Simultaneously, though, 
Hawke is inhabiting the role of world leader, representing Australia to the world and building the 
relationship with Greece, with the friendship between the nations ‘enduring’ and being ‘passed 
down’.  Finally, Hawke is alluding to his role as a policy advocate and relationship builder to sections 
of the domestic audience in Australia, as the Greek diaspora in Australia was an important 
constituency for the Australian Labor Party (ALP) during the 1980s.   
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The speech also reflects some of the newly fashioned meanings of Anzac as conveyed by Gammage 
and Weir in popular culture (see above).  In particular was the more critical view on the role  of  the 
British in the campaign:  
On this day, seventy-one years ago, Australian and New Zealand soldiers landed on the shores 
of Turkey and Gallipoli, many thousands of miles from their homeland, to fight in a war not of 
their making.  They became, under a British General, the Australian and New Zealand Army 
Corps, and are remembered by that name.  It was the first time the Australians fought as a 
nation and it was a time which revealed so much of the Australian character – determined 
spirit, mateship and egalitarianism (Hawke 1986a, 1).   
Instead of fighting for God, Queen and country, as Fraser had incisively characterised the traditional  
meaning of Anzac, the Anzacs now were at Gallipoli ‘to fight in a war  not of their making’, 
commanded by a ‘British General’, but where they also found their national, not their Imperial, 
‘Australian character – determined spirit, mateship and egalitarianism’.  And instead of imbuing 
Anzac with a martial nationalism, Hawke ends the speech by invoking the International Year of 
Peace.  The speech illustrates how Hawke was beginning to engage Anzac in a more substantive and 
entrepreneurial manner, and reflected newly emerging ideas about Anzac.  So, whilst Anzac was stil l  
a contested national narrative during the first half of the 1980s, tensions were beginning to ease, 
and the space for reconciliation with Vietnam veterans, and incorporation of their experience into 
Anzac, was opening up.   
 
Welcome Home: Vietnam Veterans and Reconciliation  
It was in this setting of easing tension regarding Australia’s military service record that Vietnam 
veterans in Australian picked up on the idea of a welcome home parade similar to the ones 
conducted in the United States, where veterans would march through city streets to a welcoming 
and appreciative public.  Having been floated as a possibility after the precedential American 
parades in 1986, an organising committee was set up and was supported by veterans organisations, 
the NSW RSL, and several local Sydney government representatives (Doyle 2002, 86).  The welcome 
home parade in Sydney in 1987 was significant, as it was the tipping point in the reconciliation 
between veterans, the government and the wider public.   
 
Hawke took up the proposal for a welcome home parade enthusiastically, telling the August 1987 
RSL conference:  
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I firmly believe that the October parade will be the culmination of a long process of 
reconciliation and community acceptance of its obligations to the veterans of Vietnam.   
I believe we must honestly acknowledge that our involvement in Vietnam did cause deep 
divisions in the Australian community.   
But whatever our individual views on the merits of Australian involvement, we must equally 
acknowledge the commitment, courage and integrity of our armed forces who served in 
Vietnam.   
No one should have ever questioned those characteristics – nor should anyone ever have 
questioned our community obligations to the Vietnam veterans (Hawke 1987, 5).   
The sincerity of this reconciliation is emphasised by Hawke’s modality and high level personal 
commitment ‘I firmly believe’; ‘I believe’.  The terms of the reconciliation are unambiguous and 
declarative - ‘No one should have questioned’ - and the imperativeness of the cause is emphasised 
‘no one’; ‘we must’.  The sincerity of Hawke’s invocation both reflected and reinforced the 
reconciliatory narrative of the day, situated as it was within Hawke’s wider discourse of national 
policy consensus and reconciliation.   
 
Thus, on October 3, 1987, around 22,000 Vietnam veterans marched in the welcome home parade 
through the streets of Sydney (Ross 2009, 212).  It was estimated that the parade was watched by a 
crowd of up to 100,000, including Hawke, and that it stood up to ten deep along the parade route in 
some places (The Sydney Morning Herald 1987, 4).  The marchers carried more than 500 Australian 
flags, each flag representing a serviceman who had lost his life during the Vietnam War.  These 
simple acts represented the reconciliatory nature of the event – the flags, standing for the nation -
state, were accepted as a proper symbol for the fallen by the veterans and symbolised their 
reconciliation with the body politic that they felt had rejected their rightful place in the Anzac 
narrative after the end of the Vietnam conflict.  The large crowd that watched and cheered the 
parade, including the head of government, Prime Minister Hawke, demonstrated the sincere regret 
the community felt at the treatment of Vietnam veterans and their welcoming into the Anzac 
tradition.  Some veterans rejected Hawke’s presence by declining to give eyes right (the drill 
command for acknowledging and saluting commanders and dignitaries) as they marched by Hawke, 
perhaps remembering his role as ACTU president at the time when waterside workers def ied ACTU 
policy and refused to unload a navy vessel in response to the Mỹ Lai massacre, Hawke’s own 
publically stated opposition to the war (Curran 2006, 222) or the ALP’s more generalised opposi tion 
to the conflict.  However, this was the only tense moment of the day reported, and the media 
recollections of the event were glowing in their appraisal of the day’s positive significance (Walker 
1987, 2; The Sydney Morning Herald 1987, 4).  Despite apprehension and some continued 
resentment, most veterans reacted positively too, with one recalling ‘I’m no longer ashamed to say 
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that I’m a Vietnam veteran.  No longer will I hang my head.  The people of Sydney made sure of that’ 
(Giblett 1990, 69). 
 
The use of Australian flags to represent fallen soldiers and Hawke’s endorsement as the head of 
government, signified the reconciliation of the state with Vietnam veterans and their incorporation 
into Anzac.  The terms of this reconciliation are what Schaap (2005, 13) calls restorative justice.  
Under this concept, an offender has violated the established norms and limits of acceptability of 
their community.  The wrong-doer, having recognised the injustice of their actions and felt the gui l t 
associated with such a violation, seeks to right their wrong via repentance – a disowning of their 
prior actions and attendance to their wrongdoing through apology, reparation and penance.  Having 
sufficiently attended to these rituals, and the victim having accepted that the wrongdoer is 
sufficiently chastened and willing to accept community norms, results in the offender being forgiven 
and the parties are consequently reconciled.   
 
Schaap argues that this process of restorative justice insufficiently addresses competin g political 
interests:   
In these terms, the reconcilability of political conflict is taken for granted.  By promoting social 
harmony as an unconditional public good, the terms within which this unity is constituted are 
presented as unambiguous.  Consequently, the representational space in which the terms of 
reconciliation itself might be contested is diminished (Schaap, 2005, 20).   
Reconciliation is here unification – a redeeming of a painful past in order to pursue a common future 
(Schaap 2005, 18).  Restorative justice is unpolitical – it requires forgetting the contingent and 
political basis of the reconciliation between formerly adversarial parties (Schaap 2005, 21), and 
institutes a form of reconciliation that purports to be essential and incontestable.  It is an active 
form of depoliticisation that newly demarcates a sphere of social relations where the political 
behaviour of deliberation and contestation is taboo and conflict remains latent.   
 
The notion of restorative justice leading to an unpolitical reconciliation is of particular importance on 
this occasion.  Having marginalised the experience of Vietnam veterans, excising them from the 
discursive narrative of Anzac and allowing Anzac as a central national narrative to wither, the state, 
along with the Australian body politic, had committed a grievous wrong against established societal  
norms.  To repent, elaborate public rituals of atonement, such as the Royal Commission into the use 
of Agent Orange, the welcome home parade, and the Vietnam Veterans war memorial that was 
announced in 1988 and opened in 1992, are all used to redress the sins of the past.  This atonement 
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is repeated by the celebratory and nationalistic observance of Anzac Day every year, as a reminder 
not to violate these principles again and restoring the order that had been disturbed.   
 
However, the nature of restorative justice precludes any contestation of the terms of the 
reconciliation.  The offender cannot contest the terms of the reconciliation because to do so would 
fail to show the adequate level of repentance and enrage the victim, causing further, if not more, 
hurt.  This has had profound continuing effects, as Anzac has become a sacred, untouchable, and 
therefore unpolitical, political discourse.  Opposition was marginali sed as the conservative and 
militaristic tendencies of Anzac were restored.  Those who might have opposed the utilisation of 
militaristic imagery as the foundational story of nationhood now faced powerful taboos that 
sanctioned such courses of action, as opposition may open old wounds once again.  An unpolitical 
form of Anzac had consequences for Vietnam veterans too - their continuing claims to policy action 
by government and incorporation of their particular and uncomfortable experience of war is 
subsumed in an official, state driven, and sanitised story of the Anzac tradition centred on the 
original landings at Gallipoli in 1915.   
 
So, after the 1987 welcome home parade, the public expression of the contestability of Anzac 
declined.  Anzac becomes an uncontested ideograph – a culturally situated and well understood 
rhetorical device, but one that is also malleable and unspecific.  As McGee (1980, 15) notes:  
Each member of the community is socialized, conditioned, to the vocabulary of ideographs as a 
prerequisite for ‘belonging’ to the society.  A degree of tolerance is usual, but people are 
expected to understand ideographs within a range of usage thought to be acceptable.  The 
society will inflict penalties on those who use ideographs in heretical ways and on those who 
refuse to respond appropriately to claims on their behavior warranted through the agency of 
ideograph.   
Thus, after the reconciliation of Vietnam veterans and the Australian public, powerful social  taboos 
existed to sanction the use of Anzac in ways that did not exist in the recent past.  Protests, such the 
ones led by WAR activists, fell away.  The 70th anniversary of the landing at Gallipoli in 1985, and 
especially the 75th anniversary in 1990 saw renewed interest in Anzac and ideographic 
representation of Anzac’s evolving meaning, as Anzac entrepreneurship by Hawke and h is 
government began to emerge.  Elites like Hawke and his successors then employed the authority and 
resources of the state to define and promote the terms which the body politic could engage with 
this central national narrative and projected their own elite agenda onto this newly unpolitical 
discursive realm.   
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Conclusion 
This chapter has explored the evolution of Anzac from the election of the Whitlam government in 
1972 to the welcome home parade for Vietnam veterans in 1987.  Prime Ministers’ engagement 
with Anzac during this period reflected the ambivalent nature of Anzac, as the limits and 
appropriateness of this sphere of national identity were interrogated and contested by a range of 
political and cultural agents.  Prime Ministers Whitlam and Fraser did not ignore Anzac, but their 
engagement was more sporadic, more local, and less spectacular than became the norm after 1990.  
Hawke also reflected these tendencies at times, but began to demonstrate signs of Anzac 
entrepreneurship.   
 
This chapter has further argued that the period from about 1980 to 1987 saw the reconciliation of 
previously marginalised Vietnam veterans with the wider Australian public, and the 
(re)establishment of Anzac as a central, and now also unpolitical, Australian nationalist discourse 
whose essentialism was taken for granted.  Hawke enthusiastically supported this reconciliation, as it 
fitted well with his wider political and policy style of consensus.  This reconciliation was not neutral ,  
however, as its form of restorative justice depoliticised Anzac and precluded the contestation of  i ts 
terms that had been occurring during the 1980s and, further, instituted powerful taboos against the 
violation of this reconciliation.   
 
The newly unpolitical version of Anzac ushered in by reconciliation had continuing effects regarding 
Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac, and this is its crucially significant legacy.   The period from 
1990 saw continued Anzac entrepreneurship by Hawke, and his successors, but this took a particular 
form due to the terms of restorative justice.  Importantly, the politics of Anzac did not disappear 
after this point, but its public expression tended to centre on the conservative policing of the 
boundaries defined by this state-orientated version of Anzac, rather than on the agenda of social 
movement or Vietnam veteran activists.  Maintaining the unpolitical nature of Anzac involved the 
emphasis upon the original landings at Gallipoli, and failed to emphasise Vietnam.  It further tended 
to emphasise the state-orientated Anzac tradition, rather than the victimhood and trauma of war 
that new discourses surrounding the Vietnam War and war remembrance did.  Above all, this newly 
unpolitical version of Anzac was operationalised by Prime Ministers as an ideograph - ripe with 
meaning and significance regarding national identity, but also unspecific and malleable.  In sum, the 
reconciliation of Vietnam veterans with the Australian public that the Hawke government had 
endorsed and encouraged was the tipping point where a newly depoliticised and unpolitical version 
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of Anzac emerged, a crucial factor in the steps towards more explicit Anzac entrepreneurs hip by 
Hawke and his successors.   
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CHAPTER 5 
Hawke and Anzac as Ideograph: Economic Reform, Multiculturalism 
and Foreign Policy 
 
Introduction 
Now that the conditions in which Anzac entrepreneurship could occur have been established, a finer 
grained analysis of the individual Anzac entrepreneurs of Hawke, Keating, and Howard may be 
conducted.  This chapter seeks to explore Hawke’s Anzac entrepreneurship from 1988-1991, having 
prefaced Hawke’s consensual governing style and explained how Anzac evolved from a contested to 
an unpolitical nationalist discourse in Chapter 4.  Hawke’s Anzac entrepreneurship involved the 
instrumental promotion of policy initiatives, and attempts to head off contestation.  Further, 
Hawke’s engagement with Anzac had a constitutive effect regarding national identity after 1987, as 
Anzac once again became a central nationalist discourse.  However, Anzac did not remain static or 
frozen in time.  Whilst Hawke’s engagement with Anzac generally conformed to the genre 
boundaries of the Anzac tradition, it also took a new form that reflected the policy priorities of  the 
Hawke government – economic liberalism, middle power activism, multiculturalism, and 
cosmopolitanism.   
 
These changes occurred within the context of the profound reforms to Australian society and pol icy 
that were occurring during the 1980s and 1990s, neatly summarised by Kelly (1994) as the 
abandonment of the Austral ian Settlement.  Stokes’ (2004, 19-20) critique and reformulation of 
Kelly’s construction of the Australian Settlement included ‘…the following nine clusters of  pol i tical  
ideas and policies: White Australia; Terra Nullius; State Secularism; Masculinism; Australian 
Democracy; State Developmentalism; Arbitration; Welfare Minimalism; Imperial National ism.’  Al l  
these areas either experienced considerable initial reformation during Hawke’s term in government, 
or the Hawke government grappled with the consequences of their ongoing change, which provided 
the context of destabilised national identity that is necessary for successful nationalism 
entrepreneurship.  The chapter will thus focus on how Hawke aligned Anzac with reforms to the 
Australian Settlement centred on the areas of economics, multiculturalism and national identity, and 
foreign policy.   
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Hawke faced little challenge to his engagement with Anzac, and he embraced Anzac 
entrepreneurship.  How he came to be in this position will be explored in four main sections that 
provide the necessary conditions for this to occur:  
1. The first section outlines Hawke’s consensus politics, the prism that defined Hawke’s 
approach to government, and his Anzac entrepreneurship.  The ‘unpolitics’ of consensus 
helped Hawke to define the parameters that Anzac took, and helped to prevent 
contestation of this nationalist narrative.   
2. This section sets out some of the economic, cultural, and foreign policy problems the Hawke 
government faced.  In particular, it looks at domestic economic reform, international trade 
and defence policy in a changing world, and government policy regarding multicultural ism.  
All these areas experienced considerable change during Hawke’s term in government.  I 
argue here that these policy challenges led Hawke to define Australianness in a manner that 
emphasised the people’s commitment to Australia’s economic competitiveness.   
3. In the third section, I will explore the relative difficulty Hawke had in mobilising this 
conception of Australianness in a celebratory manner for the Bicentenary.  The Bicentenary 
had attracted contestation as the symbolism of the celebration of white settlement had 
deeply ambivalent meaning, given the destruction that had been wrought upon Indigenous 
peoples in Australia’s modern history, and its continuing legacy.  This chal lenged Hawke’s 
consensual political style, and his notion of competitive Australianness and commitment to 
the state.   
4.  In contrast to the difficulties that Hawke faced with the Bicentenary, he was successful with 
his Anzac entrepreneurship.  This section explores how Anzac was utilised instrumentally  
and constitutively during these national occasions.  I firstly set out some of the features of  
Hawke’s Anzac Day addresses.  I then argue that the newly reconciled and unpolitical Anzac 
post-1987 offered a golden opportunity to present a universalising and celebratory form of  
nationalism and national identity during a time when this form of nationalism was 
becoming evidently unstable.  Further, I argue that Hawke’s success at employing Anzac 
instrumentally and constitutively set a precedent for Anzac’s future use and also 
demonstrated its potential to future Prime Ministers.  Nevertheless, Hawke’s Anzac Day 
addresses in 1989 and 1991 reveal little of the ceremony evident in 1990, or later Prime 
Ministerial Anzac Day addresses, demonstrating the still inchoate nature of Prime 
Ministerial discourses of Anzac.   
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Ultimately, changes to Australian politics and society demanded new forms of Austral ian identi ty.  
Hawke’s Anzac entrepreneurship was able to successfully fulfil the need for a reformulated version 
of Australian nationalism that referenced his own nationalist vision because the newly  depoliticised 
and unpolitical version of Anzac after reconciliation with Vietnam veterans operated as an 
uncontested and popular nationalist narrative suitable for consensus building.    
 
Hawke: Reconciliation, Consensus and the Governing of Group Claims 
The Hawke government had been elected in 1983 under the slogan ‘Bringing Australia Together’.  
The slogan appealed to concerns regarding the divisions rent to the Australian polity by Fraser’s 
term in office, but its more lasting consequence in government was a discursive call for unity, 
consensus and reconciliation.  This appeal to consensus was especially concerned with the 
corporatist mediation of labour, business and government interests (Johnson 1989, 103) and the 
management of dissent, with the goal being the introduction of economic reforms that would secure 
a healthy capitalist economy.  This was to be achieved through negotiation and bargaining ‘and the 
creation of a forum [the Prices and Incomes Accord] for resolving the divisions which distract groups 
from satisfying their shared material aspirations’ (Mills 1993, 26).   
 
Hawke’s consensus politics was linked to electoralism (Jaensch 1989, 157-160; Gunther and 
Diamond 2001, 25-29).  Electoralism requires a party to see politics through the eyes of the 
electorate and play to the catch-all imperatives that this demands (Jaensch 1989, 158).  Doctrinaire  
ideology has little place in this conception of electoral politics, as electoralism demands that parties 
are cautious when formulating policy and that they work towards the interests and desires of the 
electorate.  Negative reactions from the public are considered and tested for through opinion polling 
and surveying, and policy initiatives that are found to cause damage to a government’s standing are  
modified or dropped.  Consensus fitted well with electoralism: ‘It carried a mood of togetherness, of  
rational resolution of any disputes, and made possible the smothering of any criticism merely by 
labelling it as “not working for consensus”’ (Jaensch 1989, 161).  This saw the ALP seek out a range 
of constituencies and interest groups as supporters, broadening its support base beyond the 
confines of its labourist traditions.   
 
Consensus limits and denies politics (see Mouffe 1999, 754-757; Little 2007, 154-158; Maddison 
2014, 200-201).  In Hawke’s case, consensus had two important discursive consequences; first, it 
built a powerful claim to incumbency based upon the delivery of a mediated and consensual 
agreement between the forces of labour and business regarding the mutual goal o f  material  well-
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being.  Second, it discursively excluded political action by those who might oppose this conception of 
government action, as opposition to consensus, self-interest and the attainment of material security 
was illogical, churlish or unequivocally dangerous.  Consensus was the framework that Hawke 
attempted to apply to both the Bicentenary and to Anzac, but it was the unpolitical Anzac after  the 
reconciliation with Vietnam veterans that proved to be the more successful nationalist discourse, as 
contestation of Anzac was now taboo.   
 
The Hawke Government’s Policy Challenges 
The following briefly introduces some of the policy challenges that the Hawke government faced.  In 
many ways, these policy challenges destabilised the Australian Settlement in the areas of the 
domestic economy, international trade and defence policy, and multiculturalism.  Further, the 
dismantling of the Australian Settlement destabilised conceptions of Australianness based upon i ts 
assumptions.   
 
The Economy 
Hawke presided over a period of significant domestic economic turbulence.  The recession which 
brought him to power in 1983, and its mildly Keynesian expansionist response, mutated into a 
balance of payments crisis by 1985, a speculative boom in the second half the 1980s, and again into 
crisis with the recession of 1991-92.  These crises brought about a radical change in perspective 
regarding the governability of the national economy and the Hawke government responded to this 
by applying neo-liberal economic principles, which saw the post-war economic consensus, and its 
associated state-driven and expansionist policy prescription to economic management, as the 
problem.   
 
At the macro-economic level, the government found early in its term that the financial regulation 
which had underpinned the post-war Keynesian consensus was becoming increasingly difficult to 
manage (Kelly 1994, 80-83).  In response, the government decided to take a hands-off approach to 
the governing of finance and floated the dollar and abolished controls over the exchange rate in 
December 1983.  Further changes occurred in 1984/85 with the abandonment of interest rate 
controls and the opening of the Australian market to foreign banks (Bell 1997, 143-144).  The 
opening up of the economy forced market discipline upon the government, and the Accord, which 
originally had served a mildly expansionist purpose with its promise of compensating wage restraint 
with an increase to the social wage, became increasingly a tool with which the ALP exercised 
discipline over the labour movement.  The argument was that Australia needed to improve its 
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international competitiveness and the Accord became a vehicle for wage moderation (Bell 1997, 
186-187).  Having said that, the Accord also reflected the ALP’s labourist roots, driven as it was by 
the professed end goal of enabling economic growth to ensure the security of all (Johnson 1989, 98).   
 
Furthering the hands-off, deregulationist, policy initiatives at the macro-economic level was the 
interrelated opening up of the micro-economy of Australia in the 1980s.  Bell (1997) argues that this 
took the form of substantial tariff cuts to the historically heavily protected Australian manufacturing 
sector.  Further, sectoral reform aimed at opening up these areas of the economy to market forces 
by applying privatisation, corporatisation and cost reduction (Bell 1997, 216).  Some of the costs 
associated with these reforms were mediated through an industry policy that was aimed at easing 
the pain of sectoral reform and encouraging growth in new, value-added industries, in combination 
with an international trade policy that argued for international tariff reduction.  However, these 
changes also decimated Australia’s manufacturing sector and little occurred to replace it with the 
elaborately transformed manufactures that underpinned many competing Western and emerging 
Asian economies.   
 
Foreign and Defence Policy 
The 1980s and early 1990s was a time when the international context, and Australia’s place within it, 
was radically changing too.  The economic reform outlined above entailed the opening up of the 
Australian economy to international economic forces, but there was no guarantee  the national 
economy would automatically benefit from international trade.  The problem became economic 
security, and the imperative was the creation of an internationally competitive national economy in 
order to secure national prosperity (Hindess 1998, 220-221).  It was this pursuit of security that 
drove the Hawke government’s engagement with the international marketplace, in order to 
capitalise on the competitive advantages that Australia naturally had and abandon those which were 
holding competitive advantage back.  Thus, protection for Australia’s industry was unilaterally 
wound back in order to open up Australian industry to international competition in order to reduce 
the drain on government.  New markets were sought in Asia for Australian goods and services, as i t 
was recognised that relying on the traditional imperial trading links could no longer ensure 
prosperity.  Multilateral activism within the Eighth (Uruguay) Round of GATT negotiations was also 
undertaken, in order to pursue global trade reform towards free markets.  This was especially 
important for Australian agricultural producers – an area where Australia was identified as having a 
competitive advantage in the global marketplace (Higgott 1992, 134).   
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Hawke’s term in office also coincided with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Gulf War.  The 
problem of the US defeat in the Vietnam War and its withdrawal from the region was still being 
grappled with by defence planners when the Hawke government came to power in 1983 
(Cheeseman 1992, 63).  The Dibb report of 1986, and the subsequent 1987 Defence White Paper, 
criticised the old defence doctrine of ‘forward defence’ in support of allies in distant lands to ensure 
Australian security.  To replace it was defence self-reliance, with a greater focus on the defence of  
continental Australia, a reorientation of Australia’s defence posture to the north of  the continent, 
and an emphasis on Australia’s commitment to the UN, international law, and multilateral solutions 
to international conflicts.  This was, however, still firmly within the context of ANZUS, and in August 
1990 Hawke quickly reverted to old patterns of forward defence when he committed Australian 
naval ships to the Gulf War.  This commitment was ostensibly due to a phone call from US President 
Bush, though it seems clear that the decision to commit Australian personnel was reached before 
this phone call (Cockburn 1992, 43), evoking memories of Australia’s enthusiasm to join the Vietnam 
War.  Further, defence planners faced funding restrictions that meant that defence procurement did 
not match the ambition of the defence self-reliance policy documents (Cheeseman 1992, 76).  These 
instances demonstrate that whilst the ALP pursued multilateralism and supported international 
organisations when attempting to ensure Australia’s trading advantage, its defence planning was far 
more circumspect and tended to remain true to previous defence traditions.   
 
Multiculturalism and National Identity 
The changes to the Australian Settlement outlined above contributed to the changing support base 
and make-up of the ALP.  The removal of tariffs, the privatisation and/or contraction of government 
services and utilities, and the drive towards a service orientated economy, created significant 
economic hardship for the ALP’s traditional, male and blue-collar base.  Further, the catch-all 
electoralism that drove the ALP during Hawke’s term in office (Jaensch 1989) led the ALP to seek out 
a broad coalition of interest groups and supporters, and attempt to reconcile the competing 
demands of its working class base, its progressive middle class, supporters, and the speci f ic pol icy 
concerns of ethnic constituencies which made up a significant proportion of its electoral support in 
certain capital city seats (Jupp 2000).   
 
However, the Hawke government faced tensions regarding the rate of immigration and 
multiculturalism in the climate of economic difficulty.  In 1984, historian Geoffrey Blainey ignited a 
race debate in Australia by questioning the rate of Asian immigration and the Australian public’s 
ability to integrate these new communities, and in 1988, Opposition leader John Howard questioned 
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the rate of Asian immigration, and expressed his preference to slow it if it began to threaten social  
cohesion.  The release of Immigration: a Commitment to Australia (the Fitzgerald report), which had 
prompted Howard’s remarks, also identified significant community concern about the immigration 
program and government failure to guide public opinion.  The report noted that ‘[i]t is the Australian 
identity that matters most in Australia.  And if the Government will affirm that strongly, 
multiculturalism might seem less divisive and threatening’ (Committee to Advise on Australia's 
Immigration Policies 1988, 10-11).    The report recommended a reorientation of the immigration 
program to more sharply reflect the national interest and emphasised the commitments that 
immigrants were obliged to undertake as Australian residents.  More specifically, and amongst other 
recommendations, the report advised that immigrant selection methods needed a competitive and 
economic focus, involving the selection of skilled, entrepreneurial and youthful immigrants with 
competent English skills who could contribute to the process of economic reform ( Committee to 
Advise on Australia's Immigration Policies 1988, 90).   
 
In response, the government released The National Agenda for a Multicultural Australia: sharing our 
future policy document in 1989.  The report emphasised economic imperatives, noting that it was 
developed in the context of economic restraint and with efficiency in mind (Office of  Multicul tural  
Affairs 1989, v).  Multiculturalism had three dimensions:  
1. cultural identity: the right of all Australians, within carefully defined limits,  to expre ss and 
share their individual cultural heritage, including their language and religion;  
2. social justice: the right of all Australians to equality of treatment and opportunity, and the 
removal of barriers of race, ethnicity, culture, religion, language, gender or place of birth; 
and 
3. economic efficiency: the need to maintain, develop and utilize effectively the skills and 
talents of all Australians, regardless of background (Office of Multicultural Affairs 1989, vii). 
But multiculturalism also had limits – as Jakubowicz (1989, 263-264) has noted, the state in Australia 
has played a particularly important role in patrolling and policing the acceptable borders and l imits 
of national identity, both in a direct and coercive manner for immigrants, but also in terms  which 
have signalled clearly to white Australia ‘…what it means to be an acceptable Australian.’  Thus, the 
policy document noted that ‘multicultural policies are based upon the premise that al l  Austral ians 
should have an overriding commitment to Australia, to its interests and future first and foremost’ 
(Office of Multicultural Affairs 1989, vii), which translated to acceptance of basic liberal civic virtues, 
in addition to an individual commitment to the liberalisation of the economy.  Thus, the new agen da 
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for multiculturalism in the late 1980s and early 1990s had two core components – first, the state’s 
liberal toleration of difference, in return for acquiescence to the liberal values of the state; and 
second, the need for multiculturalism and the immigration program to reflect the economic 
imperatives of the late 1980s.   
 
The Competitive Australian 
In sum, the 1980s saw a radical shift in the political economy of Australia and its place in a changing 
world, and this change had profound effects for the conception of Australian national identi ty.  The 
changing rationality of rule regarding the governability of the national economy in the context of 
globalising markets and the attendant discourse of economic insecurity and crisis meant that the 
Hawke government strove to open up the Australian economy to the forces of the marketplace in 
order to impose economic efficiency and encourage international competitiveness.  National identity 
needed to change to accommodate this shift – no longer could Australia be inward looking, parochial 
or overtly racist.  Thus, the solution for the Hawke government during this period was to place the 
ethnically diverse, cosmopolitan, competitive, and self-maximising, individual working towards the 
economic good of the nation-state at the centre of Australian national identity.  The ‘commitment to 
Australia’ featured as a disciplining discourse of national identity and purpose.  Immigrants who 
could meet this need would be welcomed regardless of ethnicity, and Australian residents  of all 
ethnic and class backgrounds were called upon to take up this new challenge as their patriotic duty.  
Multiculturalism here reflected the tension that the ALP’s catch-all imperative drew out, as it sought 
to discipline the various groups who supported the ALP, and their policy demands.     
 
Attempting to put the Competitive Australian into Practice: The Bicentennial  
Hawke attempted to mobilise the discourse of ‘commitment to Australia’ and the competitive 
Australian during the Bicentennial, but was largely unsuccessful in national consensus building.  The 
occasion was riven by political contestation and Hawke consequently found it difficult to find 
universal values to base consensus upon.  Preparations for the 1988 Bicentenary were characterised 
from the start by disagreement and contestation as to the meaning of the day (Warhurst 1987, 9).  
The Australian Bicentennial Authority (ABA), as the primary organising authority of the Bicentennial , 
had tried to balance the competing and contested demands of the day - the desire to celebrate  the 
successes of the nation and the need to acknowledge the unequal power relationships that these 
successes were built upon and represented.  This tension provided ammunition for critics dissatisfied 
with the ABA’s approach to the organisation and marking of the day.  From the right, conservative 
critics levelled claims that the ABA was unnecessarily playing down the success and achievement of  
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the nation in the past 200 years and that Australia’s key cultural values were being lost or attacked.  
These subverted and marginalised values included the British connection and monarchy, 
Westminster democracy, liberal freedoms and even the Anzac tradition.  To replace them, the 
conservative critics argued, was a vision of ‘…Austral ia as a land of incoherent diversity without 
unifying traditions and values’ (Hutchinson 1992, 17).  From left leaning critics came an opposing set 
of challenges to the event:  
Critiques of the commercialisation of public rituals, of the anti-democratic nature of such mass 
celebrations, of the tactlessness of celebrating white settlement at all, of the Philistinism 
inherent in a popular rather than a more highbrow calendar of events, of the predictability and 
repressiveness of the dominant discourses used to represent Australian nationalism – all 
provided potentially powerful angles of analysis, no matter what form the Bicentenary 
ultimately took (Turner 1994, 70).   
Most prominent and powerful of all the critiques, however, was the challenge to the day pose d by 
Indigenous Australians – the ancestors of those who had been dispossessed of their land by the 
white settlement of Australia in 1788 and who continued to face discrimination and disadvantage in 
the contemporary context.   
 
The role of Indigenous Australians in the Bicentennial celebration proved to be a significant 
challenge to official, state-driven discourses of Australianness.  As Hage (2002, 421) notes, the 
origins of Australia as a white nation, and the accompanying genocidal practices which estab l ished 
white hegemony throughout the continent, ‘haunt’ the Australian psyche.  When Indigenous 
Australians do challenge white political and cultural dominance in Australia, it proves to be an 
uncomfortable reminder of past injustice for those Australians whose wealth and political 
dominance relies upon these constitutive genocidal actions.  The Bicentennial proved to be one of  
those occasions where the collective attention of the nation was forced to focus on the colonial 
violence that had established the Australian state.  As a consequence, Spillman (1997, 114-115) 
notes ‘Australian organizers avoided talk of the first settlement they were commemorating because 
they feared, from the beginning, the opposition it would evoke from Aboriginal activists and the ir 
supporters, who called Australia Day “Invasion Day” and demonstrated accordingly.’  Further, the 
organisers were anxious that the occasion would draw appropriate, and legitimating, international 
attention (Spillman, 1997 107-108), and these international observers were politely interested in 
how Australia was addressing these past injustices.  The significance of the occasion, coupled with 
the international attention, therefore gave Aboriginal activists the opportunity to challenge the 
meaning of the Bicentennial in a very public forum.    
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The public challenge to the Bicentenary centred on two marches in support of Indigenous rights and 
in opposition to an optimistic and uncritical celebration of the day - one march solely for Indigenous 
participants, and one march that included both Indigenous participants and their supporters.  Issues 
of consequence which were being contested in these marches included land rights, continued 
Indigenous disadvantage and discrimination, and the rejection of the Bicentennial as a celebration, 
and its competing representation as a year of Mourning.  As Turner (1994, 87) argues, the protests 
by Indigenous Australians and their supporters on Australia Day 1988 helped to problematise the 
conception of Australianness and open it up to a more contested, ambiguous and just form.   
 
This contested, ambiguous sense of national identity presented a problem for Hawke and the 
utilisation of his standard consensus discourse.  This problem was two-fold – firstly, the occasion had 
descended into at times ugly partisan squabble over the right way to celebrate (or commemorate) 
the event.  As mentioned, conservative critics from within and outside the Coalition, but largely 
lining up along party lines, had challenged the ALP’s organisation of the occasion.  The ALP had 
helped to engender this sense of partisanship by removing, or failing to renew, the service of several 
Fraser-era ABA board members, the general manager, and the chairman of the board, and instead 
replacing them with people of their own choosing.  Further, the Authori ty placed under closer 
government supervision in the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (Warhurst 1987, 16-17).  
Secondly, was the question of how to incorporate the experiences, values and expectations of  the 
ALP’s traditionally socially conservative blue-collar base, its multicultural immigrant support base, 
and its middle class progressive supporters.   Despite the challenges faced by Indigenous Australians 
in translating their small numbers into electoral clout, their experiences and demands were 
especially important in this coalition.  As such, they challenged the relatively stable negotiated 
settlement between ALP constituencies, as the constitutive genocidal acts which had established the 
white settlement of Australia, and the consequently unequal power relationship this had 
established, were acknowledged.   
 
The difficulty for Hawke was finding universal values upon which to establish consensus.  As 
Cochrane and Goodman (1992, 175) point out ‘[t]he Bicentenary would have been far less trying had  
it come at a high point in the Menzies era: then we could have had a solid statement of good 
government, cultural homogeneity and consensus.  The idea of “nation”, then, was ontologically 
secure.’  Hawke settled on ‘a commitment to Australia’ (anticipating the Fitzgerald report) as being 
the universalising value of Australianness and frequently asserted this during the Bicentenary events 
as the only universally defining feature of an Australian.  On the steps of the Opera House in Sydney 
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on Australia Day 1988, Hawke gave his set speech to Australia regarding the meaning of the 
Bicentenary, and the commitment to Australia theme featured prominently in a hierarchy of 
importance.  Hawke began this address by saying: 
We begin these celebrations in no spirit of boastfulness or national self-glorification.   
This is a day of commemoration.   
Even more important, it is a day of commitment…  
But, my fellow Australians, today I use the word “commitment” in a special sense.   
For, our commitment to Australia is, in a very real way, the quality which best defines what it 
means to be an Australian in 1988 (Hawke 1988a, 1-2).   
In reference to the contestation of the occasion posed by Indigenous Australians, soberness in 
remembrance of past (unnamed) injustice is present,  justified as appropriate, and in turn, crass 
jingoism is also rejected as an option.  However, commemoration is placed as a lesser value to 
commitment by the hypotaxis of the clauses, with the subordinate clause ‘even more important’  
before the following main clause ‘it is a day of commitment’.  This is further emphasised by Hawke’s  
aligning of commitment to a ‘special’ and ‘best’ definition of Australianness.  A hierarchy of meaning 
was being created by Hawke for the purpose of subordinating the contestat ion of the day to 
Hawke’s own message of commitment, and Indigenous rejection of the occasion is unmentioned.   
 
Hawke continued his speech by listing a set a characteristics and values which linked Australia of 
1988 to its past:  
What is it that links us…? 
It is not only the fact that, for the past 200 years, and to this day, we have been a nation of 
immigrants.   
It is not only the fact that we share together this vast continent as our homeland.   
It is not only the shared inheritance of all that has been built here, over the past 200 years.   
And it is not only the common bond of institutions, standards, language and culture.   
Indeed, in today’s Australia, our very diversity is an ever growing source of the richness, vitality 
and strength of our community.   
It is true that all these things I have mentioned go to shape the Australian character and define 
the Australian identity (Hawke 1998a, 2-3).   
Here, Hawke listed the concerns and expectations of other groups competing for recognition in the 
Bicentenary.  Ethnic groups and immigrants were assured that ‘our very diversity is an ever growing 
source of the richness, vitality and strength of our community’.  An effort to placate conservative 
critics was attempted by the reference to ‘the common bond of institutions, standards, language and 
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culture’.  However, the attempt to incorporate competing interests into the meaning of the 
Bicentenary implicitly acknowledged the contestation of the occasion and failed to meet the criteria 
of a universalising message.  Hawke attempted to overcome this problem by again subordinating 
these competing claims to the commitment to Australia.  As Spillman (1997, 126; emphasis added)  
has noted ‘[o]ganizers [of the Bicentenary] adopted rhetoric and programs which claimed diversity 
as characteristic of national identity, and addressed especially those groups from whom they feared 
criticism… characterizing the nation as diverse was a central rhetorical strategy for representing 
unity across difference.’    Hawke finished his address by emphasising this unity across difference:   
Yet beyond them, there remains one vital factor in the answer to the question: Who is an 
Australian?   
And that factor is: A commitment to Australia and its future.   
It is that common commitment which binds the Australian-born of the seventh or eighth 
generation and all those of their fellow-Australians born in any of the 130 countries from 
which our peoples are drawn.   
In Australia, there is no hierarchy of descent; there must be no privilege of origin.   
The commitment is all.   
The commitment to Australia is the only thing needful to be a true Australian.   
Today in this historic place and at this historic hour, let us renew that commitment, our 
commitment to Australia and Australia’s cause – the cause of freedom, fairness, justice and 
peace (Hawke 1988a, 3-4).   
Commitment here served as a universalising value, but it also neutralised critique and flattened 
difference.  Significant political and competing claims, whilst for the most part not rejected outright, 
were, subordinate to the message of commitment, and their contestation was not al lowed to spi l l  
over into the assumed meaning of the occasion or of Australianness.  This revealed a tension in the 
logic of the competitive Australian - whilst Australia may have been diverse, and whi le Austral ians 
may have disagreed, Australians were all still somehow working towards the same end goal.  This 
goal was left deliberately vague and presented as a set of uncontroversial liberal democratic 
ideographs – ‘the cause of freedom, fairness, justice and peace’.   
 
The connection to neoliberal economic reform and the competitive Australian was made more 
explicit in Hawke’s address to the National Press Club four days prior to Australia Day and in his 
release to the media for Australia Day, 1988.  On both occasions he referred explicitly to the way 
Australians had met the challenges posed by economic reform:  
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The world has seen that Australians are a people of great courage and determination who are 
unafraid of meeting a challenge.  We can all feel proud of our country, for whether it is in 
matters of domestic economy, in the international arena, the arts, science, medicine, or on the 
sports field, we have proved time and again that Australians are achievers…  
Australia’s successful progress into the twenty first century depends so much on the efforts of 
every single Australian, regardless of our origins, wherever we live (Hawke, 1988a, 1).   
And:  
The reality is that our prosperity will not be handed to us on a platter.  We will have to match 
and better the productivity, the product quality, the creativity and the entrepreneurial flair of 
the world’s best across all sections of the economy, even those not directly engaged in trade.   
This is a task for all of us.  It is not one we can take lightly.  It is one which can be facilitated by 
the actions of Government but in the end must be executed by individuals (Hawke 1988b, 8).   
Thus, the success of Australia depended on the republican commitment of Australians to their civic 
duty, ‘all of us’ and ‘every single Australian’.  Whilst not all Australians could be expected to 
contribute to the fields of arts, science or sports, all Australians could be called upon to ensure 
economic productivity – ‘even those not directly engaged in trade’.  This was part of the solution to 
the problem of economic security identified by Hindess (1998, 223, emphasis added):  
The pursuit of national economic security now seems to require that an overwhelming priority 
be placed on competitive economic efficiency.  As a result, anything (welfare, health services, 
schooling and higher education) which might seem to have a bearing on economic life is 
assessed not only in terms of the availability of resources, but also in terms of their 
consequences for promoting or inhibiting the pursuit of national economic efficiency.  Thus, in 
what is often seen as an ‘economic rationalist’ or ‘neo-liberal’ attack on the welfare state, the 
concern is not simply to save money but also to promote more efficient patterns of individual 
and organisational behaviour by bringing market relationships into what had once been 
regarded as non-market spheres of allocation.   
Thus, the competitive Australian was to be always in the entrepreneurial search of a way to 
monetise their actions, in order to ensure the prosperity of the nation.  The commitment to the 
economic health and vitality of the nation was the lesson of the Bicentenary.   
 
The difficulties Hawke, and the Bicentennial, faced should not be overstated.  Many Australians 
participated in the Australia Day celebrations – by watching the tall ships enter Sydney Harbour, 
listening to the speeches made by Prince Charles, Hawke and the Governor General Sir Ninian 
Martin Stephen at Bennelong Point, spending the day on boats or the on foreshore around the 
harbour, or watching the fireworks and entertainment that ended official proce edings in the 
evening.  By some estimations, one and half million crowded into Sydney on January 26th to 
participate in the events (Turner 1994, 70).  As Turner (1994, 71) notes:  
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There is overwhelming evidence from the press, television, film and radio talkback that 
Australians participated in large numbers in Australia Day 1988 and experienced that 
participation as a source of deep national pride and exhilaration… for many Australians the 
Bicentenary produced a moving spectacle, moments of genuine pride and in some cases even 
gestures toward a reconciliation of the great contradiction at the heart of nationhood 
[reconciliation with indigenous Australians].   
Hawke’s grappling with the competing and contradictory claims made by participants on the day 
also reflected some this success.  By representing diversity as unity, Hawke was able to fal l  back on 
his tried and tested discourse of consensus – that the differences that divided Australians were less 
important than the similarities, values and goals that united the national community.  Hawke was 
also able to use the occasion to relatively freely promote the government’s policy agenda, and his 
conception of national identity and purpose with the competitive Australian.  Additionally, some of  
the sense of occasion that the Bicentenary presented rubbed off on Hawke as Prime Minister.  
Further, the occasion had some success in opening up and challenging conceptions of 
Australianness:  
Active inclusion of non-British immigrants, and indigenous Australians, was sought by 
government and community groups organising the Bicentenary.  While those of British 
ancestry remained culturally and politically dominant, events, publications, advertising and 
festivities were aimed at, and reflected, a decreasingly British multicultural population 
(Pearson and O’Neill 2009, 73).   
As such, the Bicentenary should not be presented as an unmitigated failure at producing a sense of  
national occasion or that it was rejected by the public.   
 
However, the Bicentenary did prove to be a difficult national occasion for Hawke.  Firstly, this was 
due to the inability of Hawke to ‘celebrate’ the actual event that was being marked (the landing of  
white settlers in 1788) due to the devastation that this had wrought upon Indigenous Australians.  
The inability to celebrate the origins of the nation raised the question as to what was being marked 
at all.  This ambiguity was reflected in Hawke’s Australia Day address, as he struggled to incorporate  
an acceptable meaning for the day, as he lacked the familiar and identifiably ‘Australian’ and 
nationalist values that litter Prime Ministerial Anzac Day addresses.  Instead, Australians were 
implored to make a commitment to Australia, with all the attendant materialistic implications of that 
appeal, or to a set of uncontroversial, but hardly deeply nationalist, liberal democratic values as the 
over-riding value to be celebrated.  Secondly, however, the prominent and public contestation that 
Aboriginal activist activity posed meant that Hawke’s resort to his consensus discourse fe lt hol low 
and misplaced.  As Indigenous Australians and their supporters marched through the city on 
Australia Day, they publically challenged any settled ‘commitment to Australia and its future’ .  As 
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such, the Bicentennial proved to be a difficult and challenging national occasion for Hawke, one 
encumbered by contestation over the origins of the nation and its current and future direction.  The 
next section will explore how the newly unpolitical discourse of Anzac did not face these s ame 
problems.   
 
Hawke’s Anzac – a Corpus Assisted Discourse Analysis 
The following section presents some data on Hawke’s Anzac Day addresses.  Hawke’s addresses 
were infrequent over his time in office, and only became regular from 1989.  Hawke largely 
conformed to the Anzac tradition in his speeches, though the protean nature of his Anzac 
entrepreneurship saw some of his addresses closely resemble a regular policy speech, and lack the 
high rhetoric and nationalism of his successors.   
 
The Sites of Hawke’s Anzac Day Addresses 
Hawke gave five Anzac Day addresses, and released one media statement during his term as Prime 
Minister.  Reflecting Hawke’s emerging Anzac entrepreneurship, and the significance of the 
reconciliation of Vietnam veterans with the Australian body politic, these speeches are clustered in 
the last years of his term.   
 
Year Type 
1984 One media release 
1986 One speech 
1989 One speech 
1990 Two speeches 
1991 One speech 
Figure 13 – List of Hawke’s Anzac Day Addresses and Media Statements  
Hawke’s speeches were delivered in Australia and overseas.  1986 saw him deliver an address in 
Greece, and he gave two speeches at Gallipoli for the 75th anniversary of the landings in 1990.  
Hawke did not go to significant sites of war remembrance in Australia, and instead delivered 
addresses at the Heidelberg Repatriation Hospital in Melbourne on Anzac Day eve in 1989, and in 
Darwin at the opening of a naval gymnasium in 1991.  This was in contrast to his successors, who 
delivered Anzac Day addresses almost exclusively at significant Australian-based and foreign sites of  
Australian war remembrance, again reflecting the emerging norms of Prime Ministerial Anzac Day 
addresses during this time.   
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The Location of Hawke’s Anzac 
Hawke’s conception of where Anzac was located was strongly influenced by where he was delivering 
his speech, and what the context of that speech.  Unlike his successors, Hawke did not evangelise  a 
particular war or site of Anzac, like Keating did with Kokoda and WWII, and Howard tended to do 
with Gallipoli and WWI.  As such, WWII (four out of five total mentions in the Hawke corpus) and the 
Gulf War (all four mentions in the entire corpus featuring all Prime Ministers) feature in his 1991 
address, as he honoured the service of ADF personnel who had served in the recent Gulf conflict, 
and paid tribute to the Indigenous people who had served in World War II and who had not received 
just recompense for that service.  WWI is strongly alluded to in his 1990 addre sses at Gallipoli, but 
only gains two named mentions in 1989.   
 
The battle sites of Hawke’s Anzac Day addresses reversed this tendency.  Gallipoli dominated his 
addresses with seventeen named mentions, and other WWI sites are also predominant – France 
(two mentions), Flanders, Lone Pine and Villers-Bretonneux (all one mention).  The location and 
context is also important here, as he also referenced Crete and Greece in his 1986 Athens address, 
and contemporary peacekeeping operations in 1989 and 1991.  WWII  sites did feature, but less 
prominently – Greece (two mentions) and Crete (three mentions), Kokoda, El Alamein, Kokoda, Coral 
Sea, Tobruk and the Burma Railway (all one mention each).  Hawke also referenced Vietnam and 
Long Tan in his 1989 address, and was the only Prime Minister to give that war any substantive 
space in his addresses.  Again, this reflected the context Hawke was working within, as he continued 
to endorse the reconciliation of Vietnam veterans and the Australian public.   
 
Hawke’s Agents of Anzac 
Hawke’s agents of Anzac tended to reflect unity across diversity (Spillman 1997, 126).  The 
references to the Gulf War in his 1991 address saw the proliferation of the conjoined gendered 
nouns men and women (with seven out eight total gendered noun mentions in Hawke’s corpus), 
again reflecting the context that Hawke delivered his speeches in.  The gender diversity of the 
contemporary ADF necessitated such reference, but the fact that Hawke never in isolation 
mentioned the gendered noun women, or the service type nursing, demonstrated that he was 
unwilling to radically reformulate the masculine nature of Anzac.   
  
Hawke was better at referencing diversity when discussing ethnicity.  He was the only Prime Minister 
in the corpus to refer to Indigenous Australians as agents of Anzac in an Anzac Day address.  His Lone 
Pine address in 1990 also referenced the diversity of Anzac’s agents, and their unity despite that 
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difference, via their commitment to Australia.  However, references to the diversity of Anz ac’s 
agents do not feature frequently in Hawke’s Anzac Day addresses, and he did not re imagine Anzac 
with diversity as a central theme.   
 
The Attributes of Hawke’s Anzac Agents 
The attributes of Anzac’s agents that Hawke perceived further reinforces the notion that he did not 
radically reimagine Anzac, as the attributes he most frequently cited were closely aligned to the 
Anzac tradition – sacrifice, courage, heroism and service.   
 
Attributes Frequency 
Sacrifice 9 
Courage/bravery 8 
Heroism 4 
Service/duty 3 
Tenacity/perseverance 3 
Debt Owed 2 
Australianness 2 
Suffering 1 
Egalitarianism 1 
Mateship 4 
Comradeship 1 
Ingenuity 1 
Humour 1 
Resourcefulness 1 
Energy 1 
Professionalism 1 
Figure 14 – List of the Frequency of Mentions of the Attributes of Agents of Anzac in Hawke’s Anzac Day Addresses  
Such a reading of Anzac reinforced its status as an ideograph, calling upon the public to remember 
and honour the memory of those who had fought and died, but also providing the signifying 
backbone to the new lessons of Anzac that Hawke filled his 1990 addresses with regarding 
neoliberalism and Australian identity.   
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In sum, Hawke engaged with Anzac Day every year after 1988 until being ousted as Prime Minister in 
December 1991.  The speeches in 1989 and 1991 were prosaic and wide-ranging, covering a numbe r 
of themes and Hawke government policy initiatives, and closely resembled the structure and style of 
Hawke’s regular public policy speeches, demonstrating the embryonic nature of Prime Ministerial 
Anzac Day addresses.  However, as befits the significance of the 75th anniversary of the Gallipoli 
landings, the 1990 Anzac Day addresses spoke more about the lessons that current Australians could 
learn from the diggers and the meaning of the values that they embodied.  The ideographic nature 
of Anzac in his 1990 addresses had both instrumental and constitutive consequences for Anzac as a 
central Australian nationalist discourse.  As such, Hawke’s Anzac entrepreneurship presented a 
universalising and celebratory form of Australian nationalism and national identity in the face of  the 
increasing problematisation of these forms of national identity.   
 
Hawke’s Anzac Day Addresses: The Competitive Australian and Success with Anzac as 
Ideograph  
Anzac did not face the same difficulties that the Bicentenary faced after the 1987 welcome home 
parade for Vietnam veterans, and Hawke was able to employ his commitment to Australia’ discourse 
without difficulty.  This was for two main reasons; firstly, the newly reconciled, depoliticised and 
unpolitical Anzac that had arisen from the reincorporation of Vietnam veterans into the community 
of Australian servicemen and women meant that powerful taboos existed to sanction contestation 
of the nature present during the Bicentenary.  Social movement activism like that of the early 1980 s, 
such as WAR protests, had largely fallen away in the later years of the decade as activists concluded 
that such public challenges ‘…could alienate more sympathy than it attracted’ (Inglis 2008, 441-442).  
Secondly, and linked to the newly unpolitical and incontestable nature of Anzac, was the 
ontologically secure nature of the birth of the Australian nation at Gallipoli and the values that the 
sacrificed diggers embodied.  Unlike the Bicentenary, where the constitutive genocidal acts of white  
settlers powerfully challenged any settled and just conception of the birth of the Australian nation or 
national values and lessons for the present, the heroic sacrifice of Australian diggers at Gallipoli was 
newly safe from such contestation (McKenna 2010, 121).  As such, Anzac entrepreneurship by 
Hawke was more secure than the Bicentenary had been as a forum to espouse Australian 
nationalism.   
 
Anzac Day Eve, 1989 – Our Debt Owed to Our Veterans 
On Anzac Day eve, 1989, Hawke gave a wide ranging speech on his government’s achievements 
regarding veterans’ affairs to a group attending the opening of a new wing to a repatriation hospital 
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in Heidelberg, Melbourne.  It was a largely prosaic affair, closely resembling any number of other 
Hawke policy or interest group speeches, and addressed the concerns of the broad ex -service  men 
and women community, including newly reconciled Vietnam veterans after the 1987 welcome home 
parade.  The speech began by arguing that Anzac Day was an occasion where Australians were 
obliged to ‘…repay the debt we owe our veterans’ (Hawke 1989, 1).  The debts owed in this speech 
centred on three main obligations, some more prosaic, some more symbolic – an obl igation to the 
health of veterans, an obligation to Vietnam veterans, and an obligation to the original diggers who 
landed at Gallipoli and to the sense of Australianness that they defined.   
 
Firstly, Hawke employed the occasion instrumentally to outline his government’s policy 
achievements in the area of veteran’s affairs.  This was framed by the debt that Australians owed 
veterans – ‘…with the opening of this new ward here at Heidelberg, we are demonstrating anew our 
determination to repay that debt as fully as we can’ (Hawke 1989, 1).  Th is involved an obligation to 
ensure the health of ex-service personnel through the provision and upgrading of repatriation 
hospitals, with Hawke outlining government spending on new facilities and equipment at 
Heidelberg.  Due to speculation about the continued existence of the Department of Veterans 
Affairs, Hawke also made a commitment to the continued operation of the Department and to only 
continue with a policy proposal to integrate repatriation hospitals with the state healthcare systems 
with the consent of the RSL, reflecting the consensual approach that Hawke took with regards to 
policy making and his alignment of this approach with his use of Anzac.   
 
Secondly, the speech was an opportunity to remind the gathered audience of the taboos 
surrounding the newly reincorporated and reconciled Vietnam veterans:  
I have always made it clear that whatever’s one’s views about the controversy that surrounded 
the Vietnam War, no one can ever doubt the commitment and the courage of the Australian 
soldiers who were called upon to fight it.   
I was very pleased to attend the Welcome Home Parade in Sydney in October 1987, which, at 
last, gave fitting honours to the men who fought there (Hawke 1989, 3).   
Hawke’s statement regarding the service of Vietnam veterans is  once again declarative and 
unambiguous – ‘I have made it clear’; ‘no one can ever doubt’  – signalling that the terms of the 
reconciliation and reincorporation of Vietnam veterans is non-negotiable.  Hawke further outl ined 
that his government had pledged $200,000 towards the construction of the Vietnam Veterans 
Memorial, and encouraged others to contribute towards its construction.  The mention of  Vietnam 
veterans is notable, as Hawke here still prioritised the explicit and active inclusion of Vietnam 
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veterans into official and state-driven discourses of Anzac.  This is notable due to the conspicuous 
sublimation or absence of Vietnam veterans’ particular and problematic experience of war after this 
point in Prime Ministerial discourses of Anzac.   
 
Finally, Hawke announced that the government had agreed to assist a group of very elderly Gallipol i 
veterans to make the ‘pilgrimage’ to Gallipoli for the 75th anniversary of the landings:  
Next year, we will be celebrating the 75th anniversary of the event that in many ways still 
defines the Australian identity and consciousness – the landing by the ANZACs at Gallipoli.   
This will be an anniversary that Australians will want to mark with dignity and special 
awareness of its significance.   
It is not too early to begin now our planning of how we should honour that occasion.   
…we have agreed that there could be no more fitting way for the nation to honour the 
achievements of these veterans, and of recalling the sacrifices of their comrades-in-arms, than 
to send a party of veterans back to Anzac Cove on Anzac Day, 75 years after the first landing…  
In addition, I feel that it would be appropriate for me as Prime Minister to attend this 
ceremony – and   might I add, I would also find it deeply moving in a personal sense to be 
there. (Hawke 1989, 4).   
Again, debt is the theme which characterised Hawke’s commitment.  The Gallipoli veterans are to be 
‘honoured’, for their service and sacrifice.  The importance of the landings lays in the way it ‘still 
defines the Australian identity and consciousness’ and Hawke himself endorsed the occasion with his 
emotive commitment to attend.   
 
Thus, this Anzac Day address was fairly prosaic and largely indistinguishable from any other Hawke 
policy advocate (Grube 2013, 52-53) address.  It was given to a group of people unremarkable 
enough to not be given any mention in the press release of the text of the speech, or the one media 
report located on the speech in The Australian (Hannan 1989, 2).  It was given in an unremarkable 
location and for an unremarkable occasion – the opening of a new wing to a hospital.  It lacked the 
pomp, sanctity and sense of occasion now usually attached to Prime Ministerial Anzac Day addresses 
or the hallowed locations of Australian war remembrance.  The speech demonstrates that Prime 
Ministerial engagement with Anzac had not yet become institutionalised and that the parameters of  
engagement were still flexible and porous.  It did, however, set up his commitment to Anzac Day 
and, in particular, to the 75th anniversary of the landings the following year.   
 
Anzac Day, 1990 – The Commitment is All 
1990 saw Hawke keep his promise to the Gallipoli veterans to honour their sacrifice and 
achievements by sending 58 of them, himself, the Opposition leader John Hewson, and a large party 
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of support staff to the Gallipoli peninsula for the April 25 commemoration (Macleod 2002, 154).  It 
was the single most significant event of Hawke’s Anzac entrepreneurship, and it established a 
pattern of Prime Ministerial Anzac Day remembrance that his successors have drawn upon and 
followed.  The trip lasted three days, was accompanied by 70 journalists, and consisted of three 
Anzac Day ceremonies – a dawn service; a service at Lone Pine; and an international service, 
attended by, among others, Hawke, Opposition Leader John Hewson, the President of Turkey Turgut 
Özal, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom Margaret Thatcher, the Governor-General of New 
Zealand Sir Paul Reeves, the French Secretary of State for Veterans Af fairs and an ambassador from 
the Federal Republic of Germany.   
 
Due to the special significance of the occasion, being an anniversary and given the advanced ages of  
the surviving diggers who attended of age 90 and above, Hawke’s Anzac Day addresses and 
interviews did not contain the same prosaic and explicit link to the policy achievements of his 
government as his 1989 or 1991 addresses.  There was significantly more focus on the meaning of 
Anzac Day, how it defined Australianness and Australian values, and lessons that the occasion could 
teach the present.  For the occasion, Hawke fell back on his discourse of the competitive Austral ian 
and the phrase ‘the commitment is all’.   
 
The success that Hawke had with his use of ‘the commitment is all’ was due to the origin or bi rth of  
the values being celebrated being secure, uncontested and unpolitical.  In contrast to the 
Bicentenary, where the origins and history of events that were being celebrated were publically 
contested, and were therefore excised from Hawke’s addresses, Anzac Day 1990 faced no such 
problems (McKenna 2010, 121).  Several factors fed into the unpolitical nature of the event.  Firstly, 
and most importantly, was the newly reconciled, depoliticised and unpolitical sphere of Anzac after 
reconciliation with Vietnam veterans.  Deliberation, in the form of questioning of the continued 
relevance of Anzac, was absent, as was questioning of the values that WAR activists purported the 
day represented, such as hyper-masculinism, militarism, or rape during wartime.  Criticism of the 
anniversary was largely limited to questioning of the cost of the event and was ‘little noticed’ 
(Macleod 2002, 156) or shut down by Hawke (1990a, 2) ‘I think you can’t measure these things in 
terms of money.’  Also demonstrating the unpolitical nature of the event was the bipartisanship that 
characterised the trip, with Opposition leader John Hewson being invited along and delivering a 
speech at the Lone Pine ceremony (Hewson 1990), which contrasted with the partisan squabbles 
that had characterised the planning of the Bicentenary.  Another factor was Hawke again casting the 
occasion as one where the nation owed a debt to the Anzacs who had fought – ‘We should instead 
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dedicate ourselves – to keeping bright the memory of those men who so unstintingly did what was 
asked of them on our behalf – and to ensuring that the freedom and peace for which they so 
ardently yearned, for which they so bravely fought, and for which so many of them so selflessly gave 
their lives, shall not pass’ (Hawke 1990b, 1).  Finally, there was the repeatedly asserted sacredness of 
the anniversary.  Hawke spoke frequently of ‘pilgrimage’ to Gallipoli or the ‘sacredness’ of the 
landscape, due to ‘the bravery and the bloodshed of the ANZACs’ (Hawke 1990b, 1).  These multiple 
factors combined to draw a line around Anzac and to prevent criticism of the event of the like of the 
WAR protests on Anzac Day in the 1980s, or the Aboriginal protests of the Bicentenary.   
 
The settled nature of the trip was also endorsed by the Turkish hosts.  Old enemies were now 
friends, with the Turkish president Özal noting in his Anzac Day address that ‘[t]he Canakkale wars 
have shown that there is no place for hatred and enmity in our ever-narrowing world.  The 
Canakkale wars are the best example that States, when they sincerely wish it, can establish 
friendship even on the foundations of past wars’  (Özal 1990, 2) and Hawke (1990c, 4) remarking 
‘…the mutual respect between our nations which was forged on the battlefields of Gallipoli has 
proved to be a sound and enduring foundation for the warm and substantial relationship which has 
developed between us…’  The trip thus served as another example of  memorial diplomacy (Graves 
2014), continuing a trend that Hawke had begun with his Anzac Day in Greece in 1986.   
 
Hawke’s Anzac entrepreneurship was secure here because the events being celebrated, and the 
values that these events embodied, were secure back home too.  As Macleod (2002, 155) notes, 
although some media reports ‘…made explicit references to the ambivalence that Anzac Day had 
aroused at the time of Vietnam or the old fears that it was glorifying war, this was done not to 
continue to question, but to provide a contrast to the assured situation of the present.’  Thus, The 
Australian noted ‘It is proof perhaps that 75 years on, public interest in Gallipoli is gaining, not 
receding as so many had feared and predicted. It has returned to its original role as a unifying force’ 
(Kelly and Kershler 1990, 1).  Thus, the origins of Anzac, and the events being commemorated and 
celebrated, were secure and were being actively encouraged by the Prime Minister and were 
accepted as appropriate by the public.   
 
Hawke gave a number of addresses and interviews during the trip, with a number of theme s coming 
through prominently as lessons for the present.  These can be summarised under two headings – the 
Australian values that the Anzacs epitomised, particularly mateship and unity in diversity,  and the 
continued relevance of these values for the present day; and once again, the ‘commitment is all’ 
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refrain.  Hawke’s speech at Lone Pine was the most widely reported, and where his voice cracked 
with emotion as he finished his speech (Stevens 1990, 6).  It was also here that Hawke most 
thoroughly expounded upon the lessons Australia could draw upon for the present.  As Anzac was 
now ostensibly unpolitical, Hawke was free to use Anzac as a sacred, incontestable ideograph 
(McGee 1980).  Though bound by the genre restrictions of Anzac (mateship, sacrifice, suf fering, 
violence, heroism, pilgrimage, and the iconic phrase ‘At the going down of the sun and in the 
morning we will remember them’ are all mentioned in this speech) Anzac was, at once, pregnant 
with meaning and significance about national identity, national values and lessons for the present, 
but also vague, unspecific and malleable, too.  As Thomson (2013, 321) notes ‘One of the reasons for 
the success of the Anzac legend is its plasticity; the story and its meanings stretch and shift with the 
times and in different contexts and this malleability helps ensure popular support.’   
 
But, given the recently contested and only newly reconciled nature of Anzac, its contemporary 
meaning was not self-evident – it needed explanation:  
It is not in the waste of war that Australians find the meaning of Gallipoli – then or now. 
I saw ‘then or now’ for a profound reason.   
The meaning of the ANZAC tradition, forged in the fires of Gallipoli, must be learned anew, 
from generation to generation.   
Its meaning can endure only as long as each new generation of Australians finds the will to 
reinterpret it - to breathe, as it were, new life into the old story: and, in separating the truth 
from the legend, realise its relevance to a nation and a people, experiencing immense change 
over the past three-quarters of a century (Hawke 1990d, 2).   
Hawke’s call to renew the meaning of Anzac and ‘to breathe, as it were, new life into the old story’ ,  
reflected both the malleable nature of Anzac as ideograph, and the degree of flexibility avai lable in 
interpreting its contemporary meaning.  It actively encouraged remembrance and the renewal of 
memory of war.   
The lesson being taught is endorsed by the presence of the returning diggers attending the occasion, 
whose experience is drawn upon to demonstrate the continued lessons of Anzac:   
In the continuing quest for the real meaning of ANZAC, our way is lit by the shining presence 
here today of the little band of first ANZACS who have returned.  
This is, for all of us here, and for all our fellow Australians at home, an honour, an experience, 
an emotion, which goes beyond words.   
These men know the truth of Gallipoli.   
They would be the last to claim that they were heroes – but indeed they were.   
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They did not pretend to fathom the deep and immense tides of history which brought them to 
these shores, at the cross-roads of civilisation, so far from home, so far from all they knew and 
loved.   
They did not see themselves as holding in their hands the destiny of six mighty empires – all 
now vanished.   
Nor could they begin to imagine that the vast and terrible forces unleashed upon the world in 
1914 would still be working their way through human history 75 years on (Hawke 1990d, 2).   
Notable is the lack of voice the diggers have in this speech, or, more generally, in Hawke’s many 
speeches and interviews given during the trip.  Whilst the elderly diggers were certainly included in 
proceedings, the job of defining nationhood and the meaning of Anzac had l argely shifted to the 
Prime Minister, whose role was emphasised and well-covered.  So whilst the elderly diggers were 
certainly present, and Hawke’s rapport with them was noted (Holbrook 2014, 177), their presence 
played a supporting role to the amplified message of political elites.  The digger’s lack of  agency in 
Hawke’s speeches reflected the shift towards a more elite orientated nationalist discourse of Anzac, 
one where political elites such as Hawke, rather than the diggers themselves, spoke on behalf of 
veterans and drove the continuing marking and celebration of Anzac.  Thus, the uncomfortable 
message of the Vietnam veterans during the 1987 welcome home parades, and acknowledged only a 
year earlier by Hawke in his 1989 Anzac Day address – that war damages its participants and 
continues to do so long after conflict has ended – is lost in a sanitised and official version of the 
Anzac tradition centred on the landings at Gallipoli.   
 
Hawke painted a picture of the world of the diggers in order to explain the current meaning of Anzac 
circa 1990, which reflected this lack of agency.  In 1914/15, great forces were at work in the world, 
profoundly changing the global balance of power.  The diggers found themselves ‘at the cross-roads 
of civilisation’, where the familiar West met the foreign East, ‘so far from home’ .  By landing at 
Gallipoli, the diggers helped shape the global geopolitics of the next 75 years, ‘holding in their hands 
the destiny of six mighty empires – all now vanished’.  But the diggers themselves had little 
understanding of their profound role in these changes – ‘they did not pretend to fathom the deep 
and immense tides of history which brought them to these shores’ – with Hawke painting them 
instead as humble, ordinary men:    
But they knew two things:  
They had a job to do; and they knew that in the end, they could only rely on each other to see 
it through – they knew they depended on their mates… 
In that recognition of the special meaning of Australian mateship, the self-recognition of their 
dependence upon one another - these Australians, by no means all of them born in Australia, 
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drawn from every walk of life and different backgrounds, cast upon these hostile shores, 
twelve thousand miles from home - there lay the genesis of the ANZAC tradition.   
And at the heart of that tradition lay a commitment. It was a simple but deep commitment to 
one another, each to his fellow Australian.   
And in that commitment, I believe, lies the enduring meaning of ANZAC, then and today and 
for the future.   
It is that commitment, now as much as ever - now with all the vast changes occurring in our 
nation, more than ever - it is that commitment to Australia, which defines, and alone defines, 
what it is to be an Australian. The commitment is all (Hawke 1990d, 2-3; emphasis in the 
original).   
The diggers’ lack of sophisticated understanding of the events that had brought them to Gallipoli did 
not, however, diminish their sense of duty – ‘they knew two things: they had a job to do; and they 
knew that in the end, they could only rely on each other to see it through – they knew they 
depended on their mates’.  They were unified and did this, despite their differences in  where they 
were born or their class status, because they were mates and because they could only rely upon one 
another, which was the central lesson to be learnt from their example – ‘there lay the genesis of the 
ANZAC tradition’.  Hawke then fell back on the familiar refrain of commitment – the diggers were 
committed to each other, as mates, and to getting the job done - there ‘lies the enduring meaning of 
ANZAC, then and today and for the future’.  In sum, the lesson for the present was that a sense of 
duty, the support of mates and a commitment to one another drove the diggers at Gallipoli, despite  
their lack of understanding of the geopolitical forces at work reshaping the global balance of power.   
 
Anzac had become a vehicle for Hawke’s standard discursive message of consensus and neol iberal  
economic reform – ‘the commitment is all’.  The mateship of the diggers was conflated with Hawke’s 
well-rehearsed nationalist vision of a competitive Australian’s commitment to the nation-state – ‘it is 
that commitment to Australia, which defines, and alone defines, what it is to be an Austral ian. The 
commitment is all’.  The construction of Hawke’s language here placed the ‘commitment is all’ 
message above any other lesson to be learnt from Anzac – it was declarative and singular, as it 
‘alone defines’ Australianness.  Anzac here served as a metaphor for the appeal to citizens’ 
commitment to the Australian state, and to the policy program of economic reform by the Hawke 
government.  Just like the diggers who came before them, Australians in the 1990s were also facing 
profound geopolitical and economic changes that they may not have understood.  And much the 
same as the diggers, they did so at ‘the cross-roads of civilisation’, as the government encouraged 
them to look to Asia for future prosperity.  Finally, just as the diggers had been diverse, yet uni fied 
by mateship, Australians in 1990 were multicultural and separated by class, yet still found consensus 
in their commitment to the state and its success.  Hawke’s consensus politics in this instance 
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attempted to subsume all identities under the ‘aegis of the established consensus’ (Little 2007, 157), 
closing down the space to contest the politics of Hawke’s neoliberalism and economic reform.  Thus, 
whilst not as explicit as his 1989 Anzac Day address, Anzac was again utilised instrumentally by 
Hawke in alignment with his government’s policy agenda.  The ideographic and unpolitical nature of  
Anzac after reconciliation with Vietnam veterans allowed Hawke to subtly insert the political into 
this speech.  Hawke was able to do so without attracting sanction because he respected the 
boundaries of Anzac by honouring its well understood meaning regarding service, sacrifice, and duty, 
and thus insulated himself from criticism from partisan conservatives.  Social movement activists ,  i f  
at all roused by the occasion, were not reported upon by the media that year.   
 
Hawke’s Anzac entrepreneurship had a constitutive aspect regarding Australian nationalism too, as it 
marked the boundaries of Australian citizenship and identity.  The message of commitment, 
amplified by the unpolitical ideograph of Anzac, had two important effects in disciplining some of  
the varying groups the ALP was courting as supporters with its catch-all electoralism (Jaensch 1989).  
Firstly, it sent a strong message to non-Anglo Australians that the terms of Australian citizenship and 
identity would not be challenged.  Anzac, and all its associations with white Australia,  mascul inity,  
militarism, and conservatism, that WAR and GESPA activists had pointed to in the early 1980s, would 
remain (and be reinforced) as the framework for a central explanatory myth of Australianness, 
despite concessions to modern sensibilities by including reference to the diversity of the di ggers.  
Further, this message, and the newly unpolitical nature of Anzac, disciplined those Anglo Australians 
uncomfortable with these associations and drew a line under the contestability of Anzac.  WAR 
activists or, more generally, social movement activists who were concerned with issues of  pol i tical  
identity, now had to contend with newly reconstituted taboos sanctioning Anzac Day protest activity 
or the questioning of Anzac and its associated values.  Secondly, it disciplined the ALP Anglo working 
class base by placing the commitment to the new, competitive Australia, at the centre of the 
message of a principal national occasion.  Australians in 1990 needed to heed the example of the 
diggers who had come before them and face the economic challenges that now confronted the 
Australian economy, just as the diggers had faced the challenges of a changing world and had 
sacrificed greatly.  75 years later, Australia faced the similar need to put aside selfish wants and 
desires and sacrifice for the good of the nation in the face of a changing world.  Further, in the 
context of tension regarding multiculturalism during the period (Kalantzis 2003, 315-317), it sent a 
clear message to these Australians that traditional conceptions of Australianness would remain at 
the centre of national identity and citizenship and that they had nothing to fear from the challenges 
being posed to Anglo-identity hegemony by the large scale immigration of the post-war years.   
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These elements discursively disciplined the various groups that the ALP was appealing to for 
electoral support during the Hawke government.  The catch-all imperatives that the Hawke 
government’s electoralism had posed guided Hawke’s nationalist discourse and his established 
boundaries of Australian citizenship.  This, in combination with the ALP’s ideological commitment to 
diversity and multiculturalism, led Hawke to incorporate the diversity of Australians into the scope of 
consensus and reconciliation, whilst simultaneously drawing a boundary around the Australian 
citizenship ideal.  The lesson of Anzac Day 1990 was that Australians could be diverse, but they also 
needed to be unified in their end goal of service to the state.  Anzac Day amplified and endorsed this 
message, as the newly unpolitical Anzac was put to use.  Thus, Anzac Day 1990 was an example of 
Hawke’s Anzac entrepreneurship being employed in conjunction with the newly reconciled and 
unpolitical Anzac for instrumental and constitutive policy and national identity ends.   
 
Anzac Day 1991 – Australia’s Role in a Changing World 
Anzac Day 1991 saw Hawke return to the largely prosaic, policy orientated, format of Anzac Day 
address, much like his 1989 address.  Unlike his Anzac Day 1990 addresses, which were filled with 
rich, nationalist imagery and excluded direct references to policy, Anzac Day 1991 almost exclusively 
referenced the policy agenda of the Hawke government.  Speaking to an audience in Darwin whi lst 
opening a new naval gymnasium, Hawke’s speech began by briefly paying tribute to the sacri f ice  of 
former service-people in the World Wars, before linking that to the recent service of naval personnel 
in the Gulf War, outlining the long overdue payment of Indigenous peoples who had served 
alongside defence personnel in WWII, and the government’s recent defence reorientation after the 
1986 Dibb Report.   
 
Hawke’s 1991 Anzac Day address again demonstrated the still evolving nature of Prime Ministerial 
Anzac Day addresses.  Whilst Hawke had set an important precedent regarding the elite celebration 
of Anzac with the 75th anniversary of the landings in 1990, he did not feel obliged to continue 
observance of Anzac Day with ceremonial trips to overseas locations or at the Australian War 
Memorial.  Further, he did not continue to observe the same reverence for the occasion 
demonstrated in 1990 – the 1991 address failed to mention sacredness, overt nationalism or 
epitomised Australian values, and there was little regarding sacrifice, debt or service.  This 
contrasted with the Anzac Day addresses of Prime Ministers Keating and Howard, who largely 
conformed to the pomp, ceremony and nationalism of the example set by Hawke with the 75th 
anniversary observance of Anzac Day.   
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Thus, this speech was once again largely indistinguishable from the policy and interest group 
speeches that Hawke gave throughout his Prime Ministership.  The speech began by arguing for the 
morality of observing Anzac Day – ‘On Anzac Day 1991, it is proper for the thoughts of all Australians 
to turn to the men and women who are serving in the armed forces of our country’ (Hawke 1991, 1)  
– and recognition of the sacrifice of service men and women throughout the history of Australia’s 
military service.  However, the speech then linked the upcoming 50th anniversary of the attack on 
Pearl Harbour, and the reconciliation of nations in the region after the War in the Pacific, with the 
optimism for peace and prosperity that characterised international discourse in the early 1990s after 
the fall of communism and international cooperation during the Gulf War.  The naval personnel who 
had served during the Gulf War were praised for ‘proving, once more, Australia’s reputation as a 
nation which is willing and able to take a stand against aggression, and to meet its obligations as a 
responsible member of the international community’ (Hawke 1991, 2).  Australia at this time 
remained committed to supporting its allies in armed conflict far from home, in support of 
Australia’s own interests, and with a view to the moral obligations of participation in world affai rs, 
despite the government accepting the Dibb report’s reorientation of the ADF towards continental 
defence (Gelber 1992, 78).   
 
Hawke’s speech then paid tribute to a small group of Indigenous people who had served alongside 
Australian soldiers during WWII, but had not been formally enlisted, and therefore had not received 
payment for their service.  Speaking to an audience which reportedly contained members of this 
group (Austin 1991, 2), Hawke outlined that his government would compensate the service of these 
people, and that ‘the Government derives great pleasure from being able to recognise, with just and 
deserved recompense, the significant contribution made by these members of our community’ 
(Hawke 1991, 3).  The men being recognised had performed duties including ‘coast-watching and 
patrols, taught bushcraft to white servicemen, trained in drill and tactics, located mines and rescued 
servicemen’ (Davis 1991, 4).  This example demonstrated how the ALP’s commitment to 
multiculturalism and the inclusion of diversity into Australian nationalist discourse by Hawke in his 
Bicentenary and 1990 Anzac Day addresses opened up new opportunities to expand the boundaries 
of Anzac and Australian national identity.  Whilst Anzac remained a central Australian nationalist 
discourse, with its attendant hegemonic associations with Anglo identity and mascul ism, i t did not 
remain exclusively so.  As such, it should be acknowledged that Anzac, as presented by Hawke, was 
not exclusively white.  The extent that it did present diversity, however, was dependent on outsider 
groups conforming to the hegemonic strictures demanded by Anzac – in this case, these Indigenous 
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people were eligible to be included in the story of Anzac due to hav ing performed the duties of 
soldiers, with the attendant compliance with service, sacrifice and duty to the state.  
 
Finally, Hawke spent the remainder of the speech outlining some of the new defence thinking that 
the government had adopted after the 1987 defence white paper, along with its associated 
spending, before again paying tribute to the service personnel of the Australian Defence Force.  
Reflecting the shift to the north of Australia that continental defence required, Hawke (1991, 3) 
argued that the:  
Air Force’s chain of northern air bases, the Army’s emerging facilities in Darwin for 1 Cavalry 
Regiment and, not least, the Navy’s Patrol Boat base and communications facilities here, are 
testimony to the Government’s resolve to maintain and expand the fundamental 
infrastructure necessary to provide properly for our defence needs into the twenty first 
century. 
Hawke made some attempt to link this to Anzac by arguing that ‘the equipment is only as good as 
the person operating it’ (Hawke 1991, 4) and briefly linking the Australian Defence personnel’s 
service to those who had come before.  However, the speech did little to engage with the rich 
nationalist tradition offered by Anzac or link that with the policy agenda or announcements li ttered 
throughout the speech.  Lacking the ceremony of the 1990 Anzac Day events, Hawke’s 1991 Anzac 
Day address therefore did little more than outline the policy commitments of the ALP government.  
Prime Ministerial Anzac Day speeches had not yet institutionalised the high rhetoric of national ism 
as the predominant form of address.   
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that Hawke’s Anzac entrepreneurship encouraged the reconciled , 
depoliticised and unpolitical nationalist discourse of Anzac for instrumental and consti tutive  e nds.  
Facing profound policy challenges to the areas of the economy, the changing international context,  
and tension regarding the conceptualisation of national identity and multiculturalism, in addition to 
the catch-all electoral priorities of the ALP in the 1980s and 1990s, meant that Hawke needed to a 
new way of conceiving of national identity.  Hawke had some success in welding these disparate 
elements together into the ‘competitive Australian’ during the Bicentenary, but faced challenges in 
presenting this as a unifying message due to the contested nature of the occasion.  However, the 
contestation that faced the Bicentenary and Anzac Day in the first half of the 1980s was notably 
absent from Anzac Day after the 1987 welcome home parades for Vietnam veterans.  This allowed 
Hawke to present his vision of national identity in an uncritical and celebratory environment.  He did 
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this for narrowly instrumental ends in 1989 and 1991, when his Anzac Day addresses were largely 
similar to any number of similar policy addresses Hawke gave during his term as Prime Minister and 
lacked the pomp and ceremony associated with later Prime Ministerial Anzac Day addresses, which 
demonstrated the still formative use of Anzac by Prime Ministers.   
 
The 75th anniversary of the Gallipoli landings in 1990, however, set a precedent regarding the 
potential of Anzac entrepreneurship.  The logic of Hawke’s wider discourse of consensus was  a 
largely successful attempt to draw a line under policy contestation, conflict and politics.  Having 
applied this same logic to the reconciliation of Vietnam veterans with the wider Australian body 
politic meant the restoration of a depoliticised and unpolitical form of Anzac that did little to give ex-
servicemen a voice in the celebration of their achievements or acknowledge the uncomfortable 
truths of Anzac regarding the damage that war inflicts upon its participants and their social networks 
when they are killed in action or return home suffering mental and physical wounds.  Anzac 
therefore became insulated from the attacks of Vietnam veterans who sought to advance their 
continuing policy concerns that stood outside state-sanctioned conceptions of their service or social  
movement activists seeking to challenge established forms of Australianness or advance other 
radical agendas.  Not only that, but the established and well understood meaning of Anzac amongst 
the Australian community meant that Anzac could operate as an unpolitical ideograph – bound by 
certain genre conditions that needed to be respected, but malleable towards new national ist ends 
too.  As such, having reconciled Vietnam veterans with the wider body politic in a manner which 
denied the political nature of such a reconciliation, led to an unpolitical Anzac ideograph too 
pregnant with nationalist meaning for political elites like Hawke, and his successors, to ignore.   
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CHAPTER 6 
Keating: Success and Failure in Anzac Entrepreneurship 
 
Introduction 
December 1991 saw Paul Keating defeat Bob Hawke as leader of the ALP and become Prime 
Minister.  The country was in the midst of recession, the polling for the ALP was poor, and the 
Opposition was resurgent.  However, over the coming months Keating managed to meet the 
challenge that the Coalition had posed with their Fightback! policy program and the ALP 
subsequently won the ‘unwinnable’ 1993 election.  His political style as Prime Minister was 
characterised by his ‘Big Picture’ politics:  
…redefining the market as friend of the battler, reforming Australia’s economic institutions to 
succeed in an international age, reshaping Australian identity by abandoning the Crown for a 
republic, reaching reconciliation with indigenous Australians, embracing engagement with Asia 
as a national aspiration and entrenching the concept of a multicultural yet united nation (Kelly 
2009, 4-5).  
Keating also continued the practice of active Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac that had 
begun with Hawke a few years earlier.  Keating’s vision for Anzac was centred on the Pacific and the 
conflicts that had occurred there during WWII, and he sought to steer the Australian public’s view in 
the same direction.  This nationalist vision was bound up with his ‘Big Picture’ politics of  neol iberal 
economic reform, engagement with Asia, and an Australian republic.   
 
Keating’s embrace of Anzac, and nationalism more generally, marked Keating as another Prime 
Ministerial Anzac entrepreneur, enthusiastically promoting Anzac as a central component of 
Australian nationalism.  But Keating’s engagement with Anzac also reflected the inte rnal tension that 
his outward looking cosmopolitanism and his aggressive and parochial nationalism posed.  It wi l l  be  
argued that Keating was mostly unsuccessful with the main aim of his Anzac entrepreneurship, with 
his bold attempt to shift Australian war remembrance from Gallipoli to the Pacific and Kokoda 
ultimately failing.  Holbrook (2014, 228) argues that this was due partly to Keating’s confrontational 
and obviously partisan rhetoric and partly due to Australians’ connection with the original story o f  
Anzac centred on Gallipoli and WWI.  Especially important in the rejection of Keating’s reorientation 
was his baldly stated attempt to weld together the shift to the Pacific, Kokoda, and WWII, with 
republicanism, Asian engagement, and neoliberalism.  This was an agenda that stretched the 
boundaries of the Anzac ideograph too far.  By breaking these boundaries, Keating allowed his 
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version of Anzac to become political - more concerned with contestation than an attempt to 
universalise, avoid conflict, and become unpolitical, as Hawke before him and Howard after him 
both managed with their Anzac entrepreneurship.  Partisan contestation of Keating’s Anzac 
entrepreneurship was therefore fierce, and Keating failed to establish his version of Anzac as an 
unpolitical sphere of Australian nationalism and social relations.  Having said that, his rigorous and 
enthusiastic championing of the memorialisation of WWII did succeed in institutionalising the 
previously neglected commemoration of the War in the Pacific, and in  particular, the story of 
Australian soldiers fighting at Kokoda, as part of the narrative of Australia’s war service.   
 
In order to explore the success and failure of Keating’s Anzac entrepreneurship, it will be necessary 
to highlight Keating’s political  style and the context in which Keating was operating.  The chapter 
does this in four sections:  
1. This section presents analysis of Keating’s ‘Big Picture political style’, which is crucial to 
understanding his Anzac entrepreneurship.  Here I draw upon Johnson’s (2000, 24-25) 
observation that Keating attempted to integrate the economic and social into a 
cosmopolitan and electorally palatable discourse of government. The section shows how 
Keating’s radical nationalism sat uncomfortably with this cosmopolitanism, and created 
difficulties and tensions for his political style.   
2. Next, I will highlight the key policy challenges that Keating faced as Prime Minister.  The 
first challenges were economic - the process of continued domestic economic reform and 
unemployment, and the middle power internationalism of his multi -lateral engagement 
with the region.  The second group of challenges were social - the push towards a republic,  
Mabo and indigenous land rights, and multiculturalism.   
3. Following this, I will set out a brief corpus assisted discourse analysis of Keating’s Anzac Day 
addresses to explore the overall characteristics of Keating’s Anzac entrepreneurship.  Here 
it will be argued that whilst Keating’s attempt to relocate Anzac was a departure from the 
norm, he otherwise largely kept to the parameters of the Anzac tradition like Anzac’s other 
Prime Ministerial entrepreneurs.   
4. Finally, the chapter will textually explore Keating’s Anzac Day addresses.  It will  be  argued 
that the most prominent theme of his addresses was the way they encouraged Australians 
to look to Asia for their economic prosperity, and to think of themselves as independent of  
Great Britain.  The cosmopolitanism and radical nationalism of this push were not enti re ly 
congruent, however, and Keating’s political style posed tensions that were neither easi ly 
reconciled nor without controversy.  Keating’s radical reconceptualisation of Anzac in 1992 
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and 1993 attracted significant opposition, and in 1994 and 1995 Anzac his addresses 
became far less entrepreneurial and thus attracted less controversy.   
As such, it will be argued that Keating’s engagement with Anzac and Australia’s war history reflected 
an enthusiastic entrepreneurship that had some success in aligning his policy agenda with Anzac and 
the furtherance of the institutionalisation of Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac.  Ultimately, 
however, Keating failed to institutionalise his particular vision of Australia’s war service in the Pacific 
and its pre-eminence over the original story of the Gallipoli landings of WWI.   
 
Keating: the Economic, the Social and the Nationalist 
The following section explores Keating’s governing style by examining his tethering together of 
economic, social and nationalist tendencies.  Having come to power as Prime Minister after Hawke, 
and having participated intimately in Hawke’s government as treasurer, Keating faced many of  the 
same problems of government that Hawke had.  The ALP still relied upon a broad coalition of  social  
groups for its electoral support – its traditional Anglo and blue-collar base, middle-class progressives, 
and non-Anglo immigrants.  It still maintained the same neoliberal mindset to the problem of  how 
best to orientate and reform the Australian economy in a globalising world.  And the government 
still faced the clamour of various social movement voices for social change and their demands for 
accommodation of their political agenda.  Hawke had solved the dilemma of these competing and 
contradictory elements with his appeal to consensus, and the attendant vision of Austral ianness as 
the Competitive Australian, a cosmopolitan and diverse Australian who was committed to the 
success of the Australian state by putting their shoulder to the wheel of economic reform. This vision 
of Australianness had left the status quo framework of Australian national identity largely untouched 
– it was still masculine and Anglo-Celtic.  Unlike Hawke, though, Keating was far more radical  in his 
ambition to reform Australian nationalism and identity.  Keating solved the difficulties that the 
contradictory group and policy pulls posed, not with consensus, but with his Big Picture politics – the 
idea that Australia could both be both economically and socially reformed.   
 
Given the importance that the Hawke/Keating governments had placed upon economic reform and 
the liberalisation of the Australian economy, the reform of the social needed to fol low the logic of  
neoliberalism (Johnson 2000, 24).  The difficulty for Keating was that many Australians, especially 
ALP supporters, did not see themselves as competitive economic beings.  Keating’s pol itical style was 
an attempt to solve this problem, by reforming the social in line with his government’s economic 
vision.  As Johnson (2000, 24) argues, the Hawke/Keating governments:  
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…tried to influence the shape of social identities in ways that were compatible with their vision 
of the new 21st century Australia they wanted to build… It was not so much the case that 
Keating was taking up a broad range of social and cultural issues, but that his government was 
attempting to shape Australian culture and social identities to fit the government’s broader 
vision (Johnson 2000, 24).   
As such, Big Picture politics engaged with the issues raised by social movement activists,  but i t was 
not defined by them.  Instead, Keating adopted a selection of social issues and identities congruent 
with economic reform:  
Keating tended to privilege social issues that were compatible with his construction of 
economic issues and not recognise others.  Furthermore, he was trying to reshape 
constructions of the social in ways that fitted his particular economic vision.  This is not to deny 
that the government’s conceptions in mainstream policy documents could go beyond narrow 
economic reductionism but it is to suggest that the government’s vision was severely limited 
by the underlying framework and that the ‘social’ issues which tended to be taken up were 
ones that were seen as in some sense compatible with that framework (Johnson 2000, 31).   
Under this framework, Australians were to be cosmopolitan, diverse and tolerant, as long a s these 
identities did not challenge the process of economic reform.  There was a fundamental continuity 
with traditional ALP narratives of work and harmonious employer/employee relations, a 
characteristic which smothered contestation and which was extended to other identity relationships 
with the Australian state and economy, such as femininity and masculinity, aboriginality and 
ethnicity, and sexuality (Johnson 2000, 30-35).  The culmination of this harmonious and inclusive 
pluralism would lead Australia to the republic, constituted in the image of the economically and 
socially reformed identity of Keating’s political style (Johnson 2000, 30-31).   
 
However, the issue of an Australian republic points to the tension in Keating’s vision of  a reformed 
Australian identity.  Whilst the republic was a means to restructure Australian identity in l ine with 
cosmopolitanism, tolerance, and harmonious economic relationships, it also drew upon Keating’s 
own deeply felt and unreconstructed radical nationalism.  According to Curran, Keating’s vision of 
Australian national identity:  
…was a version of the ‘radical nationalist’ myth in which working -class ‘true’ Australians had 
been involved in a constant struggle with an Anglo-phile middle class to achieve Australian 
‘independence’… This tradition saw in the period 1890 to 1914 the great ‘flowering’ of 
Australian nationalism and social experimentation, lamented the supposed conservative 
appropriation of the Anzac legend after World War I and argued that the Liberal-Country 
party’s political ascendency in the 1950s and 60s had been led by a prime minister, Sir Robert 
Menzies, who was not ‘aggressively Australian’ and who embodied a ‘compromised’ 
nationalism.  It was ‘compromised’ since, in Keating’s view, Menzies’ imperial imagination, as 
well as his inability to separate his ‘Australianness’ from his ‘Britishness’ has delayed the 
emergence and projection of a distinctive Australian outlook on the world (Curran 2006, 256).   
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This was the language of old Labor politics - class struggle, racial exclusion, and hyper-masculism - 
not the language of economic reform, cosmopolitanism and pluralism.  It was an instinctual 
commitment, one where politics was felt personally and held to tightly, despite its narrow pol i tical  
appeal and potential for critique and opposition (Curran 2006, 314; Tate 2014, 450-452).   
 
Keating’s radical nationalism came out in moments of pressure, or during unscripted remarks, away 
from the watchful influence of his speechwriter, Don Watson.  Thus, in February 1992, Keating 
announced his intention to push for an Australian republic, after a visit by the Queen, and was under 
pressure from the Opposition for not showing adequate respect.  He rose in the House of 
Representatives to state:  
I was told that I did not learn respect at school. I learned one thing: I learned about self-
respect and self-regard for Australia - not about some cultural cringe to a country which 
decided not to defend the Malayan peninsula, not to worry about Singapore and not to give us 
our troops back to keep ourselves free from Japanese domination. This was the country that 
you people [the Coalition] wedded yourself to, and even as it walked out on you and joined the 
Common Market, you were still looking for your MBEs and your knighthoods, and all the rest 
of the regalia that comes with it. You would take Australia right back down the time tunnel to 
the cultural cringe where you have always come from… You can go back to the fifties to your 
nostalgia, your Menzies, the Caseys and the whole lot.  They were not aggressively Australian, 
they were not aggressively proud of our culture, and we will have no bar of you or your sterile 
ideology (Keating 1992a, 374). 
Statements like these reflected the tensions that existed in Keating’s political  style.   The vision of  
Australian independence from Britain presented here had less to do with a cosmopolitan and 
outward looking Australia finding its way in the newly emerging markets of Asia, and much more to 
do with contestation and settling old scores with conservatives, with all its attendant references to 
parochialism, class antagonism, and chauvinistic nationalism.  This is not to deny that Keating’s 
nationalism was deeply felt, or electorally popular amongst some sections of the Australian public.  It 
does suggest, however, that the two sides of Keating’s governing style – the cosmopolitan neoliberal 
and the radical nationalist – existed in tension, and in ways that were not easily reconciled.  This 
tension was to play out in his engagement with Anzac, as he sought to steer the country’s vision of  
its war service from Gallipoli and WWI, to Kokoda and the War in the Pacific, and revealed the 
inherently political nature of Keating’s nationalism entrepreneurship.  
 
The Keating Government’s Policy Challenges 
The Economy 
The early 1990s had seen a severe and protracted recession, partly as a result of international 
factors, partly as a result of domestic policy failure.  The late 1980s had seen a massive spending and 
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investment boom, fuelled by debt, and financial and property speculation (Bell 1997, 154-155).  
Interest rates soared in an effort to contain the speculative boom, and when the boom collapsed, 
unemployment rose to over 10% - the double-digit territory that had coincided with the Fraser 
government being defeated in 1983.  The recession had hurt Hawke’s leadership, had framed 
Keating’s challenge (Kelly 1994, xi), and posed a significant policy challenge to the start of his Prime 
Ministership.  As such, soon after taking office as Prime Minister, Keating announced the One Nation 
policy document to the House of Representatives, where he defended the economic record of  the 
ALP, and committed his government to further reform, in conjunction with Keynesian stimulus to 
kick-start the economy. In practice, this involved new roads, rail and electricity infrastructure 
projects and targeted assistance programs for families, the unemployed and certain industries, but it 
did not wind back the neoliberal reforms that he had implemented as treasurer (Kelly 2009, 59 -60).  
Instead, it committed the ALP to further reform in the areas of a national competition policy and 
workplace reform with enterprise bargaining and superannuation (Keating 1992b).  Despite the 
challenges that the poor economic outlook was posing, Keating took the One Nation document to 
the 1993 election and won.   
 
Understandably, unemployment was a primary policy concern.  Unemployment had peaked at 11.2% 
in December 1992 (Henderson 1997, 113-114).  As such, the government established an expert 
committee to recommend on policy action that would restore full employment and the result was 
the Working Nation policy document of May 1994.  The document echoed the ALP’s traditional 
commitment to social justice – ‘Employment and a reduction in the number of unemployed peopl e 
are inseparable from the Government’s ambitions for Australia.  The ambition is to create a dynamic 
social democracy – a country which has realised its economic potential’ (Keating 1994a, 1) ,  but was 
also firmly wedded to the program of economic reform that had proceeded it (Watson 2011, 487).  
Working Nation aimed resources at the long-termed unemployed and other disadvantaged groups in 
order to get them into employment and had some moderate success, with unemployment lowering 
to 8.1% by December 1995.   
 
Internationally, the Keating government continued with the middle power activism of the Hawke 
government (Cooper, Higgott and Nossal 1993).  Keating promoted international free trade, access 
for Australian exports, and encouraged Australians to look to Asia for their future prosperity, all now 
firmly linked this to his Big Picture politics.  The record here was mixed - the conclusion of the 
Uruguay Round of the GATT in 1994 did contain successes for agricultural producers like Australia, 
but the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, which set the framework for a European single market and the 
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creation of the EU, along with the creation of North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in the 
same year, and moves by ASEAN to negotiate a Free Trade Agreement that excluded Australia, were 
developments which worried Australian policy makers concerned about being locked out of  these 
regional trading blocs (Meredith and Dyster 1999, 290).  Given the increasing importance of Japan, 
China, and South-East Asian countries, as growing economies and important markets for Austral ian 
exports, reducing trade protection barriers was of particular concern.  The Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) was therefore a forum that Keating embraced to promote liberali sation in the 
region, and the Bogor Treaty of 1994, committing APEC members to freer trade, was a major Keating 
foreign policy success.   
 
Social and Cultural Policy 
The Keating government was also particularly preoccupied with social and cultural policy i ssues.  In 
October 1994, the government launched Creative Nations, the first time an Australian government 
had developed a formal cultural policy.  The document concerned itself broadly with the arts,  f i lm, 
television, radio, heritage and the possibilities that newly emerging information communication 
technologies were presenting.  The document also had an economic focus:  
This cultural policy is also an economic policy… The level of our creativity substantially 
determines our ability to adapt to new economic imperatives… It is essential to our economic 
success (Department of Communications and the Arts 1994, 7).   
In addition to cultural policy, the Keating government continued the Hawke government’s 
commitment to multiculturalism and diversity (with limits).  The High Court’s Mabo decision of  1992 
overturned the legal fiction of terra nullius and helped put Indigenous issues firmly onto the agenda. 
Keating’s ‘Redfern Speech’ was a departure from previous governmental norms when it explicitly 
acknowledged the destruction that white settlement had caused Indigenous peoples and cultures: 
…the starting point might be to recognise that the problem starts with us non-Aboriginal 
Australians. 
It begins, I think, with that act of recognition. 
Recognition that it was we who did the dispossessing. 
We took the traditional lands and smashed the traditional way of life.  
We brought the diseases. The alcohol. 
We committed the murders. 
We took the children from their mothers. 
We practised discrimination and exclusion. 
It was our ignorance and our prejudice (Keating 1992c, 3). 
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This speech earned Keating considerable goodwill amongst the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
people (Jennett 1995, 63) and signalled his championing of the reconciliation process.  Keating 
enacted this commitment by taking a personal role in negotiating the passage of the Native Title Act 
1993 in the face of opposition from various stakeholders.   
 
Finally, Keating also put the issue of an Australian republic on the agenda.  Keating’s 1993 e lection 
campaign speech featured a commitment by the Prime Minister to set up a committee of  ‘eminent 
Australians’ to examine the options for an Australian republic and to put this to a referendum by the 
centenary of Federation in 2001 (Keating 1993c, 11-12).  The republic was an issue that had 
considerable prominence through Keating’s term as Prime Minister, as he evangelised the shift 
towards a formally independent Australia.  Keating’s active championing of these social issues 
helped to put them on the agenda, despite the imperatives of the dire economic situation.  
 
Keating’s Anzac – a Corpus Assisted Discourse Analysis 
The tensions in Keating’s governing style can be introduced with corpus assisted discourse analysis  
of his Anzac speeches.  Two conclusions can be drawn from this data.  Firstly, Keating attempted to 
relocate visions of Anzac from Gallipoli and WWI to WWII, and especially to the War in Pacific and 
Kokoda; and secondly, that in doing so, Keating did little else to challenge the accepted genre 
conventions of official, state-driven discourses of Anzac.  As such, whilst Keating attempted to 
refocus Australia’s conception of the location of Anzac to Asia, in line with his Big Picture politics, his 
Anzac Day addresses did little to encompass the other cosmopolitan elements of his governing style.   
 
The Sites of Keating’s Anzac Day Addresses 
Keating gave at least one Anzac Day address or released a media statement for every Anzac Day as 
Prime Minister.   
 
Keating’s first Anzac Day addresses were held in Papua New Guinea in 1992, with an address at the 
dawn service in the Bomana War Cemetery in Port Moresby and again later that morning at Ela 
Beach, Port Moresby.  On April 26th 1992, Keating gave a further address in the village of Kokoda in 
the PNG Highlands.  In 1994, Keating laid a wreath at the Martin Place Cenotaph, Sydney, at 8.30am, 
before the start of the march (McGregor 1994, 1), and released a statement to the media in place of  
an address.  Finally, the 80th anniversary of the Gallipoli landings in 1995 saw Keating make an 
address after the dawn service, again at the Martin Place Cenotaph (Porter  1995, 4).  Keating’s 
choice of location for marking Anzac Day was telling.  By choosing to go to Papua New Guinea for his 
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first Anzac Day as Prime Minister, in particular to Kokoda, Keating was making a clear statement 
about where he wished Anzac to be located and with which war he wanted Anzac to be associated.  
This message was reinforced by the multiple speeches he gave in 1992, which signalled the 
significance of the shift.  The fact that Keating did not travel to Gallipoli for the 80th anniversary of 
the landings in 1995, despite the precedent that Hawke had set in 1990, and in fact, that he never 
travelled to Gallipoli for an Anzac Day ceremony, is also instructive - Keating only ever marked Anzac 
Day in Australia or in Papua New Guinea.   
 
Year Type 
1992 Three speeches 
1993 One speech 
1994 One media release 
1995 One speech 
Figure 15 - List of Keating’s Anzac Day Addresses and Media Statements  
The Location of Keating’s Anzac 
Keating’s focus was on the wars WWI and WWII (six named mentions each in Keating’s corpus),  and 
their associated battles in Europe, the Middle East, the Pacifi c, and in particular, the battles at 
Gallipoli (six named mentions), Kokoda (six named mentions), Papua New Guinea (5 named 
mentions) and Singapore (four named mentions).  He also highlighted the experiences of Austral ian 
POWs on the Burma Railroad (three named mentions).  He mentioned other battles and wars, but 
gave none the same attention.  They were glossed over by being mentioned in groups and fai led to 
receive the same detailed attention from Keating. 
 
Importantly, whilst Keating frequently mentioned Gallipoli, he did not give it the same prominence 
as Kokoda and the battles in the Pacific.  This will be explored later in the chapter, so a short 
example here will suffice.  In 1992, at Kokoda, Keating said: 
Even though we fought in many conflicts where we felt pangs of loyalty to what was then 
known as the "Mother Country," to Britain and to the Empire, and we fought at Gallipoli with 
heroism and in Belgium, in Flanders and in France and in other places, this was the first and 
only time that we fought against an enemy to prevent the invasion of Australia, to secure the 
way of life we had built for ourselves (Keating 1993b, 59).   
Keating was creating a new hierarchy here, where the power of the original story of Anzac was 
acknowledged, but at the same time was subordinate to the battles fought at Kokoda, demonstrated 
by the hypotaxis of the subordinate clause before ‘this was the f irst and only time…’  This hierarchy, 
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along with the location of Keating’s Anzac Day addresses presented above, demonstrates Keating’s 
attempt to relocate Anzac from Gallipoli to Kokoda.   
 
Keating’s Agents of Anzac 
The agents of Anzac in Keating’s speeches were overwhelmingly men (ten named mentions).  ‘Men’  
was the only gendered noun used by Keating to refer to Australians in his 1992 addresses at Bomana 
War Cemetery, Ela Beach and Kokoda.  ‘Men’ and ‘men and women’ was used in his 1993, 1994, and 
1995 statements (five named mentions); women alone was never used.  Looking at the service type, 
only male associations were given attention – the ‘very young men of the militia’, ‘airmen of 
outstanding courage’ and ‘soldiers of the 7th Division’ (Keating 1992d, 3-4).  As such, whilst not 
exclusively masculine, the agents of Keating’s addresses were demonstrably and overwhelmingly 
men – they were the ones who were named specifically and they were the ones who were primarily 
acting and embodying Anzac.   
 
Further, references to diversity are also largely absent from Keating’s Anzac Day addresses.  Hawke 
had set a precedent regarding the inclusion of diversity into Anzac only a few years earl ier,  having 
referred to the ‘different backgrounds’ of the original Anzacs in 1990 (Hawke 1990d, 3) and including 
reference to Indigenous Australians and their war service in his 1991 address (Hawke 1991).  One 
might expect this to continue with Keating, given the emphasis he gave to his big picture politics and 
the contemporary political context of the Mabo decision and reconciliation being played out.  
However, one brief mention is made of diversity in 1993, and none to named ethnicity.  These 
patterns demonstrate that the identity issues of Keating’s Big Picture politics made fe w inroads into 
his Anzac Day addresses.   
 
The Attributes of Keating’s Anzac Agents 
What attributes did Keating’s Anzac agents have?  As can be seen below, the attributes that the 
diggers of Keating’s speeches possessed were closely aligned to the state orientated values of  the 
Anzac tradition.  Courage and sacrifice are the most prominent themes.  Interestingly, given 
Keating’s radical nationalism, elements of the digger tradition, like suffering and mateship, do come 
through.  Suffering was especially unusual in the corpus, and reveals a more ambivalent meaning for 
Anzac than was usual for Prime Ministers who tended to towards official and state orientated 
versions of war remembrance that expunged such references.  However, the predominance of  the 
Anzac tradition reinforces the notion that whilst Keating attempted to shift perceptions of Anzac 
from Gallipoli to Kokoda, he did little to otherwise renovate the established conventions of Anzac.   
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Attributes Frequency 
Courage/bravery 10 
Sacrifice 6 
Tenacity/perseverance 3 
Mateship 3 
Heroism 2 
Suffering 2 
Honour 2 
Service/duty 1 
Debt Owed 1 
Comradeship 1 
Humour 1 
Figure 16 - List of the Frequency of Mentions of the Attributes of Agents of Anzac in Keating’s Anzac Day Addresses 
Having established some of the quantitative aspects of Keating’s Anzac Day addresses, the chapter 
will now examine in greater detail how Keating’s political style was woven into his Anzac Day 
speeches.   
 
Keating’s Anzac Day Addresses: Big Picture Politics 
A closer examination of Keating’s Anzac Day addresses reflects the success and failure  of  his Anzac 
entrepreneurship. The cosmopolitanism and radical nationalism of Keating’s political style were not 
entirely congruent, and posed difficulty.  Tensions quickly arose – why, when attempting to engage 
with Asia as a reformed, liberal, cosmopolitan and tolerant nation, would Australia wish to place the 
battles of WWII at the centre of national identity, where the central narrative was Australia figh ting 
against Asian encroachment and with all the attendant colonial and racist legacies associated with 
this?  How would sections of the Australian population who ide ntified closely with the Anzac 
tradition, the story of the original landings at Gallipoli,  and their associations with Empire and 
conservatism, react to attempts to reformulate a central Australian national narrative?  Complying 
with the opposing pulls of observing the conventions of Anzac Day, whilst also injecting a new, and 
competing, perspective was evidently a difficult task.  Keating’s speech writer, Don Watson, 
reflected upon the tension that this posed:  
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Paul Keating made so many of these speeches [about WWII] we feared that he might 
eventually have to revert to the platitudes with which such occasions are generally observed.  
Insofar as we avoided this, it made for better speeches, but also for controversy sometimes.  
He was on sacred ground: and departure from the customary words and gestures would 
always offend someone (Watson 2011, 182).   
And offend people it did.  The background of Keating’s republicanism, his publically stated desi re to 
change the Australian flag, and his close engagement with the ‘old enemy’ all provoked reaction 
from the Opposition and from critics.  In some ways, those critics have been vindicated – 
conceptions of Anzac still remain centred on the original landings at Gallipoli.  However, Keating’s 
entrepreneurship in reorientating Anzac did help to enlarge the scope of Anzac and, to some extent, 
it contributed to a new understanding of Australia’s war history and its meaning for contemporary 
Australians.  Further, it demonstrates both the extent to which Prime Ministers can redefine Anzac, 
whilst at the same time demonstrating the limits of this reorientation.   
 
Anzac Day 1992 – Papua New Guinea 
Anzac Day 1992 was the first for Keating as Prime Minister, and provided a clear enunciation of his 
position.  It was marked at several locations in Papua New Guinea - on Anzac Day in Port Moresby, 
and the following day at the Highland village of Kokoda.  It explicitly set out the reasons why he 
regarded the battles at Kokoda and during WWII to be so significant and the values associated with 
that significance, which were centred on the values of his political style, especially his radical 
nationalism.  It was a radical, shocking, novel, and explicit attempt by an Australian Prime Minister to 
reorientate the location and meaning of Anzac Day and to align the occasion wi th the policy agenda 
of the government of the day.   
 
The occasion was preceded by a trip by Keating to Indonesia, the first overseas trip that he made as 
Prime Minister, which helped to frame the subsequent trip to Papua New Guinea as a part of 
Keating’s wider regional engagement.  Arriving in Papua New Guinea the day before Anzac Day, 
Keating told an audience at an official dinner that:  
We [PNG and Australia] both know that we must seize the opportunity.   
We both know that we must engage in the region as never before. 
This is why, on my first trip overseas as Prime Minister, I am visiting Indonesia and Papua New 
Guinea…   
That is why I say strengthening our regional linkages, initiating dialogue, multiplying our 
common interests through widening our trading relationships – these measures will stay true 
to the interests of the new generations of Australians (Keating 1992e, 1-2).   
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The ground was set by Keating here for framing the trip in terms of multilateralism, regional 
engagement and trade.   
 
Keating gave three addresses regarding Anzac during his trip to Papua New Guinea.  The f i rst w as a 
short address at the dawn service at the Bomana War Cemetery in Port Moresby, attended by 
Keating, Rabbie Namaliu, the Prime Minister of Papua New Guinea, the Opposi tion leader John 
Hewson, and the New Zealand defence minister, amongst others (Nelson 1997, 157).  Afterwards, 
Keating walked through the cemetery, observing the graves of the servicemen who were buried 
there.  Later in the morning, the party had assembled at the Ela Beach memorial gates in Port 
Moresby, and the dignitaries again made speeches (Nelson 1997, 158).  It was here at Ela Bach that 
Keating gave his most wide-ranging speech on Anzac Day of the trip.  The following day, Keating 
travelled to the Highland village of Kokoda, where he dropped to his knees and kissed the ground in 
front of the modest memorial, and gave a shorter, but significant, speech.  The speeches were 
attended by a phalanx of journalists, eager to get a return on the money spent on their attendance 
in overseas locations (Nelson 1997, 161), linking the Prime Minister’s speeches to the genres of news 
reporting, and amplifying the message to the audience in Australia.  
 
The brief speech at the Bomana War Cemetery closely followed many of the conventions of the 
Anzac tradition identified above, and gave little indication of what was to follow at Ela Beach and 
Kokoda.  As such, Keating paid tribute to the ‘bravery’, ‘endurance’, ‘devotion’, ‘humour’, and 
‘comradeship’ of the servicemen who were buried at Bomana, who had ‘died in defence of their 
country and in the name of freedom’ (Keating 1992f, 1).  The audience was called upon to remember 
the sacrifice of the servicemen, the hardships they faced and the ‘bond’  the campaign had created 
between Australians and Papua New Guineans.  In many ways, the speech resorted to the kind of 
platitudes that Don Watson had hoped to avoid, but with one exception – the (brief) recognition of  
the horrors of war:  
They suffered appalling hardship in an impossible terrain. They were debilitated by disease.  
They suffered long after the war ended. Some still suffer now (Keating 1992f, 1).   
This level of acknowledgement of the harm that war causes was somewhat of a departure for Prime 
Ministerial Anzac Day addresses.  Whilst the numbers of war dead and wounded were often l i sted, 
the harm that is caused to those ‘broken’ diggers who return home, and the ongoing distress and 
damage wrought upon their families and loved ones, was often ignored, despite the efforts of 
Vietnam veterans to ameliorate this deficiency during this period.  Whilst the listing of war dead 
neatly fits narratives of dutiful sacrifice, the horror of the returned wounded and scarred challenges 
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neat, state-driven notions of honour, duty and sacrifice.  Whilst not a dominant feature of the 
Bomana speech, the acknowledgement of the horrors of war went some way to avoid the 
‘platitudes’ that Don Watson identifies as characteristic of Anzac Day memorialisation.  On the 
whole, though the Bomana address was a conventional and largely unremarkable Prime Ministerial  
Anzac Day address, closely following the accepted genre conventions of Anzac.   
 
Keating’s two following speeches, at Ela Beach and the following day at Kokoda, offered far more 
radical departures from accepted Anzac norms.  Both speeches followed similar narratives structures 
– acknowledging the importance of Gallipoli before continuing on to argue that the battles fought at 
Kokoda and Papua New Guinea were of greater significance, and created a greater sense of 
Australian identity, because of the efforts to defend continental Australia instead of the defence of  
the British Empire in faraway lands.  Both speeches went some way to acknowledge the horrors of  
war, linked the allies that Australia fought with in WWII to contemporary relationships, had a fai rly 
thinly conceived notion of liberal values as the virtues being defended and, finally, were sacral i sed 
by reference to religiosity.  They referenced Keating’s radical nationalism and made allus ions to his 
cosmopolitanism, though this was less explicit than his radical nationalism.  The speeches 
demonstrated both the ideographic quality of Anzac, in the sense that it could be uprooted and 
relocated, but also the taboos that proscribed a too radical reinterpretation of the story and its 
meaning, with the absence of the social elements of Keating’s big picture politics.   
 
Early in each speech, the significance of the original landings at Gallipoli in 1915, and how they 
helped to define Australian identity, is acknowledged.  At Ela Beach, Keating remarked:  
Gallipoli and the history of the Australian nation are indissoluble.  It is inscribed in legend… The 
spirit of Anzac became the canon of Australian life: the ideals to which we aspire, the values by 
which we live (Keating 1992d, 1).   
Here the recognition of Gallipoli is explicit and unchallenged.  However, at Kokoda the following day, 
the centrality of Gallipoli and WWI was tacitly acknowledged, but also contested:  
Even though we fought in many conflicts where we felt pangs of loyalty to what was then 
known as the ‘Mother Country’, to Britain and to the Empire, and we fought at Gallipoli with 
heroism and in Belgium, in Flanders and in France and in other places, this [the battles along 
the Kokoda Track] was the first and only time that we fought against an enemy to prevent the 
invasion of Australia, to secure the way of life we had built for ourselves (Keating 1993b, 59).  
Keating tacitly accepted the centrality of Gallipoli and the battles of the Western Front in Austral ian 
life by acknowledging them as sites of Australian virtue.  However, whilst Gallipoli and the battles of  
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WWI are acknowledged as sites of ‘heroism’, they are grammatically placed below the battles along 
the Kokoda Track.  Only at Kokoda did Australians ‘prevent the invasion of Australia’  and secure our 
way of life.  Kokoda was ousting the preeminent place of Gallipoli in Anzac narratives of  Austral ian 
identity.   
 
Both speeches went on to acknowledge death, suffering and sacrifice .  At Kokoda, Keating simply 
listed the numbers of Australian, American and Japanese dead – ‘2000 of them [Austral ians] died’.   
At Ela Beach, Keating also listed the figures of the war dead in WWI – ‘sixty thousand young 
Australians’ - and WWII – ‘30,000 in the Second’, before acknowledging the harm caused to those 
that survived and returned home – ‘Countless others died prematurely as a result of war, or had 
their lives and the lives of their families scarred by war’  (Keating 1992d, 1-2).  This explicit 
acknowledgement of the damage that war inflicts upon its participants was a further challenge to 
the accepted practices and meanings of Anzac Day.  Having said that, reminding the audience of  the 
sacrifices of war’s participants also seeks to proscribe contestation, as contestation would dishonour 
the memory of those who had died or had been wounded.   
 
At Ela Beach, Keating continued the speech by beginning the process of dismantling traditional 
conceptions of Anzac, centred on the story of the Gallipoli landings:  
Legends bind nations together. They define us to ourselves. 
But they should not stifle us. They should not constrain our growth, or restrict us when we 
have to change.  
Anzac is a commemoration of the most universal human values.  
But it does not confer on us a duty to see that the world stands still.  
The Australians who went to two World Wars, or to Korea, Malaya, Vietnam, went to secure a 
place in the world for their country and its ideals.  
The world moves on. Our country must move with it (Keating 1992d, 2).   
Keating’s political vision began to come through here, as he asked the audience to  move beyond 
accepted understandings of the centrality of Anzac.  ‘Legends’ like Anzac ‘should not sti f le us’ -  the 
modal verb ‘should’ committing the audience to Keating’s vision.   The Australians who had fought in 
Australia’s military history had fought for their country’s place in the world and a place for its ideals,  
but the world had changed.  ‘Our country must move with it’ – ‘must’ signalling the imperative 
nature of the call for change, with no ambiguity.  At Kokoda, Keating continued to contest the  
centrality of Gallipoli by simply stating ‘It was here young Australian men fought for the first time 
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against the prospect of the invasion of their country, of Australia’ (Keating 1993b, 59).  Australia was 
being asked to move beyond the accepted narrative strictures of Anzac.   
 
Back at Ela Beach, Keating declared two remembrance tasks – firstly, memorialising those who died 
in the battles of WWII, or as POWs, and secondly, remembering ‘the battle fought out in Canberra 
and London and Washington’, where wartime Prime Minister John Curtin ‘defied those people 
Australia had never before defied’ (Keating 1992d, 2).  Curtin insisted that Australian troops come 
home from the Middle East and return to defend Australia:  
John Curtin was right… 
In doing this he took the Anzac legend to mean that Australia came first - that whatever the 
claims of Empire on the loyalty of those who died in the Great war, the preeminent claim had 
been Australia’s.  
The Australians who served here in Papua New Guinea fought and died, not in the defence of 
the old world, but the new world. Their world.  
They died in defence or Australia and the civilisation and values which had grown up there.  
That is why it might be said that, for Australians, the battles in Papua New Guinea were the 
most important ever fought (Keating 1992d, 3; emphasis in the original). 
The threads of Keating’s Big Picture politics and his radical nationalism intersected here.  Having 
alluded to his policy agenda by arguing that the world had changed, Keating execute d a temporal 
shift back in Australia’s history, referencing the events surrounding the Fall of Singapore and arguing 
that the same lessons needed to be learnt again – ‘Australia came first’.  The soldiers who had 
fought in Papua New Guinea during WWII had fought for Australia and the values that the country 
represented, not for the Empire and its stale ‘old world’, and as a consequence they ‘were the most 
important ever fought’.  The speech at Ela Beach reflected the nationalism of Keating’s Anzac Day 
addresses – the rejection of the role of Great Britain in Australian history and the flowering of an 
independent, proud and distinct Australia via the deeds of Australians in the War in the Pacific.  This 
is reinforced by Keating’s references to the way these battles in the Pacific had linked the nations of  
Papua New Guinea and the United States, but he failed to do the same for the United Kingdom.   
 
Having executed this shift, Keating ran into difficulty defining what Australian service personnel had 
fought for.  Older conceptions of Anzac had established answers to these questions – Australian 
service personnel had fought for King and country, all underpinned by a racialised version of 
Australianness.  Keating’s cosmopolitanism had excised King and overt racism from his political 
repertoire, but his radical nationalism carried the rhetorical leftovers of older, racial i sed, forms of  
Australian identity.  Thus, Keating purported that Australian servicemen and women had fought for 
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reasons of Australian, not Imperial, nationalism, and fairy thinly conceived liberal values.  At Ela 
Beach, Australians in Papua New Guinea had fought for the ‘new world’, their country, its 
‘civilisation’, and the unnamed values of 1940s Australia.  The reference to ‘civilisation’ was fi lled 
with the ambiguity surrounding the hegemonic values of WWII Australia, and its associations with 
European ‘civilisation’ versus the ‘barbarism’ of the then colonised global south and Austral ia’s war 
enemies.  Later in this speech, Keating suggests that Australians fought for their beliefs – ‘they 
believed in Australia – in the democracy they had built, in the life they had made there, and the 
future they believed their country had’ (Keating 1992d, 5).  At Kokoda, ‘liberty’ is a named value that 
was defended by Australians in Papua New Guinea.  These named liberal values operate as 
ideographs, as do ‘Australia’, ‘values’, ‘their civilisation’, and ‘the future’.  Keating‘s cosmopolitanism 
led him to leave the historical meaning of these terms ambiguous and the audience is left to 
interpret their meaning.   
 
Keating’s speeches, and their attempted transition from Gallipoli to Kokoda, were sacral i sed by his 
allusions to the sacredness and religiosity of the occasion.  This sacralisation was important for 
Keating’s efforts to present his Anzac entrepreneurship as unpolitical.  At Ela Beach, Keating said 
that the ‘spirit of Anzac’ was the ‘canon of Australian life’ (Keating 1992d, 1) and the memory of 
those who served was ‘sacred’ (Keating 1992d, 2).  At Kokoda Keating became bolder.  It was here 
that Keating argued that:  
…that these young men believed in Australia and we need to give Australians, all Australians, 
but particularly young Australians, an Australia to believe in. We can't deny young Australians 
their birthright to a past with meaning for them and a future with meaning. It has to be a 
future with meaning and there can be no deeper spiritual basis to the meaning of the 
Australian nation than the blood that was spilled on this very knoll, this very plateau, in 
defence of the liberty of Australia (Keating 1993b, 59).  
In the context of recovery from the recession, young Australians of 1992 still had much to yearn for 
in their future.  In January of that year, it was reported that whilst the recession had seen the 
unemployment rate rise to 10.3%, the unemployment rate for teenagers aged 15-19 years was 
running at 30% (Encel 1992, 11).  Keating offered a future made pure by the allusions to the 
sacralisation of the blood sacrifice of the soldiers who had fought and died at Kokoda – ‘the blood 
spilled on this very knoll’ in the name of ‘liberty’.  This blood sacrifice was offered in place of the jobs 
that did not exist and the attendant futures that employment entailed, their absence at least in part 
because of the decisions made by Keating as Treasurer.  Again, these ideographs are left vague and 
ambiguous, free of definitive meaning and left open for audience interpretation, which reflected the 
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limits of engaging with nationalist sentiment in a plural and post-modern society that was 
increasingly (though not exclusively) suspicious of exclusionary meta-narratives of nation.   
 
The theme of sacrifice was immediately continued by Keating at Kokoda:  
So can I thank you the people of New Guinea and those of you who actually fought in that 
campaign, for those who died in that campaign, to the relatives here today of loved ones who 
were lost but who gave their lives selflessly in the defence of Papua New Guinea and the 
defence of Australia and the broader defence of liberty in the Pacific.  
This was the place where I believe the depth and soul of the Australian nation was confirmed. 
If it was founded at Gallipoli it was certainly confirmed in the defence of our homeland here 
(Keating 1993b, 59). 
At Kokoda, the ‘soul’ of Australia is ‘confirmed’.  Whilst a secular interpretation of confirmation is 
plausible, the preceding reference to the soul of the nation also suggests the Christian rite of 
confirmation, where the Baptismal rites are finalised and seal the covenant between God and the 
church member.  So, against the background of the trope that Gallipoli was a ‘baptism of fire’ for 
Australian troops, Keating makes the assertion that Kokoda confirmed the ‘soul of the Australian 
nation’, completing the rites of initiation.  These religious allusions helped to insulate Keating from 
critics who felt he was violating the accepted conventions of Anzac and, further, sacralised the 
statements contained within the speeches.   
 
Keating’s attempt to relocate Anzac from Gallipoli to Kokoda did not go unnoticed and uncontested 
– it was not accepted as properly unpolitical.  Aside from his speeches in Papua New Guinea, 
controversy was further provoked by a microphone picking up Keating saying to a local child at 
Kokoda who was brandishing an Australian flag ‘Don’t worry, sonny, we’ll get you a new one of 
those soon’ (Watson 2011, 184).  Conservative critics quickly emerged to discipline Keating and 
condemn Keating’s partisanship and defend the essential and depoliticised version of Anzac that had 
been newly re-established after reconciliation with Vietnam veterans.  Of course, these actions by 
critics were political in of themselves, but they had the virtue of purporting to be unpolitical in their 
defence of the essentialism of the traditionally conservative interpretation of Anzac .  Opposition 
leader John Hewson accused Keating of buying new friends in Asia, disowning old ones and 
apologising for Australia’s past (Milne and Taylor 1992, 1).  John Howard, in a sign of things to come, 
remarked that Keating was ‘using Anzac Day for partisan political purposes’ (Milne and Taylor 1992, 
1).  The now national vice-president of the RSL, Bruce Ruxton, was also unimpressed with Keating’s 
comments on the Australian flag and Keating’s republicanism: ‘Those thousands of Australians 
buried in the Bomana War Cemetery would have got up and pushed him down one of the holes’ 
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(Thompson 1992, 1).  Ruxton’s complaints, however, also reveal the RSL’s growing marginalisation in 
the process of defining of Anzac.  Keating in 1992 was able to use the authority of his office to 
relocate Anzac Day, both physically, away from the strictures of the capital city dawn service and 
march, and rhetorically, away the influence of the RSL in the governing of Anzac narrative.  As 
Nelson (1997, 161) notes, the media was keen to get a return on its investment in sending journalists 
overseas to cover the occasion.  Their attention was squarely focused on the Prime Minister in 
Papua New Guinea and the novel new ways that he was redefining Anzac, not the RSL.  
 
Anzac Day 1993 - The Burma-Thailand Railway Book Launch 
Anzac Day 1993 was more low-key for Keating, but no less provocative.  No formal speech was 
reported to have been made on Anzac Day, but he had attended a book launch on April 23 rd, and 
gave an address.  Anzac Day 1993 once again clearly reflected the tensions of Keating’s political 
style.  Keating again sought to relocate Anzac away from Gallipoli (never mentioning the battle) to 
the War in the Pacific and once again derided the influence of the Empire on Australian identity, 
claiming that the events of WWII had created an independent sense of  Australian national identi ty.  
This sense of independence was then explicitly linked to the Australian turn to Asia, and the 
attendant cosmopolitanism of Big Picture politics.  However, this was awkwardly juxtaposed with the 
tenets of radical nationalism, and the racially exclusive and masculine language that this entai led.  
These tensions were not fully reconciled by Keating and Anzac Day 1993 demonstrated the 
difficulties that Keating’s governing style posed.   
 
Keating’s 1993 Anzac Day address was not an Anzac Day address in a conventional sense of the 
word.  It was conducted on April 23rd, a full two days before Anzac Day,  rather than on Anzac Day 
itself or immediately preceding or following it (although, Anzac Day falling on a Sunday that year 
may have been a factor in the timing of the speech).  Further, it launched a book, The Burma-
Thailand Railway: Memory and History, rather than being a speech delivered at a dedicated Anzac 
Day event, like a dawn service or march.  These factors demonstrate that Prime Ministerial 
engagement with Anzac was still in a somewhat unsettled stage, not quite an institutionalised 
practice, complete with attendant ceremonial tradition, routine, and procedures.   
 
Keating began his 1993 address by acknowledging the horrors of  war.  Restrained in his language, 
Keating argued that Australians knew little about their war history, especially their regional war 
history.  Keating knew ‘because my father’s brother had been there [Sandakan], and died there’ 
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(Keating 1993a, 1) but it was not taught at school and was not widely written about.  Keating goes 
on:  
We knew the wars through legend and ritual.  
And we knew World War I better than we knew World War II.  
But we really didn't know what it had been like… 
And that, I think, is why we are shocked when we see the gravestones which remind us of how 
many died, and their ages, and what they must have gone through, and the people they left 
behind (Keating 1993a, 1-2).   
There is little sense of the Anzac tradition of duty, service, bravery and sacrifice in this quote.  
Keating links his own family’s experience of war to the paucity of the nation’s wider engagement 
with its war history.  Keating’s reaction is visceral, expressing ‘shock’  at the number of dead, their 
youth, their suffering and the impact of their loss on their families and loved ones.  Whilst still 
restrained and refraining from gratuitous description of the violence of war, the degree of 
recognition given to the horrors of war by Keating was a departure from the Anzac tradit ion.   
 
This level of acknowledgement informed the radical nationalist themes of Keating’s speech, as the 
horrors visited upon the participants of war, especially the participants of WWII, were the 
consequence of the incompetency and betrayal of Great Britain, and, in addition, Australia’s 
subservient and passive relationship with the Empire.  Keating was careful not to too explicitly draw 
this link, once again conceding the power and significance of the original story of Anzac and WWI in 
the Australian imagination ‘because these places [the battlefields of Northern France] are truly 
sacred to Australia’ (Keating 1993a, 2).  Significantly, though, Gallipoli itself was not mentioned 
anywhere in the speech and immediately after this statement, Keating once again promoted his 
relocation of Anzac from WWI and Gallipoli, to WWII and the War in the Pacific:  
But the battlefields of the Asian and Pacific war are also sacred. In the next few years I hope 
the battlefields of New Guinea, Borneo, Singapore and Malaya - and Burma and Thailand - will 
become as important to our historical understanding as the battlefields of the Middle East and 
Europe were to earlier generations of Australians.  
Everyone should know about these battles.   
Above all, they should know about the subject of this book - the prisoners of war who worked 
on the Burma-Thailand Railway. 
No Australian soldiers suffered more than these. Few had more reason to feel betrayed or 
neglected – before, during and after their capture. None had to call on such reserves of faith 
and spirit as they did: faith in themselves; faith in each other; faith - I like to think – in 
Australia, what they had created there and what they hoped to create (Keating 1993a, 2).  
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The relocation was explicit.  ‘Everyone should know about these battles’ and ‘no Australian soldiers 
suffered more than these’ are emphatic, declarative and unambiguous calls to recognise the 
significance of the War in the Pacific and an attempt to locate them hierarchically on a scale with 
them above WWI and Gallipoli, as ‘no Australian soldiers suffered more than these’.  But more than 
that, the statement condemned those who had put them in that situation, as they had ‘betrayed’ 
these Australian service personnel – ‘few had more reason to feel betrayed or neglected’.   Whilst the 
agents who had betrayed these Australian were left unnamed, Keating’s republican ism, his 
Singapore outburst in Parliament the year before, or his 1992 Anzac Day statements, leave little 
doubt that it was the British Empire that was the target here.     
 
Keating went on to argue that Australian’s found, and continued to find, themselves in Asia:  
…these were the first Australians to go en masse into South East Asia.  They saw it and dealt 
with its peoples as no other Australians had.   
They also saw the British empire [sic] as few Australians had ever seen it – and it led a lot of 
them to conclude that we Australians had evolved into a different race.  It raised their sense of 
an independent identity.  
So, it may be that in time the 8th Division will be seen as something more than soldiers or 
prisoners of war – but as the first pioneers of Australia in Asia.  The frontiersmen.  
Somehow I think it would be the highest tribute we could pay them – both those who died and 
those who managed to survive (Keating 1993a, 2).   
Keating imbued the POWs with a purpose for which there is little historical antecedent.  As Curran 
(2006, 300) points out, ‘there is little to suggest that Australian soldiers fighting in the Pacific saw 
themselves as the creators of a new national myth that would come to replace the ideas of  Empire  
with Asian engagement.’  These historical inaccuracies coupled with the insensitive language that 
Keating uses – ‘the first soldiers to go en masse into South East Asia… as the first pioneers of 
Australia in Asia’ - painted an unproblematic and power free picture of Australian engagement with 
Asia, in the mould that Curran suggests above. It is oblivious to the fact that Australians were en 
masse in South East Asia to protect the colonial territories of the British Empire and Australia against 
the invasion of Japan, rather than as equal partners seeking mutual engagement and advantage.  
‘Engagement’ in this historical sense was also accompanied, according to the later standards Keating 
himself promoted, by blatant racism and crude stereotyping.  These associations were not helped by 
Keating’s view that these Australians ‘had evolved into a different race’, with Keating being:  
…the only prime minister in the post-1972 period to use the term race as a positive equivalent 
to ‘nation’ – even though ‘race’, with its biological determinants of ‘blood’ and ‘stock’, as well 
as its unwavering devotion to ‘historical mission’ or national ‘destiny’, had fallen into disrepute 
following the excesses and evils of fascism and Nazism (Curran 2006, 300).   
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Finally, the comparison was awkward because of the wildly differing circumstances of the eras – the 
context of Australia defending itself against a (potentially) invading Japan, and all its associations 
with the defence of colonialism and realpolitik, was a world away from the middle power 
internationalism that Keating saw as central to his political style.   
 
Australians in 1993 also found themselves in Asia.  Immediately following Keating’s tribute to the 8 th  
division ‘as the first pioneers of Australia in Asia’, he continued by explaining what that tribute would 
entail:  
Such a tribute would depend on our succeeding in Asia, of course. It will mean that we will 
have to succeed economically - as an entirely independent nation, aware of necessity and 
confident of both our identity and our capabilities.  
And that will depend on our developing greater mutual understanding between the countries 
of Asia and ourselves, greater mutual respect  
The men and women discussed in this book very often did just that - they developed a deep 
respect for the Chinese and the Malays, the people of Borneo and Ambon and Sumatra who 
very often risked their lives to help them.   
They found in all sorts of circumstances that they shared common human ground with people 
they had, for cultural and historical reasons, been inclined to patronise or despise.  
There's surely a lesson in it we can come to terms with the countries of Asia and in doing so, 
far from sacrificing our identity or our principles, strengthen them (Keating 1993a, 3). 
In this case, Keating was much more sensitive to the cosmopolitanism of his political  style, even i f 
the historical accuracy of his claims were suspect.  It is also one of the rare occasions were Keating 
explicitly referenced diversity and tolerance in his Anzac Day addresses.  Difference, though, is 
emphasised by Keating, with nationalism’s ‘us vs them’ dichotomy – ‘we can come to terms with the 
countries of Asia and in doing so, far from sacrificing our identity or our principles, strengthen them’.  
Asia reinforced Australianness.   
 
Success in Asia was further conflated with mateship:  
It has been around for a long time, that word [mateship] – and those principles.  But I’m 
inclined to think that it is only in the last decade of so that we have begun to realise just what a 
powerful force they can be in the economic life of a country and in seeing a country through 
great changes and hard times…   
If we imbue all our endeavours in the next decade with those principles I am sure we will 
succeed – and if we succeed, we will have paid the prisoners on the Burma Thailand Railway 
the greatest possible tribute (Keating 1993a, 4).   
Thus, the deeds and sacrifice of the POWs during the War in the Pacific were conflated with 
neoliberal economic reform, Australia’s turn to Asia, and the push towards a republic.  To ‘succeed in 
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Asia’, Australia must ‘succeed economically’, with that success being dependent ‘on our developing 
greater mutual understanding between the countries of Asia and ourselves’ .  Mateship was 
employed as a value to effect this change, and is reconstituted with a new, economic, meaning – a 
value that could see ‘a country through great changes and hard times’ .  And by succeeding in this 
endeavour, Australia could pay ‘the prisoners on the Burma Thailand Railway the greatest possible  
tribute’.  The second half of Keating’s speech, then, largely reflected Keating’s governing style – the 
oft-rehearsed message of encouraging Australians to look to Asia for their future prosperity was 
once again repeated.  Mateship, a value intimately tied to radical nationalism, is reconstituted with 
new economic meanings for changing times, reflecting the way the social was conflated with the 
economic by Keating.  And the message is endorsed by the connection to the sacrifice of the diggers 
– by succeeding in these endeavours, Australia will have paid a suitable tribute to their suffering and 
death.   
 
Keating’s speech did not go unnoticed by the RSL or the Opposition, who both criticised the address.  
Brigadier Alf Garland, the national president of the RSL, told the Canberra Times:  
Now, he can try his damnedest but he’s never going to be able to change the fact that that 
[Gallipoli] was where the Australian character as we know it today, the Anzac spirit, was 
displayed to the world, and all that we’ve managed to do since then is to build on that…  
He moves ground every time he wants to try and raise another point to suit his agenda and 
nothing is more annoying to ex-service people, people who have been and laid their life on the 
bloody line in operations for Australia, to hear somebody, a Johnny-come-lately, sort of telling 
us why we were there and what it was all about (Garland, as cited by Brough 1993, 1).   
The Opposition reacted too.  Taking the lead in critiquing Keating’s speech, John Howard repeated 
themes that he had aired the previous year:  
He’s the first Prime Minister I know that’s tried to put some kind of spin, partisan political spin, 
on matters associated with Anzac Day and I think it’s reprehensible…  
…I think it [Anzac Day] is just one of those occasions when you don’t introduce any element of 
political debate or political controversy (Howard, as cited by Brough 1993, 1).   
Again, it should be emphasised that these criticism were political too. They were attempts at 
defending the depoliticised and essential version of Anzac that they saw as proper.  In doing so, they 
were trying to maintain a conservative version of Anzac that they argued was rightly delimited as 
unpolitical, incontestable and taboo.   
 
The public sanctioning of Keating demonstrated just how far he pushed the conception of Anzac 
Day.  By explicitly seeking to relocate Anzac to the Pacific, downplaying the role of Gallipoli, and 
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linking this manoeuvre with his republicanism, turn to Asia, and liberal internationalism, Keating was 
violating many of the accepted tenets of Anzac.  Conservative critics quickly appeared to defend 
traditional conceptions of Anzac Day, and to sanction the Prime Minister for failing to adhere to the 
confines of the Anzac tradition, and its associations with heroic sacrifice, duty and service.  Most 
critically, Keating’s republicanism, his desire to change the Australian flag, and his attempt to reform 
Australian identity, were actions that conservative critics conflated with his failure to adequately 
adhere to the traditional strictures of Anzac Day and were quick to condemn.  Keating’s Anzac 
entrepreneurship had failed to maintain a suitable level of acceptance and unpolitics, and was 
therefore largely unsuccessful.   
 
Anzac Days 1994 and 1995 – The Martin Place Cenotaph, Sydney 
Anzac Days 1994 and 1995 were more subdued affairs for Keating, both in terms of the themes 
explored in his engagement with the day, and in terms of the controversy, critique and attention 
that his Anzac entrepreneurship garnered.  The contradictory elements of Keating’s pol itical style , 
his radical nationalism and his cosmopolitanism, were pushed to the background as Keating sought 
instead to engage with Anzac in a manner which largely conformed to the accepted practice and 
performance of Anzac Day – honouring the sacrifice of those who had served, reflecting on the way 
Anzac unified the nation and, significantly, for the most part referring to the original story of  Anzac 
centred on the landings at Gallipoli in WWI instead of the War in the Pacific.   
 
Having said that, the subtext of Keating’s attempt to reorientate Anzac was still pre sent, with a 
separate media release in 1994 announcing that the government would spend $1.5 million on 
improving facilities at Kokoda (Keating 1994b).  However, these announcements, and Kokoda and 
the War in the Pacific more generally, were secondary features of Keating’s Anzac Day addresses 
during these years.  Whilst the more tempered nature of Keating’s engagement with Anzac during 
these years can be partly explained by the explosion of WWII memorialisation which was occurring 
from 1994, and especially in 1995 with the Australia Remembers program (see Chapter 7), this 
change in tone stands in sharp contrast to the previous two years.   
 
The addresses were very similar, the first similarity being their location.  1994 and 1995 saw Keating 
attend the Martin Place Cenotaph for Anzac Day.  In 1994, Keating laid a wreath after the dawn 
service and released a statement for the media in lieu of a speech, and in 1995 K eating gave a 
speech after the dawn service.  Significantly, for the 80th anniversary of the Gallipoli landings in 1995, 
Keating did not travel to the Gallipoli Peninsula, as Hawke had done in 1990 for the 75th anniversary, 
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and as his successor Howard did in 2000 for the 85th anniversary and in 2005 for the 90th 
anniversary.  The 80th anniversary of the landings instead saw the Governor General Bill Hayden and 
Veterans Affairs minister Con Sciacca attend the Anzac Cove service.  As such, Keating’s anti -Bri tish 
nationalism was not entirely absent from the marking of Anzac Day during these years.   
 
The second similarity was their themes.  In place of the attempts to reorientate Anzac and the 
radical nationalism of Keating’s Anzac Day addresses in 1992 and 1993, his 1994 and 1995 addresses 
largely conformed to the strictures of the Anzac tradition, whilst being sensitive to contemporary 
political values and current ADF deployments.  Thus, Keating directed his focus to the original  story 
of Anzac centred on Gallipoli and the WWI.  In 1994, Keating begins his media release by stating 
‘Since that fateful April day in 1915, a spirit of duty and courage that cannot be destroyed has been 
symbolised by what we know as the ANZAC legend’ (Keating 1994c, 1), explicitly linking the ‘spirit’ of 
the Anzac legend not to the War in the Pacific, but to the landings at Gall ipoli in 1915.  Further, 
Keating later links all subsequent service personnel with the ‘spirit born at Gallipol i ’  – ‘Through al l  
the years and all the wars, wherever Australians and New Zealanders have fought since, that spiri t 
born at Gallipoli has been a bond joining them with the ANZACs of 1915’ (Keating 1994c, 1).  
Comparable themes are present in 1995, as early in his speech, Keating again placed Gallipoli at the 
centre of the occasion:  
This is the eightieth anniversary of the event from which Anzac Day derives, the landing at 
Gallipoli and the tragic and disastrous military campaign which followed it. Anzac Day is not a 
celebration of military victory, or a glorification of war. But it is the most important and 
profound day in Australia's national life (Keating 1995a, 1).   
Here Gallipoli is not placed hierarchically below the battles along the Kokoda Track, or the suffering 
of the POWs captured by the Japanese, as they had been in 1992 and 1993.  Instead, the origin of 
Anzac is identified solely with the landings at Gallipoli, and the traditions that sprung up to honour 
those events as ‘the most important and profound’ to Australia.   
 
These speeches are also far less specific in their identification with Keating’s policy ini tiatives or to 
his government’s activities more generally.  Thus, in 1994, only passing reference is made to ‘…the 
activities of our service men and women on duty abroad, particularly through our participation in 
United Nations operations’ (Keating 1994c, 1) in reference to ADF personnel deployed for UN 
operations in Cambodia and Somal ia.  Keating’s 1995 speech lacked even these passing references to 
his government’s policy agenda, with the exception being the vague exhortation to ‘pay tribute to 
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Australians who died so that we could live in peace and continue the task of building a good and 
prosperous country’ (Keating 1995a, 1).   
 
In place of Keating’s explicit reference to his government’s policy agenda were the ‘platitudes’ that 
Don Watson warned could characterise Anzac Day addresses.  So, we see explanations of Anzac’s 
significance that centre on calls for unity and to remember the lessons of the Anzac tradition – 
heroic sacrifice, duty, bravery and honour:  
We took from Gallipoli, and we have taken from every subsequent war in which Australians 
have fought and died, the message contained in that sacrifice: that it is good to be brave and 
to endure difficulty, and that we are bravest, most able to endure and most likely to succeed 
when we know we can rely on each other, when we stick together (Keating 1995a, 1).   
Anzac, as presented by Keating here, lacks specificity and is rather bland – an ideograph imbued with 
little in the way of contestable meaning and left to the audience to interpret.  Instead of using Anzac 
actively to promote his government’s policy agenda, as he had done in 1992 and 1993, Keating in 
1994 and 1995 was passive in his engagement with Anzac, largely conforming to the Anzac tradition 
and its accepted meaning and practice.   
 
Another change from Keating’s 1992 and 1993 Anzac Day addresses was his greater sensitivity 
towards gender.   Thus, in place of the exclusively masculine gendered nouns of 1992 and 1993, 
Keating in both 1994 and 1995 refers to the men and women who had served during Australia’s 
history.  Whilst lacking the named and rich specificity that had characterised his eulogising of the 
soldiers who had fought at Kokoda in 1992, or the POWs who had built the Burma-Thailand Rai lway 
in 1993, Keating in his later addresses linked women to the traditional sentiments attached to male  
participants in Australia’s war history.  So, in 1994 Keating asks us ‘…to pay tribute to the gallant 
men and women who had made the ultimate sacrifice in the service of their country’ (Keating 1994c, 
1; emphasis added) and in 1995 ‘…to remember our countrymen and women who, because they 
believed in Australia and saw their duty to it, were prepared to lay down their lives in war’ (Keating 
1995a, 1; emphasis added).  
 
The benign nature of Keating’s 1994 and 1995 Anzac Day addresses is encapsulated by the lack of 
controversy his remarks attracted in the media, from the Opposition, and from the RSL.  The RSL, 
quick to defend Anzac tradition, was outraged by links being made between Anzac Day and th e 
Sydney Gay and Lesbian Mardi Gras, and the lack of instruction about Anzac in the school curriculum 
in 1995, rather than with comments made by the Prime  Minister (Porter, Le Grand and AAP 1995, 
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4).  Having pushed his radical nationalism to the background, and having largely excised reference to 
his government’s policy agenda, Keating’s engagement with Anzac Day in these years passed 
unchallenged.   
 
Conclusion 
Keating’s engagement with Anzac Day demonstrates both the success and failure of his Anzac 
entrepreneurship.  It was successful in the sense that it further institutionalised the practice of Prime 
Ministerial leadership of Anzac Day, increasingly (though not entirely) breaking free from the RSL 
and marginalising the role they traditionally played in the definition and practice of Anzac.  By 
marking Anzac Day in Papua New Guinea in 1992, Keating was able to both keep the influence of the 
RSL at arm’s length, and also attempt to redefine the location of Anzac away from Gallipoli and WWI, 
to Kokoda and WWII.  Keating also consistently engaged with Anzac, making speeches or re leasing 
some kind of statement to mark the occasion every Anzac Day he was Prime Minister.  Keating’s 
Anzac entrepreneurship emphasised neoliberal economic reform, republicanism, and  engagement 
with Asia, as well as his radical nationalism, hostility towards Great Britain and Australian 
conservatives who were identified with Britishness, and chauvinistic pride in Australianness.  These 
efforts by Keating – his regular engagement, his sidelining of the RSL and his attempt to relocate 
Anzac – all demonstrate just how much effort Keating put into defining Anzac on his terms.  As his 
speechwriter Don Watson observed, ‘…he had delivered another kind of message, namely that 
custom [surrounding Anzac] would not restrain him’ (Watson 2011, 183-184).   
 
But also, however unrestrained Keating may have been, he was not entirely successful in his 
entrepreneurship surrounding Anzac.  Conservative critics were quick to react to Keating’s thinly 
veiled swipes at the values that they associated with the Anzac tradition, the links to Empire, and the 
attempts to redefine Anzac in terms which aligned closely with Keating’s governing style and pol icy 
agenda.  Whilst the influence of the RSL was declining, i t refused to be marginalised, and continued 
to rage against attempts to redefine Anzac’s meaning. John Howard also emerged as a prominent 
critic of Keating’s attempt to relocate and redefine Anzac – themes he continued when he took 
office in 1996 (see Chapters 8 and 9).  As such, whilst Keating was an enthusiastic Anzac 
entrepreneur who contributed significantly to the institutionalisation of Prime Ministerial 
engagement with Anzac, he failed in his attempt to relocate and redefine Anzac Day in an image of  
his own nationalism and politics. 
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CHAPTER 7 
Keating and Manifold Memorialisation: War Remembrance Outside 
of Anzac Day 
 
Introduction 
The last chapter demonstrated Keating’s regular and active Anzac entrepreneurship, which 
continued the institutionalisation of Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac.  It also argued that 
Keating attempted to redefine Anzac in a manner which aligned with his political style, and that this 
redefinition demonstrated a tension between the more chauvinistic aspects of his radical 
nationalism and cosmopolitanism. Keating’s engagement with Anzac Day was accompanied by a 
parallel increase in war memorialisation and remembrance outside of Anzac Day, partly by 
coincidence and partly by contrivance.  Winter (2006, 26-27; 226-227) identifies this as part of the 
second memory boom of the 20th century – the set of practices conducted by groups and individuals 
in the pursuit of coming ‘…together in public to do the work of remembrance.’  This chapter seeks to 
explore this process of memorialisation and remembrance by analysing four memorial occasions, 
and examines how Keating engaged with memorialisation.  Whilst Anzac Day is the focus of the 
thesis, the sheer scale of memorialisation that occurred during Keating’s time in office, and  the 
accompanying unprecedented level of government involvement, warrants attention.   
 
Watson (2011, 182) argues that Keating lacked any great enthusiasm for Australia’s war history, and 
instead engaged with memorialisation because:  
…there is scarcely a country between Australia and Japan that does not have a cemetery with 
Australian graves in it, or a monument to the sacrifice of Australian servicemen and women.  
When, in accordance with his mission to secure Australia’s interests in the region, Keating 
visited almost every country in East Asia at least once, invariably these places of indescribable 
sadness became the backdrop for ceremonies commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of the 
war [WWII].  
Watson’s statement is telling – Keating felt the obligation to engage with Anzac and Austral ia’s war 
history.  But Keating did not let this obligation define the manner in which he would engage with 
Anzac and memorialisation – his engagement was active and entrepreneurial, imbuing Anzac with 
his government’s policy agenda and priorities.  At the international level, Keating enthusiastically 
aligned the middle power internationalism that his government had pursued with his engagement 
with memorialisation, linking the broadening of Australia’s outlook, its turn to Asia, and increasing 
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domestic cosmopolitanism with the meaning of Australia’s war history, via the process of memorial  
diplomacy (Graves 2014).   Memorial diplomacy created opportunities for Keating to employ his 
political style and promote his policy agenda to polite foreign audiences and a media corps eager for 
a story, all far away from the scrutiny of domestic critics.  At the domestic level, however, Keating 
was more circumspect in aligning the meanings of the interring of the Unknown Soldier and the 
Australia Remembers program with his political style.   
 
The scale of Keating’s memorialisation will be explored through four examples that demonstrate 
varying levels of success and failure at nationalism entrepreneurship:  
1. 1992 saw the culmination of the reconciliation process with Vietnam veterans with the 
opening of the Australian Vietnam Forces National Memorial on Anzac Parade in Canberra.  
Keating continued to observe the terms of this reconciliation, and felt the effect of its taboos 
when he failed to demonstrate an adequate level of observance of Anzac’s strictures  when 
in Vietnam in 1994.   
2. The 75th anniversary of Armistice in 1993 saw the interring of the Unknown Soldier in the 
Hall of Memory of the Australian War Memorial, reflecting the shift away from imperial 
understandings of Australia’s war service (Inglis 1999).  Despite this, Keating was tempered 
in his remembrance, and did not fill the occasion with his republicanism, which helped to 
keep the occasion free from controversy.   
3. Keating travelled to Europe for the 50th anniversary of the D-Day landings in 1994, and 
marked the occasion in the UK and France.  Whilst there, he practiced memorial diplomacy, 
and was successful in smoothing relationships with countries that he had offended with his 
history of intemperate remarks.    
4. Most significantly, the 50th anniversary of the end of WWII, especially the War in the Pacif ic,  
was commemorated by a series of government sponsored events with the Australia 
Remembers program.  It was a deliberate attempt by government at remembrance, and 
involved an unprecedented level of government planning and funding.  Significantly, Keating 
demonstrated his cosmopolitanism more frequently during the Australia Remembers 
program of events and managed to keep this initiative relatively depoliticised, essential and 
therefore unpolitical.   
 
Keating’s success in memorialisation was therefore dependent on his ability to keep the memorial  
occasions free of the controversy that he tended to attract when he spoke about issues of  national  
identity.  Keeping the occasions free of partisan political conflict was a higher priority for Keating in 
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these examples than it had been on Anzac Day in 1992 and 1993.  As such, the chapter provides 
further evidence for the assertion that Anzac could operate as an ideograph, but that success in 
Prime Ministerial Anzac entrepreneurship was dependent on maintaining the depoliticised and 
unpolitical nature of Anzac, in conjunction with a form of Anzac that gelle d with the public’s own 
sense of nationalism.   
 
Keating and the Process of Memorialisation 
The increase in memorialisation during Keating’s term as Prime Minister was partly due to 
circumstance, and partly due to contrivance.  The circumstantial aspects included the fact that his 
term in office coincided with the 50th anniversary of the end of WWII, the 75th anniversary of the end 
of WWI and the culmination of the reconciliation process with Vietnam veterans with the opening 
and dedication of the Australian Vietnam Forces National Memorial in 1992.  Evidently, the timing of 
the marking of these occasions was largely out of the government’s hands, as even governments 
cannot alter the dates of significant moments in Australia’s war history.  In addition, proposals for a 
national memorial to the servicemen and women of the Vietnam War had emerged and been set in 
train whilst Hawke was Prime Minister.  Finally, the initial proposal to inter an Unknown Soldier in 
the Australian War Memorial’s Hall of Memory had emerged from within the Australian War 
Memorial’s own staff (Inglis 2008, 428).   Suggestions that the proposal for the project had emerged 
from the Prime Minister were misplaced (Inglis 1999, 17).   
 
Nonetheless, Keating’s engagement with these occasions was also contrived in the emphasis and 
chosen significance placed these occasions, and the spectacular form that the marking of these 
occasions took did in fact contain a significant degree of active Prime Ministerial engagement and 
direction.18  That Keating chose to engage with these occasions is telling.  There was a certain logic 
associated with his participation, as the head of government, and even the sense of obligation to do 
so that Watson (2011) notes.  This logic, however, was not unambiguous.  For instance, Keating’s 
role in the interring of the Unknown Soldier attracted some controversy at the time due to his 
republicanism (Inglis 1999, 17) and continues to annoy conservative critics who see his picture of 
Australianness as a wrongful re-imagination of Australian history and identity (see Bendle 2014, 6) .   
It is not implausible to suggest, as critics did, that the non-partisan Governor General should have 
been the only one to speak (Blainey 1993a, 2), or to have been the leader of the ceremony, as Bill 
                                                                 
18 In addition to the influence of the Prime Minister, it should also be noted that Con Sciacca, the Minister for 
Veterans Affairs from 1994-1996, also had an enormous influence over the Australia Remembers  program, a nd a n 
enthusiasm which helped drive memorialisation (Inglis 2008, 391; 393).   
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Hayden was in 1995 at Gallipoli for the 80th anniversary of the landings.  Or, taking the example of 
Australia Remembers - Keating could have chosen to focus on the War in Europe, but instead 
focussed on his preferred theatre of war, the War in the Pacific.  His government also could have 
been more modest in its funding of the anniversary, but instead spent $9 million on commemorative 
events to mark the occasion, along with $20,000 grants for each federal electorate for community 
based memorial activities (ALP 1995, 224).  As Reed (2004, 62 - 63) notes, ‘Australians were urged to 
remember the past, but in reality it often seemed that the past was being created.  The past 
“remembered” through Australia Remembers was designed to become the national memory.’   
 
So, what was being remembered with these memorial events?  The structure that limits nationalism 
entrepreneurs’ range of options was evident in two competing and sometimes contradictory factors; 
firstly, that, to a degree, Keating felt obliged to recognise these occasions, as befits the role as Prime 
Minister following the reconstitution of an unpolitical Anzac, and also to allay suspicions regarding 
his radical nationalism.  Secondly, though, the occasions were an opportunity for Keating to espouse 
his nationalist vision, drawing deeply on his political style for a domestic audience, and linked to this, 
at times an occasion to engage with particular nation-states and to promote outward looking middle 
power activism and cosmopolitanism.   
 
This presented a conundrum for Keating – in order for his Anzac entrepreneurship to be successful, it 
needed to closely conform to the strictures of the Anzac tradition and to pay sufficient respect to the 
key stakeholders of this institution. Keating had to temper his language and his radical national ism; 
whilst his nationalism was a feature of his engagement with the process of memorialisation, i t was 
far more subtle than the megaphone delivery that had characterised his 1992 and 1993 Anzac Day 
addresses examined in Chapter 6.  On the other hand, memorialisation revealed the 
cosmopolitanism of his political style to a far greater degree than his engagement with Anzac Day 
itself did and provoked little controversy.  This fact demonstrates that Anzac could be renovated in 
ways that quite radically altered its historical form, but only to the extent that it could be presented 
in a manner that was accepted by the public, and therefore did not introduce political deliberation 
and interrogation that threatened Anzac’s unpolitical nature.  Thus, Keating’s engagement with war 
memorialisation throughout his term as Prime Minister provides further evidence for the success 
and failure of his Anzac entrepreneurship, simultaneously demonstrating the employment of Anzac’s 
ideographic nature to stretch the boundaries of Anzac, and the ultimate failure to break those 
boundaries and redefine them wholly in his preferred image.   
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Honouring the Forces of the Vietnam War 
As Prime Minister, Keating faced the continuing problem of how to honour the reconciliation of 
Vietnam veterans.  In some ways, Keating had little choice to do so – the unpolitical nature of the 
reconciliation between Vietnam veterans and the Australian state and public had been est abl ished 
during the Hawke governments, and Keating faced the ongoing need to respond to the logic and 
events that this process posed.  Chief among these was the completion and dedication of the 
Australian Vietnam Forces National Memorial in October 1992, which was the culmination of the 
reconciliation process that had begun with the Welcome Home parade of 1987.  The date of the 
dedication, October 3, made an explicit link to this beginning, being the five year anniversary of  the 
Welcome Home parade.  Signalling the incorporation of Vietnam veterans into the Anzac tradition, 
the memorial was intended to link their service to the original Anzac diggers, and make reference to 
the controversy the war provoked at home (Inglis 2008, 358).  Whilst Inglis (2008, 385-387) argues 
that the memorial does little to allude to that controversy, its form, location, and dedication did al l  
link with the memorialisation characteristics of established Anzac Day practices.  This included its 
form as a monumental memorial, location on Anzac Parade in Canberra amongst many other war 
memorials and a short distance to the AWM, and its dedication, which took the form of a dawn 
service, dedication, and then march by veterans.   
 
Keating actively participated by making an address at the dedication ceremony, unlike Hawke, who 
was an observer at the 1987 Welcome Home parade.  The media reports of the day do not shed light 
on veterans’ continuing anger at the government, or of that being directed at the Prime Minister 
(see Wright and Cadzow 1992).  This contrasted with the 1987 Welcome Home parades, where some 
marchers declined to give “eyes right” when passing Hawke on the parade route (see Chapter 4).  As 
such, the dedication signalled the culmination of the reconciliation process.   
 
Keating was sensitive to these issues in his dedication address.  Early in the speech, Keating (1992 g, 
1) linked Vietnam veterans and their service to previous generations of service personnel: ‘We 
honour them for the same reason we honour those previous generations of Australians who served 
in wars on foreign soils.’  He went on to list those reasons – their sacrifice, duty, bravery, and their 
belief in Australia, democracy and freedom (Keating 1992g, 1), all themes congruous with the Anzac 
tradition.  Keating then moved away from the Anzac tradition to explicitly acknowledge the hurt that 
the divisions of the war had caused Vietnam veterans:  
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It is true that no war divided Australia like the Vietnam War. It is true that often we remember 
those years more for the protests at home than for the fighting abroad. 
The years of Vietnam corresponded with a great social and political upheaval in Australia. The 
war was itself one of the catalysts of change. 
There is no doubt that in all the turmoil we lost sight of the reality of Vietnam. We lost sight of 
those who did the fighting, and the waiting. And by doing that we made their reality worse.  
For all the drama in the streets, and parliaments and public halls, the real war was, as always, 
on the battlefields where young men and women died. 
The real tragedy was in their suffering and death and, as ever, in the loss which lives on in the 
hearts and minds of those who loved them. 
We cannot make good this hurt any more than we can undo the war itself (Keating 1992g, 1-2).   
Keating shared the onus of harm with all by using the pronoun ‘we’  – a form that was more famously 
repeated during his reconciliatory Redfern Speech later that year (see Chapter 6) .  ‘We lost sight’ of  
the death and injury that Vietnam caused, ‘we lost sight’ of the soldiers who served and suffered, 
and ‘we made their reality worse’, with our failure to recognise the injury of our actions.  But having 
caused this hurt and harm, ‘we’ were exhorted by Keating to be the agents of reconciliation:  
But, by this memorial, we can make good the memory. 
It is the symbolic resting place of the 504 who died. It means that at last they will join the 
exalted ranks of Australians who died in other wars. 
It is a memorial to all the men and women who served in Vietnam. It is a memorial for all those 
for whom the war has meant suffering and loss. All those whose experience of Vietnam still 
haunts them. All those here today. 
We should recognise, therefore, that it is a memorial for all Australians; because, as a nation, 
we should all bear the burden (Keating 1992g, 1-2).   
Once again, the link between Vietnam veterans and service personnel of the past is made expl ici t,  
and, further, honoured by the use of adjective ‘exalted’ , with its allusions to status and sacredness.  
Finally, the speech concludes by reinforcing the terms of the reconciliation, calling upon the nation 
to collectively share the burden of the pain the war caused Vietnam veterans.  Keating’s dedication 
speech reinforced the unpolitical terms that the reconciliation between Vietnam veterans and the 
Australian body politic imposed, and the taboos surrounding violation of these terms.  Keating was 
disciplining the audience - Vietnam veterans were to be accorded the same respect and honour that 
had been bestowed upon previous generations of service personnel, the Australian community was 
called upon to be united in that pursuit, and also united in the sharing of responsibility for the pain 
that division caused veterans.   
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The taboos surrounding any violation of this reconciliation came to the fore two years later as 
Keating travelled to South-East Asia to develop ties with Laos, Thailand and Vietnam in Apri l 1994.  
The message of the trip was Australia’s new political, economic and strategic engagement with the 
region, a view that Keating wished to sell to the leaders of these countries and to the Australian 
public (Watson 2011, 478; Baker 1994a, 16).  The trip also saw Keating visit WWII war sites, and align 
the memorialisation of these sites and those who had suffere d there as Japanese POWs with 
Australia’s emerging engagement with the region.  Keating’s trip served as another example of 
memorial diplomacy, those memorial practices that take place on the fringes on international 
summits or trips and serve to link and deepen relations between the participant countries via a 
shared notion of the past (Graves 2014, 169-170).  It was a theme that characterised Keating’s 
international memorialisation, both on Anzac Day and more broadly.   
 
Whilst in Thailand, Keating visited Kanchanaburi War Cemetery, the main cemetery for POWs who 
were used as forced labour in the construction of the Burma-Thailand Railway, and made a speech 
that honoured both the service and the sacrifice of those servicemen and women.  The speech also 
aligned itself with the reasons for his trip:  
It is worth remembering that Australia's first major engagement with Asia was in war. In Korea 
and Malaya and Vietnam it was again war.  
Today it is a partnership with Thailand and other countries of the region. A partnership which 
will extend the domain of our common interest and reduce the ground for conflict.  
It seems to me that there could be no better way to honour those Australians who suffered 
and died here than to succeed in this enterprise. No better way to see that what they endured, 
and what their allies and hundreds of thousands from the countries of Asia endured, will not 
happen again (Keating 1994d, 2).  
Here we see the same connections being made between the history of Australia’s war service  and 
Keating’s politics of engagement with the region that he made in his 1993 Anzac Day address (see 
Chapter 6).  A picture of liberal interstate cooperation is presented, as conflict gives way to a 
‘partnership which will extend the domain of our common interest and reduce the ground for 
conflict’.  But more than that, this endeavour is endorsed by the memorialisation of those who had 
here suffered, sacrificed and died – ‘there could be no better way to honour those Austral ians who 
suffered and died here than to succeed in this enterprise’.   
 
Keating and his advisors had been tipped off that some journalists in the travelling party were 
preparing stories about how Keating would not be making a similar trip to memorial sites in 
Vietnam, in particular Long Tan.  This was ostensibly due to Vietnamese sensibilities surrounding 
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memorialisation given Australia’s role in the perpetuation of that war (Watson 2011, 478-479).  To 
ameliorate this omission, mention of the Vietnam experience was also inserted into Keating’s 
Kanchanaburi address:  
Tomorrow I go to Vietnam. The Australians who fought and died there have been justly 
honoured in Australia as those who were here have been honoured, and for the same reasons 
for the sacrifice they made, the faith they showed.  
In Vietnam the lesson is the same. The wounds have to be healed. The terrible legacy of the 
past must not cripple future generations.  
We must never forget, but for the sake of future generations and in the name of those who 
died, the memory should not hold us back but inspire us to find the way to peace and 
friendship, justice and prosperity (Keating 1994d, 2).   
This sensitivity was for nought when Keating reacted testily to a journalist’s question regarding why 
he would not be commemorating Vietnam veterans in Vietnam given (unnamed)  veterans’ 
expectation that he would do so, shooting back ‘frankly, why should they? [expect Prime Ministerial 
commemoration]’ (Watson 2011, 481; Millett 1994, 28).  Keating further explained ‘I visited here [ in 
Thailand] a war cemetery because of the enormous atrocities committed to Australians in prisoner-
of-war camps and death marches. These things didn't happen in Vietnam’ (Keating, as cited by 
Millett 1994, 28).  The damage had been done, and the Opposition and some sections of the media 
seized upon the remarks as evidence of Keating’s insensitivity on the issue and lack of competence in 
matters of memorialisation.   
 
This small controversy demonstrates the hold that taboos surrounding the memorialisation of 
Australian service personnel and, in particular, Vietnam veterans had taken during this period.  
Keating was forced to issue a statement acknowledging the ‘duty to the past’ (Watson 2011, 484) 
that he had as Prime Minister and to reiterate the reasons why it was not possible to fulfil these 
obligations in Vietnam itself: ‘We did not seek a memorial service in Vietnam principally because we 
decided there was no suitable place in Vietnam to conduct one, and also because I did not think it 
appropriate, while in Vietnam, to revive bitter memories’ (Keating 1994e, 1).  Keating’s di f f iculties 
regarding the recognition of Vietnam veterans is an example of the structures imposed upon Prime 
Ministers in their Anzac entrepreneurship, and their need to observe and honour Australia’s military 
history and its remembrance in forms that unambiguously respected Anzac’s taboos in order to be 
successful.  But further, the incident also demonstrates that this process could be aligned with more 
prosaic and instrumental ends – in service of Keating’s political style and pol icy agenda of Asian 
engagement.  Whilst largely overwhelmed by the controversy that his intemperate remarks 
regarding the memorialisation of Vietnam veterans had provoked, his Kanchanaburi speech itself 
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saw positive reaction from the press and an apparent tacit acceptance of the linking of  Austral ia’s’  
war history with Keating’s policy agenda of the outlook to Asia (see Baker 1994, 16; Watson 2011, 
478-480).   
 
The Interring of the Unknown Soldier 
In contrast to some of the difficulties that Keating faced with the memorialisation of the Vietnam 
War, his role in the interring of the Unknown Soldier on Remembrance Day 1993 was more 
successful.  Despite some controversy regarding his participation, reaction to Keating’s speech 
eulogising the Unknown Soldier was largely neutral or positive and did not provoke the same degree 
of negative reaction from critics that his engagement with Anzac Day and memorialisation often did.  
This section argues that this was due to Keating adopting themes for his speech that did not as 
explicitly reference his political style or policy agenda and largely conformed to the genre strictures 
of the Anzac tradition.   
 
Proposals for the interment of an Unknown Soldier in the AWM had been circulating since 1921, but 
had ostensibly been blocked because of imperial sentiment – the view that the Unknown Warrior 
interred in Westminster Abbey the same year represented all the service personnel of  the Empire  
(Inglis 1999, 10-11).  AMW planners were also worried that ‘…parsimonious politicians would make 
the unknown soldier not a part of the [as yet unbuilt] national memorial but a substitute for it’ (Inglis 
1999, 11).  Further proposals for the return of an Unknown Soldier to Australia emerged and were 
rejected from time to time over the intervening years, but by 1991, Australia had become a 
sufficiently post-imperial nation to accept a new proposal from within the AWM to consent to the 
interment of an Unknown Soldier (Inglis 1999).   
 
The fact that this proposal emerged from within the AWM is important – it did not arise from the 
Prime Minister’s office, or from within the government.  However, as plans progressed to exhume a 
soldier buried near Villers-Bretonneux and return him to Australia to be interred in the Hall of 
Memory in the AWM, some conservative critics took issue with the inclusion of Keating as an official  
pallbearer during the ceremony.  Having studied the interring of the Unknown Warrior in 
Westminster Abbey, the AWM had invited the Governor General Bill Hayden to be chief mourner 
and to walk behind the coffin, as King George V had done.  Keating, as Prime Minister, would also be 
invited and would walk to the side of the coffin as the chief pallbearer, representing the head  of  the 
Australian Government, and the two of them representing the Australian people (Wright 1993, 31) .  
The prominent Liberal Senator Bronwyn Bishop criticised the move, fulminating on talkback radio 
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that ‘What appals me is the way in which the Prime Min ister tries to politicise any important 
celebration or commemoration of sacrifice that Australians have made’ (Bishop, as cited by Wright 
1993, 31).  Former RSL national president Alf Garland also criticised the Prime Minister, incorrectly 
condemning Keating for installing himself as chief pallbearer and for ignoring service  personnel in 
the ceremony.  In a letter to The Australian, Garland said ‘[Keating] has taken every opportunity to 
tear down and destroy the Australian heritage, traditions and national identity which the Unknown 
Soldier and his colleagues fought for and established [and has] the temerity to politicise the event 
[by being chief pallbearer]’ (Garland 1993, 10), echoing Bishop’s critique.  Garland’s and Bishop’s 
comments demonstrate just how much some conservative critics opposed the idea of Keating 
participation in the interring of the Unknown Soldier due to what his presence represented – 
republicanism, radical nationalism, and the strident repudiation of everything Liberal -  rather than 
due to any of his actual actions.   
 
Reacting to the Opposition’s criticism, the AWM invited Opposition Leader John Hewson to be a 
pallbearer too, desiring to keep the occasion free of politics and continuing the practice of 
bipartisanship that had occurred on Anzac Day in 1990 at Gallipoli, and in 1992 at Kokoda.  Garland 
was subsequently corrected in the pages of The Australian by the AWM Acting Director Michael 
McKernan, and once Hewson had been invited to participate, such criticisms were isolated.  The 
occasion had been sufficiently removed from the sphere of the political , and partisan political 
conduct had been circumscribed by the inclusion of Hewson in the ceremony.   
 
Thus, Keating participated as planned in the ceremony and delivered a speech in which ‘…he bashed 
no Pom, and did not even remark that the return of an unknown Australian after all those years in 
which we were content to be represented by the remains in Westminster Abbey was an event 
registering the end of empire’ (Inglis 1999, 17).  The lack of Keating’s political agenda and style in the 
speech in striking, though not absent.  As such, Keating’s exhortation that ‘He is all of them.  And he 
is one of us’ (Keating 1993d, 1; emphasis in the original) sees the Unknown Soldier operating as an 
ideograph par excellence.  The unknowable nature of the Unknown Soldier’s identity frees him from 
any baggage that his rank, his class, his ethnicity, religion or sexuality, or even the nature of his 
death, might have burdened him.  He is a blank canvass upon which Keating could have painted his 
political image in bold colours, but perhaps sensitive to the critics, to the sense of occasion, or to the 
taboos surrounding the remembrance of Australia’s war history, Keating chose not to.  Keating’s 
lessons from the Unknown Soldier adhere closely to the Anzac tradition – the speech is full of 
references to ‘bravery’, ‘duty’ and ‘sacrifice’, and to honouring Australia’s service personnel.  
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References to empire were even included, though as Holbrook (2014, 186) notes, he inverted the 
customary phrase ‘king and country’ to ‘…the chances are he went [to war] for no other reason than 
he believed it was his duty – the duty he owed his country and his King’ (Keating 1993d, 1).  Further, 
by sticking closely to the strictures of the Anzac tradition, Keating managed to avoid controversy and 
even won private plaudits from critics, such as John Howard, who remarked ‘didn’ t the PM do us 
well?’ to Michael McKernan after Keating’s speech (Holbrook 2014, 186).   
 
But Keating could not resist inserting some of his own personality and political style into his speech.  
Thus, reflecting his radical nationalism, he presented WWI not as a necessary war that Australian 
governments, and many Australians, had felt a duty to support, but as ‘…a mad, brutal, awful 
struggle distinguished more often than not by military and political incompetence’ (Keating 1993 d, 
1), a slight that alluded to the leaders of Great Britain who directed much of the Allied campaign.  
Further, the central lessons of the Unknown Soldier, as emphasised by Keating, reflect the 
democratic and egalitarian traditions of Australian politics, rather than references solely  to duty, 
sacrifice and empire: 
For out of the war came a lesson which transcended the horror and tragedy and the 
inexcusable folly.  
It was a lesson about ordinary people - and the lesson was that they were not ordinary.  
On all sides they were the heroes of that war: not the generals and the politicians, but the 
soldiers and sailors and nurses - those who taught us to endure hardship, show courage, to be 
bold as well as resilient, to believe in ourselves, to stick together.  
The Unknown Australian Soldier we inter today was one of those who by his deeds proved that 
real nobility and grandeur belongs not to empires and nations but to the people on whom 
they, in the last resort, always depend.  
That is surely at the heart of the Anzac story, the Australian legend which emerged from the 
war. It is a legend not of sweeping military victories so much as triumphs against the odds, of 
courage and ingenuity in adversity. It is a legend of free and independent spirits whose 
discipline derived less from military formalities and customs than from the bonds of mateship 
and the demands of necessity.  
It is a democratic tradition, the tradition in which Australians have gone to war ever since 
(Keating 1993d, 2).  
Here, Keating played to the egalitarianism of radical nationalism without resorting to crude insults or 
overt hostility with his direct reference to the ‘Australian legend’ – the ‘folly’ of unheroic generals 
and politicians, and that the heroes of war were the ordinary folk who fought on the frontline.  
Reference to the digger tradition is made – ‘mateship’ not ‘military formalities’ – and the democratic 
traditions that sustained the service personnel of WWI, and the service personnel who followed.   
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Finally, Keating made a point of using that democratic tradition in an attempt to overcome 
difference and hierarchy, and he emphasised unity:  
The Unknown Australian is not interred here to glorify war over peace; or to assert a soldier's 
character above a civilian's; or one race or one nation or one religion above another; or men 
above women; or the war in which he fought and died above any other war; or of one 
generation above any that has or will come later.  
The Unknown soldier honours the memory of all those men and women who laid down their 
lives for Australia (Keating 1993d, 2). 
Keating here listed dichotomised and oppositional identities central to his political style – an exalted 
‘soldier’s character’ versus the character of an ordinary civilian; sexism that would see ‘ men above 
women’; or bigotry via chauvinistic pride in ‘one race or one nation or one religion above any other’ .   
Keating imbued the Unknown Soldier with lessons that subtly chastised those who might have 
preferred conservative, hierarchical, Australian national identities, rather than those identi ties that 
Keating’s mix of cosmopolitanism and nationalism attempted to weld together into a pluralistic,  but 
unified, national whole.   
 
Having closely referenced the traditions of Anzac and tempered his political style provided Keating 
with a platform upon which he could present his political values in an acceptable manner.  Keating 
imbued the Unknown Soldier not with his policy agenda of an Australian republic or of the economic 
outlook to Asia, as he had done on some previous Anzac Days or other memorial occasions, but 
instead with less controversial contemporary political values based on cosmopolitanism, equality 
and democracy.  Thus, reactions to Keating’s speech were mostly positive or neutral (Watson 2011, 
443).   
 
However, isolated instances of controversy remained around Keating’s eulogising of  the Unknown 
Soldier.  A week after Remembrance Day 1993, historian Geoffrey Blainey complained that Keating 
had omitted reference to the Unknown Soldier’s probable, but unknowable, Christianity, converting 
him ‘…without his consent and, fortunately, without his knowledge, into a symbol of government 
policy’ (Blainey 1993a, 2).  Blainey further accused Keating of launching ‘…yet another veiled attack 
on the legitimacy and history of the nation that the unknown soldier gave his life to defend’ (Blainey 
1993a, 2).  This was an issue which continued to irritate Blainey, who five years later as a council 
member of AWM managed to gain approval to get the words ‘Known unto God’ engraved upon the 
Unknown Soldier’s tomb (Holbrook 2014, 187-188).  More recently, Bendle (2014) condemned 
Keating’s 2013 Remembrance Day address at the AWM to mark the 20th anniversary of the interring 
of the Unknown Soldier, arguing that Keating promoted a ‘nihilistic’ view of WWI, a perspective that 
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had roots in his political style, and which unjustly condemned the political and military leadership of  
European powers.   
 
These protestations were, and continue to be, largely isolated, but they reveal the depth of 
antipathy and hostility towards Keating as Prime Minister for failing to uphold the political and policy 
traditions of the Anzac tradition in his politics and in his engagement with Australia’s war history.  
Even this relatively mild and unassuming speech (by Keating’s standards) attracted continuing 
sporadic opposition, despite the fact that it closely followed the traditions of the official and 
conservative strand of Anzac and was largely accepted by the wider public without controversy.  The 
criticism reveals the boundaries that official government discourses of Anzac that seek to include 
contemporary interpretations must contend with and the opposition that they continue to attract,  
long after the events that drove them have passed.  Nonetheless, the interring of the Unknown 
Soldier reveals the success that Keating could achieve in the memorialisation of Australia’s war 
history, and his mixed record of effectively incorporating his own interpretation of Anzac into his 
national addresses.   
 
The 50th Anniversary of the D-Day Landings 
In June 1994, Keating travelled to the UK and to France to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the 
D-Day landings.  The trip was another opportunity for memorial diplomacy - simultaneously the 
commemoration of D-Day and an opportunity for Keating to pursue domestic and foreign policy 
ends.  In particular, the trip was dominated by issues directly pertaining to Keating’s political style  – 
the republic, changing the Australian flag, creating opportunities for liberalised international trade, 
and promoting an outward looking and cosmopolitan Australia.  It was an opportunity to meet with 
world leaders too – UK Prime Minister John Major and French President François Mitterrand both 
had meetings with Keating, and the various ceremonies and events of the commemoration also 
brought him into contact with the US President Bill Clinton and Queen Elizabeth.   
 
Media reports of the occasion generally emphasised the success Keating had in his dealings with the 
British and French leaders, but also remarked upon the tension that Keating had previously caused in 
both countries and the need to repair relationships (see Wright 1994, 2). Wright was referring to 
Keating’s ‘…history of intemperate comments that have won him few admirers in British and French 
power circles.’  In particular, this included his infamous Singapore comments, where he expressed 
the view that the UK had abandoned Australia and left the country to defend itself against the 
Japanese during WWII (see chapter 6).  It further referred to remarks Keating had made the previous 
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year in France where he had lambasted the French for their intransigence in the Uruguay round of 
the GATT negotiations.  Echoing the blunt language and pugnacious attitude of Billy Hughes at the 
Versailles peace conference 75 years previously, Keating had rounded on the bemused local French 
MP who had been sent to represent the French government during a wreath laying ceremony at 
Villers-Bretonneux, asserting incorrectly that Australia had lost 10% of its population defending 
Europe, in particular France, and asking what that sacrifice was worth to French policy makers 
holding out on agriculture concessions in GATT negotiations (Kitney 1993, 13).  Keating had then 
repeated these sentiments to the press corps accompanying the Prime Minister:  
Can I say that the flower of many countries' youth was lost here in France - unselfishly, for the 
greater good of this country.  And at an important time of world decision, we are not seeing 
the magnanimity from France that all of us who have fought for and respected France have 
shown it.   
And I speak here about the GATT round; about selfishness which has crept into European 
politics… and the selfishness which the French are pursuing in international policy.  
And, I think, it is time for the French to reassess themselves and magnanimously be part of the 
world rather than sitting out there by themselves thinking that the world owes them a living. It 
doesn't and it's not going to give them one (Keating, as cited by Kitney 1993, 13).   
Unsurprisingly, French policy makers reacted testily to Keating’s provocation.  Both incidents serve 
as examples of Keating’s lack of inhibition when it came to employing Australia’s war history for 
policy ends.  If he felt he could not ignore Australia’s war history, as Watson claimed, then he 
certainly did engage with it entrepreneurially and in a manner which aligned closely with his own 
world view and policy agenda.   
 
The trip had also been conducted in the context of remarks that Keating had made in Parliament just 
prior to leaving for Europe.  Rising to the despatch box to answer an Opposition question regarding 
his desire to change the Australian flag and whether he continued to plan on doing so given that i t 
was ‘a flag under which so many Australians fought and died during World War II’, Keating asserted 
that ‘Australians fought under the British flag’ during battles in WWI and that diggers at Kokoda had 
fought for ‘the ideals of Australia [not Britain]’, much to the displeasure of the Opposition, who 
interjected frequently as Keating spoke (Keating 1994, 1318).  These debates put the issue of the 
Australian republic and the changing of the flag back firmly on the agenda as Keating set off for 
Europe.   
 
This was the context in which Keating found himself during June 1994.  As Wright (1994, 2)  argued, 
Keating faced two problems – firstly, that Australia’s involvement in the D-Day landings consti tuted 
161 
 
only a small proportion of the total Allied contribution, and secondly, that ‘…to cement friendships 
that are important in economic terms - he must undo some of the damage he has wrought.’  But 
further than repairing relationships, Keating was also playing to the domestic political issues that he 
had fixed as central to his agenda – the republic and the changing of Australia’s cultural symbols to 
reflect that independence.  Thus, Keating’s speeches contain none of the caustic condemnation of  
France or Great Britain that had characterised earlier Keating pronouncements on the respective 
countries.  Mimicking the mould of the Unknown Soldier address, Keating closely followed the 
conventions that govern Prime Ministerial engagement with Australia’s war history, and paid due  
respect to liberal values and to the sense of duty and sacrifice of service personnel.  The logic of 
memorial diplomacy was in effect – smoothing the relationships between the countries by 
emphasising the shared histories of the nations and the public remembrance of those acts during 
WWII.   
 
As such, in a Keating speech to an audience in the UK, the values that Australians fought for were 
uncontroversial – ‘liberty, justice and human decency’ – and praise is effusive for the UK - ‘Britain 
embodied the courage democracy needed. Britain inspired the free world and those whose freedom 
had been taken from them. There can be no doubt she inspired those whose names are recorded 
here [at the Air Forces Memorial, Runnymede]’ (Keating 1994g, 2).  In France, similar sentiments 
were expressed – ‘There is a thread in Australia’s history which has always linked us to France.  What 
the French called liberty, equality and fraternity Australians were inclined to call “mateship” and the 
“fair go” for all’ (Keating 1994h, 2).  Both countries are praised by Keating for the values and ideals 
that they helped to originate and uphold, values and ideals that Australia had incorporated into i ts 
own political culture: ‘…in the events of fifty years ago common values were proved and a story in 
common value was written’ (Keating 1994h, 2).  This emphasis on common values and praise  of  the 
host countries were the words that Wright (1994) argued needed to be said in order to remedy the 
offences caused and open the doors of diplomacy.   
 
The repair of damaged relationships was prominent in France, where Keating met with French 
President Mitterrand, the kind of fringe meeting enabled by such memorial occasions.  Keating 
outlined to Mitterrand the reform of the Australian economy and culture  that his government had 
instituted and envisaged for the future.  This involved changing French perceptions which, it was 
argued, still viewed Australia as an outpost of the British Empire (Baker 1994, 23).  It also occurred in 
the context of domestic debate regarding the republic and the changing of the Austral ian f lag that 
had been on the agenda shortly before Keating had left for Europe the week before.  As such, 
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Keating indicated to journalists that he had spoken with Mitterrand regarding these issues,  arguing ‘I 
told him that we were not a derivative of any other place, we were not a derivative of any other 
society which we had cultural associations with because our culture is changing’ and ‘I said that I 
thought the constitutional monarchy, though it had served Australia well, could not adequately 
either represent or serve Australia well into the future’ (Keating, as cited by Baker 1994, 1).  
 
This example further demonstrates the interplay of structure and agency in Prime Ministerial Anzac 
entrepreneurship.  The 50th anniversary of the D-Day landings had imposed an obligation upon 
Keating to attend and participate in the commemoration of those events and Australia’s war history 
that he could not easily refuse.  But that did not mean that Keating would meekly comply with the 
script that memorialisation posed.  Instead, Keating used the occasion entrepreneurially, and 
promoted his vision for Australia to both an international and domestic audience.  Thus, the 
significance of the 50th anniversary of the D-Day landings is that whilst Keating could not easily 
ignore the obligations that his office imposed upon him to mark such occasions, he could use those 
occasions to pursue his own nationalist vision.   
 
Australia Remembers – the 50th Anniversary of the End of World War II 
Australia Remembers was a year-long program of government sponsored events that marked the 
50th anniversary of the end of WWII.  The name of the program gave some indication of the 
government’s intent - to explicitly, intentionally and deliberately remember and mark the historical  
events and participants, and interpret and communicate meanings of the anniversary.  Australia 
Remembers was thus a conscious effort at nationalism entrepreneurship and government -
sponsored remembrance on a grand, year-long scale.  It was deliberately and carefully planned and 
constructed by federal government design and supported by significant government promotion and 
public funding.  These efforts were furthered by extensive community and occasional corporate 
engagement, helping to connect the government’s intention with the wider Australian community.   
 
This section argues that the Australia Remembers program of memorial events once again al igned 
closely with the political style and policy agenda of the Keating government.  Firstly, despite 1995 
being the 80th anniversary of the Gallipoli landings the program of events and media focus was 
squarely on WWII, not WWI, and on the War in the Pacific, rather than the War in Europe (Reed 
2004, 9).  Secondly, Keating’s speeches throughout the Australia Remembers program were less 
radically nationalist and inflammatory than his Anzac Day addresses of 1992 and 1993.  They 
employed tempered language that more closely conformed to the Anzac tradition; furthermore they 
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were more cosmopolitan, explicitly and positively including a more pluralistic range of identi ties in 
his narrative of remembrance.  Finally, this section argues that Australia Remembers was also a 
mostly, though not entirely, successful exercise in nationalism entrepreneurship by Keating.  Whi lst 
he had to temper his language, and be less explicit about his policy agenda, Keating did do much to 
renovate Anzac during Australia Remembers in ways that are still being observed – promoting and 
institutionalising the recognition of WWII, the service of women and multiculturalism and, to a lesser 
extent, Indigenous Australians.  There are real boundaries to nationalism entrepreneurship that 
Keating needed to observe but Australia Remembers demonstrated that these boundaries were 
elastic – change could occur and stories previously ignored were included where once they were 
not.   
 
Australia Remembers – Structure and Planning 
Whilst Australia Remembers had the endorsement of the Prime Minister, aligned as it was with his 
wider understanding of Australia’s war history, the initiative was also driven by the entrepreneurial  
activities of Minister for Veterans Affairs, Con Sciacca (Inglis 2008, 393).  Sciacca’s genuine 
enthusiasm for Australia Remembers helped to achieve bipartisanship for the project, and won him 
‘respect and affection from diverse groupings and individuals, regardless of their own political 
philosophies and affiliations’ (Reed 2004, 13).  Further, Sciacca’s personal history as a Sicilian 
immigrant and his stated belief that Anzac could transcend its British origins to include Australians of 
all ethnic backgrounds helped:  
…to heal the profound divisions it [Anzac] has created by removing it from its military context 
and extending it to former enemies and descendants of people who had no involvement in 
World War I.  More importantly, Sciacca had decentred the Anzac legend from its location at 
the core of Anglo-Australian remembrance, offering it as a secular signifier of belonging within 
the nation (Reed 2004, 122-123).   
Sciacca was therefore an active participant in the re-imagination of Australia’s war remembrance in 
a more plural sense.   
 
In addition to the goodwill that Sciacca helped to create in regards to Australia Remembers, he 
played an enormous role in envisaging its purpose, and in planning and coordinating its program of  
events.  Speaking to the House of Representatives in February 1995, Sciacca outlined what the 
Australia Remembers programs of events and initiatives were for:  
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…the aims of those working on Australia Remembers are to thank the veterans who fought in 
World War II; commemorate those who died; recognise the widows and children of those who 
died; remember all who kept the home front running; recreate the joy felt at the end of the 
war in the best way possible; educate the nation about World War II and leave a lasting legacy 
(Sciacca 1995a, 915).   
Thus, the purpose of Australia Remembers centred on two interrelated aims – to remember and to 
educate.  In the process, the government helped to steer public understandings of Australian war 
history – challenging the primacy of World War I in Australian narratives of identity and attempting, 
to varying degrees of success, to broaden the range of identities to be recognised, including women, 
immigrant identities, and Indigenous Australians.   
 
To achieve these ends, a number of elements to the program were planned - commemorative 
ceremonies, most notably including three pilgrimages by veterans to overseas theatre of war 
locations in London, Papua New Guinea, and Borneo, and major ceremonies for Victory in Europe 
(VE) Day and Victory in the Pacific (VP) Day; seed funding for state capital and regional 
commemorative committees; public funding for unit reunions and histories; certificates of 
appreciation for veterans and those who served and contributed on the home front; engaging the 
media in promotion of Australia Remembers; and the development of an education ki t for primary 
and secondary school children on the events of World War II (Sciacca 1995a, 916-919). 
 
In planning this program, Sciacca had envisaged the participation of a broad cross-section of the 
government and the community.  It was a federal affair – in addition to the Commonwealth 
contribution, Australia Remembers also involved the participation and planning efforts of state  and 
territory governments and $20,000 worth of seed funding for each federal electorate to plan and 
enact their own Australia Remembers events (ALP 1995, 250).  Employing a whole -of-government 
approach, Australia Remembers also engaged a range of Commonwealth government departments 
and bodies.  The Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC), in conjunction with the 
Department of Veterans Affairs, was asked to locate surviving uniformed and non -uniformed 
Indigenous veterans, and to plan a commemorative service that would recognise their war efforts 
(Sciacca 1995a, 917).  Of further note was the DVA’s employment initiative with the Department of  
Employment, Education and Training entitled Operation Restoration, offering unemployed 
Australians work and training opportunities to restore neglected or damaged war memorials and 
remembrance driveways, and dovetailing with the employment policies of Working Nation (see 
Chapter 6).  Inglis notes that this was somewhat of a departure for the government and the DVA, as 
small-scale local memorials were historically built and maintained by the funds and efforts of  local  
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communities, not the government.  As it was, $10 million in Commonwealth funding was set aside 
for this program (Inglis 2008, 391).   
 
Educating young Australians about WWII was also a key priority of the Australia Remembers 
program, with Sciacca (1995a, 918) remarking that the production of an education kit for Austral ian 
school children was ‘one of the most important tasks being undertaken this year.’  Students were 
asked to engage with a number of themes centring not only on the rote and passive learning of 
events, but with active tasks that encouraged students to investigate ‘the personal experiences o f  
war in their local communities’ (Sciacca 1995a, 919), the state directing the linking of generations 
through the act of remembrance.   Further to this end, youth forums were conducted around 
Australia during Australia Remembers, culminating with a Prime Ministerial address to the national  
youth conference on VP day.  Keating (1995b, 2-3) told that audience of schoolchildren:  
So it had to mean something. 50 years on, we can't say oh well that was just something in the 
past. This sort of stoicism, this sort of bravery, heroism, belief in Australia, belief in what we 
created here, belief in our values, had to mean something. And so I  am exceptionally pleased 
that so many Australians remember and so many young Australians remember and have 
learned about the period. 
Keating’s anxiety that WWII was not being properly remembered is manifest in his language – ‘it had 
to mean something’, repeated for effect after listing the heroic attributes of Australia’s service 
personnel – ‘bravery’, ‘stoicism’ and ‘belief in Australia’ - reveals his tacit acceptance that such 
meanings were not universally understood or accepted.  Concern that the significance of Austral ia’s 
war history would be lost as the generations who experienced war aged and passed away had 
preoccupied those sympathetic to Anzac for decades (see Macleod 2002; Holbrook 2014, 116-121) 
and Keating’s government had adopted a tangible policy response – curriculum intervention – for 
the expressed purpose of educating young Australians about their war history and e ncouraging their 
continued remembrance of those events and their meanings.   
 
Total Commonwealth funding for Australia Remembers stood at $9 million19 (ALP 1995, 250; Firth 
1995, 11).  The marketplace was also sought as an active partner in remembrance, but Reed (2004, 
160-161) notes the government had little success in garnering support from Australian companies.  
This did not stop licensed merchandise being produced, though, with 18 licensees producing goods 
bearing the Australia Remembers logo on coasters, mugs, spoons, flags, clothing and even a CD 
                                                                 
19 Reed (2004, 15) reports a total funding figure of $12 million, which has been repeated in Holbrook (2014, 189).  I  
have been unable to corroborate this figure with primary sources, so I have instead reported the $9  mi l l ion fi gure 
above, drawn from ALP (1995) and Firth (1995).   
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(Reed 2004, 161).  Inglis (2008, 393) further notes that Cadbury chocolates and Tooheys beer both 
produced war-time branded products, and that Australia Post and the Australian Mint produced war 
hero stamps and coins.   
 
Media coverage was also actively sought for the purposes of raising awareness and educating the 
public about the significance and meaning of WWII (Sciacca 1995a, 918), and Reed (2004, 160) notes 
the success that Australia Remembers had in this regard.  TV specials featuring personalities like Ray 
Martin interviewing the Prime Minister and newspaper reports and histories bearing the Austral ia 
Remembers logo were prominent.  In sum, Australia Remembers was an integrated and lavish 
government led initiative of nationalism entrepreneurship and remembrance, on a scale not 
previously seen for a war anniversary.  It sought to involve all levels of government and the breadth 
of the public service; integrated wider government policy priorities with programs like Operation 
Restoration; attempted to activate the consciousness of the public through media engagement, 
corporate sponsorship, and an education kit for schools; and was, on the whole, very successful in its 
aim to create remembrance and memory of the events and meanings of WWII.   
 
Keating and the Meaning of Australia Remembers 
Keating emphasised the honouring of Australia’s service personnel as the preeminent meaning for 
Australia Remembers.  Whilst the values that were fought for and the continuing lessons that these 
values had for the present were referred to, they often were presented as uncontroversial 
ideographs, and they did not directly reference Keating’s policy agenda.   Thus , in his major VP Day 
address, Keating said:  
Time has changed our perspective on the world and on ourselves. We have had to adjust our 
thinking to accommodate necessities. In many ways I think we are better for it. It may be that 
we are less naive and more worldly than the Australians of fifty years ago. I believe we are 
more tolerant and more open.  
But if we are to succeed as we should we will always need their strength, their collective spirit, 
their sense of duty, their faith. We will need their inspiration  
I hope that this Australia Remembers year has reminded us all of these things                   
(Keating 1995c, 2).   
This was as direct a reference to his government’s agenda as Keating was prepared to make  during 
his Australia Remembers speeches.  Keating here subtly referenced the changes that his government 
had ushered in, the necessity of those reforms, and the positive cosmopolitan values that this had 
brought with it.  And Australia’s war generation was presented as an example for the present – as 
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they faced change, so must the current generation – a repetition of a theme that he and Hawke had 
utilised in their Anzac Day addresses.   
 
Otherwise, Keating left this connection unspoken, instead filling his speeches with the 
uncontroversial values and meanings closely aligned with the tenets of the Anzac tradition - duty, 
sacrifice, courage, democracy, and peace.  In the same VP Day address as above, Keating 
acknowledged the logic that compelled him to mark the war history of the nation in this mann er: ‘ It 
has been my duty to utter some words of tribute on behalf of the Australian people and participate 
in services to commemorate their deeds and sacrifice’ (Keating 1995c, 1).  This duty not only 
pertained to the need to make speeches, but to also say the right things, a lesson Keating had now 
learnt from conservative reaction when he had strayed from the accepted narrative of such 
occasions.  Such an analysis is supported by Keating’s publicly stated desire to keep Australia 
Remembers ‘non-political’, with The Courier-Mail reporting that Keating sent a letter to the RSL, 
reassuring them that ‘You most certainly may tell your members that the Australia Remembers 
programme is not part of any political campaign in 1995’ (Keating, as cited by The Courier-Mail 1995, 
7).  As such, and seeing as Australia Remembers already closely aligned with Keating’s preferred war 
theatre of remembrance, the War in the Pacific, there was little gain to be had from provoking 
partisan-political controversy.   
 
Keating instead chose to honour the generation of people who had fought and lived through WWII,  
and to thus tacitly, rather than explicitly, advance his conception of the meaning of Austral ia’s war 
history.  US historians Strauss and Howe (1991) have advanced the thesis that this war generation 
was exceptional - having grown up during the hardship of the Great Depression, and having fought 
fascism and won, they had then rebuilt US society during the long post-war boom.  They were a 
generation of ‘victorious soldiers and Rosie the Riveters…“men’s men” who have known how to get 
things done’ (Strauss and Howe 1991, 261), whose collective ‘can-do’ efforts rebuilt the American 
nation and earned the thanks of a grateful public.  Speaking about this same generation in the 
Australian context, Keating alluded to Strauss and Howe’s thesis on VE Day:  
Someone once said of the Americans of that time that they were an heroic generation - they 
refused to be broken by the Great Depression, they fought the war and then they built a great 
country. Without a doubt, the same can be said about that generation of Australians. They 
went about re-building their lives with confidence and purpose and their efforts gave rise to a 
period of sustained national development (Keating 1995d, 2).   
A lesson about remembrance can thus be inferred from the above – that despite this generation 
facing enormous hardship, they had succeeded in building the prosperous modern Australian nation-
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state, and were to be lauded for their efforts.  The unnamed subtext of this is the repudiation of the 
centrality of WWI narratives of national identity – it is the generation of the Second World War that 
is ‘heroic’.  They were the ones who refused to be broken by the hardships of the Great Depression, 
the ones who stared down the threat of fascism and invasion, and the ones who returned home to 
rebuild the nation.  This generation had built the contemporary Australian state out of the ashes of  
Depression and war, not the Anzacs of Gallipoli and the Western Front.   
 
Keating emphasised the status of this generation with a sacralised place in the canon of  Austral ian 
national life.  With allusions to the life and lessons of Christ as espoused in the Gospel According to 
John, Keating told a national audience on the major VP Day set speech that:  
The story tells us that there was a generation of men and women who so loved this country, 
and the freedoms and way of life we now enjoy, they were prepared to lay down their lives. 
There were Australians who so loved what is just, they defended it to the death.  
We cannot think about this without understanding the debt we owe them, and the duty we 
have to honour their memory.  
To truly honour them is much more than a ritual task. It is to take the knowledge of their 
sacrifice into our daily lives and the life of Australia. It is to love this country and give to it as 
they did which is to say with that same faith from which their inspiration, effort and endurance 
flowed (Keating 1995c, 2).   
Keating’s statement is analogous with the message of  John 3:16 – ‘For God so loved the world that 
He gave His only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in Him should not perish, but have 
everlasting life.’  The fame of this verse (Kealy 1978, 64) and its percolation through the culture of 
nominally Christian societies such as the US and Australia makes it a reference point for sacral i sing 
the efforts of those WWII service personnel who lost their lives in the conflict.  The first sentence of  
Keating’s quote above parallels John 3:16 closely – the WWII generation ‘so loved this country’,  just 
as God had so loved the world.  Further, John 3:16’s status as ‘the gospel within the gospel ’ and i ts 
allusion to the central New Testament message - eternal life granted to man via the sacrifice of 
Christ with His crucifixion and resurrection (Kealy 1978, 64) - means that the sacrifice of WWII 
service personnel takes on a kind of saviour status made comparable to the example of Christ.   
 
This message is further reinforced by Keating’s call to incorporate ‘the knowledge  of their sacri f ice 
into our daily lives and the life of Australia’.  Lee (1994, 12-13) argues that the Gospel According to 
John can be characterised as a series of narratives where the miracles and messages of Christ are 
consistently misinterpreted as literal and pertaining to ‘material reality’ by His audience, and where 
Christ then attempts to explain their deeper, symbolic meaning to the main characters of the 
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narratives.  A similar narrative structure is employed by Keating here, where the national aud ience is 
encouraged to look for the deeper meaning of the sacrifice of WWII service personnel.  Thus, Keating 
encourages the audience to not just pay lip service to the memory and meaning of their sacrifice (‘To 
truly honour them is much more than a ritual task’), but to instead incorporate the meaning of  that 
sacrifice into their daily lives and the life of the nation, just as Christ encouraged His followers to 
incorporate His example into their lives.  Whilst other, secular, interpretations of Keating’s 
characterisation here of Australia’s WWII service personnel could well be ventured, the fame of John 
3:16 and its well-understood meaning regarding the message of Christ has been employed by the 
Prime Minister.  Its inclusion serves to sacralise the actions of WWII service personnel and the 
meanings subsequently attached to them.   
 
Broadening the Range of Australian War Remembrance Identities 
The generation that Keating so admired was not presented as a homogenous collective.  A priority of 
the Australia Remembers program was the recognition of a variety of identities, opening up the 
remembrance of Australia’s war history in ways that had not previously been pursued with any great 
vigour in official narratives of memorialisation and Anzac.   A number of identities were given 
repeated prominence in Keating’s addresses – the veterans who fought battles in the Pacific and 
Europe; those who served on the home-front in Australia; the families and loved ones of those who 
lost their lives.  Specific attention was also given to previously marginalised identities such as 
women, Indigenous Australians and post-war immigrants.   
 
Keating’s focus in his Australia Remembers addresses was not exclusively, or even overwhelmingly, 
masculine, as had been the case with some of his Anzac Day addresses.  Speaking at the launch of 
the Australia Remembers program, Keating (1994i, 4) had remarked that ‘We want Australian 
women involved as never before in such a commemoration.’  To further this end, March 1995 was 
set aside as Homefront Month in the calendar of events, highlighting especially the contribution of  
civilian women to the war effort (Reed 2004, 72).  Further, female service personnel were honoured 
with a separate commemorative ceremony three weeks before VP Day, where the Prime Minister 
spoke, listing the services associated with the participation of women – the nurses who served in 
various service branches, the Women’s Auxiliary Australian Air Force, Australian Women’s Army 
Service, and the Women’s Royal Australian Naval Service (Keating, 1995e).  Further, non-Service 
contributions were also named and listed – the Australian Women’s Land Army and those women 
who worked towards the war effort on the home front, especially those 250,000 named as working 
in factories.   
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Speaking about their contribution, Keating (1995e, 2) said that ‘[t]heir experience is part of the 
Australian experience; it is inseparable from our military history, our national legends and traditions, 
and the inspiration and values we draw from these things.’  In doing so, Keating was seeking to bind 
the contribution of women in WWII to the wider narrative of Anzac, in ways that that had previously 
been largely omitted.  Thus, women’s war experiences are equated with nationhood (‘ their 
experience is part of the Australian experience’), all the things associated with that (‘national 
legends and traditions’) and the meanings and lessons that are thus drawn from such important and 
central national efforts (‘inspiration and values’).  The imperativeness of the case is emphasised not 
only by its the link drawn to Australian nationhood, but also by the adjective ‘inseparable’ being 
used to also make the connection – the audience was being called on to always link women’s 
experiences of war with Anzac.   
 
Women were thus to be included in Australia Remembers in ways that had not previously been 
entertained.  Various authors have pointed out the ways that Anzac and Australia’s war history is 
gendered and closely associated with maleness, and the ways that this had obscured women’s 
experiences of war (see Lake, 1992; Reed 2004).  Keating, in his address celebrating the contribution 
of women, attempted to reverse some of these omissions by including the stories of certain named 
women who had been interned as POWs, had been bombed or torpedoed, or had otherwise served 
with distinction.  But, as Reed (2004, 75) points out Keating failed to reimagine Anzac:  
The fiftieth anniversary of the war’s end presented the opportunity for… gendered 
representations of the war to be reworked, for the paradigm of remembrance to be shifted 
away from tales of conflict and glorious suffering, associated with men’s endeavour on the 
fighting fronts.   Instead, women were constructed as heroes also, equal to the men in their 
contributions of labour on the home front.  This extension of a heroic status to women simply 
added another layer through which their voices struggled to be heard (Reed 2004, 75).   
As such, Keating’s representation of women largely fitted the hero characterisation that Reed 
outlines above, with women’s named experiences reflecting the glorious suffering and sacrifice that 
was also associated with men’s experience of war.   
 
Further, even these female experiences largely failed to penetrate Keating’s major speeches during 
Australia Remembers, as they were absent from the widely attended and reported VP and VE Day 
addresses.  So, whilst women had been recognised to a greater extent than they had ever had 
before, this recognition was contingent upon the tropes associated with Anzac remaining masculine, 
to the extent that women were included at all.  Such criticism should not be overstated – there 
appeared to be a genuine effort by Keating and Australia Remembers planners to include women in 
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Australia’s war history and to address their historical exclusion.  But the point remains that women’s 
inclusion was contingent on them fitting the masculine narrative of Anzac, and that opportunities to 
reformulate memories of Australia’s war history in ways that challenged the gendered nature of this 
history were missed.   
 
Similar problems existed for the recognition of Indigenous Australians.  It was the intention of 
Australia Remembers planners to ensure that a priority of the program was to be recognition of  the 
contribution of Indigenous Australians, in much the same way as the government had sought to 
include the contribution of women in ways that had not been previously recogni sed.  As Sciacca 
(1995a, 917) had told Parliament, it was his government’s intention to plan ‘…an appropriate 
commemorative ceremony to recognise the special - and often unacknowledged - role played by 
these people [Indigenous Australians] in the defence of Australia.’  As it happened, however, the 
recognition of Indigenous Australians was even more problematic than the recognition of  women, 
despite the desire of Sciacca to ameliorate their historical omission.  Indigenous service men had 
featured in promotional material and commemorative stamps for Australia Remembers, but their 
stories and memories were otherwise largely absent from the program of events (Reed 2004, 173).   
 
This absence is reflected in Keating’s speeches, with the contribution of Indigenous Australians being 
absent from his major speeches on VE and VP Day, and rating only a small, somewhat tokenistic, 
mention in a speech honouring the contribution of Pacific Island veterans (Keating 1995f, 3-4).  After 
listing the contributions of Pacific Island service personnel in this speech, Keating turned to 
Indigenous Australians, naming contributions by specific service personnel much as he had done in 
his address to Australian service women, and then stating ‘Even if the Australia of the 1940s was 
blind to their bravery and loyalty, we see it clearly now. And we acknowledge it now. It must not be 
forgotten’ (Keating 1995f, 4).  But if remembering the service of Indigenous Australians was so 
important, then it must be asked why this recognition was placed here, sitting awkwardly amongst 
the honours for Pacific Island veterans?  Why had they not been given their own ceremony, or had  
other forms of Prime Ministerial recognition?  Reed (2004, 173) suggests a partial explanation -  that 
ATSIC was largely uninterested in the occasion or organising ceremonies for Indigenous Australians, 
being more preoccupied with present day issues of Indigenous disadvantage.   
 
However, the lack of interest from ATSIC fails to account for Indigenous Australians’ tokenistic 
inclusion and lack of voice in Keating’s Australia Remembers addresses.  In much the same way as 
women found themselves defined by the gendered tropes of Anzac, Indigenous Australians were 
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included in Australia Remembers to the extent that they fitted with its heroic story of sacri f ice  and 
service.  Opportunities to challenge and redefine dominant discourses of nationhood by, for 
instance, pointing to Indigenous service people’s unpaid wages for their service, or their exclusion 
from Australian society after their return from war, and the ways this was symptomatic of 
continuing Indigenous disadvantage, were left unspoken.  Once again, whi lst this critique should not 
be overstated given the genuine concern that Australia Remembers planners had in ensuring 
Indigenous stories about wartime were conveyed, the manner in which they were delivered did little 
to challenge the Anglo-centric nature of Anzac.   
 
Immigrant identities were given more recognition in Keating’s Australia Remembers speeches for 
their transformative influence upon Australian society.  In several major Australia Remembers 
speeches Keating acknowledges those Australians who arrived in the country after the war and 
contributed to post-war nation building.  For example, after characterising the WWII generation as a 
‘heroic’ generation on VE Day, Keating (1995d, 3) immediately said the following:  
Among the builders were many thousands who had endured the war in their own countries 
and left their shattered lives and devastated homes to start new lives in Australia.  
I do not think we should let this day pass without reminding ourselves of how much they have 
given Australia; how much we have gained by being open to the world, generous towards 
those who have come here to escape oppression and hardship, and tolerant of cultural 
differences.  
In building new lives here they enriched us all. That is one of the great lessons of the fifty years 
which have passed since the war ended, and one that we should not forget.  
Keating thus grants immigrant identities the positive transformative role that was largely denied to 
women and Indigenous Australians, with his openness to difference.  It was immigrants who 
‘enriched us all’ and who the audience was called upon to ensure that they remembered how 
immigrants had taught us values of generosity and tolerance.  The values of tolerance that post -war 
immigrants had taught Australians stood in contrast to the unnamed, but well-known, history of 
prejudice that had characterised pre-war White Australia.  By doing so, Keating was linking 
Australia’s war history with the current day cosmopolitanism that his government was keen to 
advance, and great care was taken throughout Australia Remembers to ensure that these immigrant 
identities were not associated with Australia’s historical war enemies.   Instead, post-war immigrants 
were given the role of positive transformers and nation-builders of the same stature  as the heroic 
generation who had fought the war and returned to remake the nation.  In the process of honouring 
the contribution of these people, Keating made significant steps towards the opening up of 
Australia’s war history to a more diverse plurality of identities.   
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Success and Contestation 
Australia Remembers was largely successful in nationalism entrepreneurship, meeting its aims and, 
in the process, helped to promote and institutionalise the remembrance of WWII.  If, as argued 
above, Australia Remembers’ aims were centred on remembrance and education, then it surely was 
successful in these matters.  Australia Remembers events were well attended and received 
considerable media coverage, aiding the aim of remembering the actions, sacrifices and meanings of 
the generation who had fought and experienced WWII.  Education had been achieved too, with the 
intervention into school curriculums in the form of the education kit distributed to Australian 
schools, the youth forums, and more generally, the consistent government-endorsed promotion and 
coverage of the events and their meanings.  Finally, wider government policy aims were achieved 
too, with the Operation Restoration program engaging the unemployed.   
 
This was aided by attempts to ensure that Australia Remembers remained unpolitical.   Sciacca had 
made sure to anticipate controversies before they had arisen, and was successful in ensuring that 
they did not escalate (Reed 2004, 165).  His Opposition counterpart, Wilson Tuckey, was also keen to 
see that Australia Remembers progressed without controversy, or unnecessary politicking from the 
Opposition, telling the House of Representatives: ‘The minister will perform to the highest level of  
his responsibility in this year, I am sure. He can do so without any fear that the Coalition will seek to 
exploit minor areas of dispute either between our parties or within the community’ (Tuckey 1995, 
920).  Similar sentiments were expressed by Keating himself, assuring a suspicious RSL that he had 
no intention of using Australia Remembers as a platform to promote the issue of an Australian 
republic or as a campaign device for the upcoming election (The Courier-Mail 1995, 7).  Keating 
largely kept to his word and refrained from utilising Australia Remembers and Australia’s war history 
to explicitly promote his policy agenda as he had done on memorial occasions in the past.   
 
Occasionally, however, suspicions regarding the government’s, and especially Keating’s,  intention 
arose.  Two issues in particular caused strain – the use of the term Victory in the Pacific Day, rather 
than the traditional Victory Over Japan (VJ) Day, and the failure of Australia Remembers planners to 
fully include Opposition leader John Howard on VP Day, refusing a request to allow him to speak.  
The VP/VJ Day controversy was largely confined to the pages of The Australian (Reed 2004, 169) and 
the occasional interjection from the Opposition during Question Time.  The choice to use VP Day, 
rather than VJ Day, of course occurred in the context of lingering tension, and even racism, towards 
the Japanese due to the war crimes committed by their soldiers during the war, and Australia’s 
contemporary, post-war relationship with Japan as a significant trading partner.  Sciacca attempted 
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to respond to these concerns by noting that he had received advice from the AWM that the term VP 
Day had been used at the end of the war and that the government had based its decision on this 
information (Sciacca 1995b, 230).  Whilst this issue continued to irritate some in the Opposition and 
the community, a desire to see that the event remained unbesmirched by controversy saw a 
begrudging acceptance of the term VP Day (see Tuckey 1995, 920).  The second controversy, the 
refusal to allow Howard the opportunity to speak at the VP Day ceremony was similarly resolved, 
with Howard declining to overtly attack Keating publically over the issue, and stating: ‘I do not want 
to do anything that disturbs tomorrow's observance of our victory over the Japanese 50 years ago’ 
(Howard, as cited by Wright 1995, 4).  As such, Australia Remembers, like the interring of the 
Unknown Soldier in 1993, had proceeded smoothly and largely without controversy, demonstrating 
the success that Keating and his government had in its management of the occasion, despite allusion 
to his policy agenda and political style.  Continued government investment in WWII memorialisation, 
and the increasing popularity of Kokoda as both a tourist destination and a site of remembrance, 
demonstrates the success of Keating nationalism entrepreneurship with Australia Rememb ers, and 
his evangelising of WWII remembrance more broadly (Beaumont 2011, 13-14; Holbrook 2014, 190).   
 
Conclusion 
Australia Remembers encapsulated both the success and failure that Keating had with Anzac 
entrepreneurship.  On one hand, Keating was unable to dislodge the story of the landings at Gallipoli 
from its central place in Australian identity, and as a private citizen has expressed concern that he 
may have even contributed to an over-emphasis upon Australia’s war history (Holbrook 2014, 189).  
Further, to be able to achieve some degree of influence over the conception of what was being 
remembered, Keating had to restrain himself from his tendency towards pugnacious provocation, 
temper his language, and pare back reference to his Big Picture vision for Australia.  On the other 
hand, Keating and his government were still able to put forward an entire year of remembrance 
activities and ceremonies centred on Keating’s conception of Australian war history and to insert 
themes which closely, though subtly, referenced the twin threads of nationalism and 
cosmopolitanism that characterised his political narrative.  Ultimately, Australia Remembers 
demonstrated the elastic boundaries that Anzac, and Australia’s war history more generally, 
encompassed.  Whilst Keating had to conform to some of Anzac’s strictures, he was able  to reform 
them, largely without protest, too.   
More broadly, the successes and limitations that Keating encountered during Australia Remembers 
reflects the overall success Keating had in putting forward his version of remembrance.  Events of 
Keating’s Prime Ministership may well have imposed upon him the irresistible obligation to mark the 
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anniversaries of Australia’s war history that Watson claimed, but Keating certainly did not let these 
obligations define the manner in which he would engage with them.  We can see two periods of 
memorialisation in Keating’s term as Prime Minister – the early period reflecting his pugnacious 
political persona, boldly and explicitly aligning his policy agenda and his radical nationalism with 
Australia’s war history and imagining Australia’s service personnel as agents in these endeavours.  
The second period revealed the more thoughtful and cosmopolitan Keating – subtly referencing the 
social and economic agenda of his government and renovating Anzac in parallel, whilst at the same 
time paying due respect to Anzac’s traditions and meanings.  The pugnacious Keating attracted 
condemnation and hostility from conservative defenders of Anzac; the cosmopolitan and plur al istic 
Keating was largely left to conduct his interpretation of Anzac.  Thus, Keating was quite successful in 
his endeavour to reinterpret Anzac and Australia’s war history in a fashion that departed significantly 
from the Anzac tradition’s martial and conservative origins, but only to the extent that he could keep 
this version of memorialisation unpolitical and uncontested.  This required him to pay due respect to 
the sacredness of Anzac’s boundaries, but it demonstrates that significant Prime Ministeria l 
reinterpretation of Anzac could be achieved.   
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CHAPTER 8 
Howard: Anzac and a Unified Mainstream 
 
Introduction  
In 1996, John Howard and the Coalition won government at the federal level for the first time in 
thirteen years.  This election, centred on the Coalition’s election slogan of ‘For all of  us’ and bel ief  
that the Labor Party no longer understood ‘mainstream Australia’, would provide the discursive 
template for the Howard government’s term in office for the next eleven years (see Kelly 2009, 238).   
Howard had campaigned hard on what he perceived to be the ALP’s indifference to mainstream 
Australia’s experience of significant social and economic change and especially on Prime Minister 
Paul Keating’s championing of Big Picture politics - a progressive social policy agenda, a neo-l iberal 
restructuring of the economy, and a reorientation of Australia’s foreign relations towards the Asia -
Pacific region.  The ALP’s abandonment of the Australian Settlement had also challenged the pre -
eminence of white Australians in the national narrative, as Australians were encouraged to think of  
themselves as diverse, cosmopolitan, and economic citizens.   
 
Howard’s opposition to the ALP and its conception of Australianness did not mean, however, that he 
was interested in rolling back the substantive neoliberal policy direction of the Hawke/Keating 
governments in order to reassert the Anglo-centric nature of Australian society.  Howard was, 
however, keenly interested in changing the tone of government and the ways that Austral ians saw 
themselves and their place in the world.  In particular, Howard was concerned that Australia was 
being increasingly divided by the ALP.  In this way, he was continuing a long Liberal tradition of 
contrasting its concern for unity with the sectional interests of the ALP (Brett 2003, 187).  In 
particular, Howard’s emphasis on mainstream Australians and their purported values disciplined not 
only those groups who stood outside the mainstream, but also those: 
Anglo-Celtic heterosexuals and other members of the ‘mainstream’ to construct their own 
identity as unquestioningly central and other identities as ‘special interests’.  It is about 
discouraging Anglo-Celts, heterosexuals and others who do not wish to privilege their identity 
by denouncing them as ‘politically correct’, elitist, social engineers who are disempowering 
their compatriots (Johnson 2000, 42).    
The story of Australia’s involvement in the Gallipoli campaign of 1915 was to play a central role in 
this reorientation of Australian conceptions of identity.   
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Howard was a consistent Anzac entrepreneur.  Like Hawke and Keating, he sought to engage with 
Anzac to reconstitute Australian identity in a manner that was intimately bound together with his 
government’s policy agenda.  Howard was successful in this endeavour because he actively pol iced 
his depoliticised and unpolitical version of Anzac with his discourse of a unified mainstream.  This 
approach was in contrast to Hawke, who policed Anzac’s unpolitics less actively, and to Keating, wh o 
was inconsistent in his efforts to make his Anzac entrepreneurship unpolitical.  Howard’s policing 
tacitly accepted that his Anzac entrepreneurship was attracting opposition, and that it was therefore 
part of the political sphere of social relations.  However, his emphasis on a unified mainstream with 
his political style explicitly and effectively denied that his version of Anzac was partisan or pol i tical .   
Instead, Howard’s Anzac was presented as depoliticised, essential and commonsensical.  Further, 
and importantly, it proved difficult to contest.   
 
This chapter seeks to explore Howard’s Anzac entrepreneurship through this prism of national unity, 
mainstream politics, and especially neoliberalism.  It does so in four sections, as follows: 
1. Howard’s discourse of a unified mainstream characterised his political style.  Such a 
discourse repudiated the ALP’s approach to government, but also had the effect of 
marginalising identities and policy approaches that were not congruent with Howard’s 
‘mainstream’ politics.   
2. The government that Howard led faced numerous policy challenges as they attempted to 
further the process of economic reform and responded to the social and cultural legacy of 
the Keating government.  Howard’s own response to these issues reflected his neoliberalism 
and conservatism.   
3. A corpus assisted discourse analysis of Howard’s Anzac Day addresses reveals his emphasis 
upon a conservative reading of Anzac.  Howard’s Anzac was centred on Gallipoli,  the Anzac 
tradition, and national unity, and he consistently engaged in Anzac entrepreneurship during 
his time as Prime Minister by making multiple addresses at significant sites of Australian war 
remembrance.   
4. Having established these points, I turn in more detail to Howard’s Anzac entrepreneurship.  
Howard emphasised national unity in his Anzac Day addresses, policed the contestation of  
this unity actively, and constitutively reconceived Anzac with new neoliberal values that 
aligned with the values of the Liberal Party of Australia.   
As such, Howard during this period was setting up the conditions for his highly successful Anzac 
entrepreneurship after 2001.  Whilst Howard faced challenges to his version of Anzac, he had an 
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effective discourse to keep Anzac unpolitical and marginalise opposition.  It was the discourse of  a 
unified mainstream that helped Howard become Anzac’s most successful entrepreneur.   
 
Howard: Unity and the Mainstream 
When he returned as leader of the Coalition in January 1995, Howard set himself the task of 
challenging Keating’s Big Picture vision and use of Australian history to denigrate the Liberal’s 
contribution to Australia’s progress.  Aiding this task was a rich vein of political discontent, as the 
Australian economy was still performing sluggishly after the recession of the early 1990s and, as 
Howard identified in a series of addresses from Opposition dubbed the Headland speeches, the ALP 
government had become increasingly alienated from the concerns and desires of its traditional 
working class constituency.   
 
For Howard, the problem with the Labor Party was that it governed for some, not for all, and was 
thus dividing the nation.  This claim to govern for all continued the Liberal Party contrasting itself 
with the ALP by arguing that it represented all Australians, not just the working class of the 
electorate that the ALP represented (Loveday 1979, 240-1; Brett 2003, 187).  Howard’s solution to 
the ALP’s division was to fall back upon the guiding principles of Liberal Party political  phi losophy -  
the cautious decision making of conservatism, coupled with a strong commitment to individualism.  
The dual commitment to conservatism and liberalism engendered a narrow conception of social 
groupings – families at the micro level and the nation-state at the macro level (Brett 2005, 25).  
Allegiance to a social group larger than the family but lesser then the nation-state, such as class, was 
dangerous, as it ran the risk of curtailing the freedom of the individual and encouraged the 
splintering of the nation’s unity (Brett 2005).  The sub-section of the electorate that the ALP 
represented had evolved beyond the working class and now included all those Australians 
sympathetic to Keating’s Big Picture politics:  
…since the 1970s class and the unions have been joined in the Labor camp by other 
representatives of the part – feminists, environmentalists, the ethnic lobby, multiculturalists, 
the Aboriginal industry – sometimes all simply lumped together as ‘noisy minority groups’ or 
vested interests (Brett 2003, 187).   
The reassertion of the values of national unity and individual freedom was the twin antidote to the 
claims of these groups.   
 
So to whom was Howard appealing?  Much has been written on this subject (see Brett 2003; 2005; 
Scalmer 1999; Dyrenfurth 2007; Wear 2008).  What characterises these accounts is an 
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acknowledgment of the initial use by Howard of the identifier ‘battler’ as part of his appeal in the 
lead up to the 1996 election.  The battlers were a struggling section of Australian society, fighting to 
survive in Keating’s Australia.  They were, at least in part, the ALP’s natural constituency and they 
had been let down by the ALP:  
…Labor has let down the true believers.  The battlers have taken a fearsome battering from the 
boy from Bankstown [Keating].  It is little wonder that he is seen increasingly by Labor’s 
traditional constituents as a remote, elitist figure, comfortable with the chattering classes but 
decidedly uncomfortable with the rank and file who spawned him (Howard 1995a, 20).   
However, the battler discourse was not to endure, being quickly dropped when it was realised that it 
was unreasonable to expect the electorate to continue battling once Howard had taken office 
(Scalmer 1999).  Battling was what the Keating and the ALP engendered and Howard was the 
antithesis of this dystopia.   
 
In power, Howard instead appealed to and governed for the mainstream – a discursive realm similar, 
but distinct, to the image of the battler.  The mainstream had a nebulous definition that 
encompassed many, but excluded others.  Its scope was set out early in the Headland speeches:  
There is a frustrated mainstream in Australia today which sees government decisions 
increasingly driven by the noisy, self-interested clamour of powerful vested interests with 
scant regard for the national interest.   
The power of one mainstream has been diminished by this government’s reactions to the force 
of a few interest groups.   
Many Australians in the mainstream feel utterly powerless to compete with such groups, who 
seem to have the ear completely of the government on major issues… (Howard 1995a) 
The discursive construction of the term ‘mainstream’ contains a strong sense of grievance – it was 
‘frustrated’ by ‘vested interests’.  The mainstream suggested a collective, dominant idea, trend, 
constituency or ideology.  To be located outside the mainstream and as a ‘vested interest’ was to be 
outside the majority of sensible, common-sense opinion.  As such, these ‘powerful vested interests’  
had a disproportionate influence on policy makers in the Keating government.  So, whilst Howard 
talked of ‘one mainstream’, a unified and undifferentiated Australia, at the same time he was 
marginalising groups that did not fit into that category.   
 
Johnson (2000, 42) argues that Howard emphasised ‘mainstream’ identity as Australian identity:   
Part of making the Australian people feel ‘relaxed and comfortable… was precisely to reinforce 
‘mainstream’ identities and ensure that marginalised identities stayed non-threatening and 
subordinate.  The ‘mainstream’ and Australian identity were being constructed as one and the  
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same thing by a sleight of hand that simultaneously talked of all Australians and marginalised 
‘special’, ‘minority’ interests.   
Howard himself embodied the image of the mainstream in his own persona and image of  ordinary, 
unremarkable Australian identity (Brett 2005; Wear 2007).  Howard’s love of cricket, his power 
walking in the morning in a Wallabies tracksuit, his plain speech and middle Australian accent all 
projected an image of white, suburban Australia.  This ordinariness also co-opted the Australian 
Legend, especially the concept of mateship (see Brett 2003, 205; Dyrenfurth 2007).  But at the same 
time as projecting an image of the ordinary, it spoke of what was established and acceptable  for an 
Australian Prime Minister to embody and projected an image of Australian identity based upon this 
ordinariness.  This common-sense ordinariness was quite specific.  It was white, it was heterosexual,  
it was male, it was Christian, and it was classless.  It served to govern those who were placed at the 
centre of the national image by actively encouraging them to define their place as central and 
preeminent (Johnson 2000, 42).  Those Australians who were uncomfortable with being def ined as 
the centre of identity were at once both excluded from the mainstream, and encouraged to abandon 
their reservation and join the common-sense majority.   
 
Related to Howard’s conception of the mainstream was his engagement with the history wars.  
Howard was reacting to Keating’s use of Australian history for partisan political purposes and had a 
deep-seated desire to defend the conservative contribution to Australian history and life (see  
Bonnell and Crotty 2008; Clark 2010).  Howard purported that Keating had marginalised the place of  
the LPA in Australian history, had equated what contribution it had made with a negative view of 
Australian history, and was using this to unnecessarily politicise essential policy changes in a manner 
that was antithetical to Australia’s national interest.  This was the equation of the Keating 
government with the ‘black armband view’ of Australian history (see Blainey 1993b).   
 
The equation of the Keating government with a negative view of Australian history continued with 
the Headland speeches: 
National identity develops in an organic way over time.  It may be changed dramatically by 
cataclysmic events like Gallipoli.  But governments and their social engineers shouldn’t try to 
manipulate it, or to create a sense of crisis about identity.  Constant debate about identity 
implies either that we don’t already have one or, worse, that it is somehow inadequate… A 
better understanding of the past would, I suggest, leave us more humble about the relative 
significance of our current achievements but vastly more optimistic about our future 
prospects.   
It is currently fashionable in some quarters to underestimate what we have inherited – its 
uniqueness, its basic fairness and its proven ability to be able to produce cohesion, tolerance 
and stability unmatched in any other country around the world (Howard 1995b).   
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With this quote we can see the beginnings of Howard’s view on the incontestability of history and its 
alignment with a triumphalist and conservative view Australia’s past.  By employing the adjective 
‘organic’ in relation to the formation of national identity, Howard is presenting identity as a natural  
process, one unburdened by the weight of artificial or inauthentic construction, analysis and 
critique. An organic view of the state is a common conservative view, where tradition and history 
play the most important role in the explanation of the state, rather than an over-arching abstract 
theory (Dryzek and Dunleavy 2009, 269-274). Thus, to critique the historical development of 
Australianness ‘insults us all’.  Critical history that examines the experience of multiple identity 
groups, such as women or Indigenous Australians, challenges a conception of Australian history that 
provides a positive, coherent and singular narrative to explain the nation’s development.  As a 
consequence, critical history also undermines fundamental conservative values – ‘cohesion’, 
‘tolerance’ and ‘stability’.  The proof that vested interests cannot actively and artificially alter 
identity and its historic basis, is Gallipoli – an organic ‘cataclysmic event’ unburdened by the 
influence of ‘governments and social engineers’.   
 
Thus, Howard’s political style and discourse was centred on national unity.  Political identities or 
deconstructions of history that deviated from this purpose were forcefully and explicitly rejected by 
Howard due to their deleterious effect upon national cohesion.  The example of unity set by 
Australian soldiers was one of the major themes in his Anzac Day addresses of 1996 to 2001.   
 
The Howard Government’s Policy Challenges 
Unity was sorely needed by Howard in his first period in office, as a long list of controversies dogged 
his government.  Issues like the rise of Pauline Hanson and the One Nation Party as a political force, 
the confrontation with the Maritime Union of Australia (MUA) over waterfront reform, continuing 
debate over the place of Indigenous peoples in Australian society (flamed by the Wik decision and 
subsequent Native Title reform legislation, and the process of reconciliation), and controversies over 
the repeated breaches of the self-imposed ministerial code of conduct by Coalition members had al l  
bruised Howard.  Further, the 1998 election campaign centred on the introduction of a Goods and 
Services tax (GST) further hurt the Coalition government’s popularity, and at the election in October 
that year, the Coalition lost the popular vote, and their majority in the House of Representatives was 
reduced from forty four seats to twelve.  Having said that, by the time of the 2001 election, Howard 
had succeeded in instituting a number of economic and social policy reforms.   
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The Economy 
Howard was an enthusiastic supporter of further neoliberal economic reform during the 1996 
election campaign.  He continued to be in his time in office, pursuing policy reforms such as 
privatising the telecommunications utility Telstra, introducing a GST, and the deregulation of the 
labour market via the WorkChoices legislation.  The introduction of the GST, in particular, was 
complicated by increasing interest rates, rising petrol prices, and the weakness of the Australian 
dollar.  Howard showed a willingness to institute policy responses to mediate the difficulties these 
events posed for mainstream Australia (Kelly 2009, 525-526).  Less fortunate were welfare 
recipients, on whom Howard imposed mutual obligation and work for the dole schemes.  Such 
efforts revealed the Howard government’s attempts to extend the marketplace, as policy reforms  to 
the provision of unemployment services asked the unemployed to act as consumers in a 
marketplace employment providers (Dean 1998).   
 
Further, whilst his foreign policy direction emphasised a commitment to traditional  Western al l ies 
and economic ties, Howard’s commitment to a realist conception of the national interest saw him 
oversee the increasing integration of Australia with the Asia-Pacific region (Wesley 2007, 24) .  This 
included a growing economic interconnectedness with China - cemented symbolically by the 
invitation extended to Chinese President Hu Jintao to address the Federal Parliament the day after 
US President George W. Bush did so in 2003 - extending credit to regional countries during the Asian 
Financial Crisis, the seeking of bi-lateral free trade agreements in the region, with countries like 
Singapore and Thailand, and encouraging increasing regional trade and investment (see Kelly 2009).   
 
Social and Cultural Policy 
Howard was compelled to deal with social and cultural issues like the republican debate and the 
reconciliation process with Indigenous people inherited from the Keating government. Howard did 
not let Keating’s legacy define his position, and he repudiated many of Keating’s initiatives.  With the 
republic question he committed his government to holding a convention and referendum, but he 
publically backed the retention of the constitutional monarchy and utilised the divisions within the 
pro-republican movement to advance that position (Walsh 2005).  The government’s amendment of 
the Native Title Act 1993 after the Wik decision weakened Indigenous rights regarding native title 
(Patapan 2000, 38-40), and Howard’s refusal to apologise for past government practices regarding 
assimilation strained the reconciliation process (Sanders 2005).   
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Howard’s discourse of the mainstream also fed into practical policy responses to issues pertaining to 
multiculturalism and immigration.  Howard quickly abolished the Office of Multicultural Affairs,  and 
he refused to use the word ’multiculturalism’ for the first few years of government.  He did so in the 
context of the rise of Pauline Hanson, and Howard welcomed the new ‘openness’ of debate she 
represented (Jupp 2005, 178-180).  Howard continued to emphasise the economic contribution of 
immigrants as a criterion for their acceptance (Jupp 2002), and reasserted the exclusionist 
tendencies of Australia’s refugee policies in the MV  Tampa incident and the Pacific Solution (Elder 
2007, 126-127).  These policy challenges, and Howard’s response to them, reflected the 
predominance of neoliberalism and conservatism that underpinned his political style.   
 
Howard’s Anzac – a Corpus Assisted Discourse Analysis 
A corpus assisted discourse analysis of Howard’s Anzac Day addresses demonstrates his concern 
with repudiating Keating’s version of Anzac in favour of national unity.  Howard’s Anzac closely 
followed the genre conventions of Anzac Day and emphasised the campaigns at Gallipoli.   
 
The Sites of Howard’s Anzac Addresses 
Howard marked every Anzac Day of his term with a public address or media release, producing 
twenty speeches and media releases (Figure 17). He primarily marked Anzac Day in Austral ia,  with 
addresses at the Australian War Memorial in 2001 and 2003, in addition to his attendance and 
wreath laying there in 1996, 2002, 2006, and 2007 (The Australian 2001, 2; Boogs 2002, 4; Doherty 
2003, 4; Doherty 2006, 5; Karvelas, Parnell, and Dodd 2007; Rintoul 1996, 1).  Howard also made a 
speech at Greenslopes Private Hospital in Brisbane on Anzac Day 2007 before flying to Canberra to 
lay a wreath at the AWM, and attended the dawn services at the North Ryde RSL in 1996, the Martin 
Place Cenotaph in 1997, and Melbourne in 1999 (The Australian 1999, 3; Howard 2007; Karvelas, 
Parnell, and Dodd 2007; Lamont 1996, 1; Stephens 1997, 1).  Howard also made two trips to Gallipoli 
to mark the 85th anniversary of the landings in 2000 and the 90th anniversary in 2005 (Howard 
2000a; 2000b; 2000c; 2005a).  He made two other over-seas trips for Anzac Day during his term – to 
Thailand in 1998, where he gave two speeches at Hellfire Pass during the dawn service and 
Kanchanaburi War Cemetery at the 11am ceremony; and to Iraq in 2004, where he gave two brief 
reported addresses to troops (Howard 1998a; 1998b; 2004a; 2004b).  Unli ke Keating, Howard did 
not mark Anzac Day at Kokoda or in PNG.  His regular attendance at the AWM also is of note – this, 
in combination with his attendance at Gallipoli, continued the growing emphasis on Anzac as a day 
of high spectacle, rather than as an act of local and low-key remembrance.   
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Year Type 
1996 One media release 
1997 One media release 
1998 Two speeches 
1999 One media release 
2000 Three speeches 
2001 One speech 
2002 One media release 
2003 One speech, one media release 
2004 Two speeches, two media releases 
2005 One speech, one media release 
2006 One media release 
2007 One speech 
Figure 17 - List of Howard’s Anzac Day Addresses and Media Statements  
The Location of Howard’s Anzac 
Howard’s specifically named conflicts often referenced contemporary ADF deployments.  Frequent 
specific mentions of Anzac were associated with Iraq (twelve named mentions in the Howard 
corpus), East Timor (five mentions), Afghanistan (three mentions), Solomon Islands (three 
mentions), and the War on Terror (two mentions).  WWI was also frequently named specif ical ly by 
Howard (four mentions), reflecting his view that the events associated with that war were central  to 
Australian identity.  In contrast to its prominence in Keating’s speeches, WWII was mentioned 
explicitly only once, though Howard did mark Anzac Day 1998 in Thailand, where he frequent ly 
alluded to WWII.  Finally, he did not mention Vietnam by name, and the Korean War only once.  It 
should be noted that wars were often not named specifically by Howard.  Instead, they were alluded 
to by the location of his speeches, especially at Gallipoli. Howard frequently referred to all wars, and 
the loss of 100,000 Australian lives in all conflicts during Australia’s history.  Howard’s frequent 
collective call to mark all wars and war dead served his discourse of unity, as it included all service  
personnel, even as it privileged the Gallipoli campaign.   
 
Gallipoli dominated the battles mentioned explicitly by Howard, with fifteen mentions (and an 
additional three mentions of Lone Pine).  Howard rarely mentioned Kokoda (one mention) or events 
or battles during the War in the Pacific (two additional mentions).  Long Tan was also acknowledged 
twice, and the Battle of Kapyong once.  This pattern reinforces the view that Howard saw WWI, and 
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especially the landings at Gallipoli, as central to Anzac.  His tendency to name current ADF theatres 
of deployment in his speeches also reflected his constitutive and instrumental al ignment of  Anzac 
with the War on Terror.  Given the importance Howard placed upon the Australia-US relationship, 
we might expect WWII to be a war that Howard would emphasise.  However, WWII rarely featured 
in comparison to the more British sites of Anzac.20   
 
Howard’s Agents of Anzac 
The agents of Anzac in Howard’s addresses and media releases also tended to reinforce his 
conservative view of Australian war history.  In gender terms, men are overwhelmingly the primary 
agents of Anzac (twenty-five named mentions).  Notably, men tend to be agents when Howard was 
talking historically about Anzac, and ‘men and women’ (eighteen mentions) was used only when 
Howard talked about contemporary deployments, reflecting the changed make-up of Australia’s 
defence forces.  Nurses are missing from Howard’s addresses and speeches, demonstrating the 
continuing marginalised role women play in the Prime Ministerial Anzac narrative.   
 
Howard’s Anzac agents also lack diversity.  He briefly mentioned immigrants and their contribution 
to Australian life in his 2000 speech at Lone Pine (Howard 2000b), but made no other mention of 
immigrants.  No mention of Indigenous Australians was made by Howard, in contrast to Hawke’s 
Anzac Day addresses and Keating’s speeches during Australia Remembers.  Such references to 
diversity were replaced by frequent references to the unity of service personnel and to unity being a 
lesson that could be drawn from the example of Anzacs throughout history.   
 
The Attributes of Howard’s Anzac Agents 
Given the above, it is unsurprising to see that the attributes that Howard saw Anzac agents as 
possessing were closely aligned with conservative Anzac tradition.  Bravery, sacrifice, service and 
duty, and the debt we owe Anzacs, all come through strongly in Howard’s addresses.  References to 
the diggers as possessing identifiably Australian characteristics, such as mateship or larrikinism also 
feature.  The unity that the diggers displayed was mentioned several times and was used as a 
reference point for lessons for today.  The heroic status of diggers was also mentioned, and was 
reinforced by references to the wild or reckless character of the Anzacs, a somewhat unusual feature 
of Howard’s Anzac Day discourse.  For Howard, the Anzac’s brazen attitude under-fire helped 
reinforce the heroic and special status of their service.   
                                                                 
20 Credit, and my sincere thanks, for this observation must go to Dr. Robert Howard, Honorary Associate with 
Government and International Relations at the University of Sydney.   
186 
 
Attributes Frequency 
Courage/bravery 22 
Sacrifice 19 
Debt Owed 13 
Mateship 10 
Service/duty 7 
Heroism 6 
Australianness 5 
Tenacity/perseverance 4 
Unity 4 
Compassion 4 
Suffering 4 
Honour 3 
Wild/reckless/daring 3 
Fear 2 
Discipline 1 
Free 1 
Figure 18 - List of the Frequency of Mentions of the Attributes of Agents of Anzac in Howard’s Anzac Day Addresses  
There was nuance to Howard’s addresses though.  ‘Softer’ characteristics feature – he notes the 
compassion that service personnel displayed, as well as their suffering during wartime.  These 
aspects were especially prominent in Howard’s 1998 addresses in Thailand, where he dedicated his 
addresses to the remembrance of POWs.  This gives the 1998 addresses something of an outlier 
status in Howard’s Anzac Day corpus of speeches and media releases.   
 
Howard saw Anzac as centred on the events of the Gallipoli campaign, and as closely aligned with 
the conservatism of the Anzac tradition.  In particular, he emphasised unity as a value in these 
addresses.  Having established quantitatively the core aspects of Howard’s Anzac Day addresses and 
media releases, the chapter now turns to a deeper qualitative examination of how unity was 
operationalised by Howard via his Anzac discourse.   
 
Howard’s Anzac Day Addresses: Unity and Neoliberalism, 1996-2001 
The following section examines Howard Anzac Day addresses from 1996 to 2001.  It notes that the 
re-election of Howard in November 2001 was an affirmation of his sometimes controversial pol icy 
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agenda, a tipping point that marked the beginning of new policy priorities centred on national 
security and Australia’s involvement in the War on Terror, and that it precipitated a change in 
Howard’s political persona to one of strength (see Kelly 2009, especially 613-627; Errington 2008, 
223-224).  This change is reflected in Howard’s later Anzac Day addresses (see Chapter 9).  
 
Regarding Howard’s Anzac entrepreneurship from 1996 to 2001, we can in particular see a 
consistent appeal to unity.  As noted above, Howard’s first two terms as Prime Minister had been 
bruising and hard-fought, characterised by the proposal and implementation of a number of 
unpopular and controversial measures.  In addition, unity served his deeper political style and 
philosophy – to national patriotism and to individualism, whilst at the same ti me disregarding 
attempts to frame identity based upon sub-national structures such as class, ethnicity, gender or 
sexuality.  Howard’s was a mainstream reading of Australian history that constituted a conservative 
and uncontroversial view of Anzac and Australianness.  This mainstream reading progressively came 
to constitute Anzac, replacing the sometimes controversial reimaging of Anzac that Keating had 
attempted.  This is not to suggest that Howard’s version of Anzac was uncontroversial  or non-
partisan – at times it attracted bitter opposition.  But it is to suggest that Howard believed Anzac was 
unpolitical, that is, essential and ‘above’ partisan politics.  Howard  drew upon this understanding of  
Anzac and actively policed opposition to his version Australianness.  The following section examines 
these themes by looking at how Howard constructed a unified Anzac, policed that unity, and aligned 
this imagined Anzac with neoliberal values of the LPA.   
 
Anzac Day 1998 – Prisoners of War and a Unified Australia 
On Anzac Day, 1998 Howard travelled to Thailand to mark Anzac Day.  On April 24, he opened a 
museum at Hellfire Pass dedicated to the remembrance of Australian POWs held in captivity by the 
Japanese, built in part with $1.6 million in funding from the Australian government (Inglis 2008, 
528).  On Anzac Day, he attended the dawn service at Hellfire Pass and an 11am ceremony at 
Kanchanaburi War Cemetery.  He gave three major set speeches at these occasions.  The trip was 
conducted in the context of the eruption of industrial unrest with the government’s confrontation 
with dock workers and the Maritime Union of Australia (MUA) over waterfront reform.  Howard’s 
performance on this trip won him some positive accolades in unlikely  circumstances, given the 
controversy that the waterfront confrontation had provoked.  In particular, the emphasis upon the 
unity of the Australian POWs was to play a central role in this success.   
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The waterfront dispute was being bitterly fought as Howard left for Thailand.  Having decided upon 
the necessity of waterfront reform and campaigning on that policy in 1996, the Howard government 
had committed to a course of action that would see confrontation, rather than negotiation, with the 
MUA (see Singleton 2000, 143; Howard 2010, 290-291).  Having secured the commitment of Patrick 
Stevedores and National Farmers’ Federation backed non-union labour, the government publicly 
supported the dismissal of Patrick’s union workforce on April 7 1998 and their remov al from the 
dock by balaclava clad security, enforced with dogs.  The MUA took its case to the courts and April 
21st saw the Federal Court find that ‘…there were “arguable cases in respect of unlawful conspiracy” 
(to replace the Patrick workforce) and “in respect of the freedom of association provision of the 
Workplace Relations Act being breached (employees terminated due to membership of a union)’ 
(Singleton 2000, 145).  On this date, the court had further ordered the reinstatement of the union 
workforce.   
 
This was the domestic context that Howard found himself in when he addressed the crowds at 
Hellfire Pass and Kanchanaburi War Cemetery on Anzac Day.  The speeches were full of lyrical prose, 
high rhetoric, and references to sacredness, with the Prime Minister imbuing the occasions with 
suitable decorum by having a hand in penning poetry that began the dawn service speech (Howard 
1998a; McGregor 1998, 3).  The speeches were full of references to the POWs who had laboured, 
suffered and died whilst in Japanese captivity, with Howard making frequent reference in both 
speeches to their suffering, the sacrifice that they had made for each other and their country, and 
the compassion they had shown their mates.   
 
Howard’s speech drew upon the familiar tropes of the Judean-Christian religious tradition and 
especially upon the example of Christ.  Whilst this had antecedents with Keating, who had also 
alluded to the example of Christ, Howard’s references to Christianity were part of his wider poli tical 
style (see Maddox 2005).  For example, at the dawn service at Hellfire Pass, Howard had the 
following to say about the Prisoners of the War in the Pacific:  
Their story of sacrifice and suffering, of constancy and compassion, illuminates the very 
essence of the Anzac spirit.  For, of all our heroes, they were armed with human virtue alone 
and their victory was over the darkest recesses of the human heart…  
To the world, proof was given that tyranny, in the end, has no power over the courage and 
decency of ordinary men and women.  It is an example to which we all aspire – as relevant in 
peace as to war, to our future as to our past.   
And on this sacred day, at this most sacred place, we honour all Australian service men and 
women who gave or offered their lives in war…  
189 
 
We would have them know of our firm and steadfast belief that they rest not in shades of 
darkness but bask in the brightness of an Australian sun (Howard 1998a).   
The parallel with the example of Christ comes through strongly - the prisoner’s story is analogous 
with the values that Christ embodied in his life.  Innocent men ‘gave’ or ‘offered their lives’,  not for 
fame or other personal gratification, but for victory over the sin of ‘the darkest recesses of the 
human heart’, just as Christ had willingly offered Himself to absolve the world of sin.  They suffered 
this willingly, as Christ did, not with anger or despair but instead with ‘constancy and compassion’ .   
The example they set in their confinement demonstrated the clash between good and evi l ,  sin and 
salvation.  These themes are alluded to with the binary oppositions represented – ‘tyranny’ and 
‘darkness’ juxtaposed with ‘courage’, ‘decency’, ‘brightness’ and ‘sun’ .  And this served as an 
example ‘to which we all aspire’, as it proved to the world that evil will be overcome.  Presenting 
Anzac in these terms invoked the Manichaean theme of conflict between good and evil, placed 
Australia firmly on the side of good in this struggle, and helped to sacralise Howard’s words.   
 
Howard also noted the way that the prisoners’ distinctive Australianness had helped them endure 
their captivity.  This distinctive Australianness was conflated with unity by Howard at Kanchanaburi:  
 They were Australians.   
Their accent was as evident in their manner and deeds as in their speech.  There a bond, a 
unity which branded them as different from others.   
As an English officer stood in the driving rain and watched a group of Australians sing, trudging 
back exhausted from their work, he asked ‘Just what is it that these Australians have?’   
The answer, plain now as it was then, was that they had each other. They had their mates 
(Howard 1998b).   
The fact that unity presents itself as a synonym here for bond is notable , as the two terms are not 
entirely analogous.  Howard’s reading of events emphasised that the prisoners stood as an example 
not only of the deeply felt love and comradeship which can develop amongst human beings in times 
of extreme hardship, but also of unity of purpose and the strength that this granted.  They had each 
other and only by having each other did they have strength.  This unity, and the strength that it 
granted them, marked them as different to other nationalities, granted them uniqueness, and  a 
special kind of exceptionalism.  But as Dyrenfurth (2015, 146) has suggested that mateship amongst 
POWs ‘…was less utopian than later represented.  It came to exist only in co-operative groups, or 
‘syndicates’, usually consisting of two to six men, and these relationships tightened as the 
imprisonment became more challenging in the late stages of the war.’  Moreover, prisoners at times 
displayed instances of poor morale, infighting, and collaboration with their Japanese captors 
(Dyrenfurth 2015, 145-146).  As this suggests, one can be bound without being unified.  By linking 
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bond and unity, Howard obfuscated any differences that may have existed amongst the prisoners, 
differences based on class, religion, rank, or even the means to see out the terrible conditions of 
internment.   
 
In his emphasis on unity, Howard linked the experience of WWII POWs with the present day and 
used their service as an example for current generations.  The speech at Kanchanaburi began with 
Howard referencing the pilgrimages that young Australians were making to sites of  Austral ian war 
history ‘…drawn through the years towards the past’ (Howard 1998b) and the link between 
themselves and Australia’s war dead.  This link was made in nationalistic terms:  
Pausing to read inscriptions engraved upon the headstones they [young Australians] find 
countrymen who share their names, share their ages, their home towns. Men, some just boys, 
who like those today, loved sport and the beach, a beer, and looked ahead towards brighter 
lives of familiar places and loved ones (Howard 1998b). 
This common-sense Australianness linked the present with the past: 
…this better world we owe to those who rest here and all who served with them.   
They were the special ones, the unique Australians.  But within each of us is carried their 
legacy.  And we will build our future upon foundations laid deep and strong.  With such a base, 
with their example as our corner stone, there is no height to which we cannot reach together 
(Howard 1998b).   
Howard imbued the prisoners with lessons for the present, with their sacrifice being the foundation 
of what we have today, and appeals to the audience to draw upon that example in the future.  
However, this serves more as an appeal for unity, rather than an assured declaration of purpose.  
Whilst ‘we will’ has a high degree of commitment, the future tense tacitly acknowledges that this 
may not be a certain outcome.  The very need to use the POWs as an example of unity for the 
present day demonstrated Howard’s implicit acknowledgement that the nation was not united, and 
his own lack of assuredness as uncertainty and division raged at home on the waterfront.   
 
Howard’s trip and speeches won him generally positive reactions from the press.  He closely met the 
traditions of Anzac, and imbued the occasions with suitable respect and nationalism.  Positive 
reaction came from an unlikely source.  Tom Uren, the former Whitlam government minister, ALP 
left faction stalwart, and Japanese Prisoner of War, praised the Prime Minister for his addresses and 
efforts on Anzac Day 1998.  Uren, having never applied for his war service medals (but receiving 
them in 1998 anyway, as the DVA applied for them on his behalf), had them presented to him by the 
Prime Minister on Anzac Day eve in Bangkok.  Uren had attended the picket at Sydney’s Port Botany 
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in support of the MUA a few days beforehand (Steketee 1998, 6).  He subsequently wrote to The 
Sydney Morning Herald:  
I do not agree with the Howard Government's policy on the Australian waterfront, but in 
politics I believe you give credit where it is due. 
John Howard made an outstanding contribution on our visit to the Burma-Thai Railway where 
he dedicated the Hellfire Pass museum to those who died and worked on the infamous 
railway. 
His address on Anzac Day in Kanchanaburi cemetery was so giving and moving that the Diggers 
and their loved ones broke with tradition and gave him a spontaneous applause.  
Prime Minister Howard did those who served and died on this hellhole proud. He did Australia 
proud (Uren 1998, 18).   
Uren’s praise for Howard’s marking of Anzac Day 1998 played neatly into Howard’s narrative 
regarding unity.  Here was a former POW, reaching out across the partisan divide to give ‘credit 
where it is due’ for his marking of Anzac Day and recognition of POWs.  Of course, this did not mean 
that Howard had ameliorated the conflict the waterfront dispute had provoked with his Anzac Day 
addresses.  But it does demonstrate the manner in which Anzac Day could be engaged and how the 
‘correct’ engagement could win plaudits in tough circumstances.  It further demonstrates the 
flexibility of Anzac, with the remembrance once again being imbued with new meanings and lessons 
for the present.  
 
The Boundaries of Unity 
National unity was not a given and Howard keenly policed its boundaries with his Anzac 
entrepreneurship.  Howard’s policing was explicitly expressed by his principle that Anzac was 
unpolitical, telling a reporter on Anzac Day 1999 that ‘I have a golden rule on ANZAC Day I never talk 
about anything that has any kind of party political [connotation]’ (Howard 1999a).  Howard’s Anzac 
was both a crucial part of Australian national identity that deserved to be protected from division, 
and a means to achieve (attempted) national unity.  This policing tacitly accepted that Anzac was in 
fact political, but Howard’s Anzac discourse was an attempt to depoliticise his version of  Anzac and 
present it as essential and unpolitical.  The Anzac Days of 1996, 1997, 1999 and 2000 all featured 
attempts by Howard to police these boundaries.   
 
The Boundaries of Unity - Anzac Day 1996 
Anzac Day 1996 saw Howard announce one of the Coalition government’s first policy initiatives – 
introducing legislation in the first period of the new Parliament to ensure that the design of the 
Australian flag could not be altered except by plebiscite.  The Coalition had only just taken office.  
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The use of the occasion to announce a policy that was of little substantive importance but 
symbolically reinforced Anglo-Celtic identity, was a crucial signal of Howard’s intent.  In the 
statement that was released announcing the initiative, Howard noted ‘[i]t is particularly grati fying 
that some vestige of cynicism over ANZAC Day a generation ago appears to have evaporated with 
young Australians taking more interest than ever in ANZAC Day and what it means for ou r national  
identity’ (Howard 1996).  Howard often noted the way that Anzac was becoming increasingly 
important for Australians, especially young Australians, and used this as  evidence to support his 
belief in the centrality of Anzac.  Of course, Howard tacitly recognised that Anzac had not always 
proved to be such an incontestable element of Australian identity with such statements.  However, 
the increasing numbers of Australians, especially young Australians, attending Anzac Day parades or 
the Gallipoli dawn service proved for Howard that the issue was now settled.  The controversies 
surrounding Anzac Day in particular, and Australian history in general, were now a thing of the past.   
 
Thus, he stressed the legislation that he was introducing would ensure ‘…that as thousands of young 
children line the streets of cities and country towns tomorrow waving our flag, all Australians can be 
assured that no one will be able to change our national symbol without the Nation’s consent’ 
(Howard 1996).  Howard’s conservatism is central here, with the reinforcement of the central i ty of  
established Anglo-Celtic symbols and practices of national identity being pushed to the forefront of  
Howard’s thinking and policy making in the early part of his term as Prime Minister.  Anzac was both 
being constructed as unpolitical and aligned explicitly with a policy change that sought to do the 
same regarding other symbols of Australian identity.   
 
The Boundaries of Unity - Anzac Day 1997 
The lead up to Anzac Day 1997 saw further policing of the boundaries of Anzac by the Prime 
Minister. The controversy arose as the ACT government had proposed to dedicate a section of the 
Lake Burley Griffin foreshore to Canberra’s sister city in Japan, Nara, and name the park Canberra-
Nara Peace Park.  The RSL was unhappy with the proposed name due to ‘…the failure of Japan as a 
nation to come to terms with its role in World War II, [and, as such] the RSL remains complete ly 
opposed to calling the park a “peace park”’ (Greene 1997, 27).  The RSL promptly bypassed the ACT 
government with their concerns and directly approached the Commonwealth, attracting the 
attention of senior Coalition ministers and Howard himself.  Howard reportedly heatedly impressed 
upon the ACT chief minister Kate Carnell that the word ‘peace’ should be removed from the park’s 
name, and that if she chose to refuse that she would be overridden (Greene 1997, 27).  Recognising 
defeat, the ACT government complied with Howard’s threat, naming it the Canberra-Nara Park, but 
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not before the controversy produced significant negative media attention and sympathy for Carnel l  
(see Sheridan 1997; Greene 1997; Cooke 1997).  The increasing attention that the controvers y 
attracted also threatened to become an issue as Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto was visiting 
Australia the week after Anzac Day (Sheridan 1997, 4).  Whilst the issue did not prove to cause any 
public embarrassment for the government during Hashimoto’s visit, it did demonstrate the depth of  
feeling Howard had regarding the appropriate commemoration of Australia’s war history.  History 
was being actively contested by Howard, and the boundaries surrounding Anzac were to be clearly 
marked.   
 
The Boundaries of Unity – Anzac Day 1999 
The consequence of Howard’s enforcing of unity was blindness to the multiple and competing 
commitments individuals may have to group identities.  This tension is revealed in his interview with 
John Faine from Anzac Day, Melbourne, 1999.  This conversation took place against the background 
of Serbian ex-servicemen in Brisbane and Sydney refusing to march in Anzac Day parades in protest 
against NATO’s bombing of Serb forces in the former Yugos lavia in 1999 (Hodge and Krupka 1999).  
Serbian ex-servicemen in Melbourne chose to march.   
FAINE: We’ll be talking later this morning to Mr Toma Bunjanin (sic) who’s the secretary of the 
first sub-branch of Serbian ex-servicemen in Victoria. Made a point of some controversy, the 
Serbian ex-servicemen will be marching here in Melbourne…  
PRIME MINISTER: Well I’m very pleased about that.    
FAINE: They’re not marching in Sydney… 
PRIME MINISTER: No, well I mean….they are Australians of Serbian origin and they were 
wonderful allies of the allies during World War II. I’ve seen them for years in the marches in 
Sydney and I’m very pleased indeed that they are marching here because they are first and 
foremost citizens of Australia and the people who fought alongside the allies during the war 
are an honoured part of that experience, and they are an honoured part of the Australian 
community. That’s quite separate and apart from judgments people make about what is now 
occurring.  
FAINE: What’s happening in Serbia now is a political dispute of today. What we’re celebrating 
is something that happened…  
PRIME MINISTER: Well what we’re remembering is something that happened more than 50 
years ago and the Australians of Serbian descent were magnificent allies of ours and they 
fought very bravely, and they tied down, on some estimates, helped to tie down 15 to 20 
German divisions in World War II and they were wonderful allies. Now one of the great things 
about ANZAC Day is that you can remember that and you can see that for the great deed that 
it then presented. The fact that we can also very freely acknowledge without bitterness the 
fact that we fought against other countries who have now contributed magnificently to the 
modern day Australian population. I mean one of the things about…you can remember 
without that remembrance creating any present day difficulties and I think that’s a magnificent 
thing too.  
FAINE: I can’t agree with you enough and you said, they’re Australian first.  
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PRIME MINISTER: Exactly. I see people always as Australians first, an obviously we each of us 
have our distinctive heritage which we want to preserve, and that’s fine. But we’re all 
Australians first (Howard 1999a).  
Here we can see the consequences of the theme of unity.  The commitment to the nation-state was 
first and foremost in Howard’s mind.  He repeatedly argues that the commitment to national 
identity comes first and other identities are marginalised – ‘we each of us have our distinctive 
heritage which we want to preserve, and that’s fine.  But we’re Australians first’.   The use of the 
negative conjunction ‘but’ negates the sincerity of the preceding comment, as does the use of ‘fine’,  
a rather weakly positive commitment to acceptability.  The interview went on: 
FAINE: And what we can achieve in Australia as Australians is to put aside some of those 
ancient disputes and rivalries that have in fact have been the cause for many of those people 
to come here in the first place.  
PRIME MINISTER: Well indeed, and that applies, I mean whether it’s a dispute in the Balkans, 
or years and years ago a dispute in Ireland, or a dispute somewhere else. Once you come to 
this country something else takes over and that’s what we particularly have to offer. And we 
are reminded on a day like this that that really is what those people fought for (Howard 1999a; 
phasis added) 
The incontestability of unity was reinforced by Howard when he added the sacrifice and consequent 
sanctity of the death of servicemen and women – ‘we are reminded on a day like this that that really 
is what those people fought for’.  Howard was not simply asking for a commitment to Australian law 
or citizenship, he was asking for a commitment to Australian identity, as ethnicity was being placed 
squarely at a lower level than a commitment to the nation-state.  This is an important distinction – 
conservatism is being emphasised over liberalism.  Howard’s insistence on an individual adherence 
to a sense of Australianness sits uncomfortably with liberalism’s commitment to individual freedom 
within the framework of limited legal constraints.  Howard demonstrated his unease with challenges 
to Australian identity and his tendency towards conservatism when presented with such a challenge.  
This epitomised Howard’s Anzac entrepreneurship – his worldview came though strongly in his 
interpretation of events, this worldview was frequently and prominently commented upon, and was 
reinforced by the unpolitical nature of Anzac Day.  These factors made Howard’s Anzac Day 
pronouncements especially potent, giving them a power that was above the cut an d thrust of 
everyday political contestation.   
 
The Boundaries of Unity – Anzac Day 2000 
Most difficult for Howard were not immigrants, but non-conforming Indigenous Australians, as 
Anzac Day 2000 demonstrated.  Howard had visited Gallipoli for Anzac Day for the first time in order 
to mark the 85th anniversary of the landings.  This trip, which also included visits to France, the 
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Somme and Israel, attracted significant media attention and Howard was enthusiastic in his appraisal 
of the trip.  After being asked in an interview what his personal reaction to visiting Gallipoli was, 
Howard replied:  
Very moving, it was, it had a special feel in the sense that you, I know it sounds corny to say it, 
but you felt as though it was as much part of Australia as the block of land on which 19 Milner 
Crescent, Wollstonecraft is built. And I think that was, and that was the same feeling I had 
when I first went to the Somme, that I felt as though I had come home to a part of Australia 
(Howard 2000d).   
This visceral reaction from Howard was repeated in other interviews, with terms like ‘pride’, 
‘emotional’, ‘uplifting’, ‘extraordinary’, and ‘passion’  all being used in the interviews he gave during 
and immediately after the trip to describe his reaction to the visit.  This experience was contrasted 
with his position on an apology to Indigenous Australians, when interviewer Alex Kirk asked:  
KIRK: Can you understand then, at an emotional level, for example how an apology could be so 
significant and symbolic to aboriginal people? 
PRIME MINISTER: Well I think Alexandra they are two separate issues. I understand that 
different people have different emotions about different issues but I don’t think there’s 
anything served by trying to link those two issues particularly as affection for what Australian 
soldiers did in defence of this country is something that is above and beyond party politics 
(Howard 2000e).   
Howard was again actively constructing Anzac as unpolitical, despite the fact that his version of 
Anzac was not clearly distinguished from the sphere of the political.  Indigenous calls for apology 
were partisan, whereas Anzac was above such ‘party politics’.   
 
Returning home, Howard faced similar criticism from patrons of Sorry Day, former Prime Minister 
Malcolm Fraser and Dr Lowitja O’Donoghue.  In a press conference, O’Donoghue remarked:  
Why can’t he use the same sort of sympathetic words he used in relation to Anzac Day and in 
other places as he strutted the world stage?  We’ll be hoping he has a bit of a change of heart 
(O’Donoghue, as cited by Gordon 2000, 1).   
When asked about this in a talkback interview with Neil Mitchell, Howard became exasperated and 
defensive:  
MITCHELL: What about Dr O’Donoghue, she’s thinking why can’t he use the same sort of 
sympathetic words that he used in relation to Anzac Day and other places that he strutted the 
world stage? 
PRIME MINISTER: Well I didn’t strut the world stage I went to Anzac Cove on behalf of all the 
Australian people. 
MITCHELL: Do you see a link? 
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PRIME MINISTER: No, no I don’t I… 
MITCHELL: I don’t see the link. 
PRIME MINISTER: No well I don’t either, I don’t see any link at all. I mean all Australians fought 
in the wars and the role of indigenous Australians in the war was magnificent and they’re all 
part of the legend of Anzac, they’re all part of the tradition. I don’t think there is a link and I 
think it’s unfortunate there’s an attempt being made to draw a link between the two things. Of 
course I feel emotion about Anzac Day and I feel that on behalf of all the Australian people but 
there is no question of… I think she actually said that I was giving apologies. Well I didn’t 
apologise at any stage during my visit to Turkey, heavens above (Howard 2000f).   
The contrast is stark.  Howard’s reaction to his trip to Gallipoli and the Somme was presented as 
natural, instinctual and positive.  Emotions were freely expressed by Howard and demonstrated the 
ease he felt about the issue, and Anzac is thus unpolitical.  However, when confronted with the 
possibility that this same emotional reaction might be applicable to his government’s policy 
response to reconciliation with Indigenous peoples, Howard shut down the link.   Instead, 
reconciliation and Anzac was presented as ‘two separate issues’.  By separating them, Howard could 
then hierarchically rank them in terms of appropriateness, with Anzac being privileged as once again 
above the cut and thrust of the political.  Indigenous issues and reconciliation were presented as 
political, partisan and dirtied as a consequence.  Linking the two was not only incorrect, but 
sacrilegious.  When challenged on this separation, Howard became defensive, flatly denying that he 
acted inappropriately overseas or that there was ‘any link at all’  between his visceral response to his 
Anzac experiences and the expectation from supporters of reconciliation that he express a simi lar 
response to that process.   
 
Indigenous Australians presented Howard with a challenge.  Their Australianness was undeniable, 
but how to include them in a narrative of national identity that still privileged dominant white 
conceptions of self proved difficult.  When challenged, Howard linked Indigenous Austral ians wit h 
Anzac – ‘the role of indigenous Australians in the war was magnificent and they’re all part of the 
legend of Anzac, they’re all part of the tradition’. Indigenous Australians are free to identify with 
Anzac to the extent that this does not challenge existing discursive power relationships.  Beyond that 
realm were special interests that were inappropriate, political and dangerous.   
 
Howard, Anzac and Conservative Neoliberalism 
This final section examines the economic dimension of Howard’s Anzac Day addresses.  Howard 
imbued the ideographic Anzac with lessons regarding Australia’s neoliberal economic l i fe , much as 
his Anzac entrepreneur predecessors had.  However, in contrast to Keating, Howard was 
understated in his allusions to neoliberalism, in keeping with his view that Anzac Day should be 
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unpolitical.  Further, reflecting his party’s politics and his own political style, Howard’s Anzac 
reflected his conservatism, with national identity and the family mediating the impulses of the 
economic individual.  This view was reinforced by the unity and sanctity with which Howard had 
imbued Anzac, and was policed by his aggressive guarding of Anzac’s unpolitical nature.   
 
References to the Howard government’s economic policies were evident in Howard’s trip to 
Thailand for Anzac Day 1998.  The Australia-Thailand relationship had become closer the previous 
year when Australia had provided $US1 billion to the country as part of a $US17.2 billion IMF bailout 
during the Asian Financial Crisis, the only Western nation to do so (Alford 1998, 4).  It was a sign 
from the Howard government that Australia would help Asia, but it also helped establish Australia as 
a creditor power (Kelly 2009, 467).  As Baldino (2005, 191) notes, in Howard’s mind the crisis 
vindicated Australia’s model of laissez-faire economic reform and liberal democracy.  Howard used 
the trip to announce that Australian aid would continue after 2000 (instead of finishing in that year)  
and would increase by $AUS13 million (Alford 1998, 4).  These acts paint a story of unproblematic 
Australian benevolence – lending a hand to the region, and Thailand in particular, in their time of 
economic hardship.   
 
Howard used the opening of the Hellfire Pass Museum on April 24 as an opportunity to reaffirm 
Australia’s commitment to Thailand and to Asia more generally:  
So too, can this museum be claimed as a legacy for the future. Let it exemplify the courage and 
compassion which are the highest virtues to which our young can aspire. Let it be a prophecy 
of Australia’s commitment to Asia and all its peoples. Of our willingness to stand together 
during empty years of adversity as well as bountiful years of plenty. Let it warn off any nation 
who may mistakenly judge that freedom loving countries will every allow tyranny to prevail. 
And let it promise that the memory of what was done here, lost here, gained here will not be 
forgotten (Howard 1998c). 
Further reference was made to Australia’s commitment to Asia at Kanchanaburi War Cemetery:  
For we live in a world made safe, where opportunities and success are attainable by any 
person with the heart and the will to achieve them. 
A world of new and firm friendships with our neighbours. Friendships first nurtured in 
wartime, but now grown to full maturity through the blessings of regional mateship and 
mutual respect. 
A world where nations, as in our own region, seek to learn from each other, knowing that our 
futures will always lie in peaceful cooperation rather than in armed conflict. 
All these changes, these differences, this better world we owe to those who rest here and all 
who served with them (Howard 1998b).   
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We can again see evidence of the employment of memorial diplomacy in Prime Minis terial 
engagement with Anzac.  As Australia’s war history was increasingly marked overseas by Prime 
Ministers, opportunities to engage in the soft power of diplomacy in the sacralised context of the 
remembrance of war dead grew too.  Australia’s relationsh ip with the region was presented in 
neoliberal terms – the region made safe by ‘peaceful cooperation’ via increasing economic ties, and 
bound tightly by the shared bonds of wartime sacrifice and ‘regional mateship’.  But these ties are  
not unambiguous or power-free.  The power dynamics that had brought Australia’s relationship with 
the region to this point, and the unspoken subtext of Australian triumphalism permeated these 
words.  The confidence of Howard’s attitude is exemplified by the use of ‘regional mateship’, the use 
of the Australianism presenting the relationship as one dominated by Australian values, with 
discredited cosmopolitan, Asian, or Thai, values being excluded.  Thus, the power dynamics of  the 
Western IMF forcing orthodox neoliberal austerity measures upon Thailand as part of its bailout 
package, and Australia’s involvement in that manoeuvre, is subsumed by Howard in a wider 
sacralised story of ‘Australia’s commitment to Asia’ and ‘regional mateship’.   
 
Further, the ideographic nature of Anzac was evident in Howard’s Anzac entrepreneurship when 
references to neoliberalism were also aimed at a domestic audience.  What was evident in these 
instances is neoliberalism’s (and Howard’s) concern to govern at a distance ‘…through the regulated 
choices of individual citizens’ (Rose 1993, 285), in an attempt to create neoliberal individuals.  In 
particular, this was achieved through the discourse of mutual obligation, with its emphasis upon the 
responsibility of citizens to act as economic individuals in the market place.  As Johnson notes, 
mutual obligation replaces citizen entitlements with citizen obligations, with the government 
engaging ‘…in forms of governmentality designed to encourage market relations and particular 
forms of self-managing and self-regulating behaviour amongst the citizen-clients’ (Johnson 2000, 
105).  However, these references were less explicit than Keating’s and were also framed in terms of  
Howard’s conservatism.   
 
Particular reference was made to these elements in Howard’s 2001 Anzac Day address:  
But as importantly, we gather in ever-increasing numbers to each pledge anew our 
determination, not merely to dwell upon the legacy of the past, but also to build upon it. To 
extend a culture of proud self reliance and personal initiative. To create a just society where an 
individual’s rights are respected but their responsibilities are also recognised. To offer our 
children, and their children, all the possibilities of the world should they only have the heart 
and the will to grasp them. To build strong communities where men and women strive 
together for the common good and none need live in fear or isolation (Howard 2001). 
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Mutual obligation, and the importance of acting as a self-reliant economic individual, begins the 
quote.  Howard emphasised the individual, rather than the collective – ‘self-reliance’, ‘personal 
initiative’, and ‘an individual’s rights’ were all presented as central values derived from ‘our’ Anzac 
heritage that deserved to be built upon.  Self-reliance, personal initiative and responsibilities are  al l  
terms that echoed the Howard government’s disciplining of welfare recipients via mutual-obligation, 
“… to encourage market relations and particular forms of self -managing and self-regulating 
behaviour …” in newly neoliberal citizens (Johnson 2000, 105).   The creation of an economic 
individual was furthered by the values they should embody – initiative and self-reliance were 
needed to grasp ‘all the possibilities of the world’.  The rights that were won for them by their Anzac 
forbearers were contingent upon their recognition of their obligation to these responsibilities.  There 
was no place for class or structural disadvantage in this conception of Australian society – the 
individual was being disciplined to grab whatever advantages they could.   
 
But Howard did not simply extol unrestrained markets in this speech.  Instead, the comforting 
embrace of conservatism was employed to mediate the excesses of individualism and the market 
place.  The individual was called upon to build ‘strong communities’, to ‘strive together for the 
common good’ and to not be anxious about living ‘in fear or isolation’.  Howard continued:  
We gather to be reminded of the values so evident among Australians in time of war and 
adversity but that we too can use to face the challenges within our own lives. Courage, unity of 
purpose, compassion and selflessness – these virtues, so compelling and so commonplace 
amid the horror of battle, seem to subside so often in the calm of peace. Anzac Day reminds us 
all that it need not be so. 
Anzac Day reminds us that we each have a task before us. Blessedly, not to fight new wars, not 
to bear the loss of sons and daughters, but to use the peace and prosperity purchased for us at 
so high a price. Anzac Day reminds us that our nation is capable of the most extraordinary 
achievements if only we dare to reach them (Howard 2001).   
Unity was again employed as a signifier of Anzac and as a lesson for the present.  Values echoing the 
Anzac and Christian traditions – ‘courage’, ‘compassion’, ‘selflessness’ - were mobi l ised to remind 
citizens of tools they could use to face to the challenges of adversity.  Conservatism for Howard was 
the bulwark against the excesses of the marketplace and, not coincidently, these were the values 
especially embodied by the Anzacs.  Australians were called upon to observe these lessons, and to 
honour the sacrifice of the Anzacs by embodying Anzac’s example in their own lives.  Thus, Howard’s 
Anzac entrepreneurship here, and more generally, used the ideographic nature of Anzac to 
constitute Australian nationalism with contemporary LPA values - neoliberal inspiration to build 
upon, and conservative values to mediate neoliberalism’s cold individualism.   
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Conclusion 
This chapter has explored Howard’s Anzac entrepreneurship from 1996 to 2001.  It has argued that 
Howard was keen to reinforce a depoliticised and unpolitical version of Anzac.  This conservative and 
ostensibly traditional form of Anzac was part of his wider repudiation of Keating’s re imaging of 
Australian identity and policy agenda.  This was achieved with an emphasis upon a ‘mainstream’ 
reading of Anzac that emphasised the Anglo-Celtic heritage of Anzac, the centrality of Gallipoli,  and 
contained little reference to diversity.  Howard aligned the unpolitical nature of his version of Anzac 
with the subtle endorsement of his political style of neoliberalism and conservatism.  This was 
directed towards external relations with countries in the Asia-Pacific region and to a domestic 
audience, both of whom were encouraged to adopt the strictures of laissez-faire economics.  
 
Whilst Howard’s keenness to ensure that Anzac remained  depoliticised, essential and unpolitical saw 
him refrain from the overtly partisan style of Keating’s Anzac Day addresses, it did not mean that 
controversy was absent.  Howard’s emphasis upon unity in his Anzac Day addresses had to be 
actively policed, and this depoliticisation occasionally attracted controversy that threatened his 
attempts to keep Anzac unpolitical.  Having said that, Howard’s Anzac Day addresses largely failed to 
attract the repudiation from Anzac’s guardians previously levelled at Keating.  Howard’s success in 
keeping his version of Anzac unpolitical was to play out after 2001, as the response to terrorism 
dominated the government’s agenda.   
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CHAPTER 9 
Howard: Anzac in the Age of Terror 
 
Introduction  
Prime Minister John Howard was in Washington marking the 50th anniversary of the ANZUS treaty 
when passenger aircraft were used as part of a terrorist attack upon the US on September 11, 2001.  
The events that transpired that day helped entrench Howard’s approach to foreign policy – a real i st 
view of the world, a preference for bilateralism and scepticism of multilateral ism’s value, and the 
enthusiastic embrace of interventionism in both the Middle East and in Australia’s region against 
perceived threats from terrorism and failed/failing states (see Cotton and Ravenhill 2007).  This 
approach led to various foreign policy outcomes, including the strengthening of the Australia/US 
alliance, a reorientation of Australia’s defence-force structure to reflect the new security si tuation, 
the increasing pursuit of bilateralism in Australia’s relationships, and finally, Australian participation 
in interventionism in both the Middle East and Australia’s region.  Whilst many of these themes 
were touched upon by Howard in his Anzac Day addresses from 2002-2007, the foreign policy 
tendency that Howard most emphasised was Australia’s participation in interventionism, especial ly 
Australia’s commitment to the Iraq War.  This chapter seeks to explore this theme of Howard’s 
Anzac entrepreneurship, and demonstrate how it institutionalised a precedential form of Prime 
Ministerial engagement with Anzac that has had a continuing influence.  Further, the chapter argues 
that the growing institutionalisation of Anzac had unintended consequences – the anxieties, 
tensions, and ambiguities that reimagining Anzac in a contemporary setting posed Australian 
identity and nationalism, which needed to be managed by the Prime Minister.   
 
The chapter explores the institutionalisation of this form of Prime Ministerial Anzac observance in 
four parts:  
1. The development of Howard’s foreign policy approach during the latter half of his term as 
Prime Minister is crucial to understanding the evolution of his Anzac entrepreneurship.  In 
particular, it notes the way that Howard became a war leader and how he linked that to the 
imagery of Anzac.   
2. Secondly, the chapter examines how Anzac developed during the period.  The changed 
security environment and Howard’s growing policy confidence after his 2001 election victory 
is reflected in Anzac, as it became increasingly institutionalised, spectacular, and central  to 
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Australian national identity.  This was ‘hyper-Anzac’ – a form of Anzac that was more 
inspiring, identifiable, and ‘real’ than older forms of Anzac (on ‘hyper-reality’ general ly, see 
Eco 1990).   
3. The chapter will then turn to textual analysis of Howard’s Anzac Day addresses.  Howard’s 
addresses from 2002-2004 were quite similar to his earlier Anzac Day speeches in terms of 
emphasis on national unity and conservative values, but these themes were now explicitly 
constituted in conjunction with current ADF personnel serving overseas and in guarding the 
boundaries of opposition to these deployments.   
4. Finally, it will be argued that the engendering of hyper-Anzac in an environment of 
heightened security risk led to public demands and anxieties that were not easily managed.  
Much like his predecessors, Howard faced the need to manage the expectations of his socio -
political context and was not an entirely free agent in his Anzac entrepreneurship.   
Howard’s engagement with Anzac during this period demonstrated the success of his Anzac 
entrepreneurship.  This engagement was just as, if not more so, explicitly and unambiguously 
political as Keating’s had been.   It was controversial and contested, but the evidence from the 
period suggests that Howard’s conservative following of the traditions of Anzac, and active pol icing 
of contestation, largely kept his Anzac entrepreneurship unpolitical.  Further, Howard’s linking of 
Anzac with a celebratory and chauvinistic patriotism contributed significantly to the form of  hyper-
Anzac and Anzac’s further institutionalisation in Australian public life and identity.   
 
Howard and Foreign Policy 
Howard was focused upon the domestic sphere during the early years of his term as Prime Minister 
(see Chapter 8).  He had well-developed and long-held foreign policy views (DeBats, McDonald and 
Williams 2007, 235-6), but they took a backseat to his domestic political agenda during his early 
years as Prime Minister.  This changed dramatically, firstly with Australia’s intervention in East Timor 
in 1999, and especially after the 9/11 terrorist attacks upon the US.  Both these events helped 
Howard establish himself as a war leader (Kelly 2009, 481; Baldino 2005, 204) and gave him 
contemporary real life examples of the Anzac legend to embrace (Kelly 2009, 485).   
 
Whilst the intervention in East Timor was certainly not Howard’s first major foreign policy endeavour 
(see Chapter 8), it did help to shift the emphasis of his policy agenda.  Howard’s active engagement 
with Indonesia regarding the desirability of a plebiscite to consider East Timorese independence, 
Australia’s level of responsibility for the violence that then erupted as pro -Indonesian militia 
attempted to disrupt the vote and intimidate the populace, and Australia’s  interventionist response 
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under the umbrella of the UN and with international cooperation, defies easy assessment (see Kelly 
2009; Baldino 2005; and Cotton 2004).  However, it was rated by Howard himself as one his 
proudest achievements as Prime Minister (Howard 2010, 336) and this pride was reflected in publ ic 
remarks as he seemed to agree with depictions of Australia as an enforcer or ‘deputy sheriff’  to the 
US in the region.   
 
According to Kelly (2009, 515), such remarks demonstrated the ‘hubris’ of the  government after i ts 
successes in handling the East Timor conflict and the Asian Financial Crisis.  This confidence in the 
government’s foreign policy position was more fully articulated by Howard the day after the launch 
of the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) intervention, where he outlined ‘home truths’ 
about Australia’s relationship with Asia.  This assessment of Australia’s relationship with Asia was 
based upon Australia’s national interest, Australia’s geographical position in Asia and h istorical and 
cultural links to Europe and the US, Australia’s alliance with the US, the uncertainty of Australia’s 
defence position, and the values of the Australian community (Cotton 2004, 100-101).  Australia’s 
foreign policy priorities reflected the realist assumptions of Howard and his government and his 
determination to see ‘Anglospherist’ values based upon Australia’s historical links to the US and the 
UK reflected in his government’s foreign policy (Gulmanelli 2014).  Further, it was a repudiation o f  
the multilateralism and cosmopolitanism that the Keating government had pursued in the region 
(see Johnson 2007, 200).   
 
These concerns, and especially doubts about Australia’s defence position and the ADF’s ability to 
cope with future regional instabil ity, were reflected in the Defence White Paper of 2000.  The 
government recognised the changing security environment of the region and attempted to 
incorporate the implications of these shifts into defence policy.  As White (2007, 182) notes:  
The central policy choice considered in the development of the White Paper was between, on 
the one hand, the development of larger light land forces to provide more capability for the 
new non-state security tasks such as East Timor and, on the other, sustaining high investment 
in Australia’s air and naval forces against the risk of conventional conflict in Asia.  Ministers 
decided to do both.   
What this meant was a melding of ALP-era continental defence priorities with the development of  
light, deployable land forces of the type needed to react to and ameliorate instances of regional 
instability like East Timor (White 2007, 182).  These light forces were later envisaged as necessary for 
operations with the US during the War on Terror.   
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In September 2001, Howard found himself in Washington, meeting with the newly elected US 
president George W. Bush and marking the 50th anniversary of the ANZUS Treaty.  Howard had gone 
to the US with three primary aims:   
1. To establish a personal relationship with the new President and senior members of the new 
Administration; 
2. To reinvigorate the strategic relationship; 
3. To seek ways of enhancing the economic relationship (DeBats, McDonald and Williams 2007, 
241).   
Howard’s presence in Washington at the time of the 9/11 terrorist attacks,  his unequivocal support 
of the US and its people in the days after 9/11, his invocation of the ANZUS treaty, and his 
appearance without fanfare in the public galleries of Congress on September 12 to show sol idari ty 
with the US people, were all acts which US lawmakers recognised and were grateful for, and helped 
to fulfil the aims of the trip (DeBats, McDonald and Williams 2007).  As Howard (2010, 392) himself 
noted ‘…the epoch-changing events of [9/11] were to take the alliance to new levels of intimacy.  
The personal relationship between the American President and me would become the closest of any 
between the respective heads of government of the two countries’.  The closeness of the 
relationship continued throughout the remainder of Howard’s term.   
 
Australia’s response to the events of 9/11 and its participation in the War on Terror reflected the 
hardening of Howard’s foreign policy views.  The Australian-US alliance was reinvigorated, leading to 
a range of related outcomes including Australian participation in US-led operations in Afghanistan 
and Iraq, the Australia-US free trade agreement in 2005, and managing relationships in the region 
given Australia’s closeness to the global hegemon (Bell, 2007).  Interventionism was embraced 
further, both in the Middle East under the ‘Bush Doctrine’ as part of the ‘Coalition of the Willing’, 
and in the region, where the government after the Bali Bombings in 2002 reserved the right to act 
pre-emptively (Cotton 2004, 144), and intervened in locations like the Solomon Islands (O’Keefe 
2007, 131).  In sum, Howard had firmly entrenched his view of foreign policy and global politics by 
the end of his term in office.  Australian actions in the region and globally were now predicated upon 
a view of the national interest that tended towards interventionism and reflected Howard’s 
preference for the US alliance.   
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Howard and the Evolution of Hyper-Anzac from 2002-2007 
The changing security environment during the period from 1999 to 2007, and the Australian 
government’s policy response to it, was reflected in Howard’s Anzac entrepreneurship, and Anzac’s 
continuing evolution as a central nationalist discourse.  Discourses of Anzac during this period were 
intertwined with a fear of the Middle-Eastern ‘other’ in the wake of the 9/11 terror attacks and the 
continued assertion of Anglo-Celtic identity, all tacitly endorsed by the Prime Minister’s conservative 
invocation of Anzac.  Anzac from 2002 also increasingly became less about repudiating Keating’s 
Australia and more about the changed domestic and global security environment, especially 
regarding the involvement of ADF personnel deployed in regional and Middle Eastern interventions.  
Further, Howard’s personal investment in Anzac and the public’s enthusiasm for public expressions 
of Anzac identity coincided with the government’s increasing institutionalisation of the national and 
spectacular remembrance of Anzac Day, shifting further away from more local and suburban 
commemorations.  This heady mix of factors helped to engender a form of hyper-Anzac not seen 
elsewhere during the period under examination.  This ‘turbo-charged’ version of Anzac was more 
real than real – to paraphrase Eco (1990, 8), when the Australian public demanded the real Anzac, 
the fabrication of reality was required in order to attain this authenticity.  It was the government 
that continued to reproduce the authentic Anzac as the last of the men and women who had directly 
experienced the Gallipoli campaign passed away and the RSL continued to decline in importance.  
This form of hyper-Anzac was more spectacular in its staging, more controversial in its politics, more 
actively engendered by the government, and more rapturously received by the publ ic,  than in any 
other time period from 1973.   
 
Anzac and the ADF – 1999-2007 
Hyper-Anzac was in no small part connected to Australia’s increasing deployment of ADF personnel 
in foreign theatres of conflict, and particularly Howard’s oft-repeated calls to support these troops.  
According to Howard, the East Timor conflict had contributed to the Australian public’s growing 
admiration of Australian military tradition and history (Howard 2010, 358; Holbrook 2014, 201).  
However, this shift was not entirely organic, being at least in part due to the promotion of  the ADF 
by the Prime Minister himself.  Howard frequently spoke both of and to the ADF in a manner that 
honoured its role in Australian society and policed the acceptable boundaries of civilian response to 
the ADF.  This was conducted via addresses to ADF personnel and calls to support the troops.   
 
In his auto-biography, Howard notes the concern that he and military leaders had regarding the 
possibility of Australian casualties in the East Timor operations, the way that this weighed on his 
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mind, and his determination to personally farewell, welcome home, and thank the troops (Howard 
2010, 351-358).  This concern was reflected in Howard’s frequent addresses to departing, serving 
and returning troops, not just in East Timor, but throughout this period as Australia pursued 
interventionism.  Instances of this precedent were therefore also seen in occasions such as (but not 
limited to) the welcome home addresses to troops returning from Afghanistan in 2002, farewell and 
welcome home addresses for troops deployed to Iraq and the  Solomon Islands in 2003, and the 
marking of Anzac Day by visiting deployed troops in Iraq in 2004.    
 
Also driving Howard’s determination to honour ADF personnel sent to war by his government was 
the legacy of the treatment of Vietnam veterans:  
I was also mindful of the miserable fashion in which Australia had treated soldiers returning 
from service in Vietnam… As I moved around the country in the lead-up to the sending of our 
forces to East Timor, veteran after veteran who had served in Vietnam raised this issue with 
me and, in some cases, pleaded that I make sure that when our troops came home from East 
Timor, no matter what the circumstances, they were openly greeted as patriots who had done 
their duty by Australia.  I promised them, and I promised myself, that I would make sure that 
this happened (Howard 2010, 352).   
Howard was honouring the terms of the reconciliation between Vietnam veterans and the Australian 
body politic that Hawke helped strike a decade and a half earlier.  Howard furthered this 
reconciliation by issuing a statement of regret on behalf of the government and the Australian 
people for the inadequacies of past treatment and recognition of Vietnam veterans on the 40 th 
anniversary of the Battle of Long Tan on 17 August 200621 (Howard 2006a, 62).   
 
Finally, Howard was anxious to see that currently serving ADF personnel were not only personally 
thanked by himself, but that they were adequately honoured by the wider Australian public.  So, in 
an address to the troops in East Timor on November 28 1999, he (1999b) said:  
Can I assure you that your mission here has the total support of the entire Australian 
population... Irrespective of differences back home over other issues, there is very widespread 
support that you're right to be here, that you've done it well, and that in the process you have 
added a great deal of lustre  to a very proud Australian military tradition.  
                                                                 
21 The use of the term ‘regret’, instead of ‘apology’ or ‘sorry’ (‘I say to our Vietnam veterans that we honour 
everything you did. You deserve the respect and the affection of a grateful nation. We regret the inadequacies of the 
past, and we hope that the extension of the hand of friendship and honour by today’s Australians will be of comfor t 
and value to all of you’ (Howard 2006a, 62; emphasis added)) echoed the language used by Howard in his refusal to 
formally apologise on behalf of the Australian nation for the actions of Australian governments in perpetua ting the 
removal of Aboriginal children from their families.   
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In the case of East Timor, making sure that the Australian public honoured the ADF was ensured by a 
welcome home parade through the streets of Sydney for ADF personnel who had served in the 
INTEREFT operations on April 20 2000 attended by the Prime Minister, General Cosgrove, and 
thousands of Sydneysiders (Hill 2000, 3).  ADF personnel serving in the Middle East, especially Ira q, 
had welcome home parades in Sydney and Perth during June 2003, with the Prime Minister 
attending and delivering speeches (Howard 2003b; Howard 2003c).  Howard appeared to be 
genuinely committed to the well-being and honouring of the ADF and keen to avoid the mistakes of  
the past. 
 
Nonetheless, these Howard-led events helped set a public discourse that strongly supported 
Australian troop deployments, and had effects that went beyond simply honouring the actions of 
Australian troops.  As Gleeson (2014, 152) argues regarding Howard’s invocation of the call to 
support the troops during the Iraq War:  
The call to ‘support our troops’ is particularly resonant in the Australian context, partly 
because of the sense of reverence tied to military service and sacrifice (McKenna 2007), and 
also as a result of the collective public shame over the treatment of service personnel upon 
their return from the Vietnam War.  Demanding that Australians support the troops 
interpellates audience members by evoking these national narratives and memories.   
Thus, the twin factors in Howard’s Anzac discourse of the past treatment of Vietnam veterans and 
the alignment of current ADF personnel with the traditions of Anzac had the effect of limiting 
criticism of Australia’s participation in the War on Terror by conflating the service of troops involved 
in current operations with the commonly understood lessons and memories of mistreated Vietnam 
veterans and of Australia’s military traditions.  For example, in his address to the nation on the eve 
of the Iraq invasion in March 2003, Howard said:  
To those in the community who may not agree with me, please vent your anger against me 
and towards the government. Remember that our forces are on duty in the Gulf in our name 
and doing their job in the best traditions of Australia's defence forces.  
Can I say something that I know will find an echo from all of you whether or not you agree with 
the Government. And that is to say to the men and women of the Australian Defence Force in 
the Gulf – we admire you, we are thinking of you, we want all of you come to back home safe 
and sound. We care for and we anguish with your loved ones back here in Australia. Our 
prayers and our hopes are with all of you (Howard 2003d).   
Howard aligned the Iraq deployment with ‘the best traditions of Australia's defence forces’ in a 
discursive shift that sublimated the controversial lack of UN approval for the Iraq invasion by cal l ing 
on the Australian people to ‘admire’, ‘think of’, ‘anguish’ and ‘pray’  for the troops. Howard conflated 
the positively perceived traditions and nationalism of the Australian military with the Iraq invasion in 
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a move that had the effect of limiting criticism of both the troops and the war by calling on the 
audience to sympathise with the troops and to view them as positive agents of Anzac’s traditions of  
service, duty, and heroism.  This move limited the interrogation of the violence that those troops 
would soon visit upon the Iraqi military and population as agents of Western powers and interests or 
their role as invaders without a UN mandate for war.   
 
These contemporary examples of the Anzac tradition in Australia’s region and in the Middle East,  as 
well as Howard’s concern to protect ADF personnel and their operations from reproach , helped to 
legitimate his government’s foreign policy direction by attempting to discipline public reaction and 
sentiment.  Howard successfully conflated his inherently political foreign policy agenda and the 
depoliticised and essential sphere of the Anzac tradition that he had active ly engendered during his 
earlier period in office.  In doing so, he furthered the depoliticisation of Anzac and reinforced the 
essentialism and unpolitical nature of Anzac that had been building since 1990.  Further, i t was this 
confluence of factors that contributed to the intensification of a ‘hyper-Anzac’ during Howard’s later 
term in office.   
 
Anzac at Home During the War on Terror 
At home, Anzac continued its march into the centre of Australia’s national consciousness.  Anzac Day 
was growing as a spectacle, with the increasingly grandiose marking of the day at home and at 
Gallipoli.  Previous Prime Ministers, and Howard himself during the first half of his Prime 
Ministership, marked Anzac Day in an ad-hoc fashion – sometimes with fanfare at a foreign 
battlefield site like Gallipoli or Kokoda or at the AWM, sometimes with little pomp or ceremony at a 
state capital or local electorate.  From 2000 onwards, however, Howard marked every Anzac Day 
with an appearance or speech at either the AWM or Gallipoli, with the exception of his highly stage -
managed and extensively covered Iraq trip in 2004 (see chapter 8).  The Prime Minister’s shi ft from 
the local and suburban, to the nation’s capital or to Gallipoli, the site of Anzac, added to the gravi tas 
of Anzac Day.  The public was responding too, and increasing large crowds turned out to mark the 
holiday, especially at the dawn service (see Chapter 3).  The dawn service was the hyper-real Anzac, 
full of ceremony and spectacle, as opposed to the march, with its comparatively mundane and 
unmediated parade of ex-service personnel and their descendants.   
 
The growing crowds at home were mirrored in the crowds that were now appearing at the Gal l ipol i 
Peninsula on Anzac Day.  From intimate gatherings of barely a dozen individuals in the mid-1970s, by 
the 85th anniversary of the landings in 2000, 15,000 people made the ‘pilgrimage’ to Gallipoli to 
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mark Anzac Day, further growing to a reported 20,000 by 2005 (Scates 2006, 193-194; the Canberra 
Times 2005, 11).  The pursuit of authentic hyper-reality at Gallipoli provoked controversy, as road-
works that altered the landscape at the site, and bawdy crowds diverted by big screens and pop 
music before the dawn service, were required to accommodate and entertain the crowds (see Z i ino 
2006).   
 
It was around this period in the late 1990s and early 2000s that the federal government entrenched 
its usurping of the elderly and conservative RSL as the ‘new promoters of Anzac’, via the DVA and 
the AWM (Lake 2010, 139; Inglis 2008, 554-555).  As Lake (2010, 139) notes:  
Providing extensive curriculum materials, teaching resources and websites to schools, through 
its own publications and publication subsidies, the funding of documentary films and travelling 
museum exhibitions as well as the expansion and renovation of community war memorials, 
the federal government has lent its authority and vast resources to a new pedagogical project 
we might call the militarisation of Australian history.   
In 1996, the DVA established a commemoration branch, adding to its traditional functions of 
pensions, repatriation benefits, and the maintenance of war graves (Inglis 2008, 554).  Signalling the 
government’s takeover of the custodianship of Anzac, the DVA’s commemorative branch activi ties 
included many of the things the RSL used to take responsibility for: ‘National days of remembrance, 
Memorials, Significant events, Education, and Community awareness’ (Inglis 2008, 554), and the 
DVA’s budget for commemorative activities also increased (see Chapter 3).   
 
The education of Australia’s children regarding Anzac that had begun during the Keating government 
intensified under Howard.  An initiative from the DVA in 2002 distributed curriculum materials for 
everyday teaching, not just for anniversaries (Lake 2010, 148).  This was a measure of the history 
wars that also saw Howard bemoan the state of the study of Australian history in schools and 
institute a panel stacked with conservative sympathisers to develop a new national curriculum 
(Howard 2006b; Bonnell and Crotty 2008, 161).  An increase in memorial construction during the 
period - ‘It is probable that more new war memorials were erected in the years between 1995 and 
2005 than in any decade since the 1920s’ (Inglis 2008, 471) - and the continued restoration of older 
memorials ensured that instructive reminders for the general public were also distributed 
throughout the Australian landscape.   
 
The death of the last remaining Gallipoli veteran, Alec Campbell, who passed away in May 2002, 
further signalled the shift in custodianship of Anzac from the RSL and the diggers to the federal 
government.  The government honoured Campbell’s place in the life of the nation with a state 
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funeral, which included a Prime Ministerial address.  The ceremonial honours were thrust upon a 
somewhat reluctant family, with Campbell’s wife, Kate Campbell, telling a journalist: ‘I think that he 
[Alec] would have thought it all rather ridiculous. Again, he would think of the other soldiers who 
had gone missing and hadn't come back, or were no longer here’ (Darby 2002, 11).  Campbell’s 
family may have been reluctant recruits to the process of national eulogising and memorial isation, 
but the Prime Minister pressed on anyway, providing an example of the manner in which the 
participants of Australia’s war history had lost control of their remembrance as they had aged and 
passed on, and as their representative organisation, the RSL, was losing its relevance as it was losing 
its membership.   
 
Overt Australian patriotism was on the rise too, especially during the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games 
(Dyrenfurth 2015, 206).  The Australian flag rose in prominence in the public sphere (Gleeson 2014, 
163), being worn as a cape by some Australian patriots, and was accompanied by chants of ‘Aussie , 
Aussie, Aussie - Oi, Oi, Oi!’ at public events.  This overt and chauvinistic nationalism was encouraged 
by Howard’s ‘celebratory tone’ that he began to introduce into his Anzac Day addresses during the 
period (McKenna 2010, 126-127).   
 
Howard’s patriotism, informed as it was by the privileging of Anglo-Celtic identity, found its ugly 
expression in the events of the December 2005 Cronulla riots, where Anglo-Australian beach-goers 
clashed with ‘Middle-Eastern’ ‘others’ who had ‘invaded’ the racially Anglo-Celtic space of the beach 
and violated the norms of its usage (Elder 2007, 305-306). Johns (2008, 9) shows that Anglo 
participants in this violent clash justified it in terms that aligned with the Anzac legend:  
Significantly, more than one Cronulla local located the violence in defending the Anzac 
tradition… The following excerpt from The Australian…relates the confrontation on 11 
December to the legacy of Anzac: ‘This is what we’re fighting for…our fathers, our 
grandfathers, fought for these beaches, and now it’s our turn’ (The Australian 14 December 
2005). This comment specifically situates the beach as a privileged space for defending notions 
of Australian culture, connecting up practices of territorial belonging with national/ethnic 
inheritance.  
The Cronulla riots demonstrated how Howard’s discourse of the Australian mainstream could be 
given racially exclusive, gendered, and violent, expression.  Some Cronulla locals saw the violation of  
‘their’ women and ‘their’ space by Middle-Eastern others as the contemporary invasion of the 
nation.  And the need to defend this sense of Australianness was given expression by the rioters in 
what they interpreted to be the best traditions of Anzac.  This was the context in which Anzac was 
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being increasingly institutionalised at the centre of official government narratives of national 
identity.   
 
This was a concrete expression of hyper-Anzac.  Hyper-Anzac developed in an environment of 
heightened security concern, closer relations with the US, international interventionism, tightening 
domestic security, the passing of the last members of the Gallipoli campaign, the continuing decl ine 
in influence of the RSL, the growing promotion of Anzac by the government, and the success of 
Howard’s Anzac entrepreneurship.  These factors highlighted and promoted conservative 
foundations of the Anzac tradition centred on duty, service, and sacrifice, alongside the sometimes 
crudely chauvinistic expression of Australianness emphasising racial exclusivity and the paranoid 
guarding of the boundaries of belonging in Australian national life.  It displaced the attempts that 
Howard’s ALP predecessors had made to open up Anzac to difference and increasingly marginali sed 
the participants of war in the memorialisation of their own experience of conflict and its violent and 
damaging consequences.  In their place was an unproblematic, unpolitical, and highly promoted 
hyper-Anzac that was increasingly spectacularly mediated by the federal government.  The chapter 
will now turn to examine how this form of Anzac found its expression in Howard’s Anzac Day and 
Anzac-related addresses from 2002 to 2007.   
 
Howard, Anzac Day and the War on Terror, 2002-2004 
Howard’s Anzac Day speeches from 2002 to 2004 continued to emphasise national unity, warn 
against challenges to that unity, and reflected his conservative interpretation of Anzac and its 
meaning; however, now these themes were aligned explicitly with ADF personnel on deployment in 
various foreign theatres of conflict.  This alignment had the effect of endorsing the deployments in a 
manner which headed off critique and further engendered an incontestable form of hyper-Anzac.   
 
Anzac Day 2002 and the Death of Alec Campbell 
Anzac Day 2002 was the first after the events of 9/11 and the deployment of Australian ADF 
personnel in Afghanistan in late 2001.  Howard marked the day at the AWM where he laid a wreath.  
He released a media statement but, significantly, did not make a speech.  Instead, Defence Minister 
Robert Hill gave the address.  The fact that the Defence Minister spoke, instead of a more senior 
representative of the nation in the form of the Prime Minister or the Governor General, reflected 
the changed security environment and Australia’s war footing.  Senator Hill told the gathered 
audience of around 18,000 (Boogs 2002, 4) that Anzac was both a day of ‘solemn remembrance’ and 
‘…also a day of celebration. Celebration of what it is to be Australian. A celebration of  the benefits 
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we enjoy for which men and women have been prepared to fight to defend, even to sacri f ice their 
lives’ (Hill 2002).  This call to celebrate the meaning of Anzac asked the audience to revel in 
Australian nationalism.  Hill then turned to the current deployment of Australian troops in  the War 
on Terror and in peace-keeping operations:  
And it’s timely to also remember today those young Australians in harm’s way, fighting the war 
against terrorism in Afghanistan, the Arabian Gulf, in Kyrgyzstan, in protecting Diego Garcia 
and to remember our peacekeepers in East Timor, on Bougainville and elsewhere. 
They also are doing a wonderful job in protecting our freedom and our interests.  
Therefore when we spend a moment’s silence today thinking of those who died we should also 
spare a moment to think of those who are still serving (Hill 2002).   
Here, the uncritical calls to celebrate Anzac’s particular reflection of Australianness is conflated with 
the new generation of Anzacs fighting in Afghanistan and deployed in the region.  Their protection of 
‘our freedom and our interests' mirrored the government’s approach to foreign policy, with the 
ideograph ‘freedom’ reflecting the government’s concern to project Western values and ‘interests’  
echoing the realist language employed by Howard in foreign policy matters.   
 
Similar themes were advanced by Howard in his Anzac Day media statement.  With references to the 
sacredness of Anzac and its ability to unite Australians, Howard asked Australians to remember 
Australia’s allies: ‘On this day we also give thanks to friends and allies who shared ou r danger and we 
add our pledge that their loyalty will neither be forgotten nor unreturned’ (Howard 2002a).  Here, 
Howard alluded to the invocation of ANZUS that he made after 9/11 and recommitted Australia to 
the US alliance.  Howard’s message went on to explicitly link Anzac, Australian values, and the 
current deployment of troops in foreign theatres of conflict:   
As well as providing a day of commemoration, Anzac Day is also a time for all of us to reflect 
with gratitude on those great values that unite us as Australians - values such as mateship, 
courage, initiative and determination. 
This is because the same Anzac spirit that has guided us through adversity and triumph seems 
to slumber periodically only to draw new breath when the national interest calls to bring 
Australians together in times of need (Howard 2002a).    
Anzac Day represented Australianness – ‘mateship’, ‘courage’, ‘initiative’, and ‘determination’ – al l  
values which unproblematically ‘unite’ the nation.  The unity of the nation, and the nation’s 
commitment to that unity, was further reflected in the repeated reference to the possessive 
determiner ‘our - ‘our national interest’ or ‘our troops’.  These values of Australianness were quite 
particular, reflecting the conservative elements of the Anzac tradition, rather than its radical i sm or 
anti-authoritarianism.  Howard continued: 
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On this Anzac Day we especially honour those Australian Defence Force personnel currently 
serving in Afghanistan in the war against terrorism and elsewhere to support our national 
interest. 
Our young soldiers, sailors and airmen stand today as their Anzac forebears did more than 
three quarters of a century ago - willing to serve their nation and eager to defend its freedoms 
(Howard 2002a).   
This generation of Australian troops reflected Anzac – ‘our young soldiers, sailors and airmen stand 
today as their Anzac forebears did more than three quarters of a century ago’.  This was again 
conveyed with the possessive determiner ‘our’, which attempted to unite the aud ience and the 
troops.  Therefore, Australianness was conflated with Australian troop deployments.  The troops’ 
willingness to ‘serve the nation’ and ‘support our national interest’ wove together the foreign policy 
goals of the government with national identity.  As such, Howard had constructed a discourse of 
Anzac where the wisdom of the Afghan or regional deployments, the efficacy of defence planning for 
their support, or contemplation of the long-term outcome of intervention, all became that much 
harder to question, as to question and critique would be to challenge Australianness itself.   
 
Similar themes were revealed in Howard’s Anzac entrepreneurship a few weeks after Anzac Day 
2002, as the last surviving Gallipoli veteran, Alec Campbell, passed away after a short illness on May 
16, aged 103.  Campbell had served six weeks at Gallipoli as an underage recruit before being 
discharged from the army in 1916 on medical grounds (Flanagan 2002, 1).  His passing severed the 
final link between the men and women who had directly experienced the Gallipoli campaign and 
Anzac.  Whilst it certainly did not cause the transferral of Anzac custodianship from the RSL to the 
state, it was symptomatic of that shift.   
 
Campbell was given a state funeral, with the Prime Minister, the Governor General, and further state 
and federal dignitaries in attendance (Flanagan 2002, 1).  Further, Howard gave an address at 
Campbell’s funeral service, despite his family’s misgivings about the way he was being represented 
as the embodiment of Anzac (Flanagan 2002; Darby 2002, 11).  Campbell became the embodiment 
of the nation itself in the address: ‘Within this one man’s journey, we can chart the story of Australia 
itself. Within this one life are illustrated the living values that transformed Australia from the hopeful 
young federation of Alec’s childhood to one of the great developed nations of the modern era’ 
(Howard 2002b).  But as Brett (2003, 204-205) points out, Campbell had spent only a brief moment 
of his life at Gallipoli and as a soldier: ‘Most of his life he was a radical trade unionist and office 
bearer, and so to Liberal eyes a bearer of the various vices of militant unionism.’  This fact was 
glossed over by Howard, whose eulogy instead imbued Campbell with values echoing Liberal  Party 
214 
 
traditions – ‘self-reliance’, ‘endeavour’, and ‘service’ all featured as ideals that Campbell embodied 
during his lifetime.   
 
Howard also aligned Campbell’s life with his government’s foreign policy:  
…by the respectful observance of this one man’s death, our nation pledges itself once more to 
an ethos of selflessness and shared determination, courage and compassion. We make a silent 
promise that the values for which so many Australians have died and by which others, like Alec 
Campbell, have lived, will remain secure within our own lives. We signal our understanding 
that the freedom under which we shelter needs to be nurtured and, at times, defended anew. 
We think of the men and women of the Australian Defence Force now serving in Afghanistan, 
East Timor, Bougainville and elsewhere.  
The spirit bequeathed by Alec and his generation though born of war’s adversity, still slumbers 
within our people, ready to rise and draw new breath when disaster strikes or danger 
threatens. An essence that continues to define our nation’s identity and the standards by 
which we judge ourselves (Howard 2002b).   
Campbell here becomes almost totemic – a spiritual being imbued with meaning and venerated by 
the nation (Trompf 2005, 102; Durkheim 2008, 113; 119).  Campbell and his Anzac compatriots were 
analogous with supernatural beings ‘bequeathing a spirit’  or ‘essence’ to the Australian people that 
all at once defined ‘our nation’s identity’, provided a moral code to live by (the standards by which 
we judge ourselves), and could totem-like be used to protect the nation from harm if ‘disaster 
strikes or danger threatens’.  Campbell’s totemism is employed by Howard to call upon the nation to 
remember the need to renew Anzac’s values and protect them in the face of new dangers, with the 
‘Australian Defence Force now serving in Afghanistan, East Timor, Bougainville and elsewhere’ being 
the vessels now imbued with the essence that Campbell has bestowed.  Much like his Anzac Day 
message, the construction of Howard’s language here explicitly links Anzac w ith Australianness, the 
contemporary ADF, and his government’s foreign policy, in a manner that makes it extremely 
difficult to question or critique.   
 
Anzac Day 2003 and the Iraq War  
Anzac Day 2003 occurred in the context of the Iraq War, which had begun a month previously on 
March 20.  The war had gone well up until this point, with the US-led Coalition’s military strength 
proving too much for a weak and demoralised Iraqi opposition.  Coalition forces had entered 
Baghdad in early April, and declared victory in this endeavour on April 14.  A statue of Saddam 
Hussein in Baghdad’s Firdos Square had been toppled on April 9, with the highly mediated 
symbolism of the event beamed live to television audiences around the world.  In Australia, by Apri l  
2003 support for the war had grown to represent a solid majority of opinion, after a lead-up period 
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to the war where public support for Australia’s involvement in the war had seen more Australians  
opposing involvement, or bare majorities in support (see Figure 19).    
 
 
Figure 19 –Source: Goot (2007, 272). 
The support for the war was reflected in the reaction of some the crowd that turned out for Anzac 
Day.  At the AWM in Canberra, The Australian noted that the Prime Minister ‘was given a rapturous 
reception’ (Rintoul 2003, 7).  At the Sydney Anzac Day parade, The Sydney Morning Herald reported 
overt and aggressive patriotism amongst more benign expressions of Australianness:  
Children pressed up against the barricades, waving Australian flags or reaching out to 
congratulate another generation as it passed by.  Elderly women sat with rugs over their knees 
while, nearby, young men revived the "Aussie, Aussie, Aussie" chants of the Olympic Games.  
Workers from Star Track Express, Minchinbury, donned blue T-shirts proclaiming "Australia: 
love it or leave it" and "We support the troops past and present". One said anti-war opposition 
had been disgraceful. 
Charlie Scannell, 83, of Carlton, who served as an infantryman in New Guinea and has been 
marching on Anzac Day since 1960, said those who protested against Australia's involvement 
were "a disgrace". "Half of them don't even know what they're protesting about. No one wants 
war, but sometimes it has to happen." (Stevenson, Allard and Thompson 2003, 1).   
Hyper-Anzac was continuing to emerge as Anzac Day was mixed with the Iraq War, overt patriotism, 
and expressions of exclusionism amongst some of the crowd who attended Anzac Day 2003.  
 
These reactions reflected the success that Howard had in linking Anzac, Australianness, and 
legitimisation of the Iraq War.  As McDonald and Merefield (2010, 201)  note: ‘…the effective linking 
of intervention to Australian core values and national identity, and the rhetorical marginalisation 
and coercion of opponents through strategic representations were… crucial dimensions in ensuring 
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that intervention in Iraq was viewed as a legitimate foreign and security policy option.’  Howard did 
this on Anzac Day 2003 via two public addresses – one a speech to the audience assembled at the 
AWM, another via a recorded message hosted on pm.gov.au (Howard 2003a; Howard 2003e).  Both 
addresses followed a similar narrative structure, though the recorded message is far shorter.  Both 
speeches asked the audience early on to reflect upon the growing hold Anzac Day has upon the 
nation, both asked Australians to remember and honour all  100,000 Australians who had died in 
war, both explicitly located the origin of Anzac at Gallipoli and April 25th 1915, and both conclude 
with links between Anzac and contemporary ADF deployments in Iraq.  As in the previous year, 
Howard called upon the nation to celebrate Anzac and its conservative representation of 
Australianness – ‘It [Anzac] is about the celebration of some wonderful values, of courage, of valour, 
of mateship, of decency, of a willingness as a nation to do the right thing, whatever the cost’ 
(Howard 2003a).  Howard’s 2003 Anzac Day addresses followed much the same pattern as the one 
set in 2002.   
 
However, in contrast to 2002, Howard was much more explicit in his attempts to link Anzac 
normatively with his government’s foreign policy.  In his message to the nation, Howard said that 
‘today’s Anzacs’ are on deployment in ‘…Iraq, in East Timor, in Bougainvil le, and elsewhere’ (Howard 
2003e).  At the AWM, these modern day Anzacs ‘…went in our name in a just cause to do good 
things to liberate a people. They are part of a great tradition of honourable service by the Australia n 
military forces’ (Howard 2003a).  The string of positive adjectives and verbs used to describe the 
ADF’s actions in Iraq (‘just’, ‘good’, ‘liberate’) was used in conjunction with the possessive 
determiner ‘our name’ to call upon the audience to endorse the Iraq deployment as an extension of  
their sense of self and identification with nation.  The fact that the ostensible justification for the 
invasion of Iraq was to ensure the Iraqi regime was disarmed of WMDs, not to liberate a people, and 
that both those reasons for war did not enjoy UN approval, was neatly deflected as the ADF’s actions 
were, a priori, made honourable as ‘part of a great tradition’. Howard’s Anzac entrepreneurship put 
forward self-serving post-hoc justifications for sending Australian troops into a war that lacked 
legitimacy under international law and lacked a long-term vision of how the peace would be won in 
a post-Saddam Iraq.  Howard’s Anzac entrepreneurship successfully employed the unpolitical tenets 
of Anzac that he had carefully cultivated in the years prior to the Iraq War to discipline public 
sentiment regarding his government’s security and defence priorities in the age of terror.   
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Anzac Day 2004 in Iraq 
Howard marked Anzac Day 2004 by travelling to Iraq to visit the troops.  It was a flying visit, 
conducted under strict secrecy and attended by only a few government selected media 
representatives.  Leaving on April 24, Howard arrived to address the troops stationed at Doha, Qatar 
at 3am April 25 (Australian time), before flying to Baghdad, Iraq to address the troops again at the 
dawn service (11am Australian time), play two-up, and hold talks with the Administrator of the 
Coalition Provisional Authority of Iraq, Paul Bremer, General John Abizaid, and Lieutenant General  
Ricardo Sanchez (Allard 2004, 5).  The Iraq War had entered a difficult stage as fighting with 
insurgents intensified in spring 2004, leading to the Coalition losing ground and suffering casualties.  
In Australia, support for the war was dropping.  April 2004 saw a bare majority of those surveyed 
supporting the war (50%), dropping to less than 50% in May as the Abu Ghraib scandal broke, where 
support  remained (see Figure 19). The disciplining that Howard had engendered on Anzac Day 2003 
was losing its potency.   
 
The trip was both full of drama and tightly stage-managed.  In Baghdad, automatic gunfire was heard 
in the background as wreaths were laid during the dawn service (All ard 2004, 5).  As Howard left 
Baghdad, the plane carrying him and the media was forced to take evasive action for thirty minutes, 
zig-zagging low to the ground to avoid a potential surface-to-air missile lock that had been detected 
(Allard and Banham 2004, 1).  And a leg of the trip to visit navy personnel on the frigate HMAS Stuart 
was cancelled after the ship was called into action to assist US sailors injured in a suicide bombing 
(Banham 2004, 4).  The danger of these events added to the drama and newsworthiness of the trip, 
with the Prime Minister placing himself in harm’s way in order to visit the troops deployed in action.   
 
But this message was also tightly presented.  Criticism was levelled at the government for al lowing 
only a select few media organisations to attend, with a point of contention being that the 
government favoured TV network Channel 9 was the only TV news crew invited, to the exclusion of  
the national broadcaster, the ABC (Grattan 2004, 17).  The secrecy of the trip, ostensibly for securi ty 
reasons, also provided the story with a surprise element that ensured maximum interest, whilst 
further providing a plausible reason for the limited selection of journalists and media organisations.  
The presentation of the Prime Minister in the utmost of positive lights was aimed for, with images 
alluding to Australian masculinity and Anzac being emphasised.  For example, images such as 
Howard playing two-up or donning a flak jacket labelled ‘HOWARD’ was emphasised, whilst sl ightly 
embarrassing footage of the Prime Minister trying on an ill -fitting helmet was vetted by government 
minders for ‘security reasons’ (Grattan 2004, 17; Inglis 2008, 578).  The government’s failure to 
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invite Opposition Leader Mark Latham on the trip echoed Howard’s exclusion on VP Day  1995, when 
he had been not been Included in the speakers.   This helped ensure the focus was upon Howard and 
his government’s agenda, rather than the policy contest between the Coalition and the ALP over the 
continued deployment of Australian troops to Iraq.   
 
The central purported aim and message of the trip was to visit and support the troops that the 
Howard government had sent to war.  As previously noted, Howard had felt an obligation to 
personally thank Australian ADF personnel for their service, making frequent appearances at 
departure and return ceremonies.  The 2004 Iraq trip confirmed this already established pat tern by 
Howard.  In Doha, Howard thanked the troops by saying:  
There is naturally and very understandably a special focus on what is occurring in and around 
Iraq and you are very much in the thoughts and the hearts of all of the Australian people. You 
do a great job. You bring us great honour. We wish you well and our thoughts and prayers stay 
very much with you and thank you very much. And I look forward to meeting as many of you 
as I can tonight over something that is very Australian - a barbecue (Howard 2004a).   
At Baghdad, he expressed similar sentiments:  
I’ve come to Iraq on Anzac Day very deliberately to express my personal thanks and admiration 
to the men and women of the Australian Defence Force for the work that they have done and 
they continue to do in very challenging circumstances. But it’s not only to them that I extend 
my thanks and the thanks of the Australian people. But also to many civilian people [in Iraq in 
service] from Australia…  
What you are doing is for the future of the Iraqi people. It’s a just cause. The nation is united in 
its prayers and hopes for your well being and your safety and your continued contribution to 
building a better future for the Iraqi people. And how better and how appropriate I guess it is 
to express that sentiment on behalf of the Australian people on Anzac Day (Howard 2004b).   
Finally, the message was repeated to journalists at a press conference in Baghdad:  
I came to say thank you to the men and women of the ADF and the most evocative effective 
way that I could say thank you was to join them in the Anzac Day dawn service. There is no 
service in the Australian calendar that is more evocative of that particular part of our character 
and I believed it was a way that I could say thank you. I admire what they’re  doing. They are 
here in a just cause and I wanted to personally thank them (Howard 2004g).   
However, Howard’s language in these instances revealed that there was more to the trip than 
thanking the troops.  Several elements were at play in Howard’s language – the call to thank and 
support the troops, the linking of Anzac to Australianness, the contention that Anzac Day is the most 
appropriate day to give thanks, and the normative justification for the Iraq War.  These elements, in 
the context of the difficulties the Coalition forces were facing in Iraq, and the policy difference 
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between the Coalition, who supported the war, and the ALP who opposed the continued 
deployment of the ADF in Iraq, reveal that Howard was also employing Anzac to make a political 
point.   
 
The language used by Howard continued and intensified the ‘support the troops’ discourse that 
permeated his Anzac Day addresses during the War on Terror.  Howard frequently told the 
assembled audiences during the trip, and the viewers back home via the travelling media contingent, 
that both he and the Australian public supported them and their cause in Iraq, conflating the two.  
The troops and the cause in Iraq were frequently spoke of in effusively positive and normative terms 
– ‘just cause’, ‘great honour’, ‘better future’  – recalling the positive values of service, duty and 
sacrifice present in the Anzac tradition.  This had the effect of merging the positive associations of  
the ADF with the government’s far from uncontentious defence policy regarding Iraq.  This was al l  
underpinned by the frequent intermingling of these actions with Australianness, with Howard 
several times referencing Anzac as the ‘most evocative’  or ‘most appropriate’ day to express such 
nationalist sentiments.  This mix of language belied Howard’s assertion that the purpose of  the trip 
was solely to thank the troops – the unpolitical and incontestable nature of Anzac was being 
employed to defend a very political point regarding Australian defence deployments.   
 
The ‘support the troops’ discourse evident on Anzac Day 2004 was employed by the Howard 
government to critique the ALP and their policy position of withdrawing troops from Iraq.  In the 
days after the Iraq trip, Opposition defence spokesman Chris Evans, and then Opposition Leader 
Mark Latham, attempted to make the point that Australian troops should be removed from Iraq, 
since the original reasons for going to war (discovering WMDs and disarming the Iraqi  regime) had 
not been fulfilled, and the ADF’s continued presence was ‘symbolic’ (Latham 2004).  Howard 
responded:  
I am appalled at the repeated and inaccurate assertions by the Leader of the Opposition and 
the Defence spokesman for the Labor Party that Australia's military contribution in and around 
Iraq is merely symbolic. This is insulting to our personnel who face constant danger in their 
efforts to bring security and stability to Iraq (Howard 2004i).   
Howard’s response neatly sidestepped the substantive point the ALP was trying to make regarding 
the failure to find any WMDs and the wisdom of Australia’s continued presence in Iraq by equating 
the ALP’s position with an attack on the troops themselves.  Such an equation fed upon all the 
positively associated traditions of Anzac and the legacy of the mistreatment of Vietnam veterans to 
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create a powerful rhetorical weapon.  Latham found this difficult to contest, with the Canberra 
Times reporting:  
Asked yesterday if the troops were there for domestic political reasons, Mr Latham would only 
say Labor supported the troops. ''I dealt with this yesterday,'' he said. ''It is true to say that 
Labor supports the troops 100 per cent but we are entitled as an Opposition to raise these 
policy differences. ''They [the troops] have their tasks to discharge and our mention of 
symbolism if you like, it is political symbolism.” (Peake 2004, 2) 
The story was less about the ALP’s criticism of the government’s policy regarding Iraq, and more 
about the failure of Latham to adequately and appropriately honour the troops.  The sacralised 
status of the ADF provided Howard with an effective rhetorical device to head off a potential 
opportunity for the ALP to contest the government’s continued deployment of troops to Iraq.   
 
The first few years after 9/11 demonstrated how effective Anzac entrepreneurship could be in 
defending a policy program.  Howard’s active encouragement of hyper-Anzac assisted the effectively 
incontestable discourse of national identity that he enthusiastically had aligned with his policy 
agenda.  It hardly mattered that Howard’s acts and discourse ran counter to his earlier attacks in 
Opposition upon Keating for attempting to engineer national identity.  Howard’s nationalism 
entrepreneurship had effectively captured Anzac for his government and he was enjoying the warm 
glow of positive association.   
 
Howard, Anzac Day and the Continuing Institutionalisation of Hyper-Anzac, 2005-2007 
The Coalition won the 2004 election convincingly, comfortably defeating the ALP and, somewhat 
unusually, also winning control of the Senate.  The totality of the victory further confirmed Howard’s 
belief in the correctness of his approach to government.  Writing in his autobiography, Howard 
reflected on this period by saying:  
Large swathes of traditional Labor voters supported the Coalition in 1996, 2001 and 2004.  The 
‘Howard battler’ liked the economic security my government delivered, was socially 
conservative, strongly supported our policy on asylum-seekers and was suspicious of policies 
which satiated environmental prejudices at the expense of other people’s jobs (Howard 2010, 
485).   
Such a belief, and the executive’s dominance of Parliament, saw Howard pursue a series of policy 
reforms that sought to entrench his vision for Australia.  This was symbolised most starkly by his 
pursuit of industrial relations reform via the WorkChoices legislative changes, but also by his 
increasingly strident participation in the culture wars.  His final term as Prime Minister saw him 
institute initiatives such as conservative review of the national history curriculum, introduce a 
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citizenship test based upon ‘Australian values’, and increasingly reference Australia’s ‘Anglo -Celtic’  
heritage (Johnson 2007, 197-198; Gulmanelli 2014, 585).   
 
Howard’s entrenching of Anzac as a central nationalist discourse was pursued as part of this push.  
The success of this activity is noted by McKenna (2010, 128-129), who argues that the period 2004-
2007 saw increasing popular condemnation of ‘the unpatriotic past of the 1960s and 1970s’, a 
phenomenon which he partly attributes to Howard’s promotion of that popular memory.  Howard’s 
fervour for entrenching this view of history simultaneously betrayed his anxieties about Anzac’s 
contemporary commemoration (Ziino 2006), and the Anzac controversies that dogged the 
government during this period.  The spectacle of hyper-Anzac generated forms of remembrance that 
were in tension with Anzac’s traditionally understated commemoration, and led new expectations 
about war remembrance that Howard needed to observe and manage with his Anzac 
entrepreneurship.   
 
The 90th Anniversary of the Gallipoli Landings, 2005 
This mix of confidence, stridency, anxiety and ambiguity was evident in the 90th anniversary of  the 
Gallipoli landings in 2005.  Howard’s filled his dawn service address at Anzac Cove with signi f iers of  
his surety of his position and views.  The men who fought at Gallipoli ‘forged a legend whose grip on 
us grows tighter with each passing year’ and ‘what swells with each Anzac season is a hunger for 
their stories’ (Howard 2005a), claims that reflect the growing institutionalisation of hyper-Anzac.  
Anzac had grown into an irresistible force, enveloping contemporary Australian national life:  
Those who fought here in places like Quinn’s Post, Pope’s Hill and the Nek changed forever the 
way we saw our world and ourselves. They bequeathed Australia a lasting sense of national 
identity. They sharpened our democratic temper and our questioning eye towards authority…  
It [Anzac] lives on in the valour and the sacrifice of young men and women that ennoble 
Australia in our time, in scrub in the Solomons, in the villages of Timor, in the deserts of Iraq 
and the coast of Nias. It lives on through a nation’s easy familiarity, through Australians looking 
out for each other, through courage and compassion in the face of adversity.  
And so we dedicate ourselves at this hour, at this place, not just to the memory of Anzac but to 
its eternal place in the Australian soul (Howard 2005a).   
As in previous speeches, Anzac is here the source, and continuing reference point, for Australian 
identity.  Anzac ‘lived on’ in the ADF and amongst the nation’s people, bestowing Austral ians with 
conservative values of ‘sacrifice’, ‘courage’ and ‘valour’ .  Howard also referenced the Australian 
Legend – ‘our democratic temper and our questioning eye towards authority’ - but the implications 
of these values were left as ideographs of an uncomplicated and unified Australianness, and did not 
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imply any politics or contestation.  He referred to Austral ian interventionism, but omitted the 
explicitly normative connection to the Iraq War that had characterised his earlier Anzac Day 
addresses.  In this subtler approach, the ADF deployments in the Solomon Islands and East Timor 
preceded mention of the controversial Iraq War both in this speech and in Howard’s Anzac Day 
message media release (Howard 2005a; Howard 2005b).  The illegal Iraq War had become less 
popular as it had dragged on, while the Solomon Islands and East Timor had more positive and 
unproblematic associations.  
 
The dawn service address of 2005 once again largely followed many of the narrative and linguistic 
structures that Howard had established in his language of Anzac and further reflected the 
confidence he had in its central place in Australia’s national identity.  Not for Howard were the 
conclusions that the chief of the New Zealand Defence Forces, Air Marshal Bruce Ferguson, drew 
from the campaign when he spoke at the dawn service ceremony: ‘Perhaps the Gallipoli  campaign 
was the high-water mark of our nations' imperial subservience. We learned that we must shake off  
the shackles of colonial dependence’ (Ferguson, as cited by Hartcher 2005, 13).  Instead, Anzac Day 
2005 confirmed for Howard that Anzac defined Australianness: 
The original ANZACs could not have known at the time that their service would leave all 
Australians with another enduring legacy: our sense of self. The ANZAC legend has helped us 
to define who we are as Australians. ANZAC Day is a chance to reflect with pride on what it  
means to be Australian and the values we hold dear: determination, courage, compassion and 
resourcefulness (Howard 2005b).   
All that was Anzac, and therefore all that was Australian, mirrored Howard’s sense of self – his 
conservative values and his implicit privileging of Anglo-Celtic and masculine identity.  And the 
certainty that Howard had in the transformation of Anzac was demonstrated when he told an 
interviewer at Gallipoli ‘all the cynicism of some years ago has dropped away and people are very 
proud of what the young of Australia did those years ago and I think that’s fantastic’ (Howard 
2005c).  Howard felt that he had repudiated Keating and won the partisan contest over the meaning 
of Anzac.   
 
But anxiety about what Anzac was becoming was revealed by a series of minor controversies 
surrounding Anzac Day 2005.  Firstly was the question of who ‘owned’ Gallipoli and had a right to 
dictate the management of the site.  A domestic dispute had erupted in the lead-up to Anzac Day as 
road-works on the Gallipoli peninsula to help accommodate the influx of visitors offended some 
Australians who saw the whole site as a sacred war grave that should not be disturbed.  A 2003 
proposal to list Anzac Cove on the Howard government’s National Heritage List was finall y and 
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unambiguously rejected by Turkish authorities in the lead up to Anzac Day, with the Turks expressing 
a concern that such a course of action would impinge upon Turkish sovereignty (Ziino 2006, 6).  
Howard coyly played on these controversies whilst at Gallipoli, telling an interviewer ‘…I feel  I 'm at 
home here. This is Australia, it is Turkey... but you know, in an emotional way, it’s part of Austral ia -  
it always will be’ (Howard 2005c).  This was a wink and nod that referenced Ataturk’s 1934 tribute t o 
the Anzac’s – ‘You, the mothers who sent their sons from faraway countries, wipe away your tears; 
your sons are now lying in our bosom and are in peace. After having lost their lives on this land they 
have become our sons as well’.  The government’s hubris and arrogance here was revealed by its 
failure to anticipate or accommodate the sensitivity of Turkish authorities to Australian overtures of  
sovereignty over a site that Australian forces had attempted to invade 90 years earlier and the 
contribution that the victory over the Allied forces at Gallipoli had made towards Turkish 
nationalism.  But for all the coyness, arrogance, and wink and nod to domestic audiences, the 
controversy surrounding questions of sovereignty on Anzac Day 2005 also revealed the i mpotence of 
the government regarding the management of such a crucial site of Australian identity.   
 
The anxiety that surrounded the impotence of the Australian government regarding sovereignty 
over Gallipoli was further demonstrated by Coalition MP and former Veterans Affairs Minister Danna 
Vale’s proposal later in 2005 to recreate the Gallipoli landscape, including the memorials and 
battlefields, along the ‘uncannily similar’ Mornington Peninsula on the Victorian coastline (Seccombe 
2005, 1).  This was another expression of hyper-Anzac – seeking authenticity in a realistic fabrication.  
The proposal was roundly criticised by the RSL, historians, and Victorian Premier Steve Bracks, and 
further rejected by Howard within hours of it being made public (Peake 2005, 5).  Nonetheless, the 
fact that such a proposal was even entertained, after Howard’s allusion to Australian pretensions of  
authority over the meaning and management of Gallipoli, reflected the frustration that hyper-
Anzac’s most fervent entrepreneurs felt about the lack of Australian control over the site and its 
meanings.  With Gallipoli located outside the borders of Australian sovereignty, the government was 
forced to be the subservient partner in the sharing of the control of the space and its meaning.   
 
A second controversy involving hyper-Anzac expression concerned the way Anzac Day 2005 was 
marked at Gallipoli.  The Canberra Times (2005, 11) wondered ‘…whether an event that was once a 
sobering remembrance hasn't become a hyped-up, stage-managed circus’, as the crowd of 20,000 at 
the dawn service was entertained on the previous night by a big screen playing the Bee Gee’s 
‘Stayin’ Alive’ (Ziino 2006, 8), displayed instances of drunkenness, and later left large amounts of 
rubbish around the site.  As Ziino (2006, 9) notes, this ignited popular debate about whether Anzac 
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Day was appropriately marked by commemoration or celebration.  Members of the crowd might 
have been forgiven for being confused at the ferocity of the condemnation, given that the Pr ime 
Minister had been calling for commemoration and celebration on Anzac Day for several years.  
Howard leapt to their defence, responding to a question at a press conference in Istanbul on April 26 
regarding the appropriateness of the marking of Anzac Day 2005: 
But I am, on this occasion, I am defiantly sticking up for the behaviour and the decorum and 
the general reverence of the young of Australia. I thought they were outstanding and it was 
one of the greatest experiences I've had as Prime Minister to be with them yesterday, to meet 
them, to have transmitted to me their sense of occasion, their sense of enthusiasm, their 
sense of pride and their sense of being Australian. Now I thought it was great and therefore 
the things that have contributed to that feeling, which ought to make even the most 
traditional expression of Australian patriotism by a person well satisfied (Howard 2005d).  
Whilst Howard was quick to defend those young Australians who he saw as the new standard-
bearers of Anzac, the controversy surrounding their participation in, and representation of, Anzac 
Day revealed that hyper-Anzac sometimes existed in tension with older, more restrained, forms of  
Anzac remembrance.  These tensions revealed ambiguities about the appropriate form of 
remembrance - commemoration or celebration - and that this could manifest in contestation of  the 
government’s encouragement of hyper-Anzac.   Further, it demonstrated that whilst Howard was 
largely successful in his Anzac entrepreneurship, he was not entirely free  to define Anzac as he 
pleased.   
 
Anzac Day 2006 and the Death of Private Jacob Kovco 
Anzac Day 2006 revealed similar tensions, ambiguities, and difficulties.  Howard did not speak on 
Anzac Day that year, but did release a media statement where themes of honouring the sacri f ice of  
service personnel were expressed, but primarily announced that the Australian War Memorial  and 
Canberra’s Anzac Parade would be included on the National Heritage List.  Inglis (2008, 496) notes 
that during the Howard years the AWM had become ‘more military in character, more enterprising 
in the pursuit of tourists, and more richly endowed, by a government whose beneficence it 
acknowledged’.  Further, it had become more educative, with new exhibitions geared towards this 
exercise and a federal government scheme that subsidised travel for schoolchildren to Canberra fo r 
‘Civics and Citizenship Education’ (Inglis 2008, 498-499).  Anzac Parade had also seen several new 
memorials opened during Howard’s term, including the Australian Service Nurses National Memorial 
in 1999, the Australian National Korean War Memorial in 2000, the New Zealand Memorial the day 
before Anzac Day 2001 (a rare example of Australia acknowledging New Zealand around Anzac Day) ,  
and a refurbished Royal Australian Air Force Memorial in 2002 (Inglis 2008, 481-488).  Howard’s 
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announcement that they were both to be included on the National Heritage List confirmed their 
status in Australian life and extended the reach of Anzac.   
 
Anzac Day 2006 also presented Howard with challenges.  On April 21, Private Jacob Kovco died 
whilst serving in Iraq, only the second Australian death in combat since Vietnam (the first being 
Sergeant Andrew Russell in Afghanistan in 2002).  The circumstances of his death were poorly 
communicated to Kovco’s family and the public by Defence Minister Brendan Nelson 22  and the 
repatriation of his body to Australia was bungled, with a mix-up seeing the body of a Bosnian soldier 
sent to Australia instead of Kovco’s (Murphy et al 2006, 23).  The bungling compounded the anguish 
of Kovco’s family and an ‘incredibly sorry’ Howard soon made reparations by organising a funeral 
with military honours, where ‘an honour guard from Kovco’s regiment lined the path of the gun 
carriage bearing the coffin and fired three volleys as it was lowered into the ground.  An army band 
played, a bugler sounded the Last Post, and the RAAF Roulettes performed a flyover’ (Inglis 2008, 
580; Murphy et al 2006, 23).   
 
Howard and Nelson both attended the funeral, with Howard being photographed hugging Kovco’s 
widow Shelley (Inglis 2008, 580).  The ceremony of the funeral reportedly upset some veterans, who 
criticised its excesses (Inglis 2008, 580).  More recently, Brown (2014, 62-63) has argued that the 
bungling of the repatriation of Kovco’s body led to the accidental establishment of a new convention 
of Prime Ministerial attendance at military funerals, where ‘every ramp ceremony became an Anzac 
Day’.  Brown (2014) argues that this new convention has combined with the tight control of media 
reports from Iraq and Afghanistan and the poor articulation for the reasons why Australia should be 
involved in these conflicts by the government, and has consequently been a contributing factor in 
the Australian public’s low tolerance for Australian deaths in combat.  This fed into the fall in publ ic 
support for continued participation in these wars, as the only thing the public sees from the 
Australian troop involvement in the War on Terror is death, rather than positive stories of what the 
ADF was achieving in the War on Terror.  As such, Howard’s hyper-Anzac had unintended and 
uncontrollable consequences - necessitating the escalation of honours and ceremony for Austral ia’s 
                                                                 
22 Kovco had been accidently shot in the head by his own hand whilst in his quarters in Bagdad.  Nelson initially said 
he had been handling a gun while cleaning it and it had gone off, before later saying that he ha d not i n fa c t been 
handling the weapon and that it discharged accidently after being bumped (Murphy et al 2006, 23).  Also confusing 
matters was the reference to his death as an ‘accidental shooting’, a euphemism for suicide i n milita ry par lanc e 
(Murphy et al 2005, 23).  A military board of inquiry in 2006 found that Kovco had been ‘skylarking’ when the 
accident occurred, with a coronial inquest in 2008 similarly finding that ‘the gunshot wound had been irresponsibly 
self-inflicted’ (Stafford 2008).   
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war dead, but simultaneously contributing to the public’s increasing dissatisfaction with the ADF’s 
participation in the War on Terror.   
 
Anzac Day 2007, Brisbane and Canberra 
Anzac Day 2007 was more successful for Howard and saw him mobilising Anzac Day for partisan 
ends.  Howard gave an Anzac Day address at Greenslopes Private Hospital in Brisbane, a setting 
located in newly ascendant Opposition leader Kevin Rudd’s seat of Griffith.  Howard was ‘defying 
expectations that he would return to Canberra on Tuesday night after a two-day Brisbane visit to 
attend the traditional dawn service [at the AWM]’ (Karvelas, Parnell, and Dodd 2007).  Having 
trumped Rudd, who sent his daughter Jessica to stand in for him, Howard delivered a speech, before 
returning to Canberra to attend the 11am ceremony at the AWM and lay a wreath.  The speech 
brimmed with Howard’s confidence in his version of Anzac and its institutionalisat ion in Austral ian 
public life:  
It has undoubtedly been one of the most warming experiences of the Australian nation, 
particularly of those generations who fought in the wars in which this country has been 
involved to see over the last 10 or 20 years a resurgence of affection for and observance of 
ANZAC Day. The extraordinary scenes of thousands of young Australians going to Gallipoli 
Peninsula on ANZAC Day, the growing numbers of young people attending ANZAC Day services 
sends a very powerful message of reassurance to all generations of Australians that this most 
special of all Australian days will always be at the centre of our national life (Howard 2007).  
Howard was reflecting upon the growing centrality of Anzac and was pleased with what he saw.  He 
spoke warmly of the ‘resurgence of affection for and observance of Anzac Day’ and was reassured 
that it would remain ‘at the centre of our national life’.  This assuredness of the continuity of  Anzac 
was built upon the Australian values that Anzac established: 
But in addition to our sense of gratitude and that sense of owing a debt that can never be 
repaid, there is another reason why ANZAC Day will always be at the centre of the affections 
and the observance of what it means to be an Australian. And that is the values that the 
ANZAC tradition represent in our national life. Those values of courage, of mateship, of 
irreverence and larrikinism where that was appropriate; of sterling discipline and tenacious 
commitment when that was appropriate and a willingness to risk all for the defence of the 
country we love and the people we love. And it is the values of ANZAC Day as well as the sense 
of gratitude and remembrance that make it a special day in our national life. And as the years 
go by, so far from the tradition and the legend of ANZAC diminishing, it will occupy an 
evermore hallowed place in the recollection and the observance of this country (Howard 
2007).   
A check-list of Howard signifiers of national identity was reeled off.  Conservative values like 
‘courage’ and ‘discipline’ were included, along with the newly reconstituted conservative values of  
the Australian legend – ‘larrikinism’, ‘irreverence’ and ‘mateship’ when appropriate.  The negative 
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conjunction ‘but’ tempered the values of the Australian legend, making them subservient to the 
conservative values of the Anzac tradition.  Howard seemed to feel no qualms about expressing 
unabashed patriotism for the ‘country we love’  or placing Anzac at the centre of the nation’s 
identity.   
 
But whilst Howard was publicly confident and self-assured, the fact that he felt the need to mobili se 
his Anzac entrepreneurship in such a partisan manner revealed the weakness of his position.  On 
April 17 2007, Newspoll showed Labor leading the Coalition by 59 points to 41 on a two party-
preferred basis, and similar figures were reported on April 23 in a Herald/ACNielsen poll, with Labor 
leading the Coalition by 58 per cent to 42 per on a two party-preferred basis (The Australian 2007; 
Henderson 2007).  Whist Howard would soon be gone, his government losing office and he himself  
losing his seat, the intensely sacralised, spectacular and central Anzac he helped engender would 
remain.   
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated the success of Howard’s Anzac entrepreneurship.  The context of the 
War on Terror gave impetus to Howard’s reconceptualisation of Australian identity in l ine with his 
foreign policy and security setting.  This meant aligning the contemporary deployment of the ADF in 
the Middle East and the region with the traditions of service, sacrifice, heroism and honour that the 
original Anzacs at Gallipoli had displayed.  This has the effect of making it difficult to contest the 
deployment of the ADF, especially in the Iraq invasion, as Howard conflated the support of 
Australian troops and Australianness with support for the government’s foreign policy.  Howard 
reinforced this message by continuing to police the unpolitical nature of Anzac.   These factors once 
again demonstrated the ideographic nature of Anzac, and how it could be reimagined by 
entrepreneurial Prime Ministers with new meanings that matched their political styles and policy 
agendas.   
 
Whilst Howard had enormous success with his Anzac entrepreneurship, he was not able to wholly 
control Anzac.  The spectacular hyper-Anzac that his government helped engender posed tensions 
with older, more traditional and more sober forms of war remembrance, and these in turn posed 
problems for Howard that he could not wholly control.  This chapter provided evidence for the 
operation of agency and structure in nationalism entrepreneurship – whilst Howard was Anzac’s 
most successful Prime Ministerial entrepreneur, he could not employ Anzac for sol ely instrumental  
ends.  Instead, part of Howard’s success was due to his carefully attuned reading of public sentiment 
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surrounding Anzac, and his attempts to manage this sentiment in order to maintain what he 
believed to be the essential unpolitical nature of Anzac.  In the process, Howard helped to 
institutionalise a pattern of Anzac remembrance that replaced the central role of the RSL with a 
dominant role for the Australian government.   
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CHAPTER 10 
Conclusion: Anzac’s Entrepreneurs in Retrospect 
 
The intensely protected and sacralised hyper-Anzac that Howard had helped establish remained 
after the November 2007 federal election that saw Howard and his government resoundingly 
defeated.  His Prime Ministerial successors have been cooler towards Anzac, ne ver quite 
emphasising Anzac in their narratives of Australian identity to the extent that Howard did.  However, 
all have followed the Anzac conventions that Howard, Hawke, and Keating, helped to establish - 
making celebratory Anzac Day addresses at the AWM, Gallipoli, or other significant sites of 
Australian war remembrance, that were attended by the Australian public in seemingly ever-growing 
numbers.  That Prime Ministers continue to observe Anzac in a spectacular and celebratory manner, 
and that this practice is endorsed by the public with their attendance at Anzac Day ceremonies, their 
consumption of Anzac related media, and their incorporation of Anzac into their own identities,  i s a 
reflection of the success that Howard, and his predecessors, had in de fining Anzac for the 21st 
century.   
 
This thesis has employed the framework of nationalism entrepreneurship, in conjunction with 
critical discourse analysis, to explore this Prime Ministerial turn to Anzac.  It has identified constants 
and changes in the way that Prime Ministers conceive Anzac and Australian national identi ty in the 
context of economic reform, globalisation, and international terror, and has identified Hawke, 
Keating, and Howard, as significant and influential Anzac entrepreneurs.  Themes that have been 
examined in this regard have centred on the ideographic nature of Anzac; the varying levels of 
commitment by Prime Ministers to keep Anzac unpolitical; how they have maintained the unpolitical 
nature of Anzac; the increasing engagement of Prime Ministers with Anzac; and their ro le in the 
institutionalisation of a form of Anzac that is spectacular, elite driven, and rapturously received.  
Critical Discourse Analysis has been employed to explore the qualitative and quantitative textual 
representation of Anzac by Prime Ministers, as well as guiding the analysis with its triangulation via 
multiple methods, and the discourse-historical approach which encouraged the examination of  the 
research question over time.  The thesis therefore also offers suggestions for further research that 
could employ CDA, or could take a different approach to the study of nationalism or political 
language.   
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Change and Constancy in Prime Ministerial Anzac Entrepreneurship 
The thesis has identified several key themes in Prime Ministerial Anzac entrepreneurship that have 
displayed varying levels of consistency and change from 1973 to 2007.  To reiterate, nationalism 
entrepreneurship attempts to address issues pertaining to the competing causal explanation of 
structure versus agency in the operation of national ist actors by paying close attention to the role of  
both these elements.  Particular powerful and entrepreneurial nationalist actors have enormous 
influence over the conception of national identity, but they cannot wholly define that conception.  
They are products of their environment, and they must respond to that context, and further, they 
internalise forms of national identity that arise from this environment.  These actors do not pursue 
nationalist ends for solely instrumental ends exogenous to nationalism, such as power, prestige, or 
influence over a policy agenda or program.  Whilst these factors are often bound up in the 
nationalism entrepreneur’s ends, the end goal for nationalism entrepreneurs is also a nationalist 
one, and we must take their claims to be genuine nationalists seriously if we are to understand their 
motivations and the consequences of their entrepreneurship as it works its way through a 
community.  The operation of this dynamic has informed the following themes throughout the 
thesis.   
 
The Ideographic Nature of Anzac 
An ideograph is a rhetorical device, with a nebulous, but well -understood and culturally situated 
meaning.  Ideographs have a degree of malleability, but those actors who stretch the meaning of  an 
ideograph to breaking face sanction from the community (McGee 1980).  The thesis has 
demonstrated the ideographic nature of Anzac, and has proposed that Anzac’s entrepreneurs have 
consistently engaged with Anzac in this manner in order to fill Anzac with new meaning.  This new 
meaning consistently reflected the emerging realities of the collapse of older forms of 
Australianness, globalisation and neoliberal economic reform, and later, the context of  global ised 
terror and interventionism.  Hawke appealed for consensus and commitment to Australia as he 
grappled with the issue of how to reflect the changed circumstances of economic reform and 
multiculturalism in Australian identity (see Chapter 5).  Keating filled his Anzac ideographs with 
similar meaning to Hawke’s, but was far more explicit about his partisan and nationalist intentions, 
which attracted strong opposition.  Keating, in the view of some conservative critics, had broken the 
boundaries of acceptability with his Anzac entrepreneurship, and Keating’s later Anzac 
entrepreneurship was more tempered in response (see Chapters 6 and 7).  Howard engaged with 
Anzac in a manner that also emphasised neoliberalism, but this was also far more conservative than 
that of his ALP predecessors.  Howard also reflected the changing security context, as he filled Anzac 
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with meaning aligned with the service of contemporary ADF personnel in the region and the Middle  
East.  Howard also attracted opposition, but his conservative and traditional reading of Anzac helped 
him police this opposition (see Chapters 8 and 9).  The ideographic nature of Anzac suggests that 
Prime Ministers have the ability to redefine Anzac, but that redefinition also has real limits and 
boundaries that must be observed if redefinition is to be accepted.   
 
The Unpolitical Nature of Anzac 
The new meanings that Anzac’s entrepreneurs filled Australia’s war remembrance with were 
reinforced, somewhat inconsistently, by their attempts to depoliticise Anzac and guard its 
purportedly unpolitical nature.  Anzac had not always been unpolitical, as the analysis of the period 
from the Vietnam War until 1987 demonstrated.  And it did not remain ‘non-political’ in the sense 
that Anzac was outside the realms of choice, agency, deliberation and social interaction that Hay 
(2007) defines as the arena of the political (see Chapter 1) .  However, Anzac’s entrepreneurs 
frequently presented it as such, and attempted to guard Anzac’s purported incontestability and 
essential character.  The absence of radical opposition to Anzac, as occurred in period  after the 
Vietnam War, suggests that Prime Ministers have been successful in their guarding of Anzac’s 
unpolitical nature and in depoliticising this sphere of Australian nationalist discourse .  Hawke had 
begun this process, being a central agent in the unpolitical reconciliation (Schaap 2005) of  Vietnam 
veterans and the Australian body politic.  His appeal to consensus and commitment was also 
presented in an unpolitical manner, attempting to excise contestation from his version of Austral ian 
nationalism (see Chapters 4 and 5).  Keating, on the other hand, was at times happy to accept the 
intrusion of the political and partisan contestation in advancement of his Anzac entrepreneurship, as 
he decried the supposed role of the Coalition and conservatives in holding back the emergence of an 
independent Australian identity (see Chapter 6).  At other times, Keating felt the disciplining effects 
of criticism, tempered his language, and assured critics that his observance of war remembrance 
would not contain partisan contestation.  Keating was more successful in his Anzac entrepreneurship 
when he did so (see, especially, Chapter 7).  Howard actively policed the unpolitical nature of Anzac, 
sanctioning those he felt were advancing partisan positions in relation to Anzac, whilst presenting his 
own partisan agendas as outside the realm of the political .  Howard thus frequently expressed the 
view that Anzac was above partisan politics, and that it unified Australians.  His need to pol ice  this 
position, however, revealed the tacit concession that Anzac was not, in fact, depoliticised and 
unpolitical at all.  However, he was very successful in maintaining this fiction, and with his Anzac 
entrepreneurship, as a consequence (see Chapters 8 and 9).  The policing of the unpolitical nature of  
Anzac provides evidence for the assertion that nationalism entrepreneurs must be sensi tive to the 
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socio-political context they are operating within, and careful to guard against opposition to their 
forms of nationalist identity if they are to be successful.   
 
Maintaining the Unpolitical Nature of Anzac – Reconciliation, Sacredness, and the Debt 
Owed 
Attempts to depoliticise and guard the unpolitical nature of Anzac took many forms, but some of the 
most consistently experienced were the effects of reconciliation with Vietnam veterans, al lusion to 
the sacredness of Anzac, and calls upon Australians to observe the debt owed those who had served 
and died.  Anzac’s entrepreneurs felt the continuing effects of the unpolitical reconciliation of 
Vietnam veterans with the Australian community in 1987, and ensured that they paid adequate 
respect to the service of ADF personnel.  As has been demonstrated, this only rarely involved directly 
addressing the uncomfortable experiences of Vietnam veterans, as their claims to continuing 
recognition were often accompanied by contestation with government, but the lesson of their 
discursive exclusion from Anzac was observed by Hawke (see Chapter 4 and 5), Keating (see Chapter 
7), and Howard (see Chapter 9).  Howard especially conflated the lessons of past mistreatment of 
Vietnam veterans with his support for the contemporary ADF personnel serving in the War on 
Terror, which had the effect of disciplining opposition to the War in Iraq especially.  These 
developments provided evidence for Schaap’s (2005) critical examination of the limits of forms of 
reconciliation based upon restorative justice.  The unpolitical nature of Anzac was also reinforced by 
references to its sacred nature.  Hawke was fairly circumspect with allusion to sacredness, but 
Keating and Howard both filled their speeches with instances of rich and sustained references to the 
sacredness of Anzac.  Often, these references alluded to the Chri stian faith and its lessons and 
traditions.  Finally, the essential and taboo character of Anzac was reinforced by frequent calls to 
remember the debt owed the service people who had fought and died.  This was a theme that al l  of  
Anzac’s entrepreneurs returned to, as they asked their audiences to honour the sacrifice of 
Australia’s war dead by observing the ideographic meanings and lessons with which they had f i l led 
Anzac.   
 
Increasing Prime Ministerial Engagement with Anzac 
The themes examined above primarily reflect constancy and consistency, but there were changes 
too.  One of the most significant original empirical contributions of the thesis has been the 
comprehensive tracing of Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac over time, from 1973 to 2007.  
The collation of every known Prime Ministerial speech and media release during this period has 
confirmed the observation that Prime Ministers have shifted from being participants, to central 
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actors, in the commemoration of Anzac, replacing the RSL (Holbrook 2014, 6; Lake 2010, 139; Inglis 
2008, 554-555).  But it has also demonstrated that some attributes of Prime Ministerial engagement 
with Anzac that have been attributed to Howard by other scholars, like the conservative co-option of 
mateship (Dyrenfurth 2015, 201) or calls to celebrate Anzac (McKenna 2010, 126-127), in fact have 
longer histories.  More generally, the thesis has demonstrated that Prime Ministerial engagement 
with Anzac used to be sporadic, more local, and less spectacular.  It has traced the i ncreasing shift to 
spectacular and regular remembrance at significant sites of Australian war memory and the 
corresponding reaction of the public.  Finally, by examining the increase in crowd attendances at 
Anzac Day by population, it has been shown that consistent media reports of annual record crowds 
at Anzac Day have led to a somewhat exaggerated perception of Anzac’s popularity.     
 
The Institutionalisation of Prime Ministerial Anzac Remembrance 
The thesis has also demonstrated the increasing institutionalisation of Prime Ministerial engagement 
with Anzac.  Anzac’s entrepreneurs all utilised the power resources of the state to promote their 
nationalist visions, with roots early in Hawke’s time in government as he engaged the RSL, saw over 
new memorial construction, and facilitated the reconciliation with Vietnam veterans.  1990 saw the 
first foray of government into spectacular war remembrance, but this was inconsistently taken up by 
Hawke, as he also gave Anzac Day addresses that more closely resembled a policy speech (see 
Chapter 5).  Keating reflected similar inconsistency, as big events like Anzac Day 1992 in Papua New 
Guinea and Australia Remembers were also interspersed with book launches and low key 
participation at the Martin Place Cenotaph in Sydney (see Chapters 6 and 7).  Australia Remembers 
was another precedential set of events that demonstrated how far the government could go in 
institutionalising Anzac remembrance in a spectacular, government mediated, fashion.  Howard 
institutionalised a spectacular hyper-Anzac, a form of Anzac remembrance more comprehensively 
mediated by the government (see Chapter 9), and far less prosaic than Hawke had been.  The power 
resources of the state have aided Prime Ministerial success in Anzac entrepreneurship. Whilst other 
actors and social forces have of course aided the resurgence of Anzac, the evidence presented in the 
thesis demonstrates the power of nationalism entrepreneurs in defining and influencing nationalist 
observance when they can access and employ power resources.  In the process, Anzac’s Prime 
Ministerial entrepreneurs increasingly displaced the RSL as the custodians of Anzac 
 
Critical Discourse Analysis and Prime Ministerial Anzac Entrepreneurship 
The thesis has employed the methodological approach to critical discourse analysis advanced by 
Fairclough (2005) and other CDA practitioners in order to analyse the Prime Ministerial turn to 
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Anzac.  This method was chosen because previous studies of Prime Ministerial engagement with 
Anzac have not simultaneously addressed the social and political context of this engagement, and, at 
the same time, provided systematic linguistic analysis of their language, or thoroughly compared 
Prime Ministerial engagement over time.  CDA commits to examination of social pr actices and the 
social world, in conjunction with textual analysis, and to critical investigation of the interaction of 
these two elements when exploring power relationships (Fairclough 1995, 3).  Fairclough (2005)  has 
presented a guide to CDA that has informed the thesis and its analysis (see Chapter 2).  Fairclough’s 
approach to CDA has been augmented with the discourse-historical method and commitment to 
multiple ‘triangulated’ methods, in order to reinforce the empirical veracity of the findings.  The 
qualitative tendency of CDA has thus been augmented by quantitative corpus assisted discourse 
analysis, an approach that adopts some of the quantitative methods of corpus linguistics in order to 
explore the corpus and reinforce the validity of findings (Bayley 2007; Duguid 2007).   
 
The discourse-historical method, triangulation, and corpus assisted discourse analysis, have all 
underpinned the general methodological approach to the thesis, and have proven their usefulness.  
The thesis has sought to examine Prime Ministerial engagement over time, and has attempted to 
include as rich and comprehensive a picture of this turn as possible.  Doing so has supported some of 
the claims of the literature surrounding Anzac, while others have been revealed to be less 
persuasive.  There seems to be a particular blind-spot among scholars when it comes to the effects 
of Howard on Anzac, and the thesis has quantitatively demonstrated much consistency over the time 
period for effects that critics have qualitatively attributed to him.  Further, the collation of Anzac Day 
attendances by percentage of the city population has suggested that whilst embryonic revival of 
Anzac may have been occurring during the 1980s (see Holbrook 2014), the public has really 
responded after Prime Ministerial Anzac entrepreneurship from 1990.  The thesis has therefore 
made an original contribution to the literature by applying these general approaches to CDA.   
 
More specifically, the thesis has adopted the approach to CDA outlined by Fairclough (2005) .  Some 
of the elements of this specific approach have been employed quite explicitly, and some have 
informed the study more implicitly.  More concretely analysed elements of Fairclough’s approach to 
CDA have included the analysis of genre, discourses, dif ference, assumptions, semantic and 
grammatical relations, grammatical mood, and modality and evaluation.  Genre analysis informed 
the approach to Chapter 3, where the general parameters of Prime Ministerial Anzac Day addresses, 
and their evolution over time, was set out.  This contributed significantly to the analysis of the 
institutionalisation of Prime Ministerial Anzac day addresses, formed the empirical baseline that 
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informed the rest of the analysis, and was one of the major empirical findings of the t hesis.   Prime 
Ministerial discourses of Anzac have been analysed by examining their textual representation, 
including specific consideration of elements like modality and evaluation, grammatical mood, 
semantic and grammatical relations between sentences and clauses, and the assumptions that 
underpin these discourses.  These have often revealed the hierarchies of meaning that Prime 
Ministers have attempted to create, which privilege certain meanings of Anzac, and attempt to 
exclude others.  This has been particularly revealed when they have attempted to employ the 
ideographic nature of Anzac to convey and reinforce new neoliberal and securitised meanings for 
Anzac.  Finally, CDA’s concern to reveal power relationships based upon difference has been a crucial 
contribution to the thesis, and has revealed that the activism of cultural agents that have sought to 
create a more inclusive and progressive Anzac largely failed to penetrate the precedential speeches 
of Anzac’s entrepreneurs.   
 
Elements of Fairclough’s approach that have been more implicit, or have proven to be less useful, 
have included social events, intertextuality, speech exchanges, and styles.  The examination of social  
events (the social structures, practices, and actors that Fariclough (2005, 223)  contends ‘constitute 
what is actual’) and intertextuality (awareness of what voices may be relevant to the text) have both 
informed the qualitative awareness required to analyse Prime Ministerial Anzac entrepreneurship.  
However, this has been largely incorporated as a methodological concern that has informed the 
selection of primary and secondary theoretical and empirical materials, rather than being an explicit 
site for examination.  Speech exchanges have featured rarely, as Prime Ministerial addresses d o not 
follow this rhetorical pattern.  Finally, style has been alluded to on occasion, especially in relation to 
Howard and his plain and suburban style, or to the political style that characterised Prime Ministerial 
discourses.  One possibility for future research would be a fuller, and more visual, analysis of  Prime 
Ministerial style, including body language, accent, and pronunciation, or closer visual examination of  
the setting of the social events that constitute Anzac.   
 
Potential future research directions 
Considering different theoretical or methodological approaches to the general topic of Prime 
Ministerial engagement with Anzac reveals fruitful future avenues for examination.  Researchers in 
the future may like to expand the examination of Prime Ministerial nationalist rhetoric beyond Anzac 
Day and compare it to Australia Day or Remembrance Day.  Such a study has antecedents with 
Curran (2006), but the systematic approach to content and textual analysis offered by CDA promises 
to provide new perspectives on these questions.  Of particular interest would be whether the same 
236 
 
limited acknowledgement of difference and attempts to discipline public reaction that characterised 
Prime Ministerial Anzac Day discourse are revealed on these occasions, and i f so, whether they are  
as successful.  Such an approach was alluded to in comparison of the Bicentenary with Anzac Day 
1990 in Chapter 5, but could be expanded and tested for veracity over time.  Another approach 
might like to situate the increasing institutionalisation of Prime Ministerial power over the conduct 
of Anzac within the wider trend towards greater Prime Ministerial power, captured contestably by 
the term ‘presidentialisation’.  As Grube (2013, 9) notes ' The words of a prime minister have never  
been more central to the activities of government than they are today’, and examination of their 
rhetorical role in the increasing accrual (or otherwise) of power would reveal much about their 
evolving institutional role.  Finally, nationalism entrepreneurship has been revealed to be a useful  
approach to the study of Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac, and testing its tenets against 
other instances of the success or failure of nationalist actors would help measure its empirical 
veracity.  All these avenues for further research would be further enriched by comparative study 
with other polities in order to reveal interesting differences and commonalties, and enhance the 
empirical veracity of the findings.   
 
Conclusion 
This thesis has traced Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac from 1973 to 2007.  It has argued 
that Prime Minister’s Hawke, Keating, and Howard were nationalist entrepreneurs, who promoted 
their nationalist visions with their Anzac discourses, imbuing Anzac with new meanings that grappled 
with multiculturalism, neoliberalism, and global terrorism and interventionism.  Whilst the 
approaches of these Anzac entrepreneurs have not been entirely similar, they have demonstrated a 
remarkable amount of consistency.  This suggests that Prime Ministers are not entirely free to define 
Anzac in their own image by mobilising their access to the power resources of the state.  Despite 
their power, they have had to pay close attention to the social and political context in which they 
operated.  Any further research into the areas of nationalism, Prime Ministerial power, or pol i tical  
language, should pay close attention to the dynamic of structure and agency which has been central  
in explaining the Prime Ministerial turn to Anzac.   
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APPENDIX 
The Corpus – Prime Ministerial Anzac Day Addresses and Media Statements or Releases 
The following is a compendium of the Anzac Day speeches and media statements or releases by Prime Ministers from 1973 – 2007.  To the best knowledge 
of the author, it contains every speech, media statement or release by a Prime Minister on, or around, Anzac Day that substantively addresses Anzac and its 
meaning, in a form that closely resembles the Prime Ministerial rhetorical category of national representative, that being when Prime Ministers are  cal led 
upon to reflect the collective feeling regarding the meaning of the nation (Grube 2013, 54).   
 
Date Speech Title In Archive Address 
Type 
Location Source 
25/4/1979 Anzac Day Esperance Speech Esperance National Archives of Australia - 
M1263/828 
24/4/1984 Unknown Media 
Release 
Not Applicable PM Transcripts - Department of Prime 
Minister and Cabinet 
25/4/1986 Speech by Bob Hawke at the Anzac Day Ceremony, Athens Speech Athens The Bob Hawke Prime Ministerial 
Library - Series RH21, Box 1, Folder F9 
24/4/1989 Speech by the Prime Minister Opening of the extensions at the 
Heidelberg Repatriation General Hospital Melbourne - 24 April 
1989 
Speech Melbourne PM Transcripts - Department of Prime 
Minister and Cabinet 
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Date Speech Title In Archive Address 
Type 
Location Source 
25/4/1990 Speech by the Prime Minister Dawn Service, Gallipoli 25 April 1990 Speech Gallipoli PM Transcripts - Department of Prime 
Minister and Cabinet 
25/4/1990 Speech at Lone Pine Ceremony, Gallipoli - 25 April 1990 Speech Gallipoli PM Transcripts - Department of Prime 
Minister and Cabinet 
25/4/1991 Speech by the Prime Minister Opening of gymnasium at HMAS 
Coonawarra Darwin - 25 April 1991 
Speech Darwin PM Transcripts - Department of Prime 
Minister and Cabinet 
25/4/1992 Speech by the Prime Minister, The Hon P J Keating, MP Anzac Day 
Dawn Service, Bomana War Cemetery Port Moresby - Saturday, 25 
April 1992 
Speech Bomana War 
Cemetery 
Paul Keating's Personal Archive - Paul 
Keating's Office 
25/4/1992 Speech by the Prime Minister, The Hon P J Keating, MP Anzac Day 
- Ela Beach, Port Moresby, 10.30AM Saturday 25 April 1992 
Speech Port Moresby PM Transcripts - Department of Prime 
Minister and Cabinet 
26/4/1992 Kokoda Papua New Guinea 26 April 1992 Speech Kokoda Paul Keating Prime Minister: major 
speeches of the first year 
23/4/1993 Launch of the Burma-Thailand Railway Speech Canberra PM Transcripts - Department of Prime 
Minister and Cabinet 
25/4/1994 Statement by the Prime Minister The Hon P J Keating MP Anzac 
Day 
Media 
Release 
Not Applicable PM Transcripts - Department of Prime 
Minister and Cabinet 
25/4/1995 Statement by the Prime Minister, The Hon P.J. Keating MP Anzac 
Day 1995 
Speech Sydney 
Cenotaph 
PM Transcripts - Department of Prime 
Minister and Cabinet 
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Date Speech Title In Archive Address 
Type 
Location Source 
25/4/1996 ANZAC Day Media 
Release 
Not Applicable PM Transcripts - Department of Prime 
Minister and Cabinet 
25/4/1997 Anzac Day Media 
Release 
Not Applicable ParlInfo - aph.gov.au 
25/4/1998 Address by the Prime Minister The Hon John Howard MP at 
Kanchanaburi War Cemetery 11 Am 25 April 1998 
Speech Kanchanaburi PANDORA, Australia's Web Archive 
25/4/1998 Commemorative Address at Hellfire Pass, Thailand Speech Hellfire Pass PM Transcripts - Department of Prime 
Minister and Cabinet 
25/4/1999 ANZAC DAY Media 
Release 
Not Applicable PM Transcripts - Department of Prime 
Minister and Cabinet 
25/4/2000 Address at Lone Pine, Gallipoli, Turkey - ANZAC Day 25 April 2000 Speech Gallipoli PM Transcripts - Department of Prime 
Minister and Cabinet 
25/4/2000 Turkish International Service at Mehmetcik Abide Speech Gallipoli PM Transcripts - Department of Prime 
Minister and Cabinet 
25/4/2000 Dawn Service, Gallipoli, Turkey Speech Gallipoli PM Transcripts - Department of Prime 
Minister and Cabinet 
25/4/2001 Address at the ANZAC Day Parade, Canberra Speech AWM PM Transcripts - Department of Prime 
Minister and Cabinet 
25/4/2002 ANZAC DAY 2002 Media 
Release 
Not Applicable PM Transcripts - Department of Prime 
Minister and Cabinet 
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Date Speech Title In Archive Address 
Type 
Location Source 
25/4/2003 Address at Anzac Day Parade Canberra Speech AWM PM Transcripts - Department of Prime 
Minister and Cabinet 
25/4/2003 Transcript of the Prime Minister The Hon John Howard MP Anzac 
Day Message 
Speech Not Applicable PANDORA, Australia's Web Archive 
25/4/2004 Address to Australian Troops Dohar, Iraq Speech Iraq (Qatar) PM Transcripts - Department of Prime 
Minister and Cabinet 
25/4/2004 Anzac Day Media 
Release 
Not Applicable PM Transcripts - Department of Prime 
Minister and Cabinet 
25/4/2004 Anzac Celebrations Media 
Release 
Not Applicable PM Transcripts - Department of Prime 
Minister and Cabinet 
25/4/2004 Address to the Australian Troops Baghdad, Iraq Speech Iraq PM Transcripts - Department of Prime 
Minister and Cabinet 
25/4/2005 Address at Anzac Day Dawn Service Gallipoli Speech Gallipoli PM Transcripts - Department of Prime 
Minister and Cabinet 
25/4/2005 Message: Anzac Day 2005 Media 
Release 
Not Applicable PM Transcripts - Department of Prime 
Minister and Cabinet 
25/4/2006 Honouring Australia's Anzac Heritage Media 
Release 
Not Applicable PM Transcripts - Department of Prime 
Minister and Cabinet 
25/4/2007 ANZAC Day Address Greenslopes Private Hospital, Brisbane Speech Brisbane PM Transcripts - Department of Prime 
Minister and Cabinet 
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